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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This Final Report for the EU-Canada Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) on the EU-Canada 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (hereafter “the CETA,” “CETA,” or “the Agreement”) 
provides a comprehensive assessment of the potential impacts of trade liberalisation under CETA. The 
impact analysis assesses the economic, social and environmental impacts in Canada and the European 
Union, in three main sectors, sixteen sub-sectors and seven cross-cutting issues. It also assesses the 
potential impacts of CETA on the US, Mexico and other countries and regions, including a number of 
developing countries and the EU OCTs of Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon and Greenland. There are nine main 
sections of this report. Section one provides background information on the CETA negotiations, and on 
the EC’s Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) programme. Section two outlines the methodology used 
in carrying out the SIA study.  
Sections three to seven contain the core of this report, namely, an assessment of the potential 
economic, social and environmental impacts of trade liberalisation under the CETA. The macro-
economic assessment is included in section three and discusses the main macro-economic impacts on 
the EU and Canada as predicted by the CGE model. The sectoral assessments are included in sections 
four through six and provide individual impact assessments for 3 sectors and 16 sub-sectors: the 
agricultural and processed agricultural products (PAPs) and fisheries sector (and the sub-sectors of (i) 
grains and oilseeds, (ii) beef and pork, (iii) dairy, (iv) beverages, (v) other PAPs, and (vi) fisheries); the 
industrial products sector (and the sub-sectors of (vii) mining and manufacturing of metal, (viii) oil and 
petroleum products, (ix) coal, (x) forest-based industries, (xi) automotive and other transport equipment 
and (xii) textiles); and the services sector (and the sub-sectors of (xiii) transportation, (xiv) financial, (xv) 
telecommunication, and (xvi) other business services). Section seven assesses cross-cutting issues and 
provides individual impact assessments for 7 issues: government procurement, intellectual property 
rights, investment, trade facilitation, labour mobility, free circulation of goods, and competition policy. 
Section eight lists the policy recommendations, also called flanking measures, based on the results of 
the sustainability analyses. These measures cover both enhancement and preventative/mitigation 
measures, i.e. measures needed to reinforce key positive sustainability impacts and to prevent or at 
least mitigate major negative sustainability impacts. Section nine provides a Conclusion to the SIA report. 
 
The annexes are located in a separate document (available for download alongside this report), and 
include a further methodological explanation of the CGE model, E3MG model and gravity models as well 
as results of these models; and information on consultations undertaken and the stakeholder network. 
 
KEY FINDINGS FROM THE FINAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT: 
 
Macro-economic assessment: 
The CETA is expected to lead to overall gains in welfare, real GDP, total exports, the balance of trade and 
wages in both Canada and the EU over the long-term. Based on modelling results, these gains will be 
maximised under an agreement that offers the highest degree of liberalisation.  
Specifically, the modelling estimates that the EU will experience increases in its real GDP of 0.02% to 
0.03% over the long-term, while Canada is estimated to see increases ranging from 0.18% to 0.36%. 
Increases in total exports are also expected over the long-term, ranging from 0.05% to 0.07% in the EU 
and from 0.54% to 1.56% in Canada. These increases in exports are expected to improve the balance of 
trade in both Canada and the EU, with Canada likely to see the greatest improvements from the removal 
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of tariffs and the EU from the removal of barriers to trade in services. In both Canada and the EU, the 
CETA is similarly expected to lead to increased real wages. Third countries are estimated to experience 
minor degrees of welfare loss as a result of the Agreement, though the overall impact on these countries 
is insignificant, with GDP projected to exhibit no noticeable change. 
The CGE model results include that the distribution of the gains between agriculture, industrial goods 
and services varies according to the level of liberalisation achieved under the CETA. Liberalisation 
appears to generate its greatest gains for the services sector, though greater degrees of liberalisation 
can result in a worse outcome for some industrial or agricultural products as expansion in the services 
stimulates resources to move out of these sectors and into the services over the long-term. 
Liberalisation of sensitive agricultural products is estimated to have pronounced impacts on output and 
trade over the long-term.   
 
Sectoral-level assessment: 
(1) Agriculture, PAPs and fisheries: significant degrees of liberalisation would likely have a pronounced 
economic impact on a number of sectors in Canada and the EU. In Canada, significant degrees of 
liberalisation would produce pronounced gains for the beef and pork sectors. The ultimate impact would 
be further influenced by the rules of origin agreed to, given Canada’s integration with the United States. 
While maintaining the EU’s ban on hormone free beef would likely limit Canadian producers’ ability to 
realise gains from improved market access, it is expected that large enough concessions would stimulate 
producers to shift some of the production over the long-term to meet EU requirements. Increased 
imports from Canada would, however, be expected to negatively impact producers of beef and, 
particularly, pork within the EU. Additional increases in output and exports for Canada could be realised 
in the food processing sector as well as in the fisheries sector (particularly in frozen seafood). 
While the removal of tariffs on fisheries products would likely produce gains in output and exports for 
Canada’s fisheries sector, doing so could negatively impact the EU OCTs of Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon 
(SPM) and Greenland. While losses engendered from an erosion of preferences would be nominal for 
the two OCTs, the limited industrial diversification and reliance on fisheries as a source of exports 
implies that losses could be relatively substantial.  
The EU would be expected to realise the most pronounced gains from the removal of restrictions on 
dairy products in Canada. While tariff liberalisation would be expected to benefit Canadian consumers, 
any removal of supply management would result in a significant decrease in output and employment in 
the Canadian dairy sector. With the continued maintenance of the supply management system in 
Canada, smaller gains for EU producers could still be realised through improved minimum access 
requirements and/or greater recognition of GIs for a number of EU produced cheeses as well as the 
removal of Canadian TBTs pertaining to the compositional standards of cheese. The EU could also realise 
increased exports of beverages to Canada, though the outcome is largely non-tariff related measures 
and relies on the Agreement’s ability to resolve discriminatory practices that are alleged to take place in 
provincial liquor control boards.  Finally, the EU stands to benefit from the removal of tariffs on 
prepared foods, with exporters also likely to benefit from greater harmonisation in labelling and 
packaging requirements. 
Conversely, if sensitivities on (i) pork and beef in the EU and (ii) dairy in Canada are maintained, it is 
expected that potential gains on either side will be significantly lower. At the same time, the negative 
impact associated with increased competition for the beef and pork industries in the EU and the dairy 
sector in Canada would likely be averted.  
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It is not expected that the CETA’s economic impact on agriculture, PAPs and fisheries will lead to a 
pronounced social impact in either Canada or the EU. It is unclear how expansion in agricultural 
employment would impact quality and decency of work. In Canada, workers in agriculture are generally 
subject to provincial regulation and are often regulated differently from workers in other sectors. Given 
that many provinces exempt a number of workers involved in agriculture and certain types of processing 
from minimum employment standards, greater shifts into the sector could lower the overall level of 
standards that the workforce is exposed to. This would also create greater levels of temporary 
employment, given the nature of the work, which could disproportionately be filled by foreign labour 
under Canada’s Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program. Further, as agriculture and food processing tend 
to have some of the highest rates of work related injuries and fatalities, expansion of employment in 
Canada and the EU’s agriculture and food processing sectors could expose a greater number of workers 
to working conditions that are more unsafe than average. This could, in turn, produce negative 
consequences for the level of work-related stress of employees in both Canada and the EU.  
Under a full removal of tariffs, the CETA will likely have an environmental impact in the agriculture and 
PAPs sector by increasing output of Canadian products. This higher demand will require an 
intensification of agriculture to be achieved by increasing chemical inputs, changing the distribution of 
crop production, and potentially encroaching onto marginal or other productive lands. These changes 
will affect land usage and quality, water usage and quality, air pollution, biodiversity and waste creation. 
Under less ambitious liberation scenarios, the expected overall environmental impact from CETA would 
be limited. Liberalisation of beef and pork, in particular, have potential to lead to greater herd size in 
Canada, potentially leading to increased released of methane as a by-product. Moreover, if increases in 
crops like wheat are produced using more sustainable practices, such as no or reduced till, the negative 
environmental impact can be mitigated because of reduced emissions and chemical inputs. This trend 
towards more beneficial agricultural practices can potentially be further supported under CETA through 
Canadian-European cooperation and European preferences for sustainable products. 
(2) Industrial products: the CETA is unlikely to have a pronounced economic impact on the mining, 
metal manufacturing, oil, coal or forest-based industries in either Canada or the EU. While Canada is 
imbued with a significant stock of metallic ores, oil, coal and lumber, the low or complete absence of 
duties on these products within the EU, limits the impact that the CETA is likely to have. Investment 
liberalisation – notably through the extension of national treatment provisions – could lead to greater 
levels of EU investment in these sectors within Canada (perhaps stimulating greater levels of output); 
though given the fact that the EU’s existing FDI in these Canadian sectors – particularly in mining and oil 
– is already fairly robust, it does not appear that existing barriers have not been overly restrictive to 
capital inflows from the EU.   
The elimination of tariffs could lead to increased output and exports in the automotive industries on 
both sides of the Atlantic. Given Canada’s high degree of integration with the U.S. auto industry, the 
rules of origin that are ultimately agreed to will be a key factor determining the extent of the CETA’s 
impact. Specifically, rules of origin that require a higher percentage of a product’s value be produced 
within the country would likely limit the ability of Canadian producers to qualify for preferential tariffs, 
reducing gains from the Agreement.   The CETA would likewise be expected to have a positive economic 
impact on the textiles industries of the EU and Canada over the long-term.  For Canada, the greatest 
gains would be expected to arise under an Agreement that obtained the greatest liberalisation of tariffs, 
with the modelling projecting increases in output and exports in its textiles and apparel sectors; though 
there could be some deterioration in its balance of trade in these products. While Canada is expected to 
experience declines in these indicators within its leather manufacturing sector, the EU is projected to 
see increases in output, exports and its balance of trade in all three sub-sectors over the long-term. 
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Further gains for the EU would arise if the CETA leads to the removal of barriers to the free circulation of 
goods in Canada as well as improved enforcement of IPR. The impact on Canada and the EU will likely be 
significantly influenced by the rules of origin ultimately adopted.   
The social impact is likely to be limited. Quality and decency of work could be somewhat improved 
where the CETA includes a chapter on trade and labour that provides for better implementation and 
ratification of the ILO’s Core Labour Standards and Decent Work Agenda. Canada, specifically, could see 
its standards and rights improved with respect to collective bargaining and freedom of association with 
provisions that require ratification of the ILO’s Convention 98 which provides legally binding measures 
on such rights.  
With limited expected impact on production in the mining, metal manufacturing, oil, coal and forest-
based industries, it is not expected that the CETA will lead to a significant environmental impact in these 
sectors. GHG emissions from the auto industry may increase, though improvements in energy intensity 
could help offset these gains and mitigate the negative impact.  
(3) Services sector: the services sector has the potential to generate the greatest economic gains for 
both Canada and the EU, though this outcome is dependent on a CETA that achieves a significant 
amount of liberalisation. Increased merchandise trade resulting from the CETA will directly increase the 
demand for maritime transport services, increasing output and exports. Provisions in the CETA that 
would enhance the positive gains include liberalisation of feeder services and repositioning in Canada 
which would lower costs, increase competitiveness and efficiency and also spur greater levels of FDI in 
Canada’s maritime transport sector.  
The CETA has the potential to significantly impact the Canadian telecom sector, primarily through its 
ability to liberalise Canada’s foreign ownership restrictions. If the CETA results in the removal of these 
restrictions, it is likely that the impact in Canada will be pronounced, with sizeable increases in inward 
FDI, output and exports occurring over the long-term. Additional benefits would occur through 
improved competitiveness in the industry, which would serve to enhance technological acquisition of 
Canadian telecom companies and help to stimulate their expansion into foreign markets. Canadian 
consumers would likely benefit substantially from reduced prices, improved service and wider selection. 
EU telecom companies would also benefit by increased access to the Canadian market, spurring 
increased investment through establishment and acquisitions. While such an outcome may not impact 
output and cross-border trade within the EU, it would benefit EU exports via mode 3. Additional benefits 
could be achieved by the CETA’s granting of non-discriminatory access to infrastructure and networks, 
though this is likely to have less of an impact than the removal of ownership restrictions.  
The CETA is unlikely to have a pronounced impact on output, trade and investment in the financial 
services sector of either Canada or the EU. The CETA is, however, expected to have a positive impact on 
non-financial business services sectors within both Canada and the EU, with greater gains likely to 
accrue under an Agreement that provides higher degrees of liberalisation. However, given the absence 
of restrictions for most sub-sectors within the business services sector, the overall impact from the CETA 
may be limited, and instead serve to make the existing level of liberalisation legally binding. 
Nevertheless, liberalisation could yield benefits in certain subsectors where specific barriers are present, 
while improvements in the temporary movement of labour could serve to benefit trade and investment 
across the entire sector. Liberalisation of both at-the-border and behind-the-border restrictions on 
temporary movement of professionals would likely serve to increase the level of cross-border trade as 
well as the investment and trade occurring via foreign affiliates, providing greater benefits. In order to 
realise the greatest gains it will be important for the CETA to foster mutual recognition agreements 
allowing professionals to have their qualifications/certificates recognised in both Canada and the EU.  
EU-Canada SIA Final Report 
17 
 
The social impact is expected to be positive, with the CETA expected to lead to the creation of services 
jobs in both Canada and the EU. The environmental impact is also expected to be limited and could be 
beneficial if expansion redirects resources away from more environmentally harmful sectors (e.g. 
extractive industries) and towards services. Increased merchandise trade would be expected to lead to 
greater GHG emissions from the transport services sector. At the same, the vast majority of this 
increased trade would be expected to occur through maritime transport, which has a lower 
environmental impact than land or air transport. To the degree that trade in Canada is diverted away 
from the U.S. and toward the EU, the environmental impact could be positive by replacing land 
transport with maritime transport. Further, liberalising feeder services within Canada could contribute 
to the development of Canada’s short-sea shipping industry, which could help improve environmental 
performance of the transport sector by redirecting land shipments to sea shipments.  
 
Cross-cutting issues assessments: 
(1) Government procurement (GP): A government procurement chapter in CETA will have a variety of 
economic impacts that are positive for some and negative for others. The main effect of the chapter 
would be to encourage competitiveness in the bidding process. It could potentially create some 
reductions in economic (and social, and potentially environmental) policy space in Canada of the type 
relevant to this SIA; however, any loss of policy space would be mitigated to a certain degree given that 
the Agreement would only directly apply to contracts above certain thresholds, and given a number of 
other legalities likely in CETA.  
Specifically, the economic impacts of a GP chapter would be felt in terms of government savings, market 
share, and employment. The increased GP competition mentioned may result in savings by the Canadian 
government and lower-cost goods and services, while any similar effect would be much less pronounced 
in the EU given its already highly liberalised GP market. CETA will likely allow EU firms to gain some GP 
market share where they could not before, e.g. in some utilities, and overall may allow Canadian firms 
to make some, although comparatively lesser, gains in the EU GP market. The extent of these gains 
depends on a number of factors of competitiveness and not just market access afforded in CETA, as a 
wide range of foreign subsidiaries are already competitive in the Canadian GP market. An increase in 
indirect cross-border competition, i.e. from foreign subsidiaries, may lead to shifts in jobs among firms 
operating in Canada. The full effect on employment within jurisdictions/regions in Canada is unclear, 
although prohibition of offsets may have some negative impacts therein. If set-asides for Aboriginal 
business are prohibited, Aboriginal suppliers could be negatively impacted at least in the short-term on 
both economic and social indicators, although there is some indication that such set-asides in fact may 
not be prohibited in CETA.  
Potential social impacts are mixed. Neutral impacts are expected on the quality of government-
procured goods and services. CETA may create some positive impacts in terms of wider choice of GP 
service providers, although available evidence does not clearly indicate that a GP chapter in CETA would 
significantly affect quality of public goods and services, including water delivery and management, and 
health and education. In part, a number of legalities likely included in CETA’s GP Chapter would ensure 
quality of goods and services. Overall, CETA’s affect on decency and quality of work in the GP market 
would be limited by the strong domestic laws and institutions in the EU and Canada. CETA’s impact on 
“fair wage” and other “social consideration“ GP policies in the EU and Canada is unclear without further 
details of the Agreement, although government consultations suggest both parties remain committed to 
preserving such policies. 
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A GP Chapter in CETA would likely have mixed environmental impacts, although the full extent of these 
impacts is unclear without further details of the Agreement. CETA’s prohibition of offsets could have 
some mixed environmental impacts, particularly in Canada. If CETA restricts initiatives on green 
procurement it would have a significant negative impact in Canada and the EU according to a number of 
environmental indicators; however, this may very well be a non-issue given the current commitment of 
the parties to green procurement policies.  
(2) Intellectual Property Rights: Canada offers a standard level of IP protection but one lower than that 
of the EU, and it is thus assumed that CETA will lead to an upward harmonisation and call primarily for 
change in Canadian IPR laws. IPR-related provisions of CETA could have a minor positive economic 
impact on Canadian GDP growth, and may have a minor positive impact on European GDP. Specifically, a 
CETA IPR chapter will likely have a slight positive effect on specific industries in the EU, such as agri-food 
companies using geographical indications. It would also benefit the Canadian publishing industry and the 
innovative pharmaceutical industry. It could also benefit certain television, film and sound recording 
industries via reducing piracy and increasing revenues. At the same time, an IPR chapter in CETA could 
lead to notable negative effects on certain consumers in Canada, for example via higher prices on 
educational and pharmaceutical products. 
An IPR chapter in CETA would also have economic impacts on employment and policy space. Improving 
IPR enforcement as a result of CETA could lead to increased FDI flows and technology transfer, resulting 
in positive spill-over effects on production and potentially on employment. Overall, however, stronger 
IPR protection would have mixed impacts on Canadian employment. It would have a positive but minor 
impact on the employment rate in the EU. In terms of policy space, as a net importer of IPR-related 
assets, Canada has an interest in maintaining some IPR exceptions and limitations.  
Raising levels of IPR protection is likely to have some social impacts but unlikely to have significant 
environmental impacts.  
(3) Investment: The economic impact of CETA as a whole on investment in Canada will likely be positive, 
and could be of a ‘notable’ magnitude. The Investment Chapter in CETA itself could encourage economic 
benefits including trade-stimulating effects and fostering intangible business linkages in Canada, 
although the significance of these will likely be minor to notable at most. In the EU, CETA as a whole and 
its Investment Chapter specifically, will likely follow the trends mentioned for Canada but on a smaller 
level of significance given the relatively larger size of the EU economy as well as the EU’s relatively 
higher level of investment liberalisation.  
As a whole, there will likely be some positive, and potentially some negative, social and environmental 
impacts from investment encouraged under CETA. Regarding social impacts, increased investment 
under CETA might be channelled into creating jobs in Canada and the EU that score higher on quality 
and decency of work indicators, although it may also create some degree of worker displacement and 
wage inequality. Either way, these impacts would likely be relatively limited. Regarding environmental 
impacts, if CETA were to increase FDI in the oil sands and mining sectors in Canada, this could lead to 
increased environmental impacts since these sectors are environmentally intensive. At the same time, 
some investment might gravitate towards green technology, producing positive impacts in Canada and 
the EU.  
Regarding investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) specifically, the conflicting costs and benefits of such 
a mechanism make it doubtful that its inclusion in CETA would create a net/overall (economic, social and 
environmental) sustainability benefit for the EU and/or Canada. There is no solid evidence to suggest 
that ISDS will maximise economic benefits in CETA beyond simply serving as one form of an 
enforcement mechanism, just as state-state dispute settlement is also an enforcement mechanism. And 
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the policy space reductions caused by ISDS allowances in CETA, while less significant than foreseen by 
some parties, would be enough to cast doubt on its contribution to net sustainability benefits. As such, 
the study’s assessment suggests that a well-crafted state-state dispute settlement mechanism might be 
a more appropriate enforcement mechanism in CETA than ISDS. 
(4) Trade facilitation: Given the relatively sophisticated state of existing customs and border regimes in 
Canada and the EU overall, but with exceptions for certain individual EU Member States, it is unlikely 
that there will be significant economic, social or environmental impacts from trade facilitation reform 
under CETA. However, incorporating provisions under CETA to reform and improve trade facilitation 
would be particularly useful in limiting costs of compliance that will inevitably increase with the 
introduction of new rules of origin under CETA. 
(5) Labour mobility: Labour mobility provisions in the CETA focused on workers in professional business 
services could result in economic gains in the form of a more efficient allocation of skills and increased 
productivity in Canada and the EU, as well as increase innovation that could lead to social and 
environmental benefits.   
(6) Free circulation of goods: The CETA provides an opportunity to bring the federal and provincial 
governments together to enact major reform in terms of allowing free-circulation of goods within 
Canada. Provisions allowing freer circulation of goods, which will likely focus on the agriculture and agri-
foods sector given the barriers in that sector, could result in positive economic impacts through an 
improvement in Canada’s productivity performance and allowing benefits to EU exporters. 
(7) Competition policy: If CETA removes discriminatory practices of the Canadian liquor control boards 
this would foster economic gains by encouraging competition. While reducing regulatory flexibility, 
evidence suggests that this would not necessarily undermine public health and safety objectives as the 
Canadian government would retain the most important policy tools for reducing over-consumption of 
alcohol, i.e. being able to set price floors and impose taxes on beer, wine and spirits.  
Removal of discriminatory practices by the Canadian Wheat Board could improve sales and wages of 
competitive wheat farmers. Concerns about the negative economic and social impacts of removing such 
practices do not appear to have strong evidential support.  
No significant negative impacts and unclear impacts are respectively predicted for the two other 
competition policy issues. If included, CETA would legally bind Canada’s recent liberalisation in 
international letter delivery via Bill C-9 to the EU, but would not be expected to have negative effects on 
the quality of postal services. The impacts of revising state aid policies under CETA are unclear without 
further details of the Agreement. 
 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: 
The following is a non-exhaustive summary of key policy recommendations for EU and Canadian 
authorities to consider during CETA negotiations, a full list of which is found in section eight. The 
purpose of these flanking measure proposals is to enhance the positive impacts and prevent or mitigate 
negative impacts that have been identified in the SIA. 
Agriculture, PAPs and Fisheries 
 Establish an appropriate timetable for the phased reductions in tariffs and non-tariff barriers in 
beef, pork, dairy and fish and seafood. Consult with representatives from Saint-Pierre-et-
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Miquelon and Greenland to determine which fisheries products are sensitive and how 
liberalisation these products could impact their industries.  
 Rules of origin should be carefully considered in the negotiations, with a special group of EU and 
Canadian officials formed to deal with the issue. Special consideration should be given to beef 
and pork as well as food preparations containing sugar.  
 A framework should be established to formalise enhanced regulatory cooperation and regular 
dialogue on SPS and TBT issues.  Such cooperation should seek to prevent future barriers while 
providing greater transparency on packaging, labelling and certification requirements.  
 Canada and European governments should cooperate on the exchange of best agricultural 
practices to reduce the environmental impacts associated with agricultural production.  
 Promote fishery practices that are more sustainable through Canada-EU collaboration, while 
maintaining strict monitoring and implementation of quotas and Total Allowable Catch to 
remain within sustainable population levels and avoid depletion of fish stocks. More R&D should 
be invested into environmental risk of farmed fish, and into mechanisms such as the 
containment tasks, to reduce impact on wild species.     
 
Industrial products 
 Establish an appropriate phasing-in period for liberalisation in the textiles and transport 
equipment so that producers have time to adjust to changing incentives.   
 Rules of origin should be carefully considered in the negotiations, with a special group of EU and 
Canadian officials formed to deal with the issue. Special consideration should be given to 
automotive products and textiles; a study could also be conducted on the implications of rules 
of origin policies being negotiated.  
 Cooperation between companies in the energy and minerals sectors could help to produce 
sound environmental governance across the EU and Canada, and also have important spill-over 
effects in third countries. This could include exchanges of information, technology transfers, 
involvement of public-private initiatives from both sides and, in the long run, the formulation of 
a common energy policy.   
 
Services sectors 
 Restrictions on investment in telecom should be liberalised or removed completely, but should 
be accompanied by appropriate phase-in periods and policies to ensure that Canadian cultural 
objectives can continue to be met.  
 Liberalise feeder services within Canada’s maritime transport services to increase infrastructural 
investments over the long-term while helping to improve Canada’s underdeveloped short-sea 
shipping industry.    
 To increase bilateral trade and investment in services, measures should be taken to streamline 
the visa process for professionals seeking to temporarily work in Canada or the EU. Canada 
should review its requirements for ‘needs tests’ for certain professionals under the TFWP, with 
specific attention to facilitation of intra-corporate transfers between the EU and Canada.   
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 Negotiators create a mechanism for fostering agreements on mutual recognition of professional 
qualifications.   
 
 
 
Government procurement 
 Explicitly allow for Social Considerations in Public Procurement, including fair wages. Create a 
monitoring body to oversee that these allowances are not being abused.  
 Allow for green procurement policies in all ‘standard’ forms in the General Notes of both Canada 
and the EU in the GP Chapter.  Other specific language for environmental protection should be 
included. 
 Explicitly allow set-asides for Aboriginals in Canada’s schedule in the GP Chapter; however, 
make such exception more stringent than the ones allowed in NAFTA and the GPA.  
 Do not include a full-stop prohibition on GP offsets for municipalities, but rather include an 
‘offset justification provision’ pertaining exclusively to municipalities. Other offset measures 
should also be considered.  
 
IPR 
 To ensure a minimal level of flexibility, duplicate the language of TRIPs agreement article 7, 8, 13, 
and 30 as well as the language of the Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health in 
the introduction of CETA’s IPR chapter.  
 The EU and Canada should cooperate to make sure their agreed norms on enforcement become 
recognised globally as minimal standards, cooperate in multilateral fora (WHO, WIPO, WTO, 
etc.), in plurilateral settings (OECD, ACTA, etc.) and bilaterally in their respective agreement with 
third parties.  
 To accelerate the entry of new medicines on the market and lessen the actual use of patent 
extensions, the EU and Canada should cooperate to fast-track marketing approvals for those 
drugs already approved by the respective regulatory agencies.  
 
Investment 
 Consider excluding ISDS from CETA and instead use a state-state enforcement mechanism like 
that in the US-Australia FTA.  
 Consider a number of key issues when drafting dispute settlement expropriation language.  
 Emphasise domestic dispute settlement even if ISDS is included in CETA.  
 Exclude 'essential and basic' public services from investment commitments.  
 A dispute settlement monitoring body/forum should be created.  
 
Overarching issues 
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 Include a Trade and Sustainable Development Chapter in CETA and within that chapter establish 
an effective monitoring body. Include a section on trade and labour, committing to ILO Core 
Labour Standards and Decent Work Agenda. 
 Ensure CETA allows usage of domestic policy tools to limit alcohol abuse.  
 Create a clean energy partnership initiated between the EU and Canada, which could be 
modelled off of existing programs. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement  
Overview of negotiations 
With the negotiations on a Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), the EU-Canada trade 
and economic relationship has now moved beyond the Trade and Investment Enhancement Agreement 
(TIEA) toward an agreement with a much broader and more ambitious scope. The TIEA, on which 
negotiations began in 2004 but were suspended in 2006, followed several other previous EU-Canada 
economic cooperation frameworks, for example the 1998 EU-Canada Trade Initiative.  
Negotiations on a CETA are taking place on a number of areas including trade in goods and services, 
investment, government procurement, competition policy, intellectual property and trade and 
sustainable development. Negotiations on trade of goods are expected to include trade in industrial, 
agricultural and fishery products while also including tariff and non-tariff measures, trade defence 
instruments, technical barriers to trade (TBT), sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, customs/trade 
facilitation and rules of origin. Within trade in services, negotiations will include cross-border delivery 
(modes 1 and 2), the temporary presence of natural persons for business purposes (mode 4), and 
regulatory principles. Investment issues are expected to address establishment (mode 3) for services 
and non-services sectors, capital movements and payments.  
The launch of CETA negotiations was officially announced on 6 May 2009 at the Canada-EU Summit in 
Prague. The first full round of negotiations was held in Ottawa in October 2009 with many of the 
Canadian provinces in attendance. As of publication of this report, seven rounds of negotiations had 
taken place, with the seventh round in April 2011, and with the eighth round expected in July 2011. 
2008 Joint Study vs. the EU-Canada SIA (2011) 
 
A joint study entitled Assessing the Costs and Benefits of a Closer EU-Canada Economic Partnership, 
conducted by the Government of Canada and the EU and completed in 2008 (thus referred to as the 
“2008 Joint Study”), incorporates tariffs and nontariff barriers into an analysis to assess the costs and 
benefits of an EU-Canada CETA. Using a CGE model to estimate the potential economic effects of the full 
removal of tariffs on bilateral trade in goods, a partial reduction of the cost of non-tariff barriers on 
trade in goods, and a partial liberalisation of bilateral trade in services, the study estimates that the 
EU-Canada trade relationship could be significantly enhanced through a closer economic partnership. 
The study also supports enhancing the relationship in areas such as government procurement, 
investment, temporary labour mobility, regulatory cooperation, environment, and science and 
technology. 
This EU-Canada SIA (2011) is far more comprehensive than the 2008 Joint Study. First, it provides a far 
more comprehensive economic assessment of the CETA. Importantly, it also provides comprehensive 
social and environmental assessments of the Agreement. Further, not only does the report consider the 
economic, social and environmental effects on the EU and Canada across a range of in-depth indicators, 
EU-Canada SIA Final Report 
24 
 
but it also assesses the potential impacts on the US, Mexico and other countries/regions including, 
among others, a variety of developing countries. 
1.2. EU-Canada Sustainability Impact 
Assessment  
European Commission Trade Sustainability Impact Assessments (hereafter also referred to 
interchangeably as “Trade SIAs,” “TSIAs,” or simply “SIAs”) assess the potential impacts of proposed 
trade liberalisation agreements on all pillars of sustainable development in order to optimise policy 
decision-making/trade negotiations. The EU-Canada SIA is conducted by DEVELOPMENT Solutions 
Europe Ltd. (DS) in cooperation with key external experts.  
The SIA is divided into 3 phases: 
Phase 1 (end of July – beginning of September 2010) 
Phase 1 was designed to ensure the review of relevant information sources, flagging of sustainability 
issues, first stages of data preparation, preparation of analytical tools and to present how the work for 
the EU-Canada SIA will be carried out. The phase culminated with the Final Inception Report.   
Inception Report: following submission of the draft Inception Report at the end of August 2010, the first 
Steering Committee Meeting and Civil Society Meeting was held in Brussels on 7 September 2010 to 
formally discuss the contents of the report and provide any necessary feedback for revisions. The 
minutes of this Civil Society meeting can be found on the SIA website at http://www.eucanada-sia.org/. 
Feedback from the steering committee meeting and civil society meeting were directly incorporated into 
the Inception Report in order to create the Final Inception Report. The report was made public on the 
SIA website after approval in August 2010.  
 
Phase 2 (September 2010 – December 2010/January 2011) 
Phase 2 was designed to incorporate developments from Phase 1 and deliver the Trade SIA’s interim 
quantitative and qualitative impact assessment, which was presented in the Interim Report. The Interim 
Report only includes preliminary considerations from the economic modelling, and not the full results of 
these models.  
Consultation with civil society was an important tool for development of the impact assessment in this 
report. During this phase the team prepared for and delivered the Local Workshop in Ottawa on 26 
November 2010. A Preliminary Findings document, a summary of the results from the draft Interim 
Report, was provided to stakeholders registered to attend that meeting. The minutes of the Local 
Workshop can be found on the SIA website. 
Interim Technical Report: 
The draft Interim Technical Report was submitted to the Steering Committee in late October 2010 and 
its contents were initially discussed at the second Steering Committee meeting on 10 November 2010. A 
revised version of the report was submitted to the Contracting Authority in mid December 2010. The 
report was made public on the SIA website after approval in January 2011.  
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Phase 3 (January – April 2011) 
Phase 3 builds on the Interim Technical Report and ultimately culminates in the Final Report. This phase 
involves further incorporation of stakeholder feedback into the impact analysis, revised economic 
modelling, revised impact assessment, and policy recommendations. 
The draft Final Report was submitted to the Contracting Authority in early March 2011 and made public 
on the SIA website in late March 2011. A second Civil Society Meeting and the third and final steering 
committee meeting were held in Brussels on 30 2011 March to review and provide feedback on the 
draft Final Report. The minutes of this meeting are available in the annex of this report. 
Final Report:  
Contents: This Final Report includes all findings from the study. The report includes the following 
elements:  
 Executive Summary 
 Introduction and progress of the SIA’s implementation 
 Summary of methodology  
 Baseline conditions overview (trade and economic, social and environmental spheres) 
 Final sustainability impact assessment (including modelling results and expert analysis) 
o Macro level (trade and economic, social and environmental spheres) 
o Sectoral level (trade and economic, social and environmental spheres) 
o Cross cutting level (trade and economic, social and environmental spheres) 
 Proposals for flanking measures/policy recommendations 
  Conclusions 
 Information on consultation activities undertaken 
 References 
  Annexes (modelling tables; minutes of local workshop, workshop program and list of 
participants 
Additionally, the Final Report is accompanied by a Briefing Document for the Contracting Authority.  
 
State of play 
The EU-Canada SIA Final Report provides a comprehensive sustainability assessment on potential 
impacts of trade liberalisation under CETA. The assessment is undertaken at three levels: 
 Macro-economic assessment  
 Sectoral assessment 
 Cross-cutting issues assessment 
The macro-economic section discusses macro-economic effects forecasted for Canada and the EU as a 
whole, and includes a brief discussion of the macro-economic effects on certain third countries.  
The sectoral assessment looks in detail at the social, economic and environmental impacts in 3 sectors 
and 16 sub-sectors. The sectors and sub-sectors selected for analysis in this report are those that 
contain the highest frequency and magnitude of potential impacts and sensitivities as identified in the 
Inception Report and as confirmed and/or added by additional research (including consultations) for the 
Interim Report. The 3 sectors and 16 sub-sectors: are the agriculture, processed agricultural products 
(PAPs), and fisheries sector, and the sub-sectors of grains and oilseeds, beef and pork, dairy, other PAPS, 
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beverages, and fisheries; the industrial products sector, and the sub-sectors of mining and 
manufactured metal products (ferrous, nonferrous and fabricated metals), oil and petroleum products, 
coal, forest-based industries (wood, paper and forestry), automotive and transport equipment, textiles 
(textiles clothing, leather and footwear); and the services sector, and the sub-sectors of transportation, 
telecommunications, financial, and other business services. 
The cross-cutting assessment analyses 7 key issues. These ‘cross-cutting’ issues are defined in part by 
the study’s Terms of Reference. The cross-cutting issues considered in the report are: government 
procurement, intellectual property rights, investment, trade facilitation, labour mobility, free circulation 
of goods, and competition policy. 
While the focus of the assessment is on the economic, social and environmental effects on the EU and 
Canada, it also assesses the potential impacts on the US, Mexico and a group of other countries/regions 
including, among others, a variety of developing countries. 
The Final Report also includes a section on policy recommendations, also called flanking measures, 
which are based on the results of the sustainability analyses. These measures cover both enhancement 
and preventative/mitigation measures, i.e. measures needed to reinforce key positive sustainability 
impacts and to prevent or at least mitigate major negative sustainability impacts.  
 
Recommendations are presented in two main categories: 
 
 Measures related to provisions that will likely be included in CETA (“trade measures”) 
 Measures, not directly related to provisions in CETA, for cooperation that may accompany the 
agreement (“cooperation measures”) 
 
The Final Report built on the draft Final Report by considering additional feedback received from 
stakeholders and the Steering Committee up until the cut-off deadline of 11 April 2011. It used this 
feedback to refine different sections of the report.  
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2. METHODOLOGY 
2.1. Introduction: Evidence-based Approach 
The EU-Canada SIA adopts the basic methodological framework for Trade SIAs as described in the EC’s 
Handbook for Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment (EC, 2006). The SIA methodology is designed to 
provide trade negotiators and policy-makers with an evidence-based assessment of the potential 
economic, social and environmental impacts of alternative trade liberalisation scenarios.  
This section describes the main components and tools of the SIA methodology as applied in the EU-
Canada SIA. The study team has used a variety of evidence sources to inform the qualitative and 
quantitative sustainability impact analyses for specific indicators. The sources of evidence include formal 
modelling (CGE, E3MG and investment gravity modelling) results, and quantitative and qualitative 
evidence collected from desk research and consultations. Causal chain analysis is applied to the 
evidence base to estimates of impact on key economic, social and environmental indicators.  
2.2. Indicators 
Table 1 lists the main TSIA sustainability indicators that are applied in this Final Report.1 The core 
economic, social and environmental indicators listed in bold are taken directly from the original 1999 SIA 
methodology and mentioned in the Handbook for Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment (EC, 2006).2 In 
addition, other frequently used indicators are listed (not in bold) in the table.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1 Before selecting the indicators proposed herein, key sustainability themes and related sub-themes were identified. The 
indicators are specific and measurable, illustrate trends over time, are reliable and credible, coherent, and comprehensive; they 
are also relevant to policymaking (in terms of relevance to sustainable/unsustainable development, domestic policy 
targets/international agreements, etc.).  
2 These indicators are used consistently, as envisaged by the SIA handbook; however this SIA makes changes to the usage of 
other core indicators as envisaged in the handbook. Although a core indicator for previous SIAs, the poverty indicator was not 
applied in-depth in all analyses within this report. For context, the SIA methodology was employed in the past on trade 
agreements the EU was negotiating with developing countries. Poverty issues in the context of the EU-Canada CETA are not of 
the same magnitude as in an agreement between the EU and developing countries, and as such the poverty indicator is given 
different weight in this particular SIA and only mentioned when relevant. Indicators for health and education were used only 
were relevant throughout the SIA. FDI was used as a proxy for the “fixed capital formation” indicator proposed in the 1999 
methodology. 
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Table 1: Sustainability impact assessment indicators 
Sustainability 
pillar 
Theme  Indicator  
 
 
People’s ability to support 
themselves and their 
families  
Employment/unemployment  rate 
 
Competitiveness and 
economic performance 
-market share 
-exports 
-output 
-imports 
- FDI flows  
-GDP growth rate 
-overall trade balance 
-bilateral trade balance between EU and Canada 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ECONOMIC 
Other  -strength of institutional and regulatory environments 
-policy space* 
 
Quality and decency of 
work 
-Wages/income 
-Equity in wages 
-worker displacement levels and ability to shift among occupations 
-strength of collective bargaining 
-quality of work environment in terms of health and safety 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOCIAL 
Other  -strength of institutional and regulatory environments 
-policy space* 
-poverty levels 
-public safety 
-access to and/or quality of healthcare 
-access to and/or quality of education 
-rate of technological advancement/innovation 
 
Environmental quality -Waste from output (including hazardous and toxic waste, as well as other 
types of wastes) 
-rate of GHG emissions 
Natural resource stocks -rate of reduction in biodiversity  
-fish stocks 
-forest usage 
-mineral usage 
-fossil fuel usage 
 
 
 
ENVIRONMEN
TAL 
Other  -strength of institutional and regulatory environment  
-policy space*  
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* Usage of the concept of “policy space” in this SIA: Some use the term “policy space” to mean all ‘regulatory flexibility’ in 
terms of the breadth that government is afforded in making policies. However, “policy space” as used as an SIA indicator 
exclusively refers to regulatory flexibility that if reduced directly results in the inability of governments to make policies that 
have clear economic, social or environmental benefits. In other words, reductions in policy space as defined herein should lead 
to negative externalities (for example, hurting human and/or environmental health, increasing the cost of goods and services, 
reducing quality of goods and services, hurting wages and employment, among other negative effects). It does not refer to the 
wider concept of reductions in regulatory flexibility that can create positive impacts (for example, improving the efficiency with 
which businesses operate and creating positive spill-over effects on employment and income, among other effects). As a note, 
the costs and benefits from reductions in policy space are typically difficult to calculate and vary among circumstances. 
2.3. Evidence 
2.3.1. Modelling Approach 
Modelling using a CGE model, E3MG model and gravity models provided a fundamental source of 
evidence for the quantitative analysis performed in this Final Report. These results were then 
interpreted and incorporated into the more detailed assessment of specific indicators, as described in 
Section 2.4 below. 
CGE Model 
Due to the inter-linkages between various sectors within Canada and the EU as well as the relationship 
these sectors have with the rest of the world, the assessment of the liberalisation of trade and 
investment in the EU-Canada CETA requires an analytical framework that allows for a holistic view of 
world economies. This has been accomplished through application of a multi-region Computable 
General Equilibrium (CGE) model based on the framework of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP).  
 
Basic model structure  
The model employed is a comparative static model grounded in neoclassical theories.3 In particular, CGE 
models build upon general equilibrium theory that combines behaviour assumptions of rational 
economic agents with the analysis of equilibrium conditions. The model assumes perfect competition 
and thus constant returns to scale in some sectors and monopolistic competition in a number of sectors 
(depending on prior assessment of the sectors), and profit and utility maximising behaviour of firms and 
households, respectively. The model uses version 7 of the GTAP database and is executed with 
GEMPACK software.  
The main virtue of the CGE approach is its comprehensive micro-consistent representation of price-
dependent market interactions. The simultaneous explanation of the origin and spending of agents’ 
income makes it possible to address both economy-wide efficiency as well as distributional impacts of 
policy intervention/interference. 
 
 
 
                                                             
3 Full documentation of the GTAP model and the database can be found in Hertel (1997) and Dimaranan and McDougall (2002) 
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Baseline, liberalisation scenarios, countries and timeframe 
Scenarios prepared within a CGE model represent ‘what if’ or counter-factual examples that estimate 
what is likely to happen under the assumptions made in the model, the data estimates, and the policy 
and other changes specified. These scenarios employ a baseline scenario that outlines the ‘likely 
economic, social and environmental effects in the absence of a bilateral trade agreement between the 
EU and Canada,’4 as well as liberalisation scenarios as requested in the Terms of Reference.  
 
Baseline scenario: A baseline scenario is utilised to quantify the economic, social and environmental 
effects in the absence of a bilateral trade agreement between the EU and Canada. In order to obtain 
separate price and quantity observations, the common convenient procedure is to choose units for 
goods and factors so that they have a price of unity in the benchmark equilibrium. This scenario 
encompasses a successful completion of the Doha Round.  
Liberalisation scenarios: 
The Final Report employs four liberalisation scenarios:5 
 Scenario A. Limited liberalisation of agriculture and PAPs resulting in an overall liberalisation of 
95% of trade in goods in terms of tariff lines and less ambitious liberalisation of services. The 
reduction in tariffs is achieved using a sensitive list approach whereby there is no tariff cuts for 
meat products (incl. beef and pork) in the EU and no tariff cuts for dairy products and ‘other 
food products’ in Canada; all other agriculture and industrial products are fully liberalised. For 
services, liberalisation is based on the service trade cost cuts modelled in the 2008 Joint Study, 
multiplied by a factor of 0.6 (Table 2).  
 Scenario B. Limited liberalisation of agriculture and PAPs resulting in an overall liberalisation of 
95% of trade in goods in terms of tariff lines and ambitious liberalisation of services. The 
reduction in tariffs is modelled in the same manner as in Scenario A, while liberalisation in the 
services is based on the service trade cost cuts modelled in the 2008 Joint Study (Table 2).  
 Scenario C. 100% liberalisation of goods and less ambitious liberalisation of services, using the 
services trade cost cuts employed in the 2008 Joint Study multiplied by a factor of 0.6 (Table 2).  
 Scenario D. 100% liberalisation of goods and ambitious liberalisation of services, using the 
services trade cost cuts employed in the 2008 Joint Study (Table 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
4 Terms of Reference, pg 11. 
5 Given the importance of investment in EU-Canada bilateral relations, a fifth CGE scenario was originally intended that 
modelled the effects of investment liberalisation within the CGE model. However, given data limitations it was ultimately 
decided that such an exercise would not be able to accurately reflect the outcome of the CETA and would thus not provide 
realistic, policy-based outcomes.   
EU-Canada SIA Final Report 
31 
 
Table2: Cut in service trade costs by sector and scenario (% reduction) 
Sectors Scenario A & C Scenario B & D 
Electricity 3.49 5.82 
Gas manufacture, distribution 3.49 5.82 
Water 3.49 5.82 
Construction 6.13 10.21 
Trade 3.76 6.27 
Other transport  5.45 9.09 
Maritime transport 5.45 9.09 
Air transport 5.45 9.09 
Communication 2.53 4.21 
Financial services  3.76 6.27 
Insurance 3.76 6.27 
Other business services 5.45 9.09 
Recreation and other services 3.76 6.27 
PubAdmin/Defence/Health/Education 2.29 3.81 
Dwellings 3.76 6.27 
 
Geographical aggregation: The liberalisation scenarios have been applied across a select group of 
countries: the EU; Canada; US; Mexico; Least Developed Countries (LDCs) for which GTAP data is 
available; European/Mediterranean countries with preferential agreements with the EU for which GTAP 
data is available and Russia; Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Countries excluding LDCs for which GTAP data 
is available; and China. 
 
Timeframe: The results of the CGE model reflect long-term outcomes where resources have had 
sufficient time to reallocate capital in response to the CETA. Herein, all results should be understood as 
representing the outcome of the CETA by approximately 2020.  
The main results generated by the CGE modelling are: 
 Impacts on output, trade volumes and trade prices, by product group 
 Macroeconomic impacts: Welfare, GDP and aggregate exports 
 Labour market impacts: Employment and wage rates 
 
For further information on the CGE model employed in the SIA, and the modelling results see Annex 1.  
E3MG Model  
The modelling approach further employs a multi-region framework of global trade and energy use. 
Combustion of fossil fuels is a driving force of global warming through the release of CO2 and causes 
serious regional and transboundary pollution through emissions of SOx and NOx. An additional model, 
the E3MG model, has been used along with the CGE model to better detail the full scale of relevant CO2 
emissions. 
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The E3MG model is an econometric model for the world capable of addressing issues that link 
developments and policies in the areas of energy, the environment and the economy. The essential 
purpose of the model is to provide a framework for evaluating different policies in the long-term, while 
also giving an indication of short-term transition effects.  
E3MG is a detailed model of over 40 sectors, compatible with ESA95 (Eurostat, 1995) accounting 
classifications, and with the disaggregation of energy and environment industries, in which the energy-
environment-economy interactions are central; this gives a strong degree of consistency between the 
economy and environment results. The model is designed to be estimated and solved for 20 regions of 
the world, although single-region solutions are possible. 
The E3MG model provides a notable amount of detail in its modelling of GHG emissions. The model 
decomposes greenhouse gas (GHG) effects into scale effects (as a result of increased output), 
composition effects (as a result of shifts in the relative weight of sectors) and possible technique effects 
(as a result of productivity increases that can be attributed to the CETA). As such, the GHG analysis 
throughout this report covers emissions across a range of sectors.  
By combining the workings of the CGE model and the E3MG model, estimated environmental effects 
have been directly linked with changes in production and will account for pollutions costs. Resulting 
impacts are expressed in units of welfare in terms of million tons of CO2 emissions.  
The E3MG model used scenarios C and D from the CGE model in running its scenarios as these two 
scenarios would intuitively have the greatest impacts in terms of energy demand and GHG emissions.   
The main results from the E3MG model are: 
 Energy consumption, by user group and by fuel 
 CO2 emissions by sector, other atmospheric emissions 
 Macroeconomic and labour market impacts  
 
For further information on the CGE model to be employed in the SIA, and the results of the model for 
this draft Interim Report, see Annex 2. 
Investment Modelling  
Gravity modelling is used to estimate the responsiveness of sectoral level FDI flows to liberalisation of 
investment flows between Canada and the EU. The key explanatory variable employed is investment 
restrictiveness as measured by the OECD. The model shows how investment flows into certain sectors in 
Canada and the EU change with a reduction in restrictiveness. The applicability of the modelling is 
restricted given the limited availability of data on which it was based, although the results are generally 
referenced as relevant throughout the economic analyses in the individual impact assessments of the 
SIA. 
2.3.2. Desk research 
Desk research was critical to the research phase of this report. Sources used include credible literature, 
statistics, and case studies. Also, policy statements, laws, regulations and international agreements were 
reviewed. Where these types of evidence are used in developing the assessment of economic, social and 
environmental impacts, the original sources are cited in the report.  
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2.3.3. Stakeholder consultations 
Brief overview of the SIA consultation process 
 
A key part of the SIA process is consultations with stakeholders. Consultation with key stakeholders as 
experts is an important source of evidence and advice for the ex ante assessment of impacts. 
Consultation also contributes to the process of good governance, by strengthening the accountability 
and transparency of the assessment. Detailed and thorough stakeholder consultation is vital to a 
successful impact assessment, and has proven to be an integral part of the data-collecting for this report 
as well as provided information and feedback on the likely impacts and scenarios studied.  
 
A range of consultation methods was used in preparing the Inception, Interim Technical and Final 
Reports. A project website (http://www.eucanada-sia.org) was created at the inception of the project 
and was used to create awareness of the SIA and to elicit feedback from stakeholders. Each report was 
put on the website and comments were received on the reports during a specified consultation period. 
Comments received were considered by the study team.6 Civil society meetings were held in Brussels (3) 
and Ottawa (1) to facilitate face-to-face dialogue between the study team and stakeholders, and to elicit 
feedback on the draft reports.7 In-depth consultations were undertaken via telephone, email and 
person-to-person interviews.  
 
The extensive stakeholder network developed for the consultation process is described in Annex 5. The 
same annex summarises the feedback from civil society and business groups in particular, and provides 
a summary of where such information was incorporated into the report. 
While a large number of stakeholders were contacted for the SIA, not all stakeholders actually provided 
input to the study team. In some cases, groups interested in the SIA chose to place their comments on    
their own websites or on mediums outside those related to the SIA consultation process rather than 
providing substantive comments directly to the study team. Nonetheless, the study team did closely 
consider the views of these organisations by reviewing their publicly available reports, and where 
appropriate, were used as part of the evidence used in the assessment.8 Also, while a wide range of 
stakeholders responded positively to the notification of the civil society meetings in Brussels as well as 
the Ottawa workshop, and confirmed their attendance, not all actually attended the meetings.9  
A variety of stakeholders representing a number of interests were closely involved in the SIA process. 
Stakeholders involved in IPR matters were the most active in the consultation process. The study team 
received numerous comments from stakeholders in the EU and Canada both for and against certain 
provisions in an IPR Chapter in CETA. A range of stakeholders in different agricultural industries in both 
Europe and Canada provided valuable feedback to the study team through a variety of consultation 
methods. Useful comments were received from groups representing a number of other sectoral and 
cross-cutting issues.  
Despite attempts to consult a wide array of environmental NGOs and academics in Canada and Europe 
on the environmental effects of CETA, the study team received only limited feedback from 
environmental stakeholders. A number of the most active stakeholders in the field were contacted to 
identify academics or ENGOs who would be working on the topic or who would be interested in 
                                                             
6 Details of the comments received from stakeholders are given in Annex 4. 
7 Minutes of these meetings are included in Annex 4. 
8 These sources are cited in the report.  
9 The onset of adverse weather conditions on the day of the Ottawa workshop affected attendance.  
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providing comments. In Canada, these experts were probed to provide an explanation for the apparent 
lack of interest among environmental stakeholders for CETA, which contrasts with the mobilisation that 
occurred with NAFTA twenty years ago, and more recently with the Doha Round WTO negotiation and 
proposed Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA). In Europe, little or no response was received 
from the stakeholders contacted.10 
Several academic and institute-based experts, additional to the stakeholder groups described above, 
also provided helpful comments on the SIA, in particular on the investment section. These comments 
are cited in the relevant sections. 
 
Consultation tools and timing 
The SIA involved phases of consultations, organised using the mechanisms listed below. In all phases the 
study team actively sought the comments from stakeholders. Additionally, an open consultation process 
was instituted, where any stakeholders could send feedback through to the study team.  
Three major periods were used to collect feedback in each consultation phase. The first phase was 
opened from early August to mid October 2010, whereas feedback received during this phase was 
considered for inclusion in the Inception Report. The second phase was from October 2010 to 11 March 
2011, whereas feedback received during this phase was considered for inclusion in the Interim Report. 
And feedback received from 11 March to 11 April 2011 was considered for inclusion in the Final Report.  
Steering Committee meetings – Brussels 
Steering committee meetings were held with members of the European Commission at each phase of 
the study. The comments from these meetings have been considered in revising study reports. The final 
steering committee meeting was held on 30 March 2011 to discuss the draft Final Report. 
Civil Society Meetings - Brussels 
Public meetings were held throughout the study. The meetings are organised by the European 
Commission and are located in Brussels and involve Brussels-based civil society and unions.  
The first civil society meeting was held in Brussels on 7 September 2010 where the contents of the draft 
Inception Report were presented including its process, purpose, methodology, timing and consultation 
activities. And an update on negotiations was provided. The minutes from this meeting, including a list 
of attendees, can be found in the second table in Annex 5.  
The final civil society meeting took place on 30 March 2011 after publication of the draft Final Report. 
Representatives from the EC provided an update on the CETA negotiations, while the study team 
reviewed the SIA methodology, and provided an overview of the draft Final Report’s findings in terms of 
its macro-economic assessment, sectoral assessments, and cross-cutting issues assessments. The ETUC 
and EUROCOMMERCE gave brief presentations at the meeting. The study team and EC representatives 
answered questions from stakeholders regarding CETA and the SIA in particular. While 39 stakeholders 
publicly registered for the meeting, only fourteen attended in addition to the EC and study team 
representatives.  The minutes from this meeting, including a list of attendees, can be found in Annex 5. 
                                                             
10 Some hypotheses for the lack of feedback from environmental stakeholders in Canada in particular are that domestic issues, 
including climate and transportation policies take most importance; that CETA represents a small portion of Canada’s trade; 
and that Europe is generally perceived as an environmental leader. For these reasons, CETA appears to generate little interest 
or worries in the environmental community.  
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Stakeholder Workshop – Ottawa, Canada 
A full one-day consultation workshop, organised by the study team, was held on November 26th in 
Ottawa, Canada. A total of 71 stakeholder groups were formally invited to the EU-Canada SIA Ottawa 
Workshop. A balanced selection of stakeholders was proposed by the study team based upon 
consultations with stakeholders in the earlier phases of the SIA and knowledge of the major issues in the 
SIA, and discussed with the EC Delegation in Canada. Invitees included 38 industry and trade 
associations, from a variety of industries, from agricultural sub-sectors to IPR; three major labour 
organisations, from public workers’ unions to unions for workers in the private sector; eleven 
environmental organisations, from ENGOs to university-based research institutions; four groups focused 
on minority rights; and ten other interest groups, with a variety of different focuses. Of these 71 groups, 
32 representatives confirmed attendance to the workshop. Perhaps due to light snow the day of the 
meeting, only thirteen of these representatives, in addition to the EC and study team representatives, 
attended the workshop.  
During the workshop, the project experts presented the preliminary findings of the Interim Report. The 
workshop began with an introduction from the lead EC representative present on the CETA negotiations. 
Dr. Colin Kirkpatrick and Dr. Selim Raihan then provided an overview of the SIA methodology, and 
discussed it with stakeholders. Dr. Raihan then provided an overview of the macro-economic 
assessment in the SIA, and responded to stakeholder questions on the assessment. Then, Dr. Érick 
Duchesne, Adam Bleser and Karel Mayrand presented on the agricultural, PAPs and fisheries sector 
assessments and answered related questions from stakeholders. Adam Bleser and Karel Mayrand then 
presented on the industrial products and services sectors, and answered related questions from 
stakeholders. Lastly, Dan Prud’homme presented on public procurement, investment, competition 
policy and the other cross-cutting issues, and answered related questions from stakeholders.  
Overall, discussion and debate was productive. Many of those who attended commented at-length on 
the work delivered within the Preliminary Findings document sent to those interested in the workshop. 
The workshop closed with remarks on ensuring civil society input into the SIA.  
The workshop agenda, list of invitees, list of confirmed participants, and meeting minutes can be found 
in Annex 4 of this report. Comments from that workshop were incorporated in this report in relevant 
sections. 
 
Digital Consultation 
Website 
DS launched a project website to support the project’s visibility as well as to assist in facilitating the 
collection of stakeholder feedback (see www.eucanada-sia.org). The website is updated to coincide with 
the completion of each phase of the study and relevant deliverables. It provides all relevant information 
concerning the SIA’s progress, reports, meeting minutes and relevant contact information. 
To date, the website has received 1235 hits with a bounce rate of 46.8%. The average time spent 
viewing the site is 20 minutes and 50 seconds.  
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Snapshot of EU-Canada SIA website: 
 
Discussion Forum  
The website’s Discussion Forum also serves as a communications platform through which European and 
Canadian, as well as American and other stakeholders’ from other countries that convincingly make the 
case that they will be impacted by CETA are able to able to provide feedback into the EU-Canada Trade 
SIA.    
 
Electronic Trade SIA Newsletter  
Another aspect of digital consultation is the project’s Trade SIA newsletter/email update which is 
disseminated to the project’s consultation network. This newsletter is distributed electronically at key 
points during the study, coinciding with the release of each report.  
 
Interviews and Email Feedback 
In the course of the study, more than 350 civil society organisations, trade associations, academic 
institutions and government agencies were contacted to participate in telephone consultations. Initially, 
the response rate was high with close to 70 replies in the first week. However, the response rate 
subsequently declined11 although a number of key stakeholder interviews were conducted via telephone 
and numerous respondents communicated their positions via email.  
For a complete list of stakeholders contacted please see Annex 5.   
 
                                                             
11 Interest may have waned when it became known that the study team did not have access to the content of CETA 
negotiations beyond what was publicly available 
EU-Canada SIA Final Report 
37 
 
2.4. Analysis 
The results from the CGE model, E3MG model, desk research and consultations were analysed according 
to the principles of “causal chain analysis,” with more specific forms of analysis employed under this 
umbrella. Different types of analyses were employed for different issues. As relevant, ‘comparative 
analysis’ was employed. Even more specifically, policy analysis incorporating socio-economic, 
economic/statistical, and legal analysis was used. All analysis was organised in terms of the relevant 
indicators.  
The main purpose of the evidence-based assessment in the SIA is to identify where significant impacts 
are expected to occur, i.e. the most important ways in which the trade agreement being analysed will 
change the status quo/baseline per relevant indicators. The significance of an impact has been 
evaluated by expert opinion relative to an appropriate context-specific benchmark, based on the 
research and analysis described in the methodology herein. Impacts identified as less than significant 
are still discussed as relevant, particularly if stakeholders, for example, allege that such impacts will be 
significant. Also, these impacts may receive the bulk of attention in an analysis under a certain indicator 
if there are not more significant impacts to be discussed under such an indicator. As a rule of thumb, 
within each indicator, impacts with comparatively less significance receive less discussion than those 
with more significance. The below table provides an overview of how different degrees of significance 
for impacts are described in this SIA. Once a level of significance is determined, the positive and/or 
negative dimensions of such impacts are described to the extent feasible.  
Core level of impact According keywords in SIA  
Significant significant, or substantial  
Moderately significant < significant moderate/moderately significant,  
notable/noteworthy, or “not insignificant” 
Less than moderately significant > insignificant marginal, minor, or limited 
Insignificant  non-existent → negligible→ insignificant/not 
significant* 
* “→” indicates increasing degree of significance among keywords 
 
Core form of analysis 
As envisaged in the SIA Handbook, causal chain analysis was the fundamental form of all analysis 
employed in this SIA. Causal chain analysis entails reviewing impacts from a baseline and subsequently 
along a sequence of potential resulting impacts. This process was followed for each individual indicator 
employed in the assessments, as indicators are only useful in predicting future trends in so much as they 
first consider past and present trends in the absence of the trade agreement (the baseline). 
Subsequently, making a causal link between existing (past and present) trends and potential future 
trends requires a thorough risk assessment: identifying possible risks, and analysing the linkages 
between the causes/sources of risks and the possible damages.  
More specific forms of analysis 
‘Comparative analysis’ was a key tool used in a significant portion of the economic, social and 
environmental sustainability impact analyses for this SIA. Comparative analysis as used in this SIA 
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constitutes reviewing trends on similar indicators with those employed in this SIA after signature of 
trade/economic agreements or policies comparable to CETA (in terms of breadth and scope) with 
comparable countries (considering the level of development of the EU and Canada). Herein, efforts were 
made to ensure that (a) the indicators themselves, (b) the provisions of the trade/economic agreements 
or policies, and (d) circumstances of the countries (in terms of size and structure of economy, and 
nuances in the economic, social and environmental spheres) that were used are all relevant to an 
analysis of CETA. Assessments on different components of NAFTA, for example, were often used as a 
foundation for comparative analyses. The information used to create these comparisons was largely 
taken from desk research and consultations. 
Specific approaches to analysis per each of the 3 pillars of sustainability are as follows: 
Economic assessments in the sectoral analyses focused largely on the results of the CGE model and 
incorporated information from desk research and consultations; while economic assessments in the 
cross-cutting issues section focused more on statistical and economic analysis built on information 
outside the CGE model, including desk research and consultations.  
The social assessments in the sectoral analyses were based on the potential outcomes arising from 
estimated economic impacts, particularly in terms of primary concerns over employment creation and 
job displacement, as well as the impact on labour standards, health, security and culture.   
The social assessments in the cross-cutting issues sections were made through a variety of different 
forms of analysis depending on the issues, including, among others, socio-economic analysis following 
the principles of comparative analysis. 
The environmental assessments in the sectoral and cross-cutting issues sections were made through a 
variety of different forms of analysis depending on the issues, including, among others, statistical 
analysis of the results of the E3MG model, and comparative analysis.  
Legal analysis was applied in assessing all three pillars of sustainability specifically in the government 
procurement, investment, competition policy, and IPR sections of the cross-cutting issues assessment. 
Such analysis was combined with the other aforementioned forms of analysis to provide a 
comprehensive assessment. 
 
2.5. Policy Recommendations 
As a final step, a series of policy recommendations, also called flanking measures, were created based 
on the results of the sustainability analyses. These measures cover both enhancement and 
preventative/mitigation measures, i.e. measures needed to reinforce key positive sustainability impacts 
and to prevent or at least mitigate major negative sustainability impacts.  
 
A number of steps were undertaken to facilitate the process of developing the policy recommendations. 
First, individual experts created a brief bullet-pointed summary of all the major impacts from their 
sections of the sustainability impact assessment. This highlighted issues that deserved to be addressed 
with policy recommendations. It was then considered that recommendations should generally fit within 
two main categories (i.e. trade measures and “cooperation” measures). A detailed list of 
recommendations was then brainstormed, based upon best practice for formulating such 
recommendations as shared among study team members.  
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Attention was paid to making sure all recommendations are practical. It was considered that the 
recommendations to be made in this SIA will differ in many ways from those made on past SIAs, one 
reason being that past SIAs have focused on EU trade with developing countries and emerging 
economies. 
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SUSTAINABILITY IMPACT ASSESSMENTS 
 
3. MACRO-ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT12 
 
Summary  
The CGE model estimates that the CETA will lead to overall gains in welfare, real GDP, total exports and 
real wages in both Canada and the EU over the long-term. While these gains are expected under the four 
scenarios modelled in the economic assessment, the gains are expected to be higher under an agreement 
that offers the highest degree of tariff and services liberalisation. Third countries are estimated to 
experience minor degrees of welfare loss as a result of the Agreement, though the overall impact on 
these countries is insignificant. 
 
INDICATOR: Welfare 
In the GTAP model, welfare is measured by Equivalent Variations (EVs).13 Table 3 suggests that trade 
liberalisation under the CETA will lead to welfare gains in the EU and Canada over the long-term. As can 
be seen, the greatest gains will be achieved under an agreement that provides the greatest amount of 
liberalisation (Scenario D).   
 
Table 3: Equivalent Variation (Million US$ at 2004 prices) 
  Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C Scenario D 
EU 27 1,964.22 2,676.47 2,687.12 3,400.98 
Canada 1,796.87 2,437.59 2,291.10 2,931.87 
 
                                                             
12 Introductory notes: Included in this section are specific estimates from the CGE model outlining expected changes in both 
Canada and the EU in terms of welfare, GDP, exports and wages. These results are influenced by the model’s assumptions 
regarding services and tariff liberalisation. Specifically, the four scenarios estimated within the modelling simulations are: 
 Scenario A: 95% reduction in tariffs and less ambitious cuts in trade costs of services (taking the cuts used in the 2008 
Joint Study and multiplying them by a factor of 0.6) 
 Scenario B: 95% reduction in tariffs and ambitious cuts in trade costs of services (taking the cuts used in the 2008 
Joint Study) 
 Scenario C: 100% reduction in tariffs and cuts in trade costs of services as employed in the 2008 Joint Study multiplied 
by a factor of 0.6 (i.e. less ambitious liberalisation of services) 
 Scenario D: 100% reduction in tariffs and cuts in trade costs of services as employed in the 2008 Joint Study (i.e. less 
ambitious liberalisation of services).  
 
Results from the CGE model should be interpreted as reflecting the impact of the CETA itself on these indicators and does not 
necessarily imply overall changes, which could be further affected by exogenous factors. All estimated impacts are to be 
understood as occurring over the long-term (e.g. in 10+ years) after final implementation of an Agreement. As data limitations 
made it impossible to incorporate investment effects into the CGE model, the results take into account the impact of trade 
liberalisation only and do account for the impact from investment liberalisation. 
More information on the CGE model, its assumptions and the scenarios employed can be found in Annex 1.  
13 Equivalent variation (EV) is a measure of how much more money a consumer would pay before a price increase to avert the 
price increase. 
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The decomposition of the welfare effects (as presented in Figures 1 and 2) further suggests that under 
less ambitious liberalisation of services, the rise in welfare for EU and Canada is more greatly attributed 
to the cut in tariffs on goods. However, under the more ambitious cuts in services, the gains from 
services trade liberalisation are larger than the gains from tariff cuts. At the same time, however, this 
does not take into account potential welfare gains that may arise through investment liberalisation, 
which could lead to greater trade through foreign affiliates and increases in output through enhanced 
productivity.  
 
 
Figure 1: Decomposition of welfare effects for EU (Equivalent Variation in Million US$ at 2004 prices)  
 
 
Figure 2:  Decomposition of welfare effects for Canada (Equivalent Variation in Million US$ at 2004 prices)  
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Table 4 suggests that under the four scenarios modelled, there will be welfare losses for all third 
countries except Mexico and China (under certain scenarios). The magnitude of welfare losses increases 
under the scenarios with more intensified services liberalisation. In terms of value, the United States 
suffers from the largest welfare losses. Table 5 shows estimates of the percentage share of EV in terms 
of GDP (for scenarios C and D). Despite the fact that the value of welfare losses for LDCs, the countries 
with which the EU shares preferential trade agreements (EUPTA) and the countries of African, Pacific 
and Caribbean (excluding LDCs) would be smaller than estimated for the U.S. and rest of world (RoW), 
these groups of countries will be more greatly impacted as their volume of welfare losses in terms of 
percent share in GDP are as high as for USA or higher than that for RoW. The impact on China is 
negligible. However, as the magnitude of these losses is in the range of 0.0 and 0.01 percent of GDP, the 
CETA would not have a significant impact on third countries. 
 
 
Table 4: Equivalent Variation (Million US$ at 2004 prices)  
 Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C Scenario D 
USA -798.65 -978.18 -848.28 -1,028.28 
Mexico -26.12 -17.43 3.03 11.8 
China -60.69 -62.96 1.14 -1.1 
EUPTA -68.33 -96.83 -87.61 -116.12 
LDCs -14.57 -16.24 -11.39 -13.06 
ACPexLDC -36.96 -50.31 -21.78 -35.12 
ROW -266.58 -350.61 -109.57 -193.37 
 
 
Table 5: Equivalent Variation as % of GDP  
 Scenario C Scenario D 
USA -0.01 -0.01 
Mexico 0.00 0.00 
China 0.00 0.00 
EUPTA -0.01 -0.01 
LDCs -0.01 -0.01 
ACPexLDC 0.00 -0.01 
ROW 0.00 0.00 
 
 
INDICATOR: GDP 
Under the four scenarios, both the EU and Canada are expected to experience a rise in real GDP. The 
higher gain is found to be achieved under the most ambitious scenario (Scenario D), again suggesting 
greater liberalisation will provide the greatest benefit to both sides.   
 
Table 6: Percentage change in Real GDP  
 Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C Scenario D 
EU 27 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Canada 0.18 0.25 0.29 0.36 
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Under these four scenarios, third countries such as the U.S., Mexico, China and the rest of the world 
would not experience a fall in real GDP. However, under the most ambitious scenario (Scenario D) the 
countries with which the EU shares preferential trade agreements (EUPTA), LDCs and the countries of 
the APC would experience a minor decline in real GDP. Again, the magnitude of the impacts for third 
countries is in the range of 0.0 and 0.01 percent and thus insignificant.  
 
Table 7: Percentage change in Real GDP  
 Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C Scenario D 
USA 0 0 0 0 
Mexico 0 0 0 0 
China 0 0 0 0 
EUPTA -0.01 -0.01 0 -0.01 
LDCs -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
ACPexLDC -0.01 -0.01 0 -0.01 
ROW 0 0 0 0 
 
INDICATOR: Total exports 
Both the EU and Canada are expected to experience a rise in total exports. For the EU, the rise in exports 
ranges between 0.05% and 0.07%, whereas for Canada it ranges between 0.54% and 1.56%. Total 
exports would be expected to increase with greater levels of services liberalisation and tariff cuts. In 
terms of tariffs, the rise in exports observed when liberalising the sensitive products in the agriculture 
and PAPs sector implies that significantly reducing tariffs on these products would likely have a 
pronounced impact on trade in both regions.  
While it would be expected that bilateral exports will increase in most sectors, the reallocation of 
resources towards expanding sectors may nevertheless imply reduced overall exports (i.e. decreases of 
exports to third countries) in some sectors over the long-term. It should be noted that as services 
liberalisation appears to stimulate an increase in exports, these results are probably underestimated as 
they do not account for exports that occur via sales of foreign affiliates (mode 3 trade), which serve an 
important role in bilateral trade in services between Canada and the EU.  
 
Table 8: Percentage change in Total Exports 
  Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C Scenario D 
EU 27 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 
Canada 0.54 0.63 1.47 1.56 
 
 
 
INDICATOR: Balance of trade 
Both Canada and the EU are expected to experience improvements in their overall balance of trade over 
the long-term. As shown in Figure 3, the EU will generate its greatest improvements through services 
liberalisation, with removal of tariffs on sensitive sectors estimated to worsen its balance of trade in 
goods. Given that this does not take into account exports that occur via mode 3 (sales by foreign 
affiliates), the gains for its services sector may be underrepresented. Conversely, Canada would be 
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expected to generate its greatest improvements through the full removal of tariffs, though it should see 
positive improvements to its balance of trade in services as well (Figure 4). Specifically, these results 
highlight the potential impact from removing tariffs on beef and pork in the EU, which would enhance 
gains to the balance of trade in Canada while worsening the balance of trade in the EU. (See relevant 
sectoral analysis for more discussion). 
 
Figure 3: Change in the EU’s balance of trade (Million US$ at 2004 prices) 
 
 
Figure 4: Change in Canada’s balance of trade (Million US$ at 2004 prices) 
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INDICATOR: Wages 
In EU, the real wage rates of unskilled and skilled labour are expected to exhibit small increases in 
magnitudes over the long-term under all four scenarios. For the EU, the largest rise in the wage rates is 
observed under the most ambitious scenario (Scenario D). However, under this scenario, the wage rate 
of skilled labour rises more than that of unskilled labour. Conversely, Canadian wages are estimated to 
exhibit the highest increases under an ambitious liberalisation of services but where dairy and ‘other 
food products’ are not liberalised (Scenario B).14 
For Canada, the rises in wages for both skilled and unskilled labour are much higher than those is EU 
across all scenarios. However, the wage rate of unskilled labour rises more than that of skilled labour.  
 
Table 9: impact on wages for skilled (s) and unskilled labour (u) 
Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C Scenario D   
U S U S U S U S 
EU 27 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.07 
Canada 0.45 0.42 0.57 0.55 0.4 0.37 0.52 0.49 
 
 
                                                             
14 An explanation for this could be that such a scenario would imply continued protections for Canada’s dairy farmers, which 
would help to support wages for those in the sector. Alternatively, the most liberalised scenario (Scenario D), could lead to 
lower costs of capital which could be creating greater substitution of labour for capital, placing downward pressure on wages.  
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4. AGRICULTURE, PROCESSED 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS (PAPs) & 
FISHERIES15 
 
Summary  
For nearly all sectors in agriculture, PAPs and fisheries, the impact of the CETA will largely depend on the 
degree of liberalisation reached under the Agreement. CGE estimates suggest that for those sectors in 
which Canada and the EU are restricted in their market access, the greatest degree of liberalisation will 
produce the greatest gains. 
The economic impact assessment suggests that the removal of tariffs would result in moderate to 
significant benefits for Canada’s beef, pork, other PAPs and fisheries sectors and for the EU’s dairy and 
other PAPs sector. Conversely, maintaining sensitivities on these products is estimated to eliminate any 
potential gains in these products for Canada and the EU, but would serve to also guard against declines 
in output and employment. Eliminating non-tariff barriers could further increase these gains for Canada 
and the EU while also potentially leading to pronounced gains for the EU’s alcoholic beverages sector.  
In terms of grains and oilseeds, the impact of the CETA is likely to be contingent on the level of 
liberalisation achieved. Full removal of tariffs is estimated to have a positive, though marginal, impact on 
                                                             
15 Introductory notes: This subsector within the Sectoral Analysis encompasses 2 broad categories and a number of sub-
categories that were identified in the scoping stage for more in depth assessment. These broadly include, ‘Agricultural and 
Processed Agricultural Products’, with sub-categories of ‘Grains and oilseeds’, ‘Beef and Pork’, ‘Dairy’, ‘Other Processed 
Agricultural Products’ and ‘Beverages’. Other processed agricultural products should be understood as pertaining to all PAPs 
that do not classify under meat, dairy or seafood, while beverages focuses primarily on wine and spirits. The second broad 
category is fisheries which does not have any subsectors. 
All estimated impacts are to be understood as occurring over the long-term (e.g. in 10+ years) after final implementation of an 
agreement. Results from the CGE model can be found in Annex 6. It is important to note that the findings discussed herein are 
formed largely on the basis of a CGE model and the assumptions it has employed regarding the level of liberalisation to be 
reached under a CETA. For agriculture one important assumption is that of a successful completion of Doha.  
Although the future of Doha remains uncertain, both Canada and the EU remain committed to its successful completion. As 
such, and under the request of the Contracting Authority, the CGE model has assumed a successful conclusion of Doha. While 
the term ‘successful’ could have a number of interpretations, it was formulated in the modelling for agricultural products as: 
1. A 36% cut in agricultural tariffs in developed countries and a cut of 24% in developing countries. 
2. A one-third reduction in domestic agricultural subsidies in both developed and developing countries 
3. A complete elimination of agricultural export subsidies 
These assumptions have particular importance in understanding and interpreting the modelling results outlined in the 
agricultural, PAPs and fisheries sectors, particularly as domestic support measures and export subsidies constitute two of the 
most oft-cited areas of concern among stakeholders in Canada and the EU. As domestic subsidies for agriculture in the EU can 
have trade distorting effects on Canadian sales in third markets (and vice versa), the assumption of a successful completion of 
Doha – and the reductions on domestic support it formulates – is likely influencing the model’s projections for changes to trade 
and output as result of the CETA. While it is difficult to quantify the impact these assumptions are having without further 
modelling, it is important to take these assumptions into account when reading the modelling results. 
 
While the effects of investment liberalisation have been considered in the analysis of the industrial products and services 
sectors, the modelling results for agriculture, PAPs and fisheries is based solely on the impact from trade liberalisation. This 
Final Report employs four scenarios: two maintaining sensitivities on certain products in Canada and the EU and two modelling 
100% reduction in tariffs in all agricultural sectors (see box in main text for further clarification)  
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Canadian growers and a limited negative impact on the EU. Conversely, scenarios that limit tariff 
liberalisation on sensitive sectors project that CETA could lead to declines in output and exports in 
Canada over the long-term. The impact of tariff liberalisation is significantly reduced on account of the 
ability for Canadian exports of durum and high quality non-durum wheat to enter the EU duty-free. 
However, as these duties have only been suspended as a response to increased global prices for wheat, 
the positive impact for Canada could be more pronounced if the CETA makes these zero tariffs 
permanent. The impact on the sector is also likely to be influenced by the CETA’s impact on the Canadian 
Wheat Board, which is viewed as a non-competitive tool by the EU.  
If the CETA improves Canada’s access to duty-free exports of hormone-free beef, the Agreement will 
likely produce a positive impact for Canada’s beef industry. Gains would likely be limited to moderate, 
with EU rules of origin and ban on hormone-treated beef likely to limit potential gains and/or require the 
passing of an adequate amount of time for Canadian producers to adjust to increased access. The 
Canadian pork industry could see even greater gains as a result of the CETA, with the model suggesting 
that the full removal of tariffs would lead to pronounced increases in Canadian output and exports over 
the long-term. Increased access would also likely lead to greater investment in processing plants in 
Canada that meet EU standards, helping to facilitate exports over the long-term. As with beef, the 
impact will likely be influenced by the rules of origin adopted, with an agreement that promotes 
Canadian rules likely to lead to greater gains for Canada by allowing greater transhipment of products 
through Canada. The CETA also has the potential to increase cooperation on SPS/TBT issues relevant to 
trade in meat, allowing the Agreement to facilitate the trade of beef and pork between the two sides. 
Further, with collaboration on creating a separate tariff code in the EU for bison meat, the CETA could 
produce minor gains for Canada’s bison producers.  
While gains would be expected for Canada, the EU would be expected to be negatively impacted under a 
CETA that provided substantial improvements in market access to Canadian producers. The magnitude of 
this impact would be expected to increase with greater levels of liberalisation, with the pork industry in 
particular standing to be negatively affected. Conversely, under scenarios that maintain existing tariffs 
on Canadian imports of beef and pork, the modelling projects that the EU industry would not be 
negatively impacted, while Canadian output and exports would decrease over the long-term.  
Canada maintains clear defensive interests with respect to the dairy sector, with the current system of 
supply management serving to restrict EU market access. To the degree that the CETA leads to the 
elimination of supply management, it is expected that EU output and exports would substantially 
increase while Canada would experience significant declines in both indicators. While the impact on 
Canadian dairy producers would invariably be negative, it is envisaged that Canadian consumers would 
benefit through reduced prices. Under a less ambitious outcome, gains to the EU could still be realised 
through improved minimum access requirements and/or greater recognition of GIs for a number of EU 
produced cheeses. Under scenarios where dairy in Canada is not liberalised, the modelling projects the 
EU would see declines in output and exports over the long-term, while Canada would see increases in 
these indicators.  
In production of processed agricultural products (not including meat, dairy or fish), both Canada and the 
EU could experience economic gains from the CETA, though again the size of these gains is positively 
related to the achieved level of liberalisation. In scenarios where existing tariffs in Canada are 
maintained, the modelling projects decreases in EU output and exports over the long-term. Additional 
factors that will influence the CETA’s outcome on the sector are the rules of origin on sugar that are 
ultimately agreed to, with more relaxed rules like to produce greater gains for Canada. Both sides would 
gain from harmonisation in labelling and packaging requirements.  
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The economic impact of the CETA on the beverages sector is largely dependent on the Agreement’s 
ability to resolve discriminatory practices present in the provincial liquor control board. Without better 
enforcement/compliance of provisions to end these practices at the provincial level, it is unlikely that the 
CETA will have a pronounced impact on the sector. Where the Agreement is able to resolve this issue, the 
EU would likely realise increased exports to Canada, allowing European producers to capture a greater 
share of the Canadian market for alcoholic beverages.  
With 80% of its fish and seafood production exported into foreign markets, Canada could realise gains 
from tariff reductions in the EU. Limited to moderate gains are expected for Canada under full removal of 
tariffs, with the greatest impact likely to occur in exports of frozen fish and seafood. Additionally, Canada 
could realise gains if the CETA facilitates the approval of genetically modified salmon. In the EU, 
processors could potentially benefit from cheaper imports from Canada, while consumers would stand to 
benefit from reduced costs. The EU would also likely benefit from liberalisation of investment in the 
sector, particularly in regards to lowering the domestic ownership requirement for the granting of 
commercial fishing licenses. Conversely, the removal of tariffs on Canadian imports of fisheries products 
into the EU would erode preferences enjoyed by the EU OCTs of Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon and Greenland. 
Given these OCTs’ reliance on the fisheries sector and limited industrial diversification, losses in 
competitiveness could have a pronounced negative impact on their economies. 
In terms of the social assessment, the propensity of the Agreement to engender job creation and 
increased wages in the agriculture, PAPs and fisheries sector is largely contingent on the level of 
liberalisation. With greater removal of tariffs, it is expected that Canada will experience increased 
employment and likely increased wages for its agricultural, fisheries and food processing sector. At the 
same time, maintaining sensitivities is likely to eliminate these gains and may result in greater shifts of 
labour into other sectors over the long-term. While high degrees of liberalisation would produce the 
greatest overall economic gains, it could negatively impact dairy in Canada and beef/pork in the EU. 
Workers in these sectors would, subsequently, be expected to be negatively impacted with a number of 
workers likely forced to shift into alternative sectors over the long-term.  Maintaining sensitivities on 
these sectors would likely limit any negative social impact on these workers.  
It is unclear how expansion in agricultural employment would impact quality and decency of work. In 
Canada, workers in agriculture are generally subject to provincial regulation and are often regulated 
differently from workers in other sectors. Given that many provinces exempt a number of workers 
involved in agriculture and certain types of processing from minimum employment standards, greater 
shifts into the sector could lower the overall level of standards that the workforce is exposed to. This 
would also create greater levels of temporary employment, given the nature of the work, which could 
disproportionately be filled by foreign labour under Canada’s Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program. 
Further, as agriculture and food processing tend to have some of the highest rates of work related 
injuries and fatalities, expansion of employment in Canada and the EU’s agriculture and food processing 
sectors could expose a greater number of workers to working conditions that are more unsafe than 
average. This could, in turn, produce negative consequences for the level of work-related stress of 
employees in both Canada and the EU.  
Under a full removal of tariffs, the CETA will likely have an environmental impact in the agriculture and 
PAPs sector by increasing output of Canadian products. This higher demand will require an intensification 
of agriculture to be achieved by increasing chemical inputs, changing the distribution of crop production, 
and potentially encroaching onto marginal or other productive lands. These changes will affect land 
usage and quality, water usage and quality, air pollution, biodiversity and waste creation. Under less 
ambitious liberation scenarios, the expected overall environmental impact from CETA would be limited. 
Liberalisation of beef and pork, in particular, have potential to lead to greater herd size in Canada, 
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potentially leading to increased release of methane as a by-product. Moreover, if increases in crops like 
wheat are produced using more sustainable practices, such as no or reduced till, the negative 
environmental impact can be mitigated because of reduced emissions and chemical inputs. This trend 
towards more beneficial agricultural practices can potentially be further supported under CETA through 
Canadian-European cooperation and European preferences for sustainable products. 
For fisheries, the primary environmental risk is that the CETA could lead to a reduction in fish stocks in 
certain parts of the Atlantic and increased reliance on aquaculture. Fish farms are associated with a 
number of environmental impacts, from reductions in water quality to negative interactions with 
surrounding wild species. Increased Canada-EU collaboration could also provide greater impetus for the 
development of more sustainable fishery practices, such as the use of separate containment tanks in 
aquaculture, maintaining sustainable Total Allowable Catch levels and sustainable fishing practices.  
 
 
Note on liberalisation scenarios 
 
A special feature of the modelling scenarios is the use of a ‘sensitive’ sectors approach to liberalisation. 
Here, products flagged as being particularly sensitive in terms of trade were not liberalised in Scenarios 
A and B. Sensitive sectors were based on the observance of tariff peaks present in the EU and Canada 
and were applied with the goal of modelling a 95% overall reduction in existing tariffs applied on EU-
Canada trade.  
With all scenarios assuming 100% liberalisation in manufactured products, achieving a 95% overall 
reduction in tariffs in Canada and the EU implied that only two product groups (according to the GTAP 
aggregation) could be kept as sensitive. The products which were kept as sensitive in scenarios A and B 
are as follows: 
 Canada: ‘Dairy products’ and ‘other foods nec’ 
 EU: ‘Meat: cattle, sheep, goats, horse’ and ‘meat products nec’ (e.g. pig meat) 
All other products are fully liberalised in Scenarios A and B, while all products, including those listed 
above, are fully liberalised in Scenarios C and D.  
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4.1 EU & CANADA 
 
4.1.1. Agriculture & PAPs 
 
ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT 
 
Grains and Oilseeds  
 
INDICATOR: Output and trade  
BASELINE 
Canada is a major global producer of grains (particularly wheat) and oilseeds (canola and linseed), with 
27% of Canadian farms devoted to their production, accounting for over one-fifth of Canadian farm 
market receipts. 16  The industry plays a role in every province in Canada, though its highest 
concentration is in Saskatchewan and Manitoba, where 57% and 35% of farms, respectively, grow grains 
and/or oilseeds. Wheat serves as the largest crop with over 26 million tonnes produced in 2009 and 
with exports that make Canada the third largest exporter of wheat behind the United States and 
Australia.17 Other major grains produced in Canada are barley (with approximately 11.8 million tonnes 
produced) and oats (4.3 million tonnes).  
In the EU, cereals are the most widely produced crop with wheat accounting for 46 percent of all cereal 
production in 2007. With over 138 million tonnes produced in 2009, the EU is the world’s largest 
producer of wheat. Germany and France together account for nearly half of all production of non-durum 
wheat within the EU, while Italy, France, Spain and Greece account for nearly all production of durum 
wheat.18 In 2009, the EU-27 exported almost 18 million tonnes of wheat with France alone contributing 
6.8 million tonnes to export markets.19  
 
Table 10: Production of grains and oilseeds in Canada and the EU, 2009 (MT) 
Product Canada EU 
Non-durum 
wheat 
21.4 130.9 
Durum wheat 5.4 8.6 
Barley 9.5 62.4 
Total grains 49.3  294.5 
Canola/rape 12.4 21.5 
Total oilseeds 16.9 29.1 
 
                                                             
16 CAFTA (2008)  
17 Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada 
18 Eurostat 
19 Ibid.  
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Though less prominent, barley is also a widely produced grain in Canada and the EU, accounting for 
approximately a fifth of the total volume of grains produced in each in 2009 (Table 10). Due to its 
importance in beer and whiskey production, barley has particular importance in the beverage sectors 
within each economy. Hereto, approximately 70% of all barley produced in Canada’s main barley 
producing region – the three Prairie Provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta – is malting 
barley (two-row and six-row).20  While malting barley production in the EU takes up a far less significant 
share of overall barley production, the EU is still the world’s largest producer with nearly 45% of the 
world’s total malting barley resulting in 9 million tonnes – nearly sufficient to satisfy the EU’s annual 
malting demand of 11 million tonnes.21 Over 60% of all barley grown in the EU occurs within France, 
Germany, the UK and Spain with the former three also possessing over half of the EU’s total malting 
capacity. Both Canada and the EU maintain surpluses in trade of barley and malt and are among the 
world’s leaders in trade of these products. Although the EU accounts for nearly two-thirds of world 
exports of malt, Canada is one of the EU’s primary competitors serving as the second largest exporter 
after the EU. Bilateral trade is therefore limited with the two instead competing primarily in third 
markets.  
Similarly, both Canada and the EU are the world’s top two producers of oilseeds, with Canada being the 
single largest producing country though with less overall production than the 27 combined members of 
the EU. Canada’s production of oilseeds is predominantly in Canola, a Canadian innovation which is an 
abbreviation of ‘Canadian oil’ and is trademarked and licensed by the Canadian Canola Council.22 
Production is concentrated in Western Canada, with the three Prairie Provinces together with the Peace 
River region of British Columbia accounting for 99% of the total seeded area.23 Canola has become an 
increasingly important crop for Canada’s agricultural sector with production increasing 174% from 2002 
to 2009 making it Canada’s second most valuable crop after wheat. Production is mainly geared towards 
export with Canada accounting for 75% of global exports, and with exports of canola seed, oil and meal 
valued at over C$3 billion.24 Within the EU, oilseeds production is primarily in rapeseed, which 
accounted for almost three-fourths of all oilseeds production in 2009, though sunflower production is 
also a significant source of production accounting for almost the entire remainder of production (by 
volume). Production is less concentrated than in Canada. In terms of rapeseed, France and Germany are 
the two largest producers accounting for nearly half of the volume of all production, though the New 
Member States of Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic are also significant 
producers together accounting for 30% of all EU production.   
Bilateral trade of grains and oilseeds between Canada and the EU is generally classified as moving from 
the former to the latter with wheat and oilseeds (including soybeans) serving as the two largest 
exported agricultural products from Canada to the EU. Due to its importance in pasta making, Italy is the 
primary destination for Canadian exports of durum wheat to the EU, while the UK serves as the top 
destination for milling wheat.25 Table 11, below further highlights that of the top four Canadian 
agricultural exports to the EU in 2009, each falls under the category of wheat or oilseeds, with these 
four alone making up over 55% of the total value of agri-food exports from Canada to the EU.26  
                                                             
20 Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada. http://www4.agr.gc.ca/AAFC-AAC/display-afficher.do?id=1171560813521 
21 Euromalt. http://www.coceral.com/cms/beitrag/10011989/248433 
22 Casseus, L. (2007)  
23 Ibid.  
24 Canola Council of Canada.  
25 Government of Canada. http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/eu-ue/policies-
politiques/trade_stats_commerciales.aspx?lang=eng 
26 Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (2010). ‘Agri-Food Regional Profile: European Union 27’. 
http://www.ats.agr.gc.ca/eur/4148-eng.htm 
EU-Canada SIA Final Report 
52 
 
 
 
Table 11: Top 4 Canadian agri-food exports to the EU in 2009 (millions of CAN$) 
Product Export value 
Durum wheat $456.9 
Soybeans $327.0 
Wheat nes and meslin $245.0 
Linseed, whether or not broken $102.0 
Total Agri-food exports $2,046.2 
Source: Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada 
 
 
Box 1: Pulse crops 
 
Over the past several decades, Canada has emerged as a global leader in the production and export of 
pulse crops such as peas, beans and lentils. Growing demand in Asian markets, in particular, has helped 
fuel this transformation, with the Canadian Prairies (most notably Saskatchewan) being the leading 
producers and exporters in Canada. The potential for further growth in the sector in Canada remains 
strong, particularly given the growing wealth and sizeable population of Asia as well as the 
accompanying environmental benefits from growth and consumption of pulse crops.  
While there is significant potential for growth within the industry, there are several reasons to believe 
that the CETA will not have a pronounced impact on the sector. First, the main market for Canadian 
pulse crops is not the EU, but rather Asian and African markets, with the latter expected to serve as an 
important engine of export growth over the next several decades. Canadian exports of pulse crops to 
the EU have been steady in recent years while demand in the EU has also been largely unchanged.27 
Second, as noted by the Government of Canada, ‘there are few market access issues for Canadian pulse 
exports to the EU’, with peas, beans, chickpeas and lentils already able to be imported into the EU duty 
free, with Canadian grown pulses also not requiring a phytosanitary inspection certificate from the 
Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) in order to be imported into the EU.28 While it is the case that 
the EU’s biofuel polices impact Canadian pulse crop production through its impact on global demand 
and price of crops, it is not expected that the CETA will have a significant role in this regard. Given these 
factors mitigating the potential impact on Canadian pulse crops under the CETA, the sector is not 
assessed in the SIA.29  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
27 Clancey, B. (2009).  
28 Government of Canada. http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/eu-ue/policies-politiques/reports_pulse-
legumineuse_rapports.aspx?lang=eng 
29 This is supported by CGE modelling results presented in Tables 1-6 in Annex 6. Here, pulse crops are included in the GTAP 
sector of ‘vegetables & fruits’ which as seen in the aforementioned tables are not expected to be significantly impacted by the 
CETA. Specifically, the simulation results project limited changes in output and overall exports as a result of the CETA.  
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ANALYSIS 
Canada 
Overall, liberalisation under the CETA is likely to have a limited impact on Canadian growers of grains 
and oilseeds, with the degree and direction of this impact expected to depend on the level of 
liberalisation reached under the Agreement as well as external factors influencing global production and 
price.   
For wheat, tariff liberalisation under the CETA is expected to positively impact Canadian production and 
exports over the long-term under the scenarios modelling full removal of all tariffs (Scenarios C and D), 
though production is expected to increase less than 0.25% across all scenarios  while overall exports are 
estimated to increase less than 0.2%. These increases in exports would likely have a small positive effect 
on Canada’s trade balance of wheat, with the overall balance estimated to increase by nearly $5 million 
and the balance with the EU by a mere 0.46%.  
Conversely, less ambitious removal of tariffs (Scenarios A and B) is estimated to result in decreases in 
output of wheat by as much as -1.53% over the long-term and declines of total exports of -1.64%. Given 
that tariffs for wheat remain unchanged between the four scenarios, the outcome is likely contingent on 
the sector’s linkages with the livestock industry, particularly with reference to animal feed.  
The limited gains/moderate declines estimated for Canada – one of the world’s largest producers and 
exporters of wheat – stem largely from the already low MFN tariffs in the EU. While wheat entering the 
EU is generally subject to a series of tariffs and TRQs depending on the type (non-durum or durum) and 
quality (high, medium or low), tariffs on durum and high quality non-durum wheat (i.e. wheat having a 
minimum protein content of 14% according to EU measurement standards) are currently suspended due 
to significant increases in global price after a tightening of supply. With the modelling adjusting to this 
by eliminating all tariffs on wheat in the EU, the impact from liberalisation under the CETA has been 
significantly reduced.30  
This does not, however, imply that the CETA could not have a more pronounced impact on the Canadian 
wheat sector over the long term. The zero tariffs on durum wheat and high quality wheat have only 
been suspended and could be reintroduced in the future with increased global production and lowered 
prices. To this end, earlier simulations that modelled a reduction in tariffs as a result of the CETA 
projected sizeable increases in wheat production and exports in Canada.31 While these results were 
viewed to be overstated given the de facto zero tariffs currently in place in the EU, there is reason to 
believe that were the CETA to make these reduced tariffs permanent, the Agreement could have a 
noticeable positive impact on Canadian wheat growers. Further, low and medium quality non-durum 
wheat continues to be subject to a TRQ, with Canada’s reserve being 38,853 tonnes, as well as an in-
quota duty of 12€/tonne and an out-of-quota duty of 95€/tonne.32 For these grades of non-durum 
wheat the CETA could have a positive impact on Canadian producers – particularly organic farmers 
whose wheat is more prone to being labelled as medium or low quality according to EU measurements – 
if the CETA leads to an increased TRQ.33 
                                                             
30 The GTAP model aggregates all wheat and does not separate based on type or quality. This requires eliminating all tariffs or 
none at all. Based on discussions with the contracting authority, it was decided that the former path was the more appropriate.  
31 See Interim Report 
32 Government of Canada. http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/eu-ue/policies-politiques/reports_wheat-
ble_rapports.aspx?lang=eng 
33 It is, however, difficult to quantitatively assess the impact given the lack of specific data on wheat of the grade. Wheat, 
according to quality, is listed at the 8-10 digit HS code, for which data is not readily available.  
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As a final point regarding wheat, there is potential for the impact to be influenced by the CETA’s effect 
on the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB), which is argued by the EC and others as being a non-competitive 
seller (see box below).  
 
Box  2: State-trading in Canada’s wheat sector  
The Canadian Wheat Board 
 
One area within Canada’s wheat producing sector that has received particular attention is that of the 
Canadian Wheat Board. Established in 1935 by the Canadian Parliament as a means of controlling the 
price of grains, the CWB is a state-run trading company that is granted monopsony status as the 
country’s only exporter of wheat and barley. With Canadian farmers in the Western Prairies34 being 
required to sell their wheat and barley to the CWB, the CWB is the largest wheat and barley marketer in 
the world, accounting for 20% of the world’s wheat and barley sales.35   
Although the CWB was reformed to meet free market conditions under NAFTA and WTO agreements, it 
continues to receive complaints from the US and EU through claims that its exclusive rights over the 
export of wheat and barley from Canada make it non-competitive. The EU in particular has expressed 
negative views towards supply management practices used by such state-trading enterprises as the 
CWB, maintaining their provision of an unfair competitive advantage.   
The role that the CETA has on trade in wheat and barley between Canada and the EU may therefore be 
influenced by its impact on the CWB.  
 
 
Modelling results suggest that Canadian producers of barley will likely see limited gains over the long-
term as a result of tariff liberalisation under the CETA. While it is difficult to discern the model’s specific 
estimates for barley due to its grouping with all non-wheat grains, results suggest negligible changes in 
output and exports over the long-term.   
Given the nature of restrictions on barley, it is expected that any gains would mostly accrue to 
producers of malting barley. Imports of barley into the EU, as with low and medium quality wheat, are 
controlled by quota with separate TRQs for feed barley and malting barley. The TRQ for feed barley is 
significantly larger at 306,250 tonnes and an in-quota tariff of 16 €/tonne, while the TRQ for malting 
barley is smaller (50,000 tonnes and an in-quota duty of 8%) and mandates that the barley meet a 
number of criteria.36 Given that the EU requires annual imports of roughly 2 million tonnes of malting 
barley to satisfy domestic demand in the brewery sector, there is potential for Canadian producers to 
realise gains in the form of a satisfactory reservation for Canadian exporters.  
Despite its increasing importance in recent years, it is expected that the impact of the CETA on oilseeds 
will be limited over the long-term. Modelling results show that the CETA will lead to minor changes in 
production (-0.57% to 0.32%) and minor to moderate declines overall exports (-1.14% to -0.06%). As 
                                                             
34 Farmers in Eastern Canada and in most of British Columbia are not under the Board’s authority and may market their grain on 
the open market 
35 Statistics Canada 
36 Government of Canada. http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/eu-ue/policies-politiques/reports_barley-
orge_rapports.aspx?lang=eng 
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observed with wheat, the changes appear to be tied to the impact on Canada’s livestock sector, due to 
the role oilseeds play in animal feed.  
With most of its canola being of GM varieties, one of the greatest barriers to Canada’s trade of oilseeds 
with the EU has been the EU’s approval process for GMOs, which is argued by Canada to have lead to 
‘de facto moratorium on approvals’ since its implementation in 2003.37 The role the CETA could play in 
this regard appears to have been lessened, however, with Brussels reportedly approving the last GM 
canola seed used by Canadian farmers in March 2009 and with both sides agreeing in July of the same 
year to meet bi-annually to discuss issues pertaining to GM products.38 Further, Canadian canola is more 
deeply impacted by North American and Asian demand, further calling into the question the impact the 
CETA is likely to have on Canadian growers.   
 
EU 
Overall, liberalisation under the CETA is likely to have a limited impact on EU growers of grains and 
oilseeds, with the degree and direction of this impact expected to depend on the level of liberalisation 
reached under the Agreement as well as external factors influencing global production and price.   
The EU maintains a negative trade balance with Canada in trade of wheat, barley and oilseeds and it is 
unlikely that the CETA will improve the existing deficits in these products. Modelling results suggest that 
the overall impact, while negative, will likely be negligible with limited changes in production of wheat (-
0.05% to 0.06%), other grains (-0.04% to 0.02%) and oilseeds (-0.03% to -0.04%) projected. These 
changes in production will similarly translate into limited changes in overall exports and the balance of 
trade of these products – both with Canada and overall.  
With respect to wheat and barley, the EU has raised concerns over the existence of a discriminatory 
tariff system that favours imports from Canada’s NAFTA partners (the U.S. and Mexico). Hereto, out-of-
quota duties for the U.S. and Mexico remain preferential while being significantly higher for non-NAFTA 
members such as the EU.39 As noted, the CGE simulations do not generally support the view that the 
CETA may lead to sizeable gains in exports of wheat and barley from the EU to Canada. Bilaterally, the 
modelling suggests that the EU will experience minor increases in exports of wheat (2.3%) and barley 
(2.9%) to Canada with the full removal of tariffs, but given the low level of existing trade these bilateral 
increases are negligible and not expected to result in a noticeably positive impact for EU producers.   
Further, while EU MFN duties and quotas on durum wheat and high quality non-durum wheat have 
been suspended, their permanent removal under the CETA could potentially have negative long-term 
impacts on EU producers. Hereto, earlier CGE simulations which treated tariffs on wheat as changing 
from the previous rates to zero show that the CETA could lead to sizeable decreases in output and 
overall exports in the EU over the long-term, suggesting that limited protection from Canadian 
producers in a global market where excess supply drives down prices could have a negative economic 
impact on EU growers of wheat.  
  
 
                                                             
37 DFAIT (2009). ‘Trade Barrier Fiche: Canola’. http://w01.international.gc.ca/CIMAR-RCAMI/fiche-
detail.aspx?id=1449&lang=eng 
38 International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (2009).   
39 Market Access Database (2009). ‘TRQ on wheat and barley and their products’. 
http://madb.europa.eu/madb_barriers/barriers_details.htm?barrier_id=960046&version=4 
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INDICATOR: Employment  
BASELINE 
In 2006, 81,990 Canadian farm operators were involved in grain and oilseed farming, with the following 
breakdown: Soybean (8,390), other oilseeds (13,505), corn (4,880), dry peas and beans (1,590), Wheat 
(15,480), and other grains (38,145). This constitutes a sharp increase of 73.3% for oilseed (except 
soybean) operators from 2001. In contrast, the number of operators involved in the production of grain 
production decreased between 2001 and 2006, with the wheat sector experiencing a decline of 21.3%.40 
 
ANALYSIS 
Canada  
In general, the modelling results suggest that the CETA’s impact on employment in Canada’s grains and 
oilseeds sector will depend on the level of liberalisation. As shown in Appendix 6, minor gains are 
expected under the full removal of all tariffs, with declines in wheat and oilseeds estimated to arise in 
the scenarios where meat products are not liberalised in the EU. These declines are expected to be 
partly offset by greater increases in employment within the other grains sector, though overall it 
appears that less liberalisation would have a more detrimental impact on employment for Canada’s 
grains and oilseeds.     
As noted earlier, earlier simulations that accounted for the permanent removal of tariffs and quotas in 
the EU on durum wheat and high quality non-durum wheat suggest that the CETA could lead to far 
greater increases in the demand for labour of wheat, increasing employment in the sector. However, 
such an outcome would require that the EU reinstate TRQs on durum and high-quality non-durum 
wheat while at the same time allowing Canadian producers to be able to export to the EU duty free.  
 
 EU 
Within the EU, it is not envisaged that the CETA will have a pronounced impact over the long-term on 
employment within the grains and oilseeds sector. CGE estimates suggest that under full removal of 
tariffs, the CETA may lead to a very minor decline in the demand for growers of wheat (-0.05%) and 
oilseeds (-0.04%) over the long-term and a very minor increase in the demand for growers of other 
grains (0.02%). This situation is, however, reversed under a scenario where certain sectors are kept 
sensitive. Regardless, the impact on employment is expected to be negligible across all scenarios.  
As noted elsewhere, these results are largely contingent on the continued tightened global supply of 
wheat and the maintenance of a zero duty in the EU on durum wheat and high-quality non-durum 
wheat. In instances where i) changing global circumstances lead to the EU reinstalling the TRQs on these 
wheat products; while ii) Canada has gained preferential access to the EU from the CETA and is either 
not subject to these duties or granted a larger reservation within the TRQ – there is potential for the 
CETA to have a more adverse effect on employment in the EU’s wheat sector over the long-term. This, 
however, would also likely be contingent on the continued inability to conclude Doha negotiations, 
making it questionable whether such an outcome is likely over the longer term.  
 
 
 
                                                             
40 Statistics Canada 
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Beef & Pork41 
 
INDICATOR: Output and trade  
BASELINE 
Accounting for nearly one-quarter of all farms (90,000 primary producers) and one-fifth of all annual 
farm cash receipts (C$26 billion), the beef industry serves as Canada’s single largest agricultural 
commodity.42 Of all cow-calf farms in Canada, 72% are located in the western Provinces with almost half 
being in Alberta, where dependence on cattle production is highest with approximately 44% of its total 
farm receipts generated by beef and over 40% of its farms devoted to its production.43 Additionally, the 
processing of red meat, pork, lamb and horse is Canada’s 11th largest manufacturing industry and its 
single largest sector within Canadian food manufacturing with revenues of over C$16.3 billion per year.44 
The industry has become significantly concentrated in recent years with the top 4 slaughter houses and 
processing plants account for 75% of the total slaughter.45 
Canada is a major exporter of beef and beef products and has become increasingly export oriented as a 
result of the restructuring that has occurred in the Canada/US market under NAFTA. In 2008, exports 
totalled 37% of domestic production allowing Canada to maintain its consistent and healthy trade 
surplus in cattle and beef.46  Cattle numbers in Canada have swelled to record heights and with minimal 
growth potential domestically, export markets have taken on an increased importance. While the EU 
could potentially serve as a growth market for the Canadian industry, the EU’s stance towards hormone 
treated beef (Box 3) has instead forced producers to look towards markets such as Mexico, Japan, China 
and Southeast Asia.  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
41 Poultry is not included in this report. Although considered during the screening and scoping exercise within the initial phases 
of the SIA and determined to have a number of sensitivities, the scope for an impact under the CETA was determined to be 
minimal. Both Canada and the EU have TRQs for poultry, with both seeking to maintain import restrictions. For Canada, this 
includes a desire to maintain the system of supply management (see section on Dairy for more information on supply 
management), which has been publicly defended in the context of the CETA by a number of Canadian policymakers. Specifically, 
Canada operates under a system designed to limit production so as to balance supply with domestic demand, limiting its excess 
supply that can be exported while controlling the amount of imports. In recent years, Canada has increased exports to foreign 
markets, though this has been primarily to Asia and been in response to the low demand in Canada for certain chicken parts 
(which are subsequently also in relatively low demand in the EU). As such, and with it unlikely that the CETA will lead to the 
removal of supply management in the poultry sector, it is unlikely that the Agreement will negatively impact the poultry sectors 
in either Canada or the EU. For the latter, improved and permanent duty-free access to Canadian animal feed could help EU 
poultry producers stabilise production costs over the long-term, though it is not envisaged that defensive interests in the sector 
will be compromised. 
42 CAFTA (2008).   
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada 
46 Canada Beef Export Federation 
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Box 3: Hormone-treated Beef 
 
The EU ban on hormone treated beef has been in place since the early 1980s. Canada and the US 
challenged the EU's non-discriminatory ban at the WTO in 1996. The WTO Appellate Body found in 1998 
that the rules were not consistent with one provision of the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures and in 1999 Canada and the US were given permission to impose sanctions in the 
form of additional tariffs.  
While a new EC Hormones Directive was issued in 2003, based scientific findings that one hormone 
(oestradiol 17) had been found to cause and promote cancer and harm genes, Canada and the US rejected 
the evidence underpinning this directive and maintained their sanctions. In 2004 the EU challenged these 
sanctions. In November 2008, the Appellate Body ruled that it was unable to complete the analysis of the 
WTO-compatibility of the EU legislation due to mistakes made by the Panel in gathering factual 
information, and consequently did not give a definitive view on the legality of the Canadian and US 
sanctions. It did however clarify certain aspects of the SPS agreement. Furthermore, it recommended that 
the EU, Canada and US start compliance proceedings to see if the current EU legislation remedied the 
breaches that the WTO had identified in 1998, and as a result Canada and US should end their sanctions.  
Recent negotiations between the EC and the US, whose beef exports were subject to the ban, have 
resulted in the opening by the EU of a duty free hormone free erga omnes tariff quota.  A similar deal 
has recently been reached between the EC and Canada.   
 
 
In the EU, beef production reaches about 7.5 million tonnes per year and accounts for approximately 
10% of total agricultural production. Production occurs in all Member States, but is most prominent in 
Spain, France and Italy. Pasture based production is practiced particularly in the Northern and Western 
regions plus the UK with cereal based production favoured in Central, Eastern and Mediterranean 
regions. The EU’s annual consumption exceeds domestic production by over 500,000 tonnes, making the 
country reliant on imports. Given its wealth and size, the EU is a major market for beef and beef 
products, with Germany, the UK and France serving as the leading consumers.47  
The EU operates a TRQ on imports of beef with the Canadian reserve being 11,500 tonnes of high quality 
beef.48 Tariffs on this reserve are generally viewed as being prohibitive with in-quota duties of 20% and 
out-of-quota tariffs ranging from 12.8% + 176.8€/100kg to 12.8% + 303.4 €/100kg depending on cut and 
product.49 Late in 2010, however, Canada was granted access to an erga omnes duty-free 20,000 tonne 
quota on beef,50 which the Canadian Beef Export Federation estimates may generate more than C$10 
million annually for the industry.51 With this MFN quota set to increase by an additional 25,000 tonnes 
by 2012 and with a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Government of Canada and the 
EC likely to lead to the expansion of this quota by an additional 3,200 tonnes, it appears Canadian 
producers will ultimately be granted access to a 48,200 duty-free quota. These developments will have a 
positive impact on the Canadian beef industry.   
                                                             
47 Government of Canada. http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/eu-ue/policies-politiques/reports_beef-
boeuf_rapports.aspx?lang=eng  
48 HQB refers to beef graded Canada A, AA, AAA, Choice and Prime.  
49 Government of Canada. http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/eu-ue/policies-politiques/reports_beef-
boeuf_rapports.aspx?lang=eng 
50 Joining the US and Australia as those who have access to this quota 
51 Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (2010b).   
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Canada is also one of the world’s leading pork producing nations. While Canada’s more than 6,000 pork 
producers represent only 2.6% of Canada’s total farms, they account for more than 10% of total farm 
gate receipts (C$3.4 billion in 2006).52 The sector is active throughout Canada, but takes on greater 
importance in Quebec and Manitoba where it accounts for 6.3% and 4%, respectively, of total farms and 
15.5% and 27% of total farm gate receipts. In addition to primary production, the industry consists of 
value-added processors which increase the sector’s total economic contribution to nearly C$10 billion 
annually.  
Canada is the world’s third largest exporter of pork and pork products behind the US and EU, but with 
more the half of annual hog production exported to foreign markets Canada’s industry is far more 
export oriented. While exports in 2009 exceeded C$2.6 billion (more than four times the value of 
imports) the EU serves an almost negligible role, ranking as the 17th most important export market for 
Canadian pork in 2009 (0.3% of the total value of pork exports). Similarly, Canada receives few imports 
from the EU.  
Pork is the most widely consumed meat in the EU, with average annual consumption three times that of 
beef and twice that of poultry.53 As such, production is widespread throughout the EU with output in 
2008 reaching 22.4 million tonnes (260m pigs). Germany is the largest producer of pork in the EU with 
about 40 million pigs slaughtered each year, followed by Spain, France, Denmark and the Netherlands. 
While being the second largest exporter, the EU is far less export oriented than Canada with only 8.5% 
of total production (by volume) exported in 2008.54 
 
ANALYSIS 
Canada 
Given the wealth and size of the EU market, there is significant potential for Canadian meat producers to 
realise gains from improved market access. Overall, the assessment shows that the CETA could result in 
considerable gains to producers of both beef and pork over the long-term. The size of these gains, 
however, stems largely from removal/reduction in two types of market access barriers: i) tariffs/quotas 
and ii) non-tariff barriers (most notably TBT/SPS measures). 
Results from the CGE model shows that that tariff liberalisation under the CETA would have a positive 
impact on the Canadian beef industry over the long-term. Simulations show that full elimination of 
tariffs could raise output by over 1.5% (Tables 9-16 in Annex 6) while also leading to a 5% increase in 
overall exports and an $80 million improvement to the sectoral balance of trade. Increased bilateral 
exports to the EU would be the leading cause of these gains with exports of beef to the EU-27 increasing 
by approximately 220%, leading to a $100 million improvement to the bilateral trade balance in beef.55 
It should be noted that these exports would be expected to be hormone free beef, as it is not expected 
that the EU will lift its ban on genetically modified beef. To this end, it is envisaged that if significant 
increases in market access are granted to Canadian producers, they could be induced to increase their 
hormone free production over the long-term, allowing them to realise the estimates from the model. 
                                                             
52 CAFTA (2008).   
53 Government of Canada. http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/eu-ue/policies-politiques/reports_pork-
porc_rapports.aspx?lang=eng 
54 European Commission. http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/markets/pig/index_en.htm 
55 The discrepancy observed between the value of the bilateral trade balance and that of the overall balance of trade suggests 
that 3rd countries will likely experience reduced imports from Canada as beef is diverted to the EU. 
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Conversely, Scenarios A and B (which do not liberalise beef) suggest that maintaining sensitivities in the 
EU on the import of beef would likely lead to moderate declines in output (-0.22% to -0.25%) and overall 
exports (-2.02% to -2.34%) of beef and beef products 
 The potential impact on the Canadian industry would also be affected by the degree to which a number 
of non-tariff barriers are addressed. As discussed in Box 3 above, the ban on genetically modified beef 
serves to reduce exports from Canada to the EU, with it being the Canadian perspective that such SPS 
measures serve as an NTB to Canada’s trade in beef with the EU.56 Nevertheless, it appears highly 
unlikely that the CETA would eliminate this ban, requiring instead that Canadian producers fill this 
increased quota with hormone-free beef. One problem herein is that it would be difficult for Canadian 
producers to rapidly increase exports given that the majority of Canadian cattle would not qualify as 
hormone free. This being said, improved access through reduced tariffs and/or larger quotas could 
induce Canadian producers to shift an increased amount of their production towards hormone-free 
cattle over the long-term. This would similarly lead to increased investment in slaughterhouses that 
were dedicated to hormone-free production in line with EU protocol. Given that demand in the EU 
exceeds production, significantly greater access to the EU could lead to aggressive expansion in the 
Canadian Prairies as domestic producers would be provided with greater ability to fill this demand. To 
this end, the Canadian Cattlemen’s Association believes Canada could produce significant herds of 
hormone-free cattle within 5 to 10 years of the conclusion of a CETA (60,000 to 100,000 tonnes) with 
more room for expansion over the longer-term.57 
An additional SPS/TBT barrier facing Canadian exporters includes the EU’s Third Country Meat Directive, 
which places strict requirements on the standards of processing plants, production methods and meat 
hygiene. Hereto, exports to the EU require that beef is slaughtered, processed and stored in approved 
abattoirs, packing plants and cold stores. Canadian exporters feel that the EU’s BSE-related measures 
affecting livestock and meat and its Maximum Residue Limits for various compounds are issues which 
inhibit the flow of beef to the EU.58 While the study feels that it is unlikely that the CETA would lead to 
the removal of these issues, the Agreement could create greater cooperation and dialogue, improving 
Canadian producers’ ability to comply with these issues.    
 
Box 4: Bison, the other red meat 
 
In addition to beef, producers and exporters of bison meat could realise gains from the CETA. As a red 
meat without a separate tariff line in the EU, bison meat imported into the EU is subject to the TRQ for 
beef.59 The Canadian industry and the Western Provinces would like to diversify their production and 
look at CETA as a way to achieve that. 60 While the possible gains may take some time to materialise 
(due to a limited market in the EU), greater access could allow Canadian producers of hormone-free 
bison meat to establish a niche market in the EU provided adequate demand exists.  
 
                                                             
56 Government of Canada. http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/eu-ue/policies-politiques/reports_beef-
boeuf_rapports.aspx?lang=eng 
57 http://albertabeef.org/news/archived-news/?issue=286; http://www.cattle.ca/market-access-status-europe  
58 Canadian Association of Importers and Exporters (2010).   
59 Viju et al. (2010).   
60 Ibid.  
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With respect to pork, it appears that the CETA could produce even more pronounced gains for Canadian 
producers, though again this depends on the level of liberalisation established under an agreement. 
Imports of pork into the EU are controlled by three separate TRQs: 2 open to all WTO members and 1 
for Canadian exporters only (Table 12).61 These TRQs are generally held to be overly restrictive, limiting 
the amount of pork that would otherwise be able to be exported from Canada.62 
 
Table 12: Pork TRQs in the EU 
TRQ Quota 
size 
(tonnes) 
Product description Tariff rate 
‘GATT 
Quotas’ 
70,390 35,625t boned loins and hams, fresh chilled or frozen 
5,000t tenderloin, fresh, chilled or frozen 
3,002t sausages, dry or for spreading, uncooked and others 
6,161t other prepared or preserved meat, meat offal or blood 
15,067t carcasses and half-carcasses, fresh, chilled or frozen 
5,535t cuts, fresh, chilled or frozen, boned and with bone-in, 
excluding tenderloin 
Varies by tariff 
line.  
€233/t  to 
€434/t 
‘Oilseed 
Quota’ 
7,000 Fresh or chilled loins and cuts thereof, with bone in; and 
frozen bellies and cuts thereof 
0% 
Canada-
only 
Quota 
4,624 Cuts, fresh, chilled or frozen, boned and with bone in, 
excluding tenderloin presented alone 
Varies by tariff 
line. €233/t  to 
€434/t 
Source: Government of Canada 
 
Results from the CGE simulation support these assertions, with the model showing that full removal of 
tariffs would have a significant and positive impact on output and exports in Canada’s pork industry over 
the long-term (See Annex 6).63 Output of pork could increase by over 6% according to the model with 
exports likewise having the potential to grow by over 12%, leading to a significant increase in the overall 
balance of trade ($300 million). These gains would be driven primarily by increased exports to the EU, as 
full removal of tariffs could lead to increases in bilateral exports of over 550%, improving Canada’s 
bilateral balance of trade by nearly $400 million.64Again, it should be noted that these estimates are 
operating under the assumption that Canada would, if granted significantly improved access to the EU, 
be able, over the long-term, to adjust production to meeting specific SPS requirements in place in the EU.   
Conversely, Scenarios A and B – which model the continued existence of current tariffs and TRQs on 
pork – show that maintaining sensitivities on pork in the EU could cause the CETA to potentially lead to 
                                                             
61 Government of Canada. http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/eu-ue/policies-politiques/reports_pork-
porc_rapports.aspx?lang=eng 
62 Nickel, R. (2009).  
63 As a note, the GTAP model groups together all non-cattle meats into one sector. The results therefore entail the impact on 
other products and should not be taken as solely referring to pork and pork products.  
64 Again, this larger increase to the bilateral balance of trade than the overall balance of trade occurs as a result of exports 
being diverted away from third countries and to the EU.  
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reduced output (-1.12% to -1.33%) and overall exports (-1.75% to -2.09%) in Canada, worsening 
Canada’s balance of trade in pork and pork products – both with the EU and overall. In this regard, the 
model suggests that liberalising other sectors while keeping pork sensitive would stimulate the 
movement of resources out of pork and into alternative, expanding sectors over the long-term.  
Other barriers to Canada’s trade in pork with the EU include the EU’s strict approval process for foreign 
processing plants. In 2005, Canada and the EU agreed to a sub-agreement for pork equivalency under 
the 1999 EU-Canada Veterinary Agreement, leading to mutual recognition of domestic food safety 
measures for pork between the two sides. While this agreement has eased the burdens associated with 
exporting pork from Canada to the EU, the limited market access fostered by the EU’s TRQs has limited 
investment in Canada in upgrading processing plants and procedures. As such, only one processing plant 
had received EU approval as of 2009.65 Under a scenario where the CETA sufficiently improves market 
access for Canadian producers, it is likely that greater investment in plants that meet EU standards 
would occur, benefitting the Canadian pork industry.  
Another important aspect which is likely to influence the CETA’s impact on the Canadian beef and pork 
industries are the rules of origin that are ultimately agreed to. While the EU tends to advocate that 
origin should be traced back to birth, Canada prefers that origin be determined by where the animal was 
slaughtered. Were the CETA’s RoO resemble those of Canada, this would likely benefit Canadian 
producers as many of the animals slaughtered in Canada are born in the US.66 Under such an outcome, 
the ultimate gains for Canadian producers of beef and pork would be greater.   
 
EU 
Overall, the impact on the EU beef and pork industry will depend largely on the level of liberalisation 
reached under the CETA. With greater market access provided to Canadian producers, the likelihood of 
reductions in output and overall exports in the EU increases. The beef and pork sectors are particularly 
sensitive in the EU, with nearly all EU interests in the sector being defensive ones. Canada is viewed as a 
serious potential competitor in both the pork and beef sectors and it has been expressed by 
stakeholders67 that utmost caution must be taken when negotiating any tariff or quota liberalisations 
pertaining to these products. These concerns are validated by the CGE modelling results which show 
that if sensitivities are maintained, the CETA will have a limited impact, but that if the Agreement 
liberalises beef and pork, it will have a negative impact on output, exports and the balance of trade in 
the EU over the long-term.  
In beef, the modelling suggests that the EU will experience moderate declines in output and exports 
over the long-term if the Canada is allowed duty-free access to the EU market. Over the long-term 
output is predicted to decrease by 0.15% and overall exports by more than 0.55%, resulting in a 
worsening of the trade balance by nearly $90 million (See Tables 9-16 in Annex 6). Conversely, scenarios 
that do not model a reduction in tariffs on beef show that under such an outcome, the CETA would not 
change EU production of beef, while having a negligible impact on overall exports (-0.03% to -0.04%) 
and the EU’s overall balance of trade in beef and beef products (-$5m to -$7m) over the long-term.  
As with beef, the EU pork industry is particularly sensitive. Canada, as a major competitor and exporter 
of pork has historically been unable to penetrate the EU market due to restricted TRQs and the limited 
incentive to meeting EU SPS requirements. Results from the CGE analysis generally validate these 
                                                             
65 Nickel, R. (2009).  
66 Canadian Association of Importers and Exporters (2010).   
67 European Livestock and Meat Traders Union (UECBV) and the Danish Meat Industry Federation   
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concerns and predict that fully removing tariffs on Canadian imports of pork would sizeable declines in 
output (-0.44%) and exports (-0.92%) within the EU (See Annex 6).68 While exports to Canada would be 
expected to increase (by perhaps as much as 25%), these would be expected to be dwarfed by imports 
from Canada, potentially worsening the EU’s total balance of trade in pork and pork products by as 
much as $360 million.  Conversely, scenarios that model the maintenance of tariffs on pork in the EU 
suggest that the present system’s continued existence would be expected to further safeguard the 
industry from competition with Canadian imports. Under such a scenario, output and exports are 
expected to show almost no change (both increasing by 0.02% over the long-term in Scenarios A and B), 
leading to almost no change in the overall balance of trade ($1m to $2.3m).  
These estimates are further influenced by the assumed continued existence of EU rules on GMOs as well 
as SPS requirements regarding slaughtering, processing and additives. To the degree that these were 
relaxed – which is unlikely – imports from Canada could increase further.  
For both beef and pork, an important factor that will influence output and exports in the EU would be 
the rules of origin that are ultimately agreed to under the CETA. As noted in the section on Canada, the 
EU’s stance is generally that origin is determined by where an animal is born, while Canada prefers 
origin being determined by at the point of slaughter. As a large number of animals slaughtered in 
Canada are born in the United States, rules of origin that take the Canadian preference, would most 
likely increase the potentially adverse effect for EU producers. Where EU rules are maintained and 
Canadian access to the EU market is significantly improved, the EU industry would likely be shielded 
from short-term increases in imports from Canada. However, with such improved access, it is envisaged 
that Canadian producers could adjust production over the long-term to meet EU RoO.  
 
INDICATOR: Employment  
BASELINE 
More than 90,000 primary beef producers operate in Canada with a further 6,000 involved in the 
breeding of pigs. The processing sector for beef and pork is a substantial source of rural employment 
employing more than 46,000 people.69  
 
ANALYSIS 
Canada 
With the EU largely maintaining defensive interests, the impact on employment in Canada is largely 
contingent on the level of liberalisation afforded Canadian producers and exporters under the CETA. 
Under a scenario of full removal of tariffs in both the beef and pork sectors, the CGE model estimates 
that the CETA will have a positive and significant impact on employment in Canada. Hereto, the demand 
for labour in Canada’s beef sector is estimated to increase by as much as 1.3%, with skilled and unskilled 
labour being similarly impacted. The projected effect on the pork sector is expected to be even more 
pronounced, with full removal of tariffs potentially leading to an increase in employment of over 6% 
(Table 16 in Annex 6).  
                                                             
68 It is important to note that the GTAP model groups together all non-red meat into a single grouping, making it difficult to 
determine the precise estimates for pork.  
69 CAFTA (2008).   
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Alternatively, where the CETA does not lead to liberalisation in beef or pork in the EU, employment is 
expected to be negatively impacted over the long-term. Specifically, beef is estimated to see a decline in 
the demand for labour by as much as -0.4%, while employment in the pork sector is expected to 
decrease by as much as -1.4%.   
 
EU 
The degree to which sensitivities on beef and pork are maintained within the EU will ultimately 
determine the impact on employment in these sectors. Where Canadian access is only mildly improved, 
it is likely that the industry will avoid any impactful decreases in employment as a result of the CETA. 
This is supported by results from Scenarios A and B within the CGE model, which show that employment 
in the EU will not change over the long-term if sensitivities for the beef and pork sectors are maintained. 
However, where Canadian access is significantly increased, there is potential for overall employment in 
the industry to show noticeable declines. This is further supported in the CGE estimates where full 
removal of tariffs is shown to decrease demand for labour in Canada’s beef sector by as much as -0.17% 
and in the pork sector by perhaps -0.4%. This impact would be expected to become exacerbated under a 
more liberalised scenario and where rules of origin adhere to Canadian preferences.    
 
Dairy 
 
INDICATOR:  Output and trade 
BASELINE 
With total net farm receipts of C$5.2 billion in 2008, the Canadian dairy sector is the third largest 
agricultural industry in Canada behind grain and red meat. At the retail level, dairy products are valued 
at C$9 billion, accounting for 15% of all sales in the food and beverage industry. Ontario and Quebec 
serve as largest suppliers of dairy products, representing nearly 70% of dairy cash receipts in 2009.70   
Stability of supply and price has been a fundamental goal in the Canadian dairy industry, with supply 
management being the primary means of obtaining these ends (See Box 7). Supply management has, 
however, greatly inhibited export performance with Canada accounting for only 1-2% of dairy products 
traded internationally.71 Exports in 2009 totalled only $221.9 million, which, despite prohibitive TRQs on 
imports, resulted in a trade deficit of $123.8 million.72  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
70 Government of Canada (2009).   
71 Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada 
72 UN Comtrade 
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Box 7: Supply management in the Canadian dairy sector 
 
Canada’s dairy industry operates under a system of supply management according to three pillars: i) 
import control, ii) producer pricing, and iii) production discipline. The system’s main goal is the 
stabilisation of revenues for dairy farmers and the avoidance of costly surpluses. In carrying out these 
objectives, the Canadian Dairy Commission (CDC) determines the quantity of milk to be produced at the 
national level and uses a series of production quotas in an attempt to balance production and 
consumption throughout the year. The CDC then delegates production shares to each province, with 
milk marketing boards at the provincial level tasked with promoting, controlling and regulating 
production, transport, packing, storing and marketing of milk and dairy products. These boards are also 
tasked with licensing producers, transporters and processors as well as regulating prices (based on 
support prices published by the CDC) that are negotiated with producers.   
Proponents of supply management in Canada’s dairy sector argue that the system ensures fairness and 
income security for producers; requires no government subsidy or support; and promotes long-term 
investments by dairy farmers.73 Opponents, however, argue that supply management only avoids 
subsidies by passing higher prices onto consumers; limits the industry’s ability to expand into export 
markets; and serves as a highly protectionist measure that hurts Canada’s position in trade 
negotiations.74 
 
 
The EU dairy sector is active in each Member State and is one of the most prominent sectors in many 
regions of the EU, including in remote areas with limited industrial diversification. The dairy industry 
gives many rural areas their distinctive character and, as such, is important for both the economy and 
employment in many Member States. Annual revenues for the European dairy industry generally exceed 
$100 billion and account for approximately 13% of total turnover in the EU food and beverage 
industry.75 Within the industry, the leading producers include Germany, France, the Netherlands, Italy 
and the UK, while cheese serves as the most lucrative sector, accounting for over 30% of the market’s 
overall value.76 
In terms of trade, the EU is a major net exporter of dairy products with total exports in 2009 of $7.47 
billion and a surplus of $6.68 billion.77 Germany, France and the Netherlands serve as three of the 
world’s largest exporters of dairy products, cumulatively accounting for nearly 40% of global exports in 
dairy in 2009.78 Cheese and milk/milk products serve as the two largest sources of exports, together 
accounting for 93% of the total value of dairy exports. Many Member States are globally renowned for 
their cheese production and, in many instances, are the predominant producer of certain speciality 
cheeses protected within the EU by GIs (See Box 8 for further discussion). While this has allowed the 
cheese industry to become more export oriented in recent years, the vast majority of the EU’s 
                                                             
73 Dairy Farmers of Canada. http://www.dairyfarmers.ca/what-we-do/supply-management/the-benefits-of-supply-
management 
74 Simpson. J. (2010).   
75 Datamonitor (2009); Euromilk. http://www.euromilk.org/eda/content_html.aspx?cid=426 
76 Datamonitor (2009).  
77 UN Comtrade 
78 Government of Canada (2009).  
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production continues to be consumed domestically, with only 6% of production (by volume) exported in 
2009.79  
In terms of bilateral trade, the EU controls a significant share of Canada’s dairy imports (42%). However, 
prohibitive TRQs have largely restricted market access for all Canadian trade partners, limiting overall 
imports and causing Canada to serve as a minor market for EU dairy exports. As such, EU dairy exports 
to Canada in 2009 totalled only $138.8 million representing less than 2% of the EU’s total exports.80 
Exports of cheese serve as the primary export product, accounting for nearly 97% of the value of total 
EU dairy exports to Canada in 2009. Trade, however, is largely one-sided with Canada’s dairy exports to 
the EU being only 15% of the value of dairy imports from the EU. Under the CETA, interests in Canada 
remain defensive while expanding the export market is viewed as a primary goal for the EU. 
 
ANALYSIS 
Canada 
The impact of the CETA on Canada’s dairy sector will likely be largely determined by the degree of 
liberalisation reached. Dairy serves as arguably the most sensitive agricultural sector for Canada, making 
it appear that the CETA could result in three (broadly defined) potential outcomes: 
1. Elimination of supply management in Canada, resulting in sizeable reductions in import controls 
and increases in the quota for imports 
2. Maintenance of sensitivities for dairy, resulting in the continued system of supply management 
and limited to no concessions on minimum access commitments for EU imports 
3. Improved minimum access commitments for certain products from the EU (e.g. specialty 
cheeses), resulting in a limited adjustment in the dairy sector’s system of supply management. 
The Canadian dairy sector has clear defensive concerns with respect the CETA, with the industry seeking 
a CETA whose outcome closely resembles the second of these three options and ensures the 
maintenance of the supply management system and its pillar of import controls.  
Industry concerns hereto are reflected within the CGE simulations, with two scenarios (A and B) 
modelling an outcome similar to point 2 above and a further two scenarios (C and D) modelling one 
similar to point 1. Under the two scenarios that retain sensitivities on dairy in Canada and continue to 
apply existing tariffs on imports from the EU, estimates suggest that the CETA would lead to significant 
increases in output (7.7%) and exports (117%) over the long-term, leading to improvements in the 
sectoral balance of trade by as much as $470 million.  
Alternatively, the two scenarios that model a full elimination of tariffs on EU imports of dairy project 
that the CETA will lead to substantial declines in output (over 12%) in Canada’s dairy sector over the 
long-term (Table 17 Annex 6). While liberalising the sector would stimulate its expansion into 
international markets – leading to increases in overall dairy exports of approximately 180% over the 
long-term – imports would be expected to rise by a significantly larger amount resulting in a $1.2 billion 
reduction in the overall sectoral balance of trade. This imbalance in trade would almost entirely be due 
to increased imports from the EU, which are estimated to increase by over 770% with the removal of 
tariffs. It should be noted, however, that while significant degrees of liberalisation would likely 
                                                             
79 Euromilk. http://www.euromilk.org/upload/docs/EU%20Dairy%20Market%20summary%202006-
2009%20+%202010%20forecast.pdf 
80 UN Comtrade 
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negatively impact Canadian dairy producers, it could benefit consumers by providing wider supply and 
lower prices.  
It is, however, unclear whether the CETA will lead to full liberalisation of the dairy sector. The dairy 
industry has been vocal in its opposition to liberalisation under the CETA, maintaining that tariffs and 
TRQs must be maintained in order to ensure that Canadian producers are not competing against 
‘subsidised producers from the EU’.81 With the government increasingly voicing its support of supply 
management in terms of the CETA negotiations, it therefore appears that a scenario such as that 
modelled in the CGE analysis is unlikely. Further, with import controls serving as one of the three pillars 
of supply management in Canada’s dairy sector, it becomes increasingly improbable that supply 
management is maintained and significant levels of liberalisation are achieved. As such (and with the 
government in apparent support of the system), it is unlikely that the first outcome outlined above will 
be reached under the CETA.   
Although the study believes that full removal of tariffs for the sector may be an unrealistic outcome of 
the CETA and the maintenance of sensitivities for dairy appears possible – Canada has, after all, 
protected supply management in all previous trade agreements – there remains the possibility that the 
EU could achieve some concessions. These would most likely take the form of improved minimum 
access commitments for certain products (i.e. specialty cheeses), resulting in a limited adjustment in the 
dairy sector’s system of supply management.82 Further concessions to the EU could be made in the form 
of granting EU producers protection for certain geographical indications (GIs) as discussed in Box 8 
below. In both cases, the impact on Canadian dairy producers would be negative, resulting in reduced 
output and a further worsening of the sectoral balance of trade with the EU (though likely far less severe 
than that predicted by the CGE model). Such an outcome would, however, likely benefit Canadian 
consumers through reduced costs.   
 
EU 
As noted in the analysis on Canada, the assessment has identified three broad potential outcomes for 
the dairy industry as a result of the CETA. The impact on the EU is largely contingent on the level of 
market access granted, and hereto, to the degree that the CETA’s outcome resembles one of the 
following:  
1. Elimination of supply management in Canada, resulting in sizeable reductions in import controls 
and increases in the quota for imports 
2. Maintenance of sensitivities for dairy, resulting in the continued system of supply management 
and limited to no concessions on minimum access commitments for EU imports 
3. Improved minimum access commitments for certain products from the EU (e.g. specialty 
cheeses), resulting in a limited adjustment in the dairy sector’s system of supply management. 
Imports into Canada of dairy products are limited by restrictive TRQs, with prohibitive out of duty-
quotas averaging 251.3%. The TRQ for cheese, for example, is set at 20,412 tonnes with out-of-quota 
duties of 245.6%.83 With the EU being a major source of Canadian cheese imports, there appear to be 
                                                             
81 Dairy Farmers of Canada. http://www.dairyfarmers.ca/what-we-do/international-trade/international-trade-
negotiations/negotiations-between-canada-and-europe 
 
 
82 Viju et al (2010).   
83 European Commission and Government of Canada (2008) 
EU-Canada SIA Final Report 
68 
 
significant opportunities for the EU under an outcome resembling the first listed above. The results from 
the CGE model support this view, with full removal of tariffs on dairy in Canada estimated to increase 
output in the EU by nearly 1% over the long-term (Tables 17-24 in Annex 6). This projected increase in 
output would likely result from increased export opportunities as the model predicts an increase of 
overall exports of nearly 6% in the EU, leading to an improvement to the sector’s overall balance of 
trade of nearly $1.6 billion. Increased exports to Canada would be the primary driver of the industry’s 
expansion, with full elimination of tariffs projected to increase bilateral exports by up to 770% over the 
long-term, leading to a gain of over $1.6 billion in the bilateral balance of trade in dairy products. These 
gains would likely be further enhanced through the granting of protection in the Canadian market of a 
number GI protected EU speciality cheeses (Box 8). 
As noted in the assessment of Canada, it is, however, highly unlikely that the CETA will lead to full 
reduction of tariffs for dairy products in Canada. Although the CETA negotiations have proceeded under 
an ‘everything is on the table’ mantra, it has appeared increasingly unclear that the Agreement will lead 
to a removal of supply management, as the Government of Canada has repeatedly claimed that it 
‘strongly supports supply management and will defend the system with the same vigour as in all of its 
previous trade agreements’.84 Given that it appears nearly impossible to reconcile protection of supply 
management with significant degrees of liberalisation, the potential for the CETA to reach an outcome 
such as that modelled in the CGE analysis is questionable. Further, the continued maintenance of supply 
management also calls into question the ability of the CETA to obtain significant degrees of liberalisation, 
casting doubt on the likelihood of the first outcome being reached.  
Scenarios A and B in the CGE model attempt to capture a CETA where existing tariffs on EU dairy imports 
into Canada are maintained. The results show that such an outcome would negatively impact EU 
producers by instead leading to moderate declines in output (-0.26%) and exports (-1%) over the long-
term, ultimately leading to a worsening of the sectoral balance of trade by as much as $470 million.  
While this would be a worst case scenario for EU producers, there is still potential for gains to be 
realised under the CETA – even if these are likely to remain modest. This would most likely take the form 
of improved minimum access commitments for certain products (i.e. cheeses) with the Agreement 
thereby resulting in a limited adjustment in the dairy sector’s system of supply management.85 Further, 
the EU could realise gains from concessions in the form of extending GI protection of certain EU cheeses 
into the Canadian market (Box 8). Additionally, EU exporters would stand to benefit from improvements 
in the procedures from obtaining veterinary certificates, which have been identified by stakeholders as 
being overly burdensome while increasing costs.86  
Apart from prohibitive tariffs, numerous non-tariff barriers hamper EU dairy exports to Canada. One 
example is the Canadian measure imposing new compositional standards for cheeses, which establishes 
two basic criteria to define and limit protein sources used in cheese production. The first criterion is to 
prescribe a minimum level of casein in different varieties of cheese which must be derived from (and as 
a consequence necessarily domestic) raw milk. These protein values are set at 63%, 83% and 95% 
depending on the cheese variety.  The regulations allow the remainder of the protein content of cheese 
(respectively 37%, 17% and 5%) to be derived from "milk products" of "constituents of milk" such as 
imported MPCs. The second criterion of the regulations is that the relative proportion of whey protein 
and casein protein in any cheese must not exceed the whey to protein ratio in milk. The effect is to limit 
                                                             
84 Gauthier, A. and M. Holden (2010a).   
85 Viju et al (2010).   
86 EC. http://madb.europa.eu/madb_barriers/barriers_details.htm?barrier_id=075089&version=4 
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the use of "milk products" in cheese production, in favour of a minimum content of fresh (and thus 
necessarily Canadian) milk proteins. 
 
Box 8: Extending EU GIs on cheese in Canada 
 
An additional potential area of impact within the dairy sector concerns geographical indications. 
Geographical indications (GIs) have become an important component of the EU’s agricultural policy with 
its stance being that GI protection encourages the diversification of agricultural production, protects 
products names from misuse and imitation while providing information to consumers on the specific 
characteristics of the product. The welfare enhancing effect of GIs for agricultural producers has led to 
their taking a greater role in EU trade agreements, with EU negotiators seeking to ensure greater 
protection for GI designated producers in foreign markets.  
Along with wine and spirits, cheeses have been one of the primary food products that the EU has sought 
additional GI protection for in international markets. Canada is no exception, with the EU having 
targeted GIs as an issue of concern in trade relations with Canada, making it possible that EU negotiators 
will seek to use the CETA to extend protection into Canada for a number of cheeses.87  
  
 
 
 
INDICATOR:  Employment 
BASELINE 
Canada has 12,965 dairy farms with over 81% of these located in Quebec and Ontario.88 These farms 
employ approximately 30,000 people with a further 21,000 employed at the primary processing level.89 
Approximately 1 million farms in the EU are engaged in the production of milk with the dairy industry as 
a whole responsible for around 10% of employment in the entire EU food and beverage industry.90  
 
ANALYSIS 
Canada 
As with output and trade, the extent of the CETA’s impact on employment within the Canadian dairy 
sector is likely to be largely contingent on the degree of liberalisation provided under an agreement. It 
would, therefore, be expected that greater degrees of liberalisation would negatively impact 
employment in Canada’s dairy sector leading to workers being forced to shift into other areas. This is 
supported by the CGE model which suggests that full elimination of tariffs in the dairy sector would lead 
to decreases in employment in the dairy sector of upwards of 13% over the long-term (Table 24 Annex 
6), while retaining existing tariffs could lead to gains in employment of 7.5%.  
                                                             
87 EC. http://madb.europa.eu/madb_barriers/barriers_details.htm?barrier_id=105371&version=1 
88 CDIC. http://www.dairyinfo.gc.ca/index_e.php?s1=dff-fcil&s2=farm-ferme&s3=nb 
89 Statistics Canada 
90 EDA. http://www.euromilk.org/eda/content_html.aspx?cid=426 
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Decreased employment of a mild to moderate degree may also occur either through increased minimal 
access commitments for the EU that raise the overall import quota or where the CETA leads to the 
granting of GI protection in Canada of heretofore generically used cheese names such feta or parmesan. 
 
EU 
The effect of the CETA on employment within the EU dairy sector is similarly expected to be tied to the 
degree of liberalisation reached under an agreement. Where significant improvements to market access 
in Canada are achieved, it is likely that the EU would experience moderate increases in the demand for 
labour. This is supported by the CGE results which find that fully removing tariffs in Canada would lead 
to an almost 1% increase in employment within the dairy processing industry and a 0.3% increase in the 
milk production industry (Table 23 Annex 6). Conversely, scenarios which model a continuance of 
existing tariffs on dairy imports into Canada find that maintaining sensitivities would likely result in 
limited declines in employment (-0.27%) within the EU over the long-term.  
Alternatively, improvements in market access either through increased minimum access commitments 
and/or extension of designated protections for holders of GIs would likely have a positive impact on 
employment within the industry, though likely to a more limited extent than observed under the full 
removal of tariffs.  
 
Other PAPs91 
 
INDICATOR:  Output and trade 
BASELINE 
The processed agricultural products (PAPs) industry serves as Canada’s second largest manufacturing 
sector, trailing only transportation equipment, generating turnover in excess of C$74 billion in 2008.92 
However, as Canada’s transportation equipment manufacturing industry is predominantly concentrated 
in Ontario and Quebec, PAPs serve as the largest manufacturing sector in a number of Canada’s 
provinces. Excluding meat processing, seafood and dairy (which are assessed separately in this report) 
the remainder of the PAPs sector accounts for C$36.4 billion in turnover (Table 14). While meat and 
dairy comprise the two main sources of turnover for the sector, other areas of relative economic 
importance include animal feed, preserved fruits and vegetables and baked goods. As shown in Table 14, 
Canada maintains an overall trade surplus in PAPs though this becomes a trade deficit when excluding 
dairy, meat and seafood. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
91 This subsector includes all other PAPs excluding beverages and tobacco, dairy products, processed meat and seafood 
products, which are discussed elsewhere in this report. As such, it entails manufactured and processed food products such as 
animal feed (including for pets), grain and oilseed milling (e.g. pasta, flour, breakfast cereals), sugar and confectionary products 
(e.g. chocolate, maple syrup), fruit and vegetable preserving (e.g. frozen vegetables, canned fruit, preserves), speciality foods, 
baked goods (e.g. bread, cookies), snack foods and coffee and tea.  
92 Industry Canada 
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Table 14:  Canada production of PAPs and trade overall and with the EU, 2009 (Mio. CAN$) 
Product Share of CAN 
PAPs revenue 
Total CAN 
exports  
Exports to EU Total CAN 
imports 
Imports 
from EU 
Animal feed 7.6% 518 55 751 20 
Grain & oilseed 
milling 
11.6% 3,585 23 2,915 235 
Sugar & 
confectionary 
4.7% 1,404 13 1,970 305 
Fruit & vegetable 
preserving; 
specialty foods 
7.8% 2,275 102 2,848 211 
Baked goods 9.4% 1,647 18 1,207 177 
Other  8.1% 1,446 47 2,944 263 
Dairy, meat and 
seafood 
50.8% 7,575 461 4,789 237 
TOTAL - 18,450 719 17,430 1,449 
TOTAL (excl. 
dairy, meat and 
seafood) 
- 10,875 258 12,641 1,212 
 Source: Industry Canada 
 
The agri-food industry currently represents 2% of the EU’s GDP and contributes greatly to providing 
consumers with a diverse range of safe and healthy products which meet their needs.93 The EU operates 
a sizeable trade surplus in PAPs with total exports of approximately €21 billion in 2009 compared to 
imports of €8 billion. The four largest exporters and importers of PAPs in 2009 in the EU were France, 
the Netherlands, the UK and Germany with the sum of their exports totalling more than 60% of the total 
for the EU.94 
As in most areas, the US accounts for the majority of Canada’s exports and imports (51% in 2009) in 
other PAPs making the EU a relatively minor trade partner. And while Canada maintains overall trade 
surpluses in grain and oilseed milling products and baked goods, it has trade deficits with the EU in 
nearly all PAPs except animal feed, though total bilateral trade in this product is negligible. So, while the 
EU accounts for only 6.3% of all of Canada’s trade in other PAPs, it accounts for 54% of its trade deficit in 
these products. Hereto, it should be noted that other PAPs serve as one of main agricultural exports 
from the EU to Canada, trailing only alcoholic beverages and cheeses in overall value, with the most 
popular exports (listed in Table 15) accounting for over 16% of the total value of agricultural exports 
from the EU to Canada in 2009.95  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
93 Eurostat 
94 Ibid. 
95 Government of Canada. www.canadainternational.gc.ca/eu-ue  
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Table 15: EU’s leading exports to Canada of other PAPs, 2009  
Product Imports into Canada from 
the EU 2007 (in mio. CAN$) 
Bread and pastries $164.96 
Olive oil $110.80 
Chocolates $90.03 
Black tea $62.80 
Sugar products $37.60 
Pasta, couscous $46.85 
Sugar candy $34.00 
Pizza $33.56 
Source: Government of Canada 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
Canada 
As in other areas, the extent of the impact of the CETA on Canada’s PAPs sector depends on the degree 
of liberalisation reached. Hereto, estimates suggest that the industry would benefit under an agreement 
that sought greater degrees of liberalisation. 
Specifically, CGE estimates suggest that while Canada could see minor increases in output and exports of 
vegetable oils and sugar under full removal of tariffs, the primary gains for manufacturers of other PAPs 
would likely be concentrated in such areas as frozen and preserved vegetables and fruits, prepared 
foods of the milling industry and preparations of cereals (Tables 25 to 32 in Annex 6). Precise CGE 
estimates for the sector, while difficult to precisely decompose,96 suggest that these products could 
potentially witness substantial increases in output and overall exports over the long-term under the full 
removal of tariffs, leading to sizeable improvements to the overall balance of trade in these products. At 
the same time, it would be expected that increased imports from the EU would outpace bilateral 
exports, implying that gains to the industry would likely arise as a result of increased competition 
stimulating overall efficiency gains that increase the sector’s ability to compete in third markets.  
Several factors, however, are likely overstating the gains projected by the CGE model. First, a number of 
seafood products are included in the GTAP sector (see below footnote), inflating gains for the sector on 
account of the GTAP’s sectoral aggregation. Second, these estimates do not take into account rules of 
origin, which may serve to increase the gains for the industry in Canada. Specifically, RoO on sugar are 
more stringent in the EU, making many fruit preserves or confections produced in Canada unable to 
qualify as Canadian-produced under EU rules.97 Therefore, if the CETA adopts a more relaxed set of rules 
of origin on sugar, it is likely that the estimates would be increased, as a number of Canadian products 
would be unable to qualify for preferential tariffs.   
                                                             
96 The GTAP sector ‘ofd’ (‘other food’) is a combination of a wide range of processed agricultural products including cocoa 
preparations, frozen and preserved fruits and vegetables, coffees and teas, confectionaries, prepared foods of the milling 
industry and preparations of cereals and flours. Many of these products have high tariffs and/or TRQs, making it difficult to 
isolate the shock from tariff liberalization. Specifically complicating the assessment is the GTAP sector’s further inclusion of all 
frozen fish/seafood products, which are almost certainly overstating the gains for the ‘other PAPs’ sector when they should 
be accrued to the fisheries sector. This should be kept in mind when reading the results from the CGE simulations.  
97 Gauthier, A. and M. Holden (2010a).   
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Nevertheless, the industry stands to benefit under the CETA’s ability to address a number NTBs. 
Requirements under food labelling of ingredients and nutritional information continue to be under 
review and subject to change. Canadian food and beverage manufacturers argue that one of the 
challenges facing their industry is the lack of harmonisation between Canada and the EU on certain food 
ingredients and labelling regulations. The CETA has the potential to further improve cooperation on 
these issues and ensure greater transparency and harmonisation, facilitating trade in other PAPs.  
 
EU 
With a high degree of liberalisation in other PAPs, the CETA could potentially lead to moderate gains for 
EU producers. These overall gains are likely to be increased under more restrictive rules of origin on 
sugar and improved regulatory cooperation in such areas as labelling and packaging.  
With low applied tariffs on cocoa preparations and coffees and teas in Canada, it appears that the CETA 
will have a limited impact on the EU’s trade of these products. The EU would, therefore, most likely 
experience gains for its preparations of cereals and flours (e.g. pastas, bread and biscuits) as well as 
frozen and preserved fruits and vegetables. Given the existence of high tariff peaks on a number of 
prepared food products in Canada, the modelling framework applied a ‘sensitive list’ approach on the 
GTAP sector of ‘other food nec’ and employed two scenarios in which tariffs were not liberalised in 
Canada.  
The results from these scenarios suggest that EU producers will be negatively impacted if current 
sensitivities are maintained and positively impacted if tariffs are fully removed. Specifically, the 
simulations project that a CETA that fully removes tariffs will lead to limited to moderate increases in 
output (0.11%) and overall exports (0.68%) of prepared foods in the EU over the long-term (Tables 25 to 
32 in Annex 6). This would have a positive impact on the EU’s overall balance of trade in these products, 
with the majority of these gains being derived from increased trade with Canada, with exports of these 
products outpacing imports from Canada by as much as $340 million over the long-term.  
Conversely, restricting these products from liberalisation (Scenarios A and B) is estimated to lead to 
minor declines in EU output (-0.09%) and overall exports (-0.56%) over the long-term, leading to a 
worsening of the EU’s sectoral balance of trade by as much as $685 million.  
EU exporters have also raised concerns with respect to labelling and packaging requirements (e.g. 
nutritional labelling and product description requirements), maintaining that overly burdensome 
requirements raise costs for EU producers and exporters.98 Further, Canada continues to maintain 
compulsory container size requirements – a practice abandoned in the EU over a decade ago – with 
highly regulated requirements for canned fruits and vegetables in particular, which raise costs for EU 
exporters.99 Where the CETA improves harmonisation of standards between the two sides, it is likely 
that the EU other PAPs sector could realise further gains through reduced compliance costs.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
98 Guerin S.S. and C. Napoli (2008).   
99 Canadian Association of Importers and Exporters. http://www.iecanada.com/ienow/2010/may_10/inside_1.html 
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INDICATOR:  Employment 
BASELINE 
The PAPs sector represents 1.5% of total employment in Canada, with Quebec and Ontario accounting 
for 64% of the sector’s workforce.100 Modernisation and rationalisation in the workforce has resulted in 
some large scale workforce reductions in the past few years.101   
The manufacturing of food products and beverages employed 4.9 million persons in the EU-27 in 2008, 
accounting for approximately 8% of EU industrial employment and 2% of the total workforce. Within the 
sector, 43.8% of employment takes place in the bread, sugar, confectionary and other food products.  In 
absolute terms, Germany, France and the United Kingdom top the list with almost 60% of the EU's agri-
food jobs.102 These countries, together with Italy and Spain, account for almost four out of every five 
jobs in the European PAPs sector.103  In terms of relative importance, the PAPs sector serves the greatest 
role in Ireland and Denmark where it accounts for more than 3% of all jobs.104 
 
ANALYSIS 
Canada 
Employment in Canada’s other PAPs sector has the potential to be positively impacted by the CETA, with 
the magnitude of this impact positively correlated with the degree of liberalisation reached under the 
Agreement. This assertion is supported by the CGE estimates which predict significant increases 
(upwards of 3%) in the demand for labour over the long-term in Canada’s manufacturing of other PAPs 
under a CETA that fully removes tariffs in the EU. This, however, is likely an ambitious estimate with it 
unclear whether full removal of tariffs on all products can be reached, and as the EU’s more stringent 
RoO on sugar could potentially reduce the ability of a number of Canadian products from qualifying for 
preferential tariffs.  
 
EU 
The CETA’s impact on employment in the EU’s other PAPs industries will likely be contingent on the level 
of liberalisation. Scenarios which model a full removal of tariffs in Canada suggest that the CETA will lead 
to a limited increase in employment over the long-term (0.1%), while scenarios that model a 
continuation of current tariffs in Canada estimate that the Agreement would lead to minor decreases in 
employment over the long-term (-0.1%). At the same time, however, the ability of the CETA to improve 
regulatory harmonisation in such areas as labelling and packaging could place upward pressure on 
employment by increasing the overall gains for the EU.  
 
 
                                                             
100 Statistics Canada, Labour Force Survey 
101 Statistics Canada 
102 Eurostat 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid. 
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Beverages105 
 
INDICATOR:  Output and trade 
BASELINE 
Canada’s beverages manufacturing sector generated C$10.1 billion in 2008 with the majority of this 
produced within the soft drinks (40%) and breweries subsectors (44%). While spirits make up the largest 
export product for Canada’s beverages sector (50% of all exports), limited production in wineries or 
distilleries make Canada heavily reliant on imports from other countries to meet its domestic demand. 
As such, Canada operates a heavy trade deficit in the beverages sector (C$2.9 billion in 2009) with this 
extending to trade in all subsectors of beverages: soft drinks (C$466m), brewery products (C$390m), 
wine (C$1,733m) and spirits (C$317.6m).106  
The EU, as a leading producer of beverages – particularly wine and spirits – serves as a major import 
source for Canada, being the largest external source for wine (46.8% of imports), beer (55.7% of imports) 
and spirits (44.6% of all imports). In fact, according to trade data at the HS 4-digit level, EU exports of 
agriculture and agri-foods to Canada are predominantly in beverages, spirits and vinegar, with this 
sector representing 49.2% of the value of all EU agri-food exports to Canada in 2007.107 As such, the EU 
maintains a significant trade surplus with Canada in trade of beverages, with the total in 2009 reaching 
C$1.72 billion.108 Canada is also an important export market for the EU, particularly in wine where it 
serves as the fourth largest importer of EU produced wine.109 
While tariff liberalisation may produce some benefits to EU exporters, the CETA’s greatest potential 
impact on the EU wine and spirits industry rests in its ability to resolve disputes regarding practices 
within Canada’s Provincial Liquor Control Boards (see Box 9).  
 
Box 9: Provincial Liquor Control Boards in Canada 
 
In Canada, each province and territory has a body that oversees control, distribution and sale of 
alcoholic beverages within its jurisdiction. With the exception of Alberta, which is the only Canadian 
province to have privatised its alcohol distribution system, each of these liquor boards are granted a 
quasi-monopoly position over the import, supply and distribution of alcoholic beverages. These liquor 
boards operate under two primary objectives: profit maximisation for revenue generation and limitation 
of abusive/excessive alcohol consumption.  
Operating independently (i.e. not at a federal level), these liquor boards establish ‘reference’ or ‘floor’ 
pricing standards, which set the minimum retail price for each product category. These prices are 
enforced within the retail and distribution system operated by these liquor boards, with the aim being 
to encourage profits and collect tax. Where off-site point of sale is allowed, e.g. in licensed bars and 
private outlets, the retailer is required to purchase their products through the liquor board outlet.  
The EU has taken issue with the provinces’ monopoly control over distribution and retail, arguing that 
                                                             
105 The results of the CGE analysis include bottled water, soft drinks, breweries, wineries and distilleries, while the impact 
assessment is directed primarily at wineries and distilleries. 
106 Industry Canada 
107 Statistics Canada 
108 Industry Canada 
109 Eurostat 
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liquor boards ‘appear discriminatory and substantially hinder the access of European alcoholic 
beverages to the Canadian market.’110 Garnering particular contention from the EU has been the 
complaint of discriminatory listing procedures, pricing and quota systems that favour domestic over 
imported products. The liquor boards’ listing procedures require any supplier of beer, wine or spirits 
wishing to sell their product(s) in a province to first obtain a listing from the provincial marketing 
agency. The EU has complained that decisions by the boards pertaining to listing requests lack 
transparency, while such decisions have seemed to discriminately exclude entry of imported products.111 
Further, it is claimed that the monopoly status of these boards, which for example has made the Liquor 
Control Board of Ontario the world’s largest purchaser of alcoholic beverages, has allowed these 
provincial liquor boards to leverage their position to inflict further ‘onerous commercial conditions on 
suppliers, once an imported product is listed.’112 In addition, the EU claims that some provincial liquor 
boards apply discriminatory cost of service differentials on imported EU wines.113  
In reference to the quota systems placed on imported products, it is important to note that liquor board 
purchasing groups have strict sales quotas for all brands listed. Brands not reaching their quota are 
discounted at the supplier’s cost, sold out and denied future access to the retail network. The EU has 
claimed that this system imposes discriminatory quota systems for imported wines that make it difficult 
for EU products to meet the quota and therefore maintain the ability to be sold in state-run retail stores.  
While these concerns have, in part, been addressed bilaterally through the 1989 EC-Canada Agreement 
on trade and commerce in alcoholic beverages and the 2004 EU-Canada Wine and Spirits Agreement, 
the issue remains unresolved due to continued concern from the EC over lack of 
enforcement/compliance at the provincial level and continued ongoing discriminatory behaviour. As 
such, resolving these issues either through greater enforcement or a significant reduction in the 
provincial boards’ monopoly status stands to be an important means of ensuring greater access for 
Europe’s alcoholic beverages industries. With these products being the most widely exported processed 
food products into Canada and exhibiting sizeable demand in Canada, such an outcome by the CETA 
could produce significant gains for the European industry. 
For further analysis on this issue see the Competition Policy section. 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
The issue of liberalisation as it pertains to the beverages sector is primarily non-tariff related, with the 
CETA’s impact to be determined largely by its ability to resolve EU disputes pertaining to discriminatory 
practices alleged to exist in Canada’s liquor control board system. 
While tariffs do exist on alcoholic beverages in both Canada and the EU, the CGE model predicts that 
their elimination will only stimulate minor gains for the industries on both sides of the Atlantic. With 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
110 Market Access Database. http://madb.europa.eu/madb_barriers/barriers_details.htm?barrier_id=960047&version=6 
111 Market Access Database 
112 Ibid. 
113 This includes: (1) ‘minimum (and maximum) price requirements on certain imported products’; (2) ‘the waiver or reduction 
of various charges to the domestic industry (e.g. freight, direct delivery mark ups, costs of marketing programmes) not available 
to imported products’; (3) ‘Ontario, authorizes the Liquor Control Board of Ontario to apply an additional reduction of 5% on all 
sales of Ontarian wines to restaurants and bars’; (4) ‘British Columbia allows the BC Liquor Board to practise a mark-up discount 
on the province’s wines, which obviously would not benefit imported wines’. 
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respect to Canada, the CGE model projects that fully removing tariffs on beverages will have a low to 
moderate impact, with production estimated to increase by approximately 0.45% and overall exports by 
as much as 3.1% over the long-term (Tables 33-40 in Annex 6). These increased exports would be 
expected to be smaller than increases in imports, however, leading to a very minor reduction in the 
sectoral balance of trade. It is expected that increased trade with the EU would be the primary driver of 
these effects.  
Similarly, the CGE model predicts that fully removing tariffs in the CETA would have only a limited 
impact on the EU beverages industry, with output expected to increase by as much as 0.09% over the 
long-term and overall exports by 0.3%. Driven largely by increased exports to Canada (nearly 19%), the 
CETA would be expected to lead to an improvement of the EU’s balance of trade in beverages by as 
much as $85 million over the long-term.  
As noted, however, the potentially larger impact is in the CETA’s ability to improve enforcement/ 
compliance at the provincial level, thereby eliminating alleged discriminatory practices implemented by 
liquor control boards. While difficult to quantify, it would be expected that the removal of these 
practices would lead to even greater gains for the EU than currently projected by the CGE model, while 
lowering gains for Canada. An example of the impact on the EU could potentially be found by examining 
the privatisation of the retail and distribution network that took place in Alberta throughout 1993.  With 
all of Alberta’s LCBs closed and all retail privatised throughout the year, the impact on imports was fairly 
pronounced. The value of Alberta’s imported alcoholic beverages, which averaged C$61.2 million 
between 1990 and 1993, climbed to C$100.9 million in 1994, marking a far more significant increase 
than observed elsewhere in Canada.114 While it is not clear that the CETA would lead to a removal of 
LCBs throughout Canada, the example highlights the potential impact that elimination of their control in 
imports could have on EU market share.  
 
INDICATOR:  Employment 
BASELINE 
Employment in the EU’s beverage manufacturing sector is just under half a million, with the Member 
States of Germany, Spain, the UK, France and Italy accounting for 56% of total EU employment in the 
sector.115 In Canada, employment in the beverage manufacturing sector was nearly 24,000 in 2008, with 
the majority of employment concentrated in Ontario, British Columbia and Quebec.116  
 
ANALYSIS 
It is not expected that the CETA will have a pronounced impact on employment in the beverages 
industries of Canada or the EU over the long-term. According to the CGE results, tariff liberalisation 
under the CETA will stimulate limited changes in the demand for labour with full liberalisation estimated 
to lead to limited changes in the demand for labour in the EU and Canada. At issue, however, is largely 
whether the CETA will address discriminatory practices by provincial control boards in Canada. If the 
CETA is able to fully ensure provincial enforcement and compliance, it is likely that the EU will be able to 
realise greater gains from the CETA through increased exports to the EU. While this would likely place 
upward pressure on the demand for labour in the EU’s beverage industry, it is not expected that the 
                                                             
114 Industry Canada, Trade Data Online 
115 Eurostat. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-BW-09-001-03/EN/KS-BW-09-001-03-EN.PDF 
116 Industry Canada. http://www.ic.gc.ca/cis-sic/cis-sic.nsf/IDE/cis-sic3121empe.html 
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overall impact would increase greatly in significance. Conversely, the full removal of these practices in 
Canada would likely have the opposite effect, as increased domestic market share for EU producers 
would imply decreased domestic sales for Canadian producers and likely downward pressure on the 
demand for labour in Canada’s beverages industry. Nevertheless, evidence does not support that such 
an outcome would be significantly negative.  
 
 
SOCIAL ASSESSMENT 
 
INDICATOR:  Worker displacement  
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Canada 
Overall, the economic assessment suggests that the CETA will likely have a positive impact on 
employment in Canada’s agriculture and PAPs industries with greater degrees of liberalisation, while 
maintaining sensitivities will create greater possibilities that workers will be displaced. Specifically, CGE 
estimates suggest that full removal of tariffs would place upward demand on labour in nearly all sectors, 
with the notable exception of dairy, which would be expected to see significant decreases in labour. 
Conversely, maintaining sensitivities on dairy and prepared foods in Canada and on meat products in the 
EU is expected to lead to declines in labour in nearly all agricultural sectors except for dairy, other PAPs, 
fisheries and other grains.  
The impact of full removal of tariffs would largely be positive with the CETA likely to generate 
employment in a number of sectors, benefitting provinces across the country. For Canadian crops (i.e. 
wheat, barley, oilseeds and fruits and vegetables), the impact would be marginal with full removal of 
tariffs only expected to lead to very minor increases in labour. Alternatively, the cattle/beef and 
pig/pork producing sectors would be expected to expand noticeably over the long-term creating new 
employment opportunities, with rural areas in Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba and Quebec 
expected to be the most directly impacted. Food manufacturing industries across Canada would also 
stand to benefit from full removal of tariffs under the CETA as increased market access for Canada’s 
processed agricultural products would likely stimulate expansion of the industry, providing a boost for 
employment in a number of sectors, particularly in rural areas where food manufacturing remains an 
important source of employment.  
The expansion of these industries would help to offset potentially sizeable contraction in Canada’s dairy 
sector that would be expected to occur with removal of the system of supply management and 
increases in imports from the EU. Supply management has historically provided Canada’s dairy farmers 
with security and its removal would almost certainly result in structural changes, requiring producers to 
shift into other areas of employment. While the short- to mid-term impact would be detrimental, there 
would be opportunities for those displaced to shift into expanding areas within the agriculture and PAPs 
sectors or in industrial product manufacturing or services, mitigating the negative impact over the long-
term; particularly as older dairy producers exit the workforce. The impact, however, would likely be 
concentrated in the provinces of Quebec and Ontario, making any elimination of supply management 
more difficult on rural areas in these two provinces.  
Those employed in Canada’s beverages sector may also be negatively affected with structural shifts 
facilitated by the CETA’s potential removal of discriminatory practices implemented by Canada’s 
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provincial liquor control boards. Compliance at the provincial level and an end to these practices would 
potentially increase EU market share, to the partial detriment of Canadian producers. Under such an 
outcome, demand for labour in the industry may decrease, though this could likely be offset by 
expansion in production of other PAPs across Canada.  
 
Table 16: Agriculture, PAPs and Fisheries sectors in Canada estimated to exhibit a change in 
employment over the long-term 
Sector Impact on employment using 
sensitive lists approach 
(Scenarios A  & B) 
Impact on employment from full 
removal of tariffs (Scenarios C & 
D) 
Wheat - + 
Other grains  + + 
Oilseeds  - + 
Vegetables & fruit - + 
Cattle/beef  - + 
Other animal 
products/meat 
- ++ 
Other PAPS ++ ++ 
Fisheries + + 
Dairy ++ -- 
Beverages - - 
 
+ denotes marginal increase, ++ denotes significant increase, - denotes minor decline, -- denotes significant 
decline 
Source: CGE model  
 
These outcomes are, however, largely the result of an ambitious CETA that assumes full removal of 
tariffs for agricultural products. While maintaining tariffs and the supply management system would 
likely benefit Canadian dairy farmers, helping to maintain employment in areas that lack industrial 
diversification, failure to liberalise beef and pork in the EU would likely engender declines in 
employment in a number of agricultural sectors across Canada, forcing workers to shift into alternative 
areas of employment over the long-term.  
  
 
EU 
The CETA’s effect on worker displacement in the EU’s agriculture, PAPs and fisheries sectors is likely to 
be determined by the degree of liberalisation achieved under an agreement. Nevertheless, no matter 
the outcome, the overall impact on the EU is expected to be far less pronounced than what is likely to 
occur in Canada given smaller expected percentage changes in output and employment in the former.  
CGE estimates suggest that full removal of tariffs would place upward demand on labour in sectors in 
which the EU owns a comparative advantage vis-à-vis Canada: dairy, prepared foods and beverages. 
Expansion of these industries would, therefore, generate employment in some of the higher value-
added sectors within the EU’s agriculture and PAPs sectors, while also serving to benefit a number of 
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rural areas. This is particularly the case in the dairy industry, which is an important source of 
employment in rural areas throughout the EU and where gains for employment under the CETA have 
the greatest potential.  
Member States that could potentially realise the greatest creation of employment from economic gains 
to the dairy sector include France, Italy, Poland, Germany and Spain as well as the Netherlands and 
Ireland, which enjoy high levels of dairy production relative to the size of the population.117 SMEs could 
benefit from the removal of onerous listing procedures in Canada’s provincial run liquor boards, with 
wine and spirit producers in France, Spain, Italy and Germany poised to benefit.118 In terms of other 
PAPs, increased employment could particularly benefit Germany, France, Italy, the UK and Poland, which 
together account for nearly 55% of EU employment in other food manufacturing, with gains also 
potentially accruing to Ireland which is relatively more reliant on food production as a source of national 
output.119  
Conversely, full removal of tariffs would likely lead to decreased demand for labour in a number of 
sectors within the EU, most notably in the beef and pork sectors. These sectors maintain defensive 
interests with respect to the CETA and it is likely that significant improvements in access for Canadian 
producers would lead to displacement for a number of workers employed in primary production and 
processing. The negative impact on these workers would be most significant in the short-term as labour 
market frictions increased jobs search times and in some instances, could require relocation in order to 
find employment in an alternative, expanding industry. With estimated declines in employment most 
pronounced in the pork sector, it is here where the CETA stands to most negatively impact EU 
agriculture and PAPs workers. The outbreak of a ‘pork crisis’ in late 2010/early 2011, resulting from 
increased production costs and likely to persist throughout 2011, could stand to amplify the associated 
negative impact, if liberalisation were to take effect in 2012. Within the EU, the Member States of 
Poland, Germany, France, the UK and Denmark could be particularly affected given their share total EU 
pig processing. Liberalisation in the beef sector, which would likely have a less pronounced impact than 
in pork, could nevertheless negatively affect Ireland, France and Italy. Ireland, in particular, which is 
particularly reliant on exports to the UK market, could stand to be negatively impacted by greater 
competition from Canadian exports over the short-term.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
117 Eurostat (2009a) and Wijnands et al. (2007).  
118 Wijnads et al. (2007) 
119 Eurostat (2009a) and Wijnands et al. (2007). 
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Table 17: Agriculture, PAPs and Fisheries sectors in the EU estimated to exhibit a change in 
employment over the long-term 
Sector Impact on employment using 
sensitive lists approach 
(Scenarios A  & B) 
Impact on employment from full 
removal of tariffs (Scenarios C & 
D) 
Other grains  - + 
Dairy - ++ 
Other PAPs - + 
Beverages + + 
Wheat + - 
Oilseeds - - 
Beef 0 - 
Pork 0 -- 
 
+ denotes marginal increase, ++ denotes significant increase, - denotes minor decline, -- denotes significant 
decline, 0 denotes no change 
Source: CGE model  
 
Alternatively, the assessment finds that keeping tariffs on beef and pork in the EU in place would 
minimise any potential adverse effect on workers in the EU’s meat processing sector, though similarly 
failure to liberalise dairy in Canada could eliminate potential gains for workers in these areas.   
 
INDICATOR:  Quality and Decency of work 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Canada 
Within the agriculture and PAPs sector, only workers employed in grain elevators, feed and saw mills are 
regulated at the federal level and subject to the Canada Labour Code; all other agricultural and agri-food 
workers are subject to provincial regulation. Standards vary across provinces with agricultural workers in 
a number of Provinces being regulated differently from workers in other sectors. In many provinces, 
agricultural workers involved in certain types of production and processing may be exempted from 
minimum employment standards and may not be legally required to receive weekly rest, meal breaks, 
paid holidays, paid vacation or overtime pay and may not be subject to provincial standards for 
minimum wage or hours of work.120 
To the degree that increased processing of PAPs such as beef, pork or other PAPs leads to increased 
output and employment in primary production (e.g. grains or cattle/hog production), it is conceivable 
that more Canadians will find employment in these temporary, seasonal positions, exposing them to 
conditions where employment standards are below the level enjoyed in other sectors. At the same time, 
Canada’s agricultural workforce is aging with younger workers increasingly moving into off-farm 
employment in the manufacturing and services sectors. To deal with shortages of labour experienced 
during peak periods, a number of provinces participate in Canada’s Seasonal Agricultural Worker 
Program (SAWP), which allows foreign workers from countries that have signed bilateral agreements 
                                                             
120 Hacault (2009): p. 118-119. Also, see: Commission for Labor Cooperation, ‘Guide to Minimum Employment Standards, Pay 
Deductions and Employment Insurance in Canada’. http://www.naalc.org/migrant/english/pdf/mgcanmes_en.pdf 
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with Canada to temporarily enter Canada to assist in harvesting and planting periods.121 Given these 
shortages and increased movement off-farm, it is therefore unclear whether Canadians would be 
significantly subjected to issues relating to quality and decency of work in the agricultural sector; or if, 
instead, increased demand for labour could be largely filled by non-Canadian temporary workers.  
Employment in agriculture and agri-foods also contains heightened safety issues, which could impact 
quality and decency of work along the dimension of work environment safety. While fatalities and 
injuries in Canada’s agricultural sector are far less prevalent than in most countries, the sector continues 
to serve as one of the country’s most dangerous professions. Injuries and fatalities generally arise either 
as a result of accidents resulting from use of machinery (i.e. machine rollover, runover or entanglement) 
or from farm animals.122 Farmers can also be subject to a number of ambient risks including exposure to 
dangerous chemicals (such as from pesticides), toxic gases (primarily in manure storage facilities) and 
farmers lung.123  
Over the long-term, Canada is likely to continue its trend of reducing the number of work-related 
fatalities and injuries in the agricultural sector. Nevertheless, increased employment in the sector would 
likely expose a greater number of workers to employment that is more dangerous on average, affecting 
the quality of working conditions that those who move into the sector are exposed to. As cattle and 
dairy cows have been found to double the likelihood of work related injuries on Canadian farms, there is 
potential for expansion/contraction in these sectors to particularly influence worker safety.124 With dairy 
poised to contract under liberalisation and beef production to expand, there is, however, also potential 
for the effects to cancel each other out.   
 
EU 
Agricultural work in the EU is subject to many of the same concerns as outlined in the section above on 
Canada. While safer than most countries, the agriculture and PAPs sector has one of the worst incidence 
rates for non-fatal accidents in the EU and has the worst rate for women.125 While the main causes of 
accidents can vary by Member State, the majority of injuries and fatalities tend to result from machinery 
and livestock. While data could not be located for each individual EU Member State, the following 
examples illustrate the problems faced within Member States: 
 Czech Republic: workers in agriculture are far more likely to be subject to chronic health 
problems;126 
 Denmark: the meat and meat processing sector has the highest incidence of accidents127; 
 Hungary: a larger proportion of agricultural workers are exposed to high degrees of work-
related stress128; 
                                                             
121 These countries include: Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad-Tobago, Antigua, Grenada, St. Kitts, St. Lucia, St. Vand Montserrat and 
Mexico. http://www.rhdcc-hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/workplaceskills/foreign_workers/ei_tfw/saw_tfw.shtml 
122 CAISP (2008).  
123 Farm Safety Association. ‘Manure Gas Dangers: Factsheet’. http://www.farmsafety.ca/factsheets/manure_gas.pdf; and 
‘Farmer’s Lung: Factsheet’. http://www.farmsafety.ca/factsheets/farmer_lung.pdf. Farmers lung is when farmers are exposed 
to air ‘contaminated with particulate matter or toxic gases’, usually resulting from breathing in dust from moldy hay, grain or 
feed.  
124 Maltais (2007): p. 7.  
125 http://osha.europa.eu/en/sector/agriculture/index_html/women 
126 http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/ewco/studies/tn0612036s/cz0612039q.htm;  
127 http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/ewco/2007/10/DK0710019I.htm 
128 http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/ewco/2009/02/HU0902019I.htm 
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 Ireland: the most common cause of non-fatal accidents on farms are from livestock, trips and 
falls and tractors and machinery;129 
 Poland: agriculture results in more accidents than construction, with underage workers also 
overly exposed to unsafe conditions130;  
 Portugal: falling and/or crushing is one of the most prevalent types of preventable accidents and 
is most common in the food and beverage manufacturing sector;131 
 UK: in 2009, agriculture accounted for 0.9% of total employment but 1.4% of reported work-
related injuries.132 
 
Greater risk of injury tends to subject these workers to higher levels of stress and has resulted in 
agricultural workers being subjected to some of the highest levels of work-related stress in the EU.133 
Musculoskeletal disorders are also a particular problem in the agriculture industry with a majority of 
workers frequently subjected to painful positions, carrying of heavy loads and exposure to repetitive 
hand movements.134 Similarly, workers in the EU’s food and beverage manufacturing sector are subject 
to greater levels of ergonomic risk, non-standard work hours, lower levels of control over the work 
process, and lower levels of skilled work: all negatively impacting the overall quality/decency of work.135  
With potential expansion of the dairy, beverages and other PAPs sectors, it is possible that an increasing 
number of EU workers could shift into a position that places them at greater risk of injury. This could 
arise through machine-related injury in the manufacturing of food, and also from injuries caused by 
greater exposure to dairy cows if greater production of dairy products leads to expansion of primary 
milk production. The impact would likely occur across a number of Member States, but given the far 
greater importance the agriculture and agri-foods industry has as a source of employment in the EU’s 
New Member States, the effects could be more concentrated here. Regardless, it is not expected, that 
the impact would be significant with the EU already exhibiting high levels of workplace safety and with it 
unlikely that significant degrees of liberalisation in dairy will be reached.  
 
Box 10: Canada’s Liquor Control Boards and the social impact from the CETA 
 
Opponents of the CETA claim that should the Agreement lead to the dismantling of provincial liquor 
boards, it would ultimately undermine the government social policy space and limit its ability to 
‘implement policies that reduce the substantial social and economic harm caused by alcohol 
consumption’.136 Herein, these opponents cite increases in drunk driving convictions and sales to minors 
following privatisation in Alberta.137 Additional concerns over the potential negative social impact 
revolve around employee benefits derived through the liquor board owned distribution system’s usage 
of union employees. Specifically, concern has been raised over the impact on Alberta’s employees in the 
                                                             
129 http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/ewco/2006/10/IE0610019I.htm 
130 http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/ewco/2007/02/PL0702019I.htm   
131 http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/ewco/2008/05/PT0805029I.htm 
132 http://www.hse.gov.uk/statistics/industry/agriculture/index.htm 
133 European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (2009) 
134 http://osha.europa.eu/en/sector/agriculture/msds 
135 Eurofound (2008a)  
136 Grieshaber-Otto, J. (2010).   
137 National Union of Public and General Employees. http://www.nupge.ca/content/3387/canadas-liquor-board-unions-join-
fight-save-lcbo 
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alcohol industry who have seen privatisation lead to lower pay and benefits as well as decreased job 
security.138 
However, there is evidence that these concerns are likely unfounded. For one, it is not dismantling of 
the liquor boards which the EU seeks, but rather an end to what it deems are discriminatory practices 
that favour domestic producers. Hereto, it is possible to address EU concerns through greater 
enforcement of already agreed to measures, allowing the liquor control boards to continue to operate. 
Evidence suggests that such an outcome would not necessarily undermine public health and safety 
objectives as the Canadian government would retain the most important policy tools for reducing over-
consumption of alcohol, i.e. being able to set price floors and impose taxes on beer, wine and spirits. As 
a note, the Systembolaget liquor control board system in Sweden is maintained as a means of ensuring 
public health by reducing the abuse and excessive consumption of alcohol;139 however, differences 
between Sweden and Canada exist in Systembolaget’s expressed mandate of being brand-neutral and 
selecting its products based on consumer demand.140 As such, opponents’ concerns that CETA cannot 
put an end to discriminatory practices while ensuring public health are likely unfounded.  
For further analysis on this issue see the Competition Policy section. 
 
 
 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 
 
INDICATOR:  Land and soil usage 
BASELINE 
Canada 
In Canada, agriculture represents an important portion of land cover, with 4.57% of total land consisting 
of arable land and 0.65% for permanent crops.141 Over the last three decades, land in Canada has 
increasingly been used for crops with the intensification of agriculture in turn causing less land to be 
devoted to pasture and to idle land in eastern Canada, and less land used for summerfallow in western 
Canada.142   
At the same time, agricultural soil land quality in Canada has improved over the past 25 years,, with 
improvements occurring in the levels of soil erosion, soil carbon change and soil salinisation. This has 
largely been the result of improved land management practices, moving towards no-till agriculture and 
increasing the levels of forage and permanent crop cover. Most of this has occurred in the Western 
Provinces through emphasis on cereal and oilseeds agriculture, which lends itself to reduced till 
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agriculture.143 Agricultural soil quality in eastern provinces, namely Quebec, Ontario and the Atlantic 
Provinces have experienced minimal improvements due to continued reliance on conventional tilling.144  
Central and Atlantic Canada rely more heavily on chemical inputs to increase crop yield, as the 
precipitation conditions make this more viable compared to Western Canada, where low levels of 
precipitation and a short growing season reduce the yield benefits of chemical fertiliser and pesticide 
inputs. Thus, this region of the country sees less chemical input per hectare than the U.S. and certain 
European countries.145 Overall, around 75% of farms apply fertiliser to their crops. These chemical inputs 
can reduce the quality of soil. 
 
EU 
Agriculture in the EU utilises a significant portion of land, and soil degradation is a significant issue that 
has been exacerbated by unsustainable farming practices and land use. According to the European 
Commission Directorate-General for Agriculture, half of the EU’s land is farmed. 146 Specifically, the 
utilised agricultural area is 38% of the total EU-27 area in 2009: 24% being considered arable land, 3% of 
land being permanent crop, and 14% land being permanent grassland.147 Member countries’ share of 
this agricultural land varies greatly, with, for example 65% of the United Kingdom’s land area being 
utilised in agriculture, but only 2% in Latvia. 148 Using FAOSTAT figures for all EU member countries, in 
2008 the EU had 119 Mha of arable and permanent crops from a total land area of 428 Mha (about 28%), 
representing little change since 1980.149    
Soil erosion is particularly prevalent in Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy. Risk of soil erosion is higher 
where the organic carbon content of the soil is low (0 to 1%), which occurs mostly in Southern Europe. 
As most of the arable land (about 80%) is covered by crops between 70-80% of the time, the prevalence 
of erosion is limited. Soil quality can be further reduced by excess chemical inputs and nutrients 
surpluses. Low input farms have grown in importance in the EU-12, while nitrogen and phosphate usage 
in the EU-15 has decreased noticeably over the past several decades. Part of these decreases in 
chemical inputs can be explained by a rise in organic farming.150  
Livestock levels have remained fairly constant, however, livestock density has increased in certain areas 
over the last two decades.151 Specialist livestock farms in particular lead to nutrient surpluses because of 
excess manure. On the other hand, specialist crop holdings can lead to a nutrient deficit, meaning that 
nutrients need to be imported and applied in the form of mineral fertilisers. 152 Between 2003 and 2007, 
the distribution of livestock specialist (22%), crop specialist (40%), and mixed farming (38%) has stayed 
fairly constant in the EU. 153  
The EU in recent years has sought to address these issues with rural development planning policies, 
among other policies, that institute soil management practices to minimise soil erosion.  The EU’s 2003 
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Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform aims to minimise soil erosion and protect soil quality, including 
organic content and structure, through reinforced cross-compliance. 154 
 
ANALYSIS 
Canada 
As demand increases, intensification of agricultural practices to attain higher crop and livestock yields 
could have increasing environmental impacts by encroaching further onto marginal lands and by 
increasing the chemical inputs (for fertilisers, pesticides and herbicides) which can degrade the quality of 
soil. 155 
Certain crops, like wheat, are more amenable to practices that favour reduced tillage and greater cover 
crops. Thus, where CETA leads to replacing cropland to grow these crops, there can be an environmental 
benefit.  However, more production of red meats and pork typically leads to a reduction in the quality of 
soil because of the problems surrounding surplus manure. Through better management of manure, 
livestock access to surface water and usage of pesticides can potentially offset this impact.156 
The results of the CGE model suggest that the CETA will lead to increase in wheat output and wheat 
exports (both overall and to the EU). These could become more significant if CETA makes the zero tariffs, 
which have been implemented because of unprecedented high wheat prices, permanent. Although 
Canadian wheat farming is already mature and operating at scale, such an outcome as a result of the 
CETA’s agricultural provisions would likely have some impacts on land and soil usage in the Prairie 
Provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta, where the Canadian wheat production is 
concentrated. There could be some negative impacts in terms of increased concentrated land and soil 
usage if increased wheat production and land usage come at the expense of other agricultural activity 
such as the production of other grains, fruits & vegetables and oilseeds. However, should land be 
converted to cropland to increase production, greater soil degradation and erosion as well as organic 
matter loss may occur.157  
The quota proposed under the CETA for Canadian hormone-free beef is expected to be large enough to 
increase production. Under a full liberalisation scenario, CGE simulations estimate that Canadian beef 
output and export to the EU is expected to increase. However, as it is the opinion of the study team that 
it is unlikely that the NTBs such as the ban on hormone beef will be removed, whatever increase in beef 
production is likely to come from hormone-free beef. This would then alter the CETA’s impact on land 
and soil usage with potentially more land converted into pasture for cattle. Pasture has a lower degree 
of soil degradation than cropland, and can be suitable as a habitat for certain species, which could 
improve biodiversity. 158 What impact production of hormone free beef will have on soil depends greatly 
on whether an increase in output will be the result of a conversion of cropland to pasture, in which case 
it could have some environmental benefits. To realise this benefit, cattle must be graze-fed rather than 
factory farmed, something that is more likely if it is hormone free. However, if increases in production 
are achieved by turning marginal land into pasture land, this would result in a negative environmental 
impact.  
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For Canada’s pork sector, the preliminary CGE model shows a significant impact only where pork is 
liberalised in the EU. Under such an outcome, it is expected that there would be a substantial increase in 
overall production in Canada. Yet, even under a more comprehensive level of liberalisation it would not 
be expected that the CETA will lead to significant pressure on land and soil usage in Canada. It should be 
added however that land usage for pork production is a hotly debated issue in Canada and even a 
moderate percentage change in the demand on land use to this effect could lead to some social turmoil. 
The CETA’s environmental impact that can be attributed to beef and pork production will inevitably be 
tied to the liberalisation achieved under the Agreement. In this respect, alternative scenarios that kept 
beef and pork as sensitive in the EU, show that such an outcome would likely lead to declines in output 
of beef and pork in Canada over the long-term, limiting the potentially negative environmental impact.  
Upon liberalisation, Canada’s dairy industry would be expected to witness significant declines in output, 
thus leading to important decreases in land and soil usage related to farming in the provinces of Ontario 
and Quebec. Again, however, this outcome is likely only to the degree that dairy is liberalised.  
 
EU 
In the EU, the results of the CGE model suggest that CETA will lead to minor changes in output of wheat, 
with full liberalisation projected to lead to minor decreases of land usage for wheat in the EU, a minimal 
increase in barley, and a minimal decrease in oil seeds.   
The EU’s beef and pork industries are expected to decrease output and exports under a full liberalisation 
scenario. The CGE model estimates that beef output will decrease by 0.15% over the long-term and pork 
output by 0.4%. If the CETA achieves full liberalisation of this sector, there is potential for benefits to soil 
quality as specialised livestock production tends to create nutrient surpluses. However, it also depends 
on where the change in production would occur, as northern Europe, western Europe and the UK are 
more reliant on pasture for livestock, while central, eastern and Mediterranean Europe are largely 
cereal based. Pasture and graze fed cattle tend to be better for soil quality. At the same time, alternative 
scenarios that model the maintenance of tariffs on beef and pork and the EU, estimate that retaining 
sensitivities will not alter output in the EU over the long-term, implying that the environmental impact 
will be largely tied to the level of liberalisation achieved under the CETA.  
For dairy, the outcome is similarly dependent on the level of liberalisation achieved. Under full 
liberalisation dairy output is expected to increase 1% according to the CGE model, while maintaining 
current tariffs on imports into Canada is estimated to lead to declines in EU output. With it apparently 
unlikely that the CETA leads to the full removal of tariffs on dairy, more limited degrees of liberalisation 
that include improvement in terms of geographical indicators for cheese could lead to minor increases in 
output in the EU. The environmental impact on soil usage and quality is not expected to be significant, 
as change in farm structure is not anticipated. 
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INDICATOR:  Water usage and quality 
BASELINE 
Canada 
Irrigation is used on 8% of Canadian farms, with crops such as fruit and vegetables being the main use of 
irrigation on farms in Canada over half of farms relying on irrigation.159 Currently, the most commonly 
used kinds of irrigation systems, such as sprinkler and gun systems, are also the most water 
inefficient.160 In Canada, nutrients and bacteria have been found to exceed acceptable limits on some 
occasions in water affected by agricultural run-off. Nitrate can be found in virtually all groundwater 
around agricultural land, though levels are typically within safe limits.161 Though maintaining reasonable 
performance, water quality in Canada resulting from agricultural practices has decreased since 1981.162 
The primary culprits for this decline were usage of inputs like nitrogen and potassium through fertiliser 
and manure. This change is present throughout Canada, though regions like British Columbia and the 
eastern provinces found larger declines because greater rainfall has led to higher rates of infiltration to 
groundwater and run-off of surface water. Generally, there is less application of nitrogen in the Prairies 
than in the rest of the country.163   
When considering contamination of water from coliforms, the decline in water quality has been more 
important in the Prairies, where there has been a rise in quantity of animals raised. 164 As a note, 
because 60% of grazing livestock in Canada do not have access to surface water, and less than 10% of 
livestock feed near surface water, some of the impacts on water quality are mitigated.165 
Managing wastewater from agricultural sources has in the past consisted of little more than dispersal 
with minimal treatment. There is increasing awareness of the importance of using additional 
technologies, such as engineered wetlands166 which can reduce the concentration of wastewater 
pollutants by 70-98%167 
 
EU 
On average, 44% of total water abstraction in Europe is used for agriculture. Southern European 
countries use the highest amount of abstracted water for agriculture, constituting around two-thirds of 
total abstraction.168 As in other countries, water usage for agriculture irrigation depends on climate, soil 
characteristics, water quality, cultivation practices and crop type. Between 2003 and 2007, the total 
irrigable area in the EU27 (except Germany and Estonia), saw a decrease of 8%.169 Overall, the areas 
with the highest water usage can be found in southern Europe. The South uses about 50% of the 
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agricultural water, while the North uses about 7%.170 The environmental impacts of this range from soil 
erosion, salinisation of groundwater, harm to habitat and water pollution. Crops that are very water 
intensive include potatoes and cotton in northern Europe, and grain maize, rice and fruit in southern 
Europe. 171 Field crops, horticulture and permanent crops, represent nearly 70% of total irrigable area.172   
Regions with higher concentrations of livestock generally represent areas of higher nutrient surpluses 
because of manure. Beef, pork and dairy farms reduce the environmental quality of water because of 
the excessive accumulation of manure, which can lead to contamination of water from bacteria. Pig and 
dairy production are intensive in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, northern Spain, Denmark, western 
UK and southern Ireland among others.173 
Protecting water quality is a key issue in the EU Common Agricultural Policy, specifically to avoid water 
pollution from agricultural activity by encouraging sustainable usage of fertilisers and pesticides. The 
EU’s 1991 nitrate directive aims to reduce water pollution from nitrates.174 Some of the measures 
included monitoring, establishing vulnerable zones, creating codes of practice, and action programmes. 
The water framework directive looks at assessing, monitoring and managing surface and groundwater 
with respect to ecological and chemical status. This reduces the discharge of hazardous substances from 
pesticides for example. 175 The European Commission also adopted the communication ‘Pricing policies 
for enhancing the sustainability of water resources’ in 2000.176 
 
ANALYSIS 
Canada 
As demand increases in Canada, intensification of agricultural practices to attain higher crop and 
livestock yields could have increasing environmental impacts, by increasing water usage and have higher 
levels of inputs which can lead to reductions in the quality of water. 177 
By further concentrating Canadian livestock production, large surpluses of manure are likely to cause 
some degradation of surrounding water quality due to run-off of nutrients and bacteria.178 Under the full 
liberation scenario, dairy production in Canada would decrease, resulting in less negative impacts of 
water quality from this segment of agricultural industry. However, pork and beef production would 
increase, which adversely affect water quality.  
 
EU 
In the EU, the impact is expected to be minimal. With liberalisation, it is likely that the negative 
environmental impact associated with livestock manure would decrease in the EU given the potential for 
decreased output. Conversely, expansion in the dairy sector could worsen the impact on water quality 
from this sector.   
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As fruit crops in Southern Europe are more water intensive, the extent to which certain processed 
agricultural products like fruit preservatives are favoured in Europe under a full liberalisation scenario 
(especially if labelling and packaging requirements are simplified for European exporters to Canada) 
could result in greater water usage. Full liberalisation is only expected to have a minimal increase in 
output for beverages according to the CGE model. However, the real change in output would come from 
a resolution of the dispute over the provincial Liquor Control Boards in Canada. This could increase 
water usage for irrigation of fruit crops like grapes, but also during production of wine, beer and spirits.  
 
INDICATOR:  Biodiversity 
BASELINE 
Canada & EU 
Natural lands and unimproved pasture offer the best conditions to support higher levels of 
biodiversity. 179 As land is converted from wetland to cropland, habitat capacity is deteriorated. 
Agricultural production hinders biodiversity by reducing the quality and diversity of habitats for different 
species and forcing wild flora and fauna to compete with agricultural species for resources. In cases 
where they are successful, this can harm crop performance.180 Monoculture creates habitats that reduce 
the capacity for biodiversity.  
There is significant controversy over the purported environmental impacts of genetically modified crops. 
As many of these GM crops have been modified to be resistant to certain chemical inputs, such as 
pesticides and herbicides, there is a risk that the breed could become a weed that would be difficult to 
eradicate because of its resistance to herbicides. The other oft-stated risk is the possibility that a hybrid 
offspring become more harmful or invasive, thus harming wild plant species and the surrounding 
ecosystem. For example, one study found that Bt corn was harmful to monarch butterflies, though the 
study was criticised for not replicating natural conditions. Further, use of GM crops which have been 
created to produce insecticides result in less insecticides being applied to crops, which is often cited as 
an environmental benefit.181  
In Canada, nearly 600 species of birds, mammals, reptiles and amphibians rely of agricultural land in 
Canada for their habitats. Habitat capacity has decreased from 1986 to 2006.  
As farmland in the EU makes up roughly 40% of land, agriculture thus plays an important role in 
providing habitats for wildlife in the EU. Commercial production in EU agriculture, as in many other 
developed countries, has resulted in intensive, large-scale, high-input and heavily mechanised farmlands. 
The impacts on biodiversity come from farm intensification and abandonment. Farm intensification, 
with higher use of chemical and other inputs, can negatively affect the local ecosystem, negatively 
affecting its capacity to support biodiversity. However, the trend for intensification in the EU-15 has 
stabilised over the course of the 1990s. By reducing the diversity on the farm itself, the capacity to 
support ecological biodiversity is also diminished. Farms that support biodiversity and landscape quality 
are considered high nature value farmland. These are mostly found around the Mediterranean, upland 
UK and Ireland, and mountainous regions of Scandinavia. Overall, high nature value land represents 15-
25% of the utilised agricultural land in the EU-15. 182 Most of the high nature value farmland is not under 
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a protected area within the CAP framework, while the rest is protected under Birds and Habitats 
Directions. 183 
EU legislation of GMOs has been in place since the 1990s, which emphasizes the assessment of risk, 
monitoring, public disclosure, labelling and traceability of GMOs. Since Directive 1990/220, only 18 
GMOs have been authorised for commercial release in the EU, with no authorisations granted since 
1998. 184 
 
ANALYSIS 
Canada 
Though the Canadian agriculture industry is already mature and operating at scale, full liberalisation 
may increase output and export of agricultural products to the EU. This intensification could cause 
further harm to biodiversity, where marginal lands are converted to croplands. However, to the extent 
that crops allowing for greater surface cover and pasture are favoured, such as for grazing of cattle, the 
agricultural landscape could benefit biodiversity.   
Regarding GM crops, the CETA is unlikely to reverse the EU labelling policy of GMOs and the Advance 
Informed Agreement under the Cartagena Protocol. As such, the environmental impacts of GM crops in 
Canada are likely to remain unchanged as greater export of GM crops to the EU is unlikely to be 
encouraged. 
 
EU 
Full liberalisation in the EU could lead to a decrease in output of beef and pork. If this decrease comes 
from regions of Europe that use mostly pasture land for production (Northern and Western Europe and 
UK, as opposed to central, eastern, and Mediterranean Europe that are more cereal based) this could 
harm biodiversity where it is replaced with specialised cropland. However, this is unlikely to occur, as 
even under a full liberalisation scenario, the decrease in output is only likely to be 0.15% for beef output. 
Since the EU agriculture industry is already mature and operating at scale, the impact of CETA on 
biodiversity in the agricultural sector is expected to be relatively minor. Greater intensification, 
specialisation and abandonment of crops are not likely to be further extended by CETA, even by a full 
liberalisation scenario.  
 
INDICATOR:  Air pollution 
BASELINE 
Canada  
GHG emissions from agriculture increased by 27% between 1990 and 2008, rising to 71Mt in Canada.185 
The emissions came from livestock, crops and on farm-fuel use. However, the majority, 62%, comes 
from animal production. Most of this is the result of food digestion, though about one-fifth is from 
manure and one quarter from nitrous oxide which is released from manure disposal. 186 Non-dairy cattle 
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have the largest impact on GHG emissions, representing over 80% of all enteric fermentation 
emissions.187 Dairy cattle generate more milk today than they used to, but they also produce more GHG 
emissions. However, in Canada, emissions from dairy cattle has decreased overall since population of 
dairy cattle decreased on account of higher milk productivity.188 Emissions that come from crops result 
from decomposing crop residues and emissions from chemical nitrogen fertilisers. Emissions from this 
latter category have gone up to 13Mt from 9Mt in 1998. However, better agricultural practices, like 
reduction of summerfallow and more conservation tillage have mitigated this effect.189  
Processed foods and beverages are larger consumers of energy, which results in more GHG emissions. 
Specifically, grain and oilseeds milling, sugar and confectionary products require more energy than meat, 
dairy and seafood. Of course, the quantity of GHG emissions depends on the source of energy, which 
varies across the country. 190 
 
EU 
GHG emissions from agriculture in the EU have decreased since 1990, though agricultural land remains a 
carbon sink. Most of the GHG emissions come in the form of nitrous oxide and methane.191 Nitrogen 
fertilisation of soil increases nitrous oxide emissions, and intestinal fermentation from livestock 
produces methane emissions. In fact, over 40% of all methane emissions are the result of agriculture.192 
Soil denitrification causes 1.3 tonnes of GHG emissions per hectare (almost half of total agricultural 
emissions in the EU27, or 226 million tonnes CO2e), fermentation in ruminants cause 1.9 tonnes per 
livestock unit (almost a third or total agricultural emissions, or 145 million tonnes CO2e), while manure 
management causes 0.6 tonnes per livestock unit (a fifth of agricultural emissions, or 88 million tonnes 
CO2e). 193  When compared across livestock production, beef production represents 29% of GHG 
emissions, 29% for cow milk, and 25% for pork production, while all others (poultry, eggs, sheep, goat) 
account for 17% together. Ruminants produce the most emissions per amount of meat (between 20 and 
23 kg CO2e/kg of meat).194 
Carbon dioxide emissions from agriculture occur because of fossil fuels burned during farm 
operations.195 Direct energy usage has decreased by 7% between 2005 and 2007, going from 29.9 
thousand kilotonnes of oil equivalent to 27.8 thousand kilotonnes oil equivalent (OE)196. The energy 
consumed per hectare tends to be less in new Member states than old Member states. For example, the 
Netherlands has by far the highest energy intensity with 2166Kg OE/ha because it is highly dependent 
on glasshouses.   
Certain practices to reduce GHG emissions from agriculture are being explored by Commission Working 
Groups, including efficient fertiliser application (which is already included under the EU Nitrates 
directive in 1991), composting and production of biogas, conservation tillage and organic farming among 
others. Biomass for renewable energy production is being encouraged under the 2003 Common 
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Agricultural Policy (CAP) reforms with carbon credits. 197  For manure management in particular, 
composting can reduce methane emission by 30 to 70%, especially when straw content is increased.   
 
ANALYSIS 
Canada 
By further concentrating livestock production, large surpluses of manure are likely to increase emissions 
of greenhouses like methane and nitrous oxide.198 Under full liberalisation, it is expected that animal 
product output would increase, requiring larger herd sizes and leading to larger production of methane 
as a by-product. In fact, between 1990 and 2008, output from the beef industry increased 30%, the 
swine industry increased 24% and the poultry industry increased 31%. The impact on GHG emissions 
was a 10Mt rise, from 30 to 40Mt in 2008.199 Thus, higher amounts of cattle could still cause a rise in 
GHG emissions, as would an increase in swine production. Under full liberalisation, the E3MG model 
predicts a 0.75% to 0.76% rise in methane emissions by 2020 and a 0.61% to 0.72% rise in NOx emissions 
by 2020.   
Emissions associated with transportation can be expected to rise with the increase in shipment of 
agricultural commodities across the Atlantic between Canada and the EU as a result of CETA.  
 
EU 
Since the EU agriculture industry is already mature and operating at scale, the impact of the CETA on air 
pollution in the agricultural sector is expected to be minor. As beef and pork output is expected to 
decrease under a full liberalisation scenario, GHG emissions associated with fermentation in ruminants 
and manure management would be expected to decrease. Dairy output would increase under full 
liberalisation, though because of the unlikely elimination of the supply management system in Canada, a 
decrease in output, or an increase in only certain products such as cheese is much more likely. Where 
increase in dairy output is the result of more milk farms, GHG emissions could increase. This overall 
limited impact on GHG emissions is reflected in the E3MG results, which sees no change in CO2 
emissions in either a limited or ambitious tariff liberalisation for food, drink, and tobacco by 2018. Any 
change in GHG emissions in the EU is much more likely to come from changes in manure management, 
supported by various CAP policies, than from decrease in output caused by the CETA. 
 
 
INDICATOR:  WASTE 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Canada & EU 
One of the main environmental impacts of PAPs is an increase in solid waste disposal from packaging. 
Canadian output is expected to see moderate increase under full liberalisation, which could result in 
higher levels of packaging waste created because of increased consumption.  
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In the EU, processed agricultural products that require packaging, such as beverages, pasta, bread, 
biscuits, fruit and vegetable preserves, are expected to see some gains in output under a full 
liberalisation scenario, which could cause an increase in waste.  
Farms produce toxic waste because of the need to dispose of pesticide containers and products, 
veterinary products and used oil among others.200 Over half of Canadian farms use specialised recycling 
programs and 40% return toxic waste to suppliers. About 10% of farms use unsustainable practices like 
disposal at local dumps and burning. 201 
Manure is an important form of waste on Canadian farms. A 1995 survey in Canada showed that 60% of 
farms stored manure on their land. Of these, 11% stored liquid manure, mostly on dairy, hog and poultry 
and egg farms. The most common liquid manure storage system was lagoons (33%) and open tanks 
(31%). Moreover, 40% of farmers can store over 250 days of liquid manure. 96% of farms store liquid 
manure more than 30 meters from any water source. Nearly all, 95%, of farms storing manure stored 
solid manure. The most popular storage method was an open pile without a roof (60%). 202  Overall, this 
kind of waste is expected to increase in Canada along with increase in livestock output. 
Most diary milk farms in Mediterranean regions use liquid manure storage system using an intensive 
system. Dairy farms in pasture areas typically use 100% liquid manure in the EU. Farms where cereal is 
not grown use 100% liquid manure to avoid buying straw for litter, which is the case in Ireland, Scotland, 
West England, Wales, parts of Denmark, the Netherlands, and most of northern Scandinavia. Mixed 
farming areas see more solid manure management because litter is available. This is present in northern 
France, eastern Netherlands, and mixed farms in Denmark. Industrial farms under the former Soviet 
collectivism use liquid manure storage because these dairy farms do not employ grazing. Small farms 
with less than 100 cows use solid manure management. 203 Means of improving manure management in 
the EU were explained in the section on air pollution, particularly in terms of reducing GHG emissions. 
However, because beef and pork production are expected to see a decrease in output under full 
liberalisation, waste in the form of manure should decrease, though not significantly.  
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202 Manure, Fertilizer and Pesticide Management in Canada. Results of the 1995 Farm Inputs Management Survey. Economic 
and Policy Analysis Directorate Policy Branch. 1998.  
203 Evaluation of the livestock sector’s contribution to the EU greenhouse gas emissions (GGELS). Final Report. Administrative 
Arrangements AGRI-2008-0245 and AGRI-2009-0296. Joint Research Centre. European Commission.  
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4.1.2. Fisheries 
 
ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT 
 
INDICATOR:  Output and trade 
BASELINE 
Bordering three oceans and possessing numerous lakes and rivers, Canada has direct access to a wealth 
of fishing sources. Capture fishery accounts for approximately 76% of total fish and seafood production 
in Canada, with lobster, crab and shrimp comprising 67% of the landed value of all fish and shellfish 
harvested.204 The seafood industry in the Atlantic is the country’s largest, with its value driven by lobster, 
crab, shrimp and scallops. The Pacific industry is instead led by salmon, clams, groundfish and herring 
roe. Freshwater fisheries make a minor contribution to the industry contributing only 4% of total 
revenue from the fisheries sector.205 Aquaculture, though still minor within the Canadian industry, 
continues to increase in importance with key products including farmed salmon, trout, steelhead, Arctic 
char, blue mussels, oysters and manila clams. 
In 2009, total exports in fish, crustaceans and molluscs (SITC 03) from Canada were $3.21 billion, 
providing it with a trade surplus of $1.31 billion.206  Canada’s main seafood exports are shellfish (frozen 
snow crabs, live lobsters, frozen lobsters and frozen prawns and shrimp) and fresh Atlantic farmed 
salmon, with the former representing 56.6% of the value of all fisheries exports.207  As would be 
expected, trade in seafood is particularly important for the coastal provinces, with Nova Scotia, British 
Columbia, Newfoundland and New Brunswick accounting for 87.1% of all exports in 2007.208 The US is 
the leading international market for Canadian fish and seafood, receiving 61.8% of all exports in 2007, 
followed by the EU with 14.8%.   
With imports more than six times the value of its exports and a trade deficit in 2009 of $17.67 billion, 
the EU is heavily dependent on external sources for fish and seafood.209 While the most widely imported 
fish and seafood products in the EU are pacific salmon, frozen shrimp, tuna, Alaska Pollack, frozen 
octopus and frozen cod, it is noteworthy that Canada is a relatively minor contributor to the EU of these 
products.210 Instead, Canada’s major exports to the EU are in shrimp and prawns, which represent 
almost 30% of Canada’s total fisheries exports to the EU. Other important Canadian exports consist of 
prepared salmon and lobster, with the EU importing approximately 90% of all its frozen lobster and 41% 
of all fresh lobster from Canada in 2007.211 Within the EU, Denmark and the UK are the two largest 
export markets for Canadian fish and seafood followed by France, Germany and Spain.212 The EU does 
not play a predominant role in Canadian imports of fish and seafood contributing only 2.1% of the value 
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of all fisheries imports in 2009.213 From 2006-2008, Canada ran a trade surplus of €320 million with the 
EU in the fisheries trade.214 
 
 
Box 11: Non-Tariff Barriers in Fisheries 
 
A defensive area of great concern amongst EU stakeholders is the fair application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary (SPS) measures to fisheries products. Internal trade of fish and seafood products within 
the EU Member States is subject to regulations specifically related to sanitary conditions aimed at 
consumer’s health. As a result, imported products should comply with the same standards. It is a 
minimum expectation of the EU stakeholders that any agreement reached with Canada would require 
imports to meet the EU standards. Among other issues, the allowance of Canadian Genetically Modified 
(GM) salmon into the EU is of particular interest to the Canadians. 
In terms of offensive measures, the EU could potentially realise some benefits by the removal of NTBs in 
Canada’s laws and regulations pertaining to licensing for purchasing, processing and transporting fish as 
well as removal of restrictions stipulating fishing enterprises with foreign ownership levels of more than 
49% are prohibited from holding Canadian commercial fishing licenses. 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
Canada 
With over 80% of its fisheries products exported into foreign markets, the Canadian fisheries sector 
could potentially experience significant gains from the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers under the 
CETA. In terms of tariffs, the EU operates high MFN rates on a number of fish and seafood products, 
serving to restrict exports from Canada and disadvantaging it in the EU market vis-à-vis major 
competitors such as Norway and Iceland.215 While difficult to properly decompose,216 CGE estimates 
appear to suggest that full elimination of EU tariffs on fish and seafood would have a positive impact on 
output and trade in Canada. 
Specifically, the CGE model projects that fully removing tariffs on fish and seafood under the CETA will 
lead to limited increases in production of fisheries products in Canada (0.5% to 0.65%) over the long-
term. While the CETA would not be expected to lead to an increase in exports of fresh fish and seafood 
from Canada, it would likely lead to at least low to moderate increases in overall exports of frozen fish 
and seafood products (Tables 41-48 Annex 6). For both fresh and frozen seafood products, exports to 
the EU would increase – with the greater gains likely to occur in the latter – producing an improvement 
to Canada’s bilateral balance of trade and the overall balance of trade in fish and seafood.  
                                                             
213 UN Comtrade 
214 EC (2008b) 
215 DFAIT. http://w01.international.gc.ca/CIMAR-RCAMI/fiche-detail.aspx?id=1419&lang=eng 
216 These difficulties stem from the nature of the GTAP database’s aggregation. While it includes a sector for fisheries products 
this omits all frozen fish and seafood products, which are instead aggregated into the ‘other foods’ sector. Problematic is that 
this aggregation also includes a number of variegated PAPs such as cocoa preparations, coffee and tea products, cereal 
products and preparations, frozen and preserved fruits and vegetables, etc. At the same time, some of these products are also 
levied with higher than average tariffs in both Canada and the EU, making it unclear to what degree tariff shocks are impacting 
the frozen fisheries products included in this sectoral grouping.  
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The aquaculture industry could also realise significant gains with it serving as a major growth industry in 
Canada. An aquaculture product which Canadian exporters are eager to bring to the EU market is 
genetically modified (GM) salmon. Canada has proposed that proper labelling should resolve any 
consumer issues, but at this time GM salmon is not permitted to be sold in the EU although it is under 
consideration. Any resolutions within the CETA that facilitates access for GM salmon is likely to lead to 
substantial growth for the industry in Canada, benefitting output and exports while also providing EU 
consumers with lower costs.  
 
EU 
The EU is highly reliant on imports to meet its demand for fish and seafood and could therefore benefit 
from increased imports from Canada with greater levels of liberalisation under the CETA. CGE results 
suggest that full removal of tariffs under the CETA would have a limited impact on production in the EU 
fishing industry while perhaps benefiting processors (Tables 41-48 Annex 6). As the wild fisheries 
industry has a limited supply chain, lowering and/or removing tariffs will allow the import process to 
become less cumbersome with harvesters, exporters, importers and processors not having to juggle 
their timing with respect to storage and quotas.  This will ultimately benefit the consumer. 
The EU industry could further see benefits from investment liberalisation brought by the CETA. As 
Canada’s restrictions on investments in its fisheries sector are among the highest out of any sector there 
may be an opportunity for increased investment in both the fish processing and aquaculture sectors, 
especially with regards to R&D. Canada maintains several restrictions on investment in the fisheries 
sector, whereas the chief constraint is the policy that fishing enterprises having a foreign ownership 
level of more than 49% are prohibited from holding Canadian commercial fishing licenses (although 
there is no limit on foreign ownership of fish processing companies that do not hold a fishing licence). 
Although the policy allows minority ownership of Canadian fish harvesting companies by foreign 
investors, majority ownership would require forfeiting any existing licenses held by that company.  
 
INDICATOR:  Employment 
BASELINE 
The fishing and incidental industries employ 0.2% of the overall labour force in Canada. 217 
Newfoundland and Nova Scotia are the two provinces with the highest proportion of jobs in the fishing 
and incidental services industry in Canada with over 55% of the workers in the sector.  
The fisheries sector serves a relatively minor source of employment for the entire EU. As part of the 
2002 Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) reform,218 the EU proposed a dramatic reduction in the fishing 
efforts by enforcing mandatory cuts in days at sea of between 30% and 60%.219 This led to voluntary cuts 
in overall EU fleet capacity of about 18% and resulted in a large reduction in the numbers of fishermen 
as they left the industry in search of alternative employment. Approximately 130,000 are employed in 
the processing and preserving of fish, with Spain, the UK, France, Poland and Germany accounting for 
over 60% of this total.220  
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ANALYSIS 
Canada 
Where the CETA leads to significant levels of liberalisation in the fisheries sector, it is expected that the 
Agreement will have a positive impact on employment in Canada’s fisheries sector. This would include 
both gains in the fishing industry as well as in the processing of fisheries products. CGE estimates 
support these assertions, with the simulations modelling full removal of tariffs projecting that the CETA 
could lead to an increase in employment greater than 1% (Scenarios C and D) in the fishing sector over 
the long-term. While it is difficult to decompose the effect on the fish processing industry, data suggests 
that the impact would be larger, but still likely be only limited overall.   
 
EU 
Overall, it does not appear likely that the CETA will have a pronounced impact on employment in the 
EU’s fisheries sector. CGE estimates suggest that full removal of tariffs would have almost no noticeable 
impact on the fishing sector in the EU. Further, while difficult to decompose from other impacts, it is 
possible that increased access to seafood products from Canada may have a positive – albeit likely 
negligible – impact on employment in the food processing industry.  
 
 
SOCIAL ASSESSMENT 
 
INDICATOR:  Worker displacement 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Canada 
The fishing industry is primarily made up of a number of independent operators who sell their produce 
as independent contractors to fish processing plants; it is also made up of fishermen and fishing boat 
crews working for commercial fleets some of which belong to processing companies. While the industry 
serves a relatively minor role in terms of national employment, it is particularly important in Canada’s 
Atlantic Provinces, where it is a major source of livelihood for a number of regions.  
With full removal of tariffs, it is likely that the fishing and processing industries in Canada would see 
increased employment, generating jobs in the Coastal provinces and generating opportunities in food 
manufacturing companies that process fish. Such an outcome would likely have a positive social impact 
as improved livelihoods increased the standard of living in these areas and ensured the continued 
existence of rural areas revolving around a system of production that has been in place for several 
generations. Such an outcome is, however, largely tied to the CETA’s ability to eliminate tariffs on fish 
and seafood, with its failure to do so likely to limit the impact.  
 
EU 
The overall impact arising from the CETA is likely to be negligible. Increased access for Canadian 
producers would likely negatively impact employment in the EU’s fishing industry, though the declines in 
labour would likely be offset by gains for the processing industry which would benefit by better access 
to Canadian fish and seafood products.  
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INDICATOR:  Quality and Decency of work 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Canada 
While it is expected that the CETA will lead to increases of exports of seafood to the European market, 
the problems in the fisheries sectors are largely structural and the CETA is unlikely to impact on the 
quality of life on the Canadian fisheries workforce. 
 
EU 
The EU has one of the largest fishing fleets in the world, and although most of it operates within 
community waters, a significant part of the fishing sector depends on access to non-community 
resources. Similar to Canada, the CETA is not expected to have an impact on this indicator in the EU’s 
fisheries sector. 
 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 
 
INDICATOR:  Resources depletion 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
In fisheries, the main environmental concern is that the CETA could potentially lead to an decrease in 
fish stocks in certain parts of the Atlantic, although increased Canada-EU collaboration could provide 
greater impetus for the development of more sustainable fishery practices.  
Canada 
Full removal of tariffs are expected to increase Canadian exports as tariffs are listed as a main limiting 
factor to exports.221 Because full liberalisation under CETA is expected to increase output and export of 
fisheries products, there is a risk that Canadian fish stocks could be reduced if fisheries are improperly 
managed. The environmental impact of the fisheries sector is highly dependent on the method of its 
catch. SeaChoice ranks trap Atlantic shrimp as ‘best choice’, meaning that it has limited negative 
environmental impact, while Atlantic shrimp caught from trawlers as ‘some concern’. In that case, the 
primary source of its environmental impact is the severe deterioration done to seafloor habitats by 
trawlers.222 Full removal of tariffs would increase Canadian exports as tariffs are listed as a main limiting 
factor.223 This could mean greater reliance on trawlers, which are better equipped for processing and 
exporting to the EU, and thus greater environmental impact, as well as possible resource depletion if 
improperly managed.  
Atlantic shrimp has seen its total allowable catch (TAC) more than double between the late 1990s and 
2006 to 150,000 tonnes. If a rise in output due to CETA is achieved through unsustainable increases in 
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TAC, or if it results in greater reliance on trawlers, which are better equipped for processing and 
exporting to the EU, resource stocks could be adversely affected.  
Lobster fishery has average landings of 45,000 and 50,000 tonnes per year. Several management 
practices are implemented to limit the environmental impact of lobster catch, such as minimal carapace 
size to allow young to reproduce and protection of eggs on females.224 Thus, unsustainable increases in 
TAC for Canadian lobster producers and negative changes in resource management would be necessary 
to have dramatic resource impacts.  
Aquaculture has important environmental impacts on surrounding ecosystems, including nutrient 
enrichment, habitat alteration, and harming of wild fish stocks. Aquaculture produces wastes, mainly 
metabolic fish waste and excess feed, which are released into the surrounding ecosystems. The farming 
of fish also causes an increased risk of introducing disease to wild fish populations, which can potentially 
harm wild fish stocks.225 Chemicals are also added to the ecosystem, through pesticides (such as anti-sea 
lice pesticides), drugs (antibiotics), persistent organic pollutant and metals, many of which may harm 
benthic fauna diversity, accumulate in certain species, be lethal, or have other effects (such as moulting 
of lobster shells).226 All of these impacts reduce biodiversity and biomass in wild ecosystems.227 Because 
prepared salmon is an important export to the EU, increases in output of farmed open net salmon under 
full removal of tariffs could create many environmental issues in terms of impacts on wild species. 
Farming salmon in closed containment tanks, rather than in open nets, can reduce these impacts. This 
aquaculture practice eliminates the interaction of farmed species with wild species. However, use of 
wild species for feed of farmed species continues under this management practice.  
The transportation of fisheries products from Canada to the EU will also have an environmental impact 
in terms of the increase in greenhouse gases associated with shipping exports. 
 
 
EU 
CETA fisheries provisions are not likely to impact fish stock depletion or have any other environmental 
impacts in the EU. 
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4.2. USA, MEXICO & OTHER THIRD COUNTRIES 
 
USA 
BASELINE 
The United States is rich in fertile farm soil and also enjoys a moderate climate. There are more than 2.2 
million farms in the U.S. and the country is a net exporter of agricultural products.  By volume the top 
agricultural products are corn, cattle meat and cow’s milk. By value, the top products are corn, soy and 
wheat.228 
Output from U.S. farms has grown dramatically, allowing consumers to spend an increasingly smaller 
portion of their income on food and freeing a large share of the population to enter nonfarm 
occupations that have supported economic growth and development.229 While the more broadly 
defined food and agriculture sector continues to play a strong role in the national economy, farming has 
progressively contributed a smaller share of GDP (1.2%) and employed a smaller share of the labour 
force.230  
As of 2008, approximately 2-3 percent of the population is directly employed in agriculture. Of the 145 
million employed workers in the U.S., 834,000 of them held jobs as agricultural workers with 83% of 
these jobs being as farm workers. 
The United States has the largest feed-cattle industry in the world, and is the world's largest producer of 
beef, primarily high-quality, grain-fed beef for domestic and export use.231 The retail value equivalent of 
U.S. and beef cattle industry amounted to $73 billion in 2009.232 The United States exported 7.2% of its 
beef production in 2009, for a value of $2,828 billion. Over 90% of the U.S. beef exports markets are 
sent to, in order, Mexico, Canada, Japan and South Korea.233 With the partial EU ban on hormone-
treated beef, the EU constitutes a small market in this sector. 
At the beginning of 2009, the U.S. had nearly 67 million hogs and pigs, with the majority located in the 
Midwest and a further 15 percent in North Carolina.234 The United States is the third-largest producer 
and consumer of pork and pork products and the largest exporter and fifth largest importer.235 The 
largest export markets for American pork products were Japan (28.36%), China/Hong Kong (18.24%) and 
Mexico (14.44%). It should be noted that the EU and Canada are the two most important U.S. 
competitors in the pork export market.  
Dairy has the second largest value of production in the United States behind beef. Dairy farms are 
generally family-owned and managed, with most maintaining membership in cooperatives.236 As a 
member of the WTO, the United States, along with many other dairy-trading countries, established tariff 
rate quotas (TRQs) for dairy products. The TRQs allow imports at very low tariffs up to fixed amounts. 
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Any additional imports are subject to very high tariffs. Many of the individual TRQs are administered 
through licenses for imports of specific products from specific countries or regions. The United States 
has not been a major exporter of dairy products on a sustained basis, while being a relatively large 
importer of cheese.237 
Enjoying an extensive coastline on both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, as well as on the Gulf of Mexico, 
the Great Lakes and surrounding Alaska, the fishing industry is also a large contributor to the U.S. 
economy at 0.5% of GDP.238 According to the FAO, in 2005 the United States harvested 4,888,621 million 
tonnes of fish from wild fisheries and another 471,958 tonnes from aquaculture. This made the United 
States the fifth leading producer of fish after China, Peru, India and Indonesia, with 3.8 percent of the 
world total.239 As with other countries, the 200 nautical miles (370 km) exclusive economic zone (EEZ) off 
the coast of the United States gives its fishing industry special fishing rights. It covers 11.4 million square 
kilometres (4.38 million sq mi). This is the largest zone in the world, exceeding the land area of the 
United States.240  
 
ANALYSIS 
The CETA’s impact on the U.S. agriculture, PAPs and fisheries sector is likely to be minimal, with the 
extent largely tied to the level of liberalisation achieved under the Agreement. The most prominent 
general impact will be the erosion of preferences with Canada as the EU achieves preferential access to 
the Canadian marketplace for a number of its agricultural products.  
Dairy stands out as a sector in which the U.S. may lose Canadian market share should the CETA lead to 
increases in EU market access. However, as noted in the Canada assessment, it appears unlikely that the 
Agreement will lead to anything more than improvements in the minimum access commitments 
bestowed on the EU, limiting the negative impact likely to befall the U.S.  
With significant reduction in tariffs on both sides, it appears that the CETA could lead to reduced exports 
of U.S. processed foods (e.g. preparations of cereals and milling products, preserved/frozen fruits and 
vegetables, etc.), as increased EU access to the Canadian market leads to reduced imports of U.S. agri-
food products in Canada. Minor decreases in employment within food manufacturing industry within 
the U.S. could lead to marginal amounts of displacement, leading to a minor negative social impact.  
An additional sector that may be negatively impacted as a result of the CETA is the U.S. alcoholic 
beverages sector as increased access to the Canadian markets would allow EU producers to take an 
increased share of the market previously held by U.S. imports. The degree of this impact would likely be 
largely influenced by the degree with which the CETA is able to lead to a resolution of what the EU 
deems are discriminatory practices in Canada’s provincial liquor control boards.  
Finally, the meat sector stands to be negatively impacted by improved EU market access for Canadian 
beef and pork producers, particularly given the likelihood that this would likely require that cattle and 
hogs be raised in Canada in order to qualify for preferential access to the EU. Significant improvements 
in market access would, over the long-term, likely lead to some disruption in the level of integration 
between the U.S. and Canada as it relates to meat production, leading to less exports from the U.S. to 
Canada and less production in the former as Canadian producers would be incentivised to increase 
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domestic production of hogs and cattle so as to ensure i) hormone free production and ii) ability to 
qualify as ‘Canadian-produced’ under EU rules of origin.   
The environmental impacts of a CETA for this sub-sector are likely to be very limited because of the 
minimal economic impacts that predict very little change in national output. Specific to GHG emissions, 
the E3MG model results predict 0% difference in GHG emissions by 2018 under both a limited and 
ambitious tariff liberalisation. If as suggested there is a reduction in beef and pork production in the U.S. 
because of incentives to Canadian producers to increase production locally, there could be a reduction 
in environmental impact from this sector on water quality and GHG emissions.  
 
 
Box 12: Regulatory Concerns 
 
A specific concern addressed by U.S. stakeholders in the Agriculture, PAPs and fisheries sector, is that 
CETA represents an effort by the Europeans to ‘export’ EU standards and regulatory regimes across a 
wide range of trade issues including health and safety mechanisms.  The belief is that the CETA is part of 
a much broader strategy to target existing North American standards and regulations established in the 
NAFTA.  As a result, it can be expected that the CETA will provide a template for future negotiations with 
the U.S. 
With many multinationals already operating inside the regulatory system of the EU through investments 
or partnering, the U.S. is keeping a close eye on CETA negotiations with regards to increased 
administrative and compliance burdens imposed by EU regulatory schemes.  Both the U.S. and Canada 
have concerns that SMEs will not be able to cope with programs such as REACH – the Registration, 
Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of Chemical substances. U.S. trade officials consider the 
inability of Canadian and U.S. companies to cope with the regulations will encourage greater investment 
and see production moving to Europe. 
 
 
MEXICO 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Mexico has the world’s 14th largest economy, and agriculture, PAPs and fisheries account for 4.3% of 
Mexico’s GDP. With 18% of the labour force employed in the sector, agriculture and agri-food serves as 
an important source of jobs for Mexico. However, agriculture as a percentage of GDP has been steadily 
declining as Mexico’s economy becomes more developed.  
Crop production is the most important agricultural activity in Mexico, accounting for fully 50% of 
agricultural output. With limited projected impact in Canada or the EU as a result of the CETA, it is 
unlikely that Mexico will experience any significant effect in crop production over the long-term.  
Mexico has some 11,500 kilometres of Pacific, Gulf of Mexico, and Caribbean coastline, and its inland 
waters cover more than 2.9 million hectares. The country's coastal fishing grounds offer a rich variety of 
fish and other seafood. In 2008 the fishing subsector employed 328,000 people.241  The fishing industry 
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in Mexico is largely handled by cooperative societies, which are granted monopolies on the most 
valuable species of fish. Most fish processed in Mexico's canneries are consumed domestically. 
Generally it is not expected that the CETA will impact the industry in Mexico. Again, it is not expected 
that Mexico’s fisheries industry will be significantly altered by a CETA between the EU and Canada.  
Overall then, it does not appear that a CETA will have a pronounced economic impact on the agriculture, 
PAPs and fisheries sectors of the Mexican economy. While Mexico may experience some erosion of 
preferences presently held due to separate trade agreements with the EU and Canada, it is not likely 
that agriculture will be adversely or positively impacted to any significant degree. As a result, the 
environmental and social impacts of CETA from this sub-sector are likely to be very limited as well. 
Specific to GHG emissions, the E3MG model results predict 0.2% difference in GHG emissions by 2018 
under both a limited and ambitious tariff liberalisation.  
Overseas Countries & Territories 
While not specifically ‘third countries’, Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) associated with EU 
Member States242 can be impacted by EU trade agreements such as the CETA. Associate status for the 21 
OCTs was conferred upon them by the Treaty of Lisbon, with the principal aim being to contribute to 
their economic and social development. 243  This aim has been reinforced through the Overseas 
Association Decision (OAD), which allows all goods originating in OCTs to be exported to the EU duty and 
quota free. As such, a preferential trade agreement between the EU and a non-OCT has the potential to 
weaken terms of trade for OCTs by eroding their preferential access to the EU market.  
In terms of the CETA specifically, the two North American OCTs of Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon (SPM) and 
Greenland have been flagged as being potentially prone to such an outcome given their proximity to 
Canada and its role as a major competitor in exports of fisheries products. This section will outline the 
potential impact of the CETA on Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon and Greenland, particularly from the vantage 
point of its impact on the fisheries sector.  
 
Modelling the impact of the CETA on Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon & Greenland in the CGE Model 
 
While it is desirable to analyse the impact of the CETA on SPM and Greenland through the CGE 
framework, the GTAP database unfortunately does not provide individual data specific to these OCTs. As 
such, it is impossible to provide isolated outputs for either SPM or Greenland, compromising the study’s 
ability to perform a rigorous, quantitative analysis of the CETA’s impact on these two OCTs. Where 
relevant, quantitative data is provided, though the assessment on SPM and Greenland is predominantly 
qualitative in nature, employing existing studies and stakeholder consultations to gather evidence and 
inform opinions. 
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Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon 
 
INDICATOR: Population  
BASELINE 
The French overseas collectivity of Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon (SPM) is the only remaining French territory 
in North America, located only 25 km from Newfoundland.244 The archipelago, consisting of eight islands, 
has a total area of only 242 km2. The most recent estimates from 2006 cite the population of SPM as 
6125 which marks a decrease of 3% since 1999.245 Outward migration of young adults is a significant 
problem currently facing the archipelago: stakeholders report that between 1999 and 2006, 30% of the 
males between the ages of 25 and 35 left the island, with fewer rates of returnees given the limited 
economic prospects provided on SPM.246 This issue poses to significantly threaten economic and social 
sustainability. 
 
INDICATOR: Output    
BASELINE 
Fishing and its incidental services have historically been the most important industry on SPM, though 
the industry collapsed in the early 1990s with the ruling by the New York arbitral tribunal in 1992 to 
restrict SPM’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to an area of approximately 21 nautical miles around the 
archipelago.247 Today, SPM’s GDP is largely reliant on the tertiary sector. The economy is driven 
predominantly by public investment, which accounts for approximately 39% of the archipelago’s GDP 
and 45% of its value added.248 Other major contributors to output include commerce (14% of GDP) and 
construction (11%), though this is also largely contingent on government-led investments in 
infrastructure.249 The fisheries sector contributes about 4% of SPM’s GDP and roughly 2% of the 
archipelago’s total value added.250 While GDP per capita in 2004 was €26,073 – only slightly below the 
average of France and above the average of its other OCTs – residents of SPM are largely dependent on 
transfers from the French government.251   
The preservation of fishing rights is an important issue for the archipelago’s fisheries sector.252 The 
fishing industry is subject to quotas for cod, shrimp, redfish and halibut, regulated by NAFO, with tuna 
and swordfish quotas managed under the framework of the International Commission for the 
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT). Management of fish resources within SPM’s territorial waters is 
managed by the French State with support from IFREMER and the Service des affaires maritimes.253   
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247 Another key factor includes a 5 year moratorium on cod fishing implemented by Canada in the same year.  
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SPM’s cod quotas: 1999-2009 (in tonnes)  
1999 2000 2001 2006 2007 2008 2009 
5616 3120 2340 2158 2210 2028 1794 
Source: IEDOM 2010 
Despite continued reductions in quotas, the majority of Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon’s landed fish (by 
volume) continues to be cod (45%), with lumpfish (14%), scallops (10%) and snow crab also serving an 
important role in fisheries production.254 Industrial fishing is conducted by SPM Seafood International, 
with 52% of its total catch in 2007 consisting of crustaceans (primarily shrimp and snow crab), 30% 
pelagic, 12% groundfish and 6% shellfish (scallops and mussels).255 
Given the reduction in fishing rights and the moratorium on cod implemented by Canada to replenish 
natural cod stocks, the processing industry (particularly of imported fish) has taken on greater 
importance. Within SPM, processing of cod plays an important role, though processing of snow crabs, 
whelk and lumpfish is also important. The industry is populated by only four companies: 
1. SPM Seafood International, which transforms the entire catch allocated to the SPM fishing 
industry: mainly cod, but also rockfish, halibut and flounder.  
2. SNPM, which specialises in processing cod into salted cod 
3. Les Nouvelles Pêcheries, which primarily processes snow crab.  
4. Pêcheries Paturel, which is focused on packaging fresh fish, crab and lumpfish roe as well as 
smoked products (salmon, shark, cod, scallops, etc).256   
Aquaculture has been flagged as a key development industry, with it being viewed as a means of 
diversifying the economy and reviving the fishing industry in light of reduced quota allocation for cods 
and other fish. At present, however, the industry is still in its early stages with projects to develop the 
cod and scallops aquaculture industries not yet reaching wide scale commercial viability.257  
Agriculture has not had a long commercial history on SPM, with subsistence farming being the primary 
mode of production until the moratorium on cod fishing in the 1990s created a need to diversify 
economic activity.258 SPM’s harsh climate and narrowness of land restricts the development of large-
scale agriculture and livestock and requires wide usage of greenhouses in production. At present, more 
than 30 different agricultural products are grown on the archipelago, though lettuce and tomato serve 
as the two main products in terms of value. Livestock production is generally limited.  
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INDICATOR: Trade    
BASELINE 
As a small, insular economy, SPM is heavily reliant on trade. Given its lack of resources, however, the 
archipelago is limited in what it can produce and export, making trade largely unbalanced. As such, 
exports in 2009 were only 6.2% of the value of imports, resulting in a trade deficit for the archipelago of 
€60.21 million.259 In total, exports’ contribution to SPM’s GDP is around 2%.260 
Exports in 2009 were valued at €3.86 million: their lowest level since 2000. After recording exports of 
fisheries products in excess of €6 million in 2007 and 2008, total exports of fisheries products decreased 
sharply, partly as a result of a processing plant’s closure for several months.261 Despite the industry’s 
decline, fish and seafood remain SPM’s leading export, comprising nearly all of the value of exports from 
the archipelago. While the United States and Asia continue to serve as important export markets, the 
decline in the value of the dollar vis-à-vis the Euro (which is the official currency of SPM) has made the 
archipelago increasingly reliant on the EU for its exports. As a result, the EU is the leading destination, 
with Spain and France accounting for 24.2% and 14.3%, respectively.262  
 
Exports of fisheries products (2009) 
Product Value (€) Percentage of total 
Fresh or frozen fish 1,626,000 42.1 
Salted, smoked, dried fish and 
fish eggs 
165,000 4.3 
Fresh or refrigerated crustaceans 520,000 13.5 
Fresh or refrigerated shellfish 53,000 1.4 
Warehouse output 1,496,000 38.8 
Total Exports  3,860,000 100 
Source: Herran 2011 
 
INDICATOR: Employment  
BASELINE 
The labour force on SPM is comprised of approximately 3185 workers (2006). Unemployment in 2009 
was 7.7% and the three year average 2007-2009 was 7.87%.263 The labour market is characterised by 
high degrees of seasonality, particularly in fishing, agriculture and construction. While nearly 63% of the 
long-term unemployed are women, they have played an increasing role in SPM’s labour force and as 
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more young adults have migrated out of SPM, women have increasingly entered the workforce to fill 
this void.264  
SPM Labour statistics: 1990, 1999 and 2006 
 1990 1999 2006 
Labour force 
- Men 
- Women 
2981 
- 1893 
-1088 
3198 
-1826 
-1372 
3185 
-1747 
-1438 
Employed  
-Men 
-Women 
2695 
-1740 
-955 
2790 
-1604 
-1186 
2867 
-1575 
-1292 
Source: IEDOM 2010 
Sectoral employment has changed significantly since the collapse of the fishing industry in the early 
1990s. The tertiary sector has taken on increased importance, accounting for 86% of employment in 
2006, compared to 72% and 81% in 1990 and 1999, respectively.265    
SPM had 528 companies in 2009. Artisanal craft enterprises and shops make up 28.2% and 23%, 
respectively, while 15% are engaged in business services and 12% in construction. The fisheries and 
aquaculture sector is comprised of only 24 companies, together accounting for approximately 5%-7% of 
all employment.266 Traditional fishing is comprised of approximately 30 small and medium-sized vessels, 
while processing, as mentioned, consists of four plants.  
Processing plant Employment (approximate) 
Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon-Seafood International 60 full-time works and 10 seasonal workers 
Les Nouvelles Pêcheries 5 full time employees and 30 seasonal workers 
Pêcheries Paturel four full-time staff and one seasonal employee 
SNPM 15 seasonal workers 
Source: IEDOM 2010, Territorial Council of SPM 
 
ANALYSIS (All indicators) 
As an OCT of the EU, SPM enjoys a number of economic advantages with regards to trade. Under the 
Overseas Association Decision (2001/822/EC), goods can be shipped duty-free from SPM (and other 
OCTs) to the EU (provided they qualify as originating in SPM) and are not subject to quantitative 
restrictions such as quotas. Combined with derogations on rules of origin, Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon has 
thus dually benefitted from improved competitiveness of processed products such as lobster vis-à-vis 
Canada as well as the ability to source certain products from Canada and ship them to the EU with only 
limited processing. It is, therefore, the case that the CETA could directly impact SPM by reducing the 
industry’s competitiveness in exports to the EU vis-à-vis Canada should tariffs on products such as cod, 
lobster, scallops, mussels and snow crabs be eliminated or reduced under the Agreement.   
With the collapse of the fishing industry in the early 1990s, SPM’s private economy has suffered, forcing 
the archipelago to remain heavily dependent on financial transfers from France and public investment. 
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In an effort to revitalise the private economy, the Territorial Council has recently adopted the Schéma de 
Développement Stratégique 2010-2030 (SDS). Included in this, is the realisation that if the economy is to 
improve, diversification will be an important path towards development and greater sustainability. 
While greater development of the services sector (particularly e-services) and tourism have been 
targeted as a means of achieving this goal, a cornerstone of the agenda is the development of a fish and 
seafood processing industry that focuses on exports to the EU.267  
In essence, the realisation of this goal would appear to be reliant on the continued preferential access to 
the EU vis-à-vis Canada as well as continued/expanded derogation of rules of origin on fisheries 
products and cumulation with Canada. The underlying premise is that since SPM’s fisheries sector is not 
as competitive as Canada’s, the continued existence of tariffs on certain products is required in order to 
ensure the continued survival of the fisheries industry. Tariffs are claimed to be essential in offsetting 
higher shipping and handling costs faced by SPM processors, with one study estimating that the 20% 
tariff applied on Canadian lobster imported into the EU provides cost savings of C$1.12 per pound when 
processed in SPM and savings of C$0.54 when reducing the tariff to 16%.268 Similarly, the same study 
estimates that tariffs of 8% on scallops provide savings of C$0.16 per pound, placing SPM processors on 
equal footing with their Canadian competitors.   
Therefore, if the CETA leads to the removal or reduction of tariffs on Canadian imports of certain 
fisheries products (e.g. lobster or scallops) it appears probable that SPM’s industry will experience a 
reduction in its competitiveness. While this would certainly affect local processors such as SPM Seafood 
International (which is responsible for processing all domestically harvested fish and seafood), it would 
also likely significantly undermine objectives in the SDS to transform SPM into a transshipment hub for 
Canadian landed fish and seafood.  
SPM is strategically hoping to utilise its preferential access to the EU market to transform itself into a 
gateway, whereby – through extended derogations of RoO and cumulation with Canada – greater 
amounts of Canadian fisheries products would pass through SPM for processing before being shipped to 
the EU. Under such an outcome, it is hoped that the archipelago can attract greater foreign investment 
(predominantly from Canada) as Canadian processors seek to capitalise from the reduced tariffs that 
shipping through SPM could provide. However, should the CETA lead to significant reductions in tariffs 
on Canadian imports of processed fish and seafood, it is likely that this plan would be compromised, 
limiting the ability of SPM to attract FDI into its fish processing industry. While not conclusive, 
consultations with stakeholders have noted that the uncertainty involved in the CETA negotiations have 
been at least partially responsible for a recent withdrawal of a planned investment in SPM’s processing 
sector by Canadian investors. 
Additionally, the elimination of preferential tariffs vis-à-vis Canada and the loss of competitiveness it 
confers on SPM’s fish processing industry could nullify the utility of other measures incidental to the 
establishment of SPM as a transshipment hub. This includes: (i) the hope to develop niche markets in 
the EU through effective branding of high-end seafood products processed in and associated with SPM; 
(ii) plans to improve competiveness and attractiveness as a transhipment hub through measures to 
improve trade facilitation (i.e. e-clearing functions and certification facilities); and (iii) ensuring greater 
compliance with EU SPS measures (i.e. for fish products and molluscs and living bivalves).269 In short, it 
could seriously undermine present development plans, forcing the archipelago to make adjustments to 
its recently adopted 20-year SDS.  
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Based on the analysis thus far, it would appear that there is notable potential for the CETA to 
significantly and negatively impact the fisheries sector in SPM, with the negative outcome being to 
potentially: (i) reduce competitiveness of the existing industry, impacting exports and employment in 
SPM; and (ii) limit the industry’s future development by transformation into a transshipment hub for 
Canadian fisheries products entering the EU.  
Taking these outcomes under consideration, it is pertinent to examine what the outcome might be if the 
CETA maintained tariffs on fisheries products sensitive to SPM. To begin, it is likely that under such a 
scenario, the gains estimated to accrue to the Canadian industry would likely not materialise. To recall, 
the CGE model projects fairly sizeable gains for Canada’s fisheries sector under the full removal of tariffs, 
with these gains expected to occur largely in products such as those that are undergirding 
competitiveness of the industry in SPM.270 By continuing to uphold these tariffs, it is likely that Canada’s 
fisheries sector would not be able to capture those gains, with the most directly impacted being the 
Atlantic Provinces that border SPM. At the same time, there are gains for EU consumers that would 
likely also be forgone should tariffs be maintained.  
This being said, it is likely – as pointed out by a local stakeholder – that Canada’s fisheries sector would 
continue to be a viable industry in the absence of the CETA; though the failure of the Agreement to 
remove tariffs on all fisheries products would leave it less well-off than it otherwise could be. When it 
comes to the industry in SPM, it is highly questionable if, under the removal or reduction of tariffs on 
Canadian fisheries products entering the EU, the SPM fisheries sector could be sustained over the long-
term. Therefore, from the perspective of sustainability, it would appear that the CETA could significantly 
injure SPM’s fisheries sector and do so in a way that is relatively (though not nominally) 
disproportionate to the benefits observed in Canada.  
Nevertheless, it is important to recall exactly what would be sustained by failing to liberalise tariffs in 
the fisheries sector. As outlined in the Baseline, the fisheries sector in SPM employs only around 150-
200 people. The four processing plants employ even fewer, with the majority being only temporary 
workers. The export industry is currently only 4% of imports and 2% of GDP. Given these figures, it is 
also relevant to question whether the industry is sustainable even under the continuation of current 
preferences. To this end, the EC itself notes that it is ‘a fact that the theoretical benefits offered to the 
OCTs by the current OCT-EC trade regime in terms of preferential access to the Community market are 
eroding as a result of progressive trade liberalisation on a global and regional scale’.271 Given the 
expected continued proliferation of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements (most notably in the 
Doha Round), the long-term effectiveness of building a development model that revolves around 
preferential tariffs becomes questionable given the likeliness that these preferences will erode over 
time even in the absence of the CETA. As such, for SPM to grow as a transshipment hub, preferential 
tariffs alone are likely not sufficient. The archipelago would almost certainly require expanded 
derogations of RoO and cumulation with Canada in order to attract investment into the industry and 
allow it to significantly expand. In short, there are serious questions as to the sustainability of the 
current situation regardless of the outcome of the CETA. 
As a third point, it is pertinent to examine the alternative possibilities for development in the absence of 
a continued processing industry. Here, it is recalled that the SDS 2010-2030 highlights other areas of 
focus in addition to the fisheries sector. Specifically, emphasis is placed on developing the services 
sector (notably e-services) and tourism. On the first point, stakeholders have pointed out that SPM is 
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currently trying to develop its e-services industry from scratch and that any headway into the sector will 
undoubtedly take time. In this regard, while the long-term sustainability of the fisheries sector is 
perhaps not essential, it is perhaps required in order to sustain the economy while the industry develops. 
On the second point, stakeholders have pointed out that the development of the tourism industry is 
inextricably linked to the survival of the fisheries sector. The archipelago is positioning itself as a 
destination – primarily for Canadians in the neighbouring provinces – where one can experience a 
unique culture that combines elements of its French heritage and fishing history, and which is tied to the 
culinary experience that revolves around a merger of these two aspects. In short, if the fishing industry 
contracts further, there are questions as to whether tourism can flourish and become a viable 
alternative. There is also the critical issue of demography and the impact that a collapse of the industry 
could have on outward migration. Presently, SPM is already suffering from increased outward migration 
as it struggles to retain its younger population in the face of dwindling economic prospects. To the 
degree that SPM’s tourism is built on its unique culture, any increase in outward migration facilitated by 
the further collapse of the fisheries sector could limit the prospects of fostering a viable tourism sector.  
Additional prospects for development seem limited as well. The aquaculture sector, like the 
development of an e-services industry, requires time and is still in its infancy. Further, while there were 
hopes of developing oil and gas reserves located in SPM’s EEZ and neighbouring Canadian provinces, 
these appear to have been significantly diminished with decreased interest among exploration 
companies in light of the difficulties in exploiting these reserves. Further, any prospects of attracting 
investment by transforming SPM into a tax haven is limited since such a move would require approval 
from Paris, which appears uninterested in making any such concessions at this time.272 
 
In summary, there are notable grounds to suspect that the CETA could have a prononounced negative 
impact on the economy of Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon. The Canadian fisheries sector is more competitive, 
and without the incentive to conduct processing on SPM in order to gain preferential access to the EU, it 
would not appear that the archipelago could diversify its fisheries industry and meet its developmental 
goals of serving as a ‘gateway’ for Canadian fish and seafood into the EU. Given the inter-linkages of the 
fisheries sector with the rest of the economy, the further collapse of the industry could potentially have 
pronounced effects on the economy of SPM and its residents. It is therefore recommended, that the 
following actions be taken: 
1. In terms of the CETA negotiations, EU negotiators for the fisheries sector should seek input from 
representatives of SPM and discuss which products are the most sensitive. Research and 
consultations with stakeholders suggest that the SPM fisheries sector would like the 
maintenance of preferences for frozen cod fillets, frozen lobster, and processed scallops, 
mussels and snow crabs. Negotiators should weigh potential impacts on SPM, Canada as well as 
processors and consumers in the EU. 
2. While perhaps radical, a compromise to balance the competing interests of EU consumers, the 
Canadian fisheries sector, and the SPM fisheries industry could be for the CETA to lead instead 
to a substantial expansion of limits on non-originating materials that may be sourced from 
Canada for certain products. Allowing for significant improvements in SPM’s cumulation with 
Canada could potentially provide the dual benefit of (i) providing de facto tariff reductions to 
Canada’s fisheries products, while (ii) allowing SPM (and Greenland) to directly and significantly 
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benefit from the CETA. This would need to coincide with improved regulatory cooperation 
between Canada and the EU/SPM and relevant trade facilitation measures.  
3. Conduct further, in-depth analysis on the potential impact. While it may not be feasible to 
conduct further ex-ante assessments due to the advanced stages of negotiations, it is strongly 
recommended that an ex-post assessment of the impact on the CETA on SPM be conducted.  
4. Any liberalisation of sensitive fisheries products should be accompanied by a suitable phasing-in 
period to allow the industry adequate time to adjust and formulate new strategies. Given the 
results of an ex-post assessment, this may include adjustment funds to mitigate the negative 
impacts incurred in SPM as a result of the Agreement.  
5. Include a mechanism for regular dialogue between stakeholders in SPM and the EC. Included in 
this mechanism should be facilitation of greater cooperation between the two sides, particularly 
with respect to development projects for alternative industries.  
6. The CETA could include greater cooperation between Canada and SPM in areas of mutual 
economic importance, such as the potential exploration of energy deposits and tourism.  
 
 
Greenland 
 
INDICATOR: Output  
BASELINE 
With an area of 2,175,600 km2, Greenland – an OCT of the Kingdom of Denmark – is the largest island in 
the world. However, given its Arctic climate, only 15.7% of the island is ice-free, making it home to only 
56,615 people.273 The combination of the vast territory, small and dispersed population and Arctic 
climate present unique challenges for Greenland’s economic and social development and limit what can 
be profitably produced on the island. As such, only a handful of industries are responsible for 
contributing to Greenland’s GDP, which in 2009 was approximately €1,464.55 million.274 
The most important industry in Greenland is by far the fisheries sector. Greenland is endowed with a 
wealth of coastline and waters that are among the most productive in the world. Output in the fisheries 
sector in 2008 reached 214 million tonnes with the most important products being shrimp and 
Greenland halibut, which accounted for 63.1% and 18.7%, respectively, of the total volume.275  
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Output of fish harvested in Greenland waters, 2003-2008 (1,000t) 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total shellfish 103.5 144.7 143.5 138.1 131.4 138 
Islandic scallop 2.6 2.7 1.4 1.9 1.4 0.7 
Northern prawn 89.6 137.8 137.6 132.5 127.9 135.1 
Snow crab 11.3 4.3 4.5 3.6 2.2 2.2 
Total fish 184.3 114.3 68.4 75.5 73.4 76.1 
Atlantic cod 4.6 5.5 6.6 10.6 16.3 25.3 
Lumpfish 7 8.2 9.7 10 8.8 6.5 
Capelin 117.9 45.6 0 0 0 0.1 
Greenland cod 1.3 0.9 1.1 1 0.6 0.6 
Greenland halibut 39.3 43.1 41.9 44.9 43.6 40.1 
Redfish 13.3 10.2 8.3 7.9 3.2 2.2 
Catfish 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.9 1.2 
Source: Statistics Greenland 2009, Statistics Greenland 2010 
 
The importance of the shrimp industry has grown significantly in recent years and today contributes 
more than €160 million to Greenland’s economy.276 Expansion of the industry has been facilitated by 
drastic increases in the Total Allowable Catch (TAC), which has risen from 50,000 tonnes in 1990 to over 
130,000 by 2004. Current estimates are that production has reached the maximum sustainable yield, 
making it unlikely that future production will notably exceed 135,000 tonnes.277 
 
Shrimp quotas for Greenland’s fleet 2000-2008 (thousand tonnes) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
104 119 118.2 129 136.7 136.7 136.7 135.4 128.7 
 
The industry has experienced greater concentration in recent years, leading to the emergence of a few 
major players and fewer vessels. Within this development has been greater usage of trawlers that can 
process shrimp onboard. Generally, rules allow up to 75% of the catch to be processed on board, with 
the remainder required to be processed onshore in Greenlandic facilities. Smaller vessels are 
responsible for harvesting shrimp inshore, and continue to be the main source of raw materials for the 
processing industry, providing about two-thirds of the 60,000 tonnes processed onshore in 2006.278 
The majority of shrimping is conducted by Greenlandic companies, though EU vessels are allotted up to 
11,000 tonnes per year for the period 2007-2012. The Greenland Treaty of 1985, under which Greenland 
withdrew from the European Community, provided for a fisheries agreement between the EU and 
Greenland in which the former would be allowed to maintain its fishing rights in Greenlandic waters in 
exchange for continued provision of financial aid to the latter and tariff free access to the EU for 
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Greenlandic fisheries products.279 Currently, EU fishing vessels are allowed approximately 80,000 tonnes, 
for which a compensation of DKK 133 million (€17.8 million) is disbursed to Greenland.280 
The majority of the fishing industry in Greenland is managed by the wholly state-owned Royal 
Greenland A/S, which is the largest company in Greenland and one of the 10 largest fishing and 
processing companies in the world. Its main product is peeled prawns, which are sold in northern 
Europe. Its trawlers primarily produce unpeeled cooked or raw shrimp, which is frozen at sea. Of its four 
industrial vessels operating in Greenland, three are directed towards shrimp.281 Additionally, the private 
company Polar Seafood A/S manages a number of trawlers and processing plants, with a specific 
emphasis on shrimp.282 
With the depletion of cod stocks, Greenland halibut has taken on significant importance for Greenland’s 
fisheries industry and today is the second largest source of revenue after shrimp. Accounting for nearly 
one-fifth of all fish output, Greenland halibut contributed more than €67 million to Greenland’s 
economy in 2006.283 
Outside of the fishing industry, Greenland’s industrial structure is fairly limited. One of the major future 
growth sectors is the extraction industry, which has expanded in recent years. With significant deposits 
of raw materials (offshore oil, gold, niobium, tantalite, uranium, iron, molybdate and diamonds), there 
are strong prospects for future development, which would greatly assist with Greenland’s diversification 
efforts. While likely to become increasingly important in the future, the industry’s development is still in 
its early stages and complicated by difficulties posed in extraction.   
The arctic climate and lack of arable land, limit the presence of commercial agriculture on the island, 
relegating the industry primarily to hunting and sheep farming. The latter has developed into a viable 
industry, though it is largely relegated to the more fertile areas of southern Greenland and, as such, 
remains a relatively minor source of economic activity. There are approximately 50 farms with 
production of around 20,000 sheep annually – mostly for domestic consumption.284   
 
INDICATOR: Trade  
BASELINE 
With limited industrial diversification, Greenland is heavily reliant on imports. As a result, Greenland is a 
net importer with a trade deficit in 2009 of €238.1 million.285 This imbalance is largely compensated for 
by the ‘Block Grant’ from the Danish government, which in 2009 was €468 million (DKK 3,643 million).286 
Greenland’s trade takes place largely with the EU (predominantly Denmark) with it accounting for over 
90% of the island’s exports and imports.  
Fisheries products make up the overwhelming majority of Greenland’s exports, accounting for 88.1% of 
the total value in 2009. Prawns (54.3%) and Greenland halibut (20.7%) are the two leading sources of 
export revenue and account for three-fourths of all exports. Given the dependence of export revenues 
on world prices of fish and seafood, total exports generally fluctuate from year to year.   
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Source: Statistics Greenland 2010 
 
 
INDICATOR: Employment  
BASELINE 
Given its Arctic climate and industrial structure, the labour market in Greenland is subject to a high 
degree of seasonality. Unemployment was 7.1% in 2009, which marked a rise over 2007 and 2008 when 
the rate fell to as low as 5.5%.287 The largest sector of employment is public administration and services, 
which employs over 44% of all full-time workers. Fishing employs approximately 4.9% of the Greenlandic 
workforce, though when accounting for those who rely on the sector as a source of seasonal income, 
the industry is considered a far more important provider of employment and provides income for 
roughly 6,500 Greenlanders.  
Royal Greenland A/S is the largest employer in the fisheries sector with approximately half of its 2000 
total employees located in Greenland. In addition, it employs approximately 1,500 seasonal workers 
while supporting 1,100 artisanal fishermen.288 Polar Seafood Greenland A/S is the largest privately 
owned employer in the fisheries sector, providing jobs for approximately 400 workers in Greenland.289  
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Greenland’s Labour force, by sector (2006) 
Sector No. Employed Share (%) 
TOTAL 29,472 100% 
Agriculture and hunting 14 0.05% 
Fishing 1442 4.89% 
Mineral extraction 160 0.54% 
Industrial services 924 3.14% 
Energy supply 420 1.43% 
Construction and building 2904 9.85% 
Trade and repairs 5003 16.98% 
Hotel and restaurants 859 2.91% 
Transport 2582 8.76% 
Financial and insurance 
services 
165 0.56% 
Real estate, rental etc. 1281 4.35% 
Public admin and service 13063 44.32% 
Education 50 0.17% 
Health and social affairs 86 0.29% 
Other collective and social 
services 
515 1.75% 
Source: Statistics Greenland 2009 
 
ANALYSIS (All indicators) 
As with Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon, it is not expected that the CETA will engender sizeable nominal 
changes in output, exports and employment in Greenland’s fisheries sector. However, given the small 
size of Greenland’s economy and its reliance on the fisheries sector, there remains significant potential 
for Greenland to be significantly impacted in relative terms.  
The primary issue for Greenland is again the potential for the CETA to lead to an erosion of preferences 
with the EU. In contrast to Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon, however, the issue is not primarily one of 
transshipment, but rather the loss of competitiveness that the industry would suffer vis-à-vis Canada, 
which is one of its primary competitors. Greenland’s two major sources of export revenue are cold-
water shrimp and Greenland halibut, both of which are major export products for the Canadian fisheries 
sector.  
With the Greenland Treaty of 1985 and the subsequent preferential access it has conferred upon 
Greenland’s fisheries products, Greenland’s fisheries sector has become strategically oriented towards 
the EU market. Greenland’s largest company, the wholly state-owned Royal Greenland A/S, has made 
significant investments in processing plants in the EU (primarily Denmark, but also Germany and Poland) 
and while it does not rely entirely on products sourced from Greenland, the linkage between the two is 
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an important component of the company’s business model. As such, further erosion of preferences with 
the EU could lead to losses for Greenland’s fisheries sector.  
As with Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon, lack of data has made the inclusion of Greenland into the CGE model 
impossible, forcing this analysis to forgo a rigorous quantitative assessment of the CETA’s impact on 
output, trade and employment. Nevertheless, research that has been conducted for the government of 
Greenland suggests that the removal of tariffs under the CETA could generate losses of more than €5 
million annually for Greenland’s shrimp and Greenland halibut industries.290 In context, as these 
industries generate roughly €230 million annually, this equates to about 2.2% of the industry’s value, 
2.3% of exports, and about 0.34% of GDP. This impact would be expected to arise exclusively from the 
erosion of preferential tariffs on Greenland halibut and deep sea shrimp and the loss in export revenues 
it could engender.  
As such, the potential impact that could arise from the CETA could be significant for Greenland. 
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the Greenlandic fisheries sector will be as negatively impacted as that in 
SPM. Even in the absence of the preferential tariffs, Greenland would likely sustain its fishing industry, 
with it continuing to be a major source of employment and exports. This being said, there appears to be 
significant potential for losses with further erosion of preferences as the EU market operates the highest 
returns for Greenland’s fisheries exports, while the tariffs applied on imports from other trade partners 
(most notably Canada) serve to improve competitiveness and compensate for higher operating costs 
present in Greenland (imported inputs and wages).291 
It should be further noted, however, that several factors could potentially mitigate the overall adversity 
of the impact. As noted, Greenland is endowed with a wealth of untapped natural resources – including 
offshore oil, gold, niobium, tantalite, uranium, iron, diamonds and rare earth elements –  that could 
potentially serve to offset any losses that occur in the fishing industry. However, the development of 
this industry is not guaranteed and is still in its early stages, making it possible that impacts could be 
more pronounced in the short- to mid-term. Further, stakeholders have pointed out that a reduction in 
the competitiveness of the industry would harm diversification efforts, even with the development of 
extractive industries, hindering sustainability of the economy. At the same time, if the improved access 
were to lead to declines in output, exports and employment in Greenland’s fishing industry, and, 
subsequently, greater reliance on extractive industries, it could have a negative environmental impact.  
Given the potential impacts, the following actions are recommended: 
1. In terms of the CETA negotiations, EU negotiators for the fisheries sector should seek input from 
representatives of Greenland and discuss which products are the most sensitive. Research and 
consultations with stakeholders suggest that the Greenland fisheries sector would like the 
maintenance of preferences for deep sea shrimp and Greenland halibut. Negotiators should 
weigh potential impacts on Greenland, Canada as well as processors and consumers in the EU. 
2. Conduct greater assessment on the potential impact. While it may not be feasible to conduct 
further ex-ante assessments due to the advanced stages of negotiations, it is strongly 
recommended that an ex-post assessment of the impact on the CETA on SPM be conducted. 
From the viewpoint of Greenland, it is felt that the erosion of preferences is against the spirit of 
the Greenland Treaty, and as such, any losses incurred under the CETA should be duly 
compensated by the EC. Based on the results of the assessment, compensation measures and 
adjustment funds should be considered.  
                                                             
290 OS Consulting 2010 
291 Consultations with Megapesca 
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3. Any liberalisation of sensitive fisheries products should be accompanied by a suitable phasing-in 
period to allow the industry adequate time to adjust and formulate new strategies. 
4. Include a mechanism for regular dialogue between Greenlandic stakeholders and the EC. 
Included in this mechanism should be facilitation of greater cooperation between the two sides, 
particularly with respect to development projects for alternative industries.  
 
OTHER THIRD COUNTRIES 
Modelling estimates suggest that the most notable impact of the CETA in the Agriculture, PAPs and 
Fisheries sectors is the redirection of Canadian exports of fish towards the EU, and away from Third 
Countries. Further, as the EU is not expected to grow its overall imports, this would likely be 
accompanied by a corresponding reduction in EU imports of fish and seafood from third countries. The 
result is likely to be a change in trade patterns within the EU, Canada and their more important trade 
partners (the US and Mexico), rather than in trade with other Third Countries. However, in the short run, 
while adjustments occur, some countries may try to gain competitiveness in order to keep their export 
share in the EU market. This may create some incentives for overfishing in countries where 
environmental regulation is not strict, though such an outcome would be expected to be limited. 
Table 18 below outlines the Third Countries that are trading partners with the EU in terms of Fish 
products.  
More affected countries in the fisheries sector would likely be Norway, China, Iceland, Vietnam, India, 
Thailand, Ecuador, Russian Federation, Argentina, Faeroe Islands, Chile and Bangladesh, which currently 
have higher shares of exports than Canada in the EU market. In LDCs the risk of losing market share 
might push them to increase their competitiveness by intensification, which could lead to predation. 
 
Table 18:  Fish Products 
Partner Country   Cumm 
% 
Imports US $ % 
Norway 1 29.5 3412326208 29.5 
China 2 39.1 1099755848 9.5 
Iceland 3 45.4 735753460 6.4 
Viet Nam 4 50.8 615588765 5.3 
United States 5 56.0 602847053 5.2 
India 6 59.6 416748326 3.6 
Thailand 7 62.6 352668856 3.1 
Ecuador 8 65.3 301707701 2.6 
Russian Federation 9 67.6 266669382 2.3 
Argentina 10 69.7 252463349 2.2 
Faeroe Islands 11 71.9 252001876 2.2 
Chile 12 74.0 234143243 2.0 
Bangladesh 13 75.9 224368427 1.9 
Canada 14 77.6 199561854 1.7 
Indonesia 15 79.1 168545855 1.5 
Senegal 16 80.5 163096107 1.4 
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Morocco 17 81.9 156601807 1.4 
Sri Lanka 18 83.2 153547145 1.3 
South Africa 19 84.4 141013974 1.2 
Turkey 20 85.6 135395920 1.2 
Madagascar 21 86.5 111566242 1.0 
Peru 22 87.4 95832236 0.8 
Uganda 23 88.2 92100387 0.8 
Tanzania, United Republic of 24 88.9 90404146 0.8 
Namibia 25 89.6 77379322 0.7 
Source: Based on OECD data (best available data for most recent year between 2007-2009) 
Note: EU imports by country in cumulative percentage, US dollars and simple percentage 
 
In other Agriculture and PAPs subsectors, although the decrease of output will be insignificant, it will 
affect all third countries other than Mexico and the USA discussed above (see Annex 6). 
In the wheat subsector, while the decrease of output in the EU is minor and the increase of exports from 
Canada limited, a substitution effect between wheat and other cereals in third countries could also 
occur, in particular if shortages of other cereals (such as rice) increase their price and the price of wheat 
decreases. 
Main EU partner countries affected in the cereals subsector (dominated by wheat and rice) would likely 
be Thailand, India, Australia, Chile, Pakistan, Serbia and Montenegro, Ukraine, Croatia and Argentina 
(see Table 19). If production increases in these countries to respond to eventual increase of EU imports, 
some positive economic and social effects can be expected. The environmental effects can be positive or 
negative if countries try to increase their competitiveness by intensification. 
 
Table 19:  Cereals 
Partner Country   Cumm 
% 
Imports US $ % 
Canada 1 20.5 649992226 20.5 
United States 2 30.9 330945668 10.4 
Thailand 3 41.2 329707476 10.4 
India 4 49.7 268211358 8.4 
Australia 5 55.1 171714126 5.4 
Chile 7 63.8 112673184 3.5 
Pakistan 8 67.2 110346864 3.5 
Source: Based on OECD data (best available data for most recent year between 2007-2009) 
Note: EU imports by country in cumulative percentage, US dollars and simple percentage 
 
In the beef industry, the increase of Canadian production and the redirection towards the EU market 
may reduce Canadian exports to third countries. According to the CGE results, this will not have 
significant impact on the output of third countries; however it may reduce imports from Canada as beef 
is diverted to the EU. Eventual reduction of market share for third countries will potentially affect Brazil 
and Argentina and other LDCs to a marginal degree. While this may hinder the economies of these 
countries, it might have a positive effect on the environment. 
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5. INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS ASSESSMENTS292 
 
Summary 
In terms of industrial products, the economic assessment finds that the CETA is unlikely to have a 
pronounced impact on the mining, metal manufacturing, oil, coal or forest-based industries in either 
Canada or the EU. While Canada is imbued with a significant stock of metallic ores, oil, coal and lumber, 
the low or complete absence of duties on these products within the EU, limits the impact that the CETA is 
likely to have. Investment liberalisation – notably through the extension of national treatment provisions 
– could lead to greater levels of EU investment in these sectors within Canada (perhaps stimulating 
greater levels of output); though given the fact that the EU’s existing FDI in these Canadian sectors – 
particularly in mining and oil – is already fairly robust, it does not appear that existing barriers have not 
been overly restrictive to capital inflows from the EU.   
The CETA could have an impact on the transportation equipment manufacturing sectors within Canada 
and the EU. The assessment finds that the elimination of tariffs could lead to increased output and 
exports in the automotive industries on both sides of the Atlantic. Given Canada’s high degree of 
integration with the U.S. auto industry, the rules of origin that are ultimately agreed to will be a key 
factor determining the extent of the CETA’s impact. Specifically, rules of origin that require a higher 
percentage of a product’s value be produced within the country would likely limit the ability of Canadian 
producers to qualify for preferential tariffs, reducing gains from the Agreement. Additionally, differences 
in emission standards between Canada and the EU could serve to further reduce estimated gains for the 
Canadian auto industry. This is largely dependent, however, on the level of market access granted to 
Canadian auto manufacturers under the CETA, with significant improvements in market access likely to 
stimulate Canadian producers to make necessary investments in order to meet the stricter EU standards. 
EU manufacturers would not be expected to be hindered by the differences in standards and would likely 
see greater gains under an agreement that adopts more stringent rules of origin. While Canada is 
expected to see increased output and exports among its manufacturers of other transportation 
                                                             
292 Introductory notes: This section contains an analysis of the CETA’s impact on industrial products in the EU and Canada as 
well as in third countries across the economic, social and environmental pillars of sustainability. The scoping exercise conducted 
in the initial phases of the study flagged 6 sub-sectors within industrial products that will be individually assessed for the EU and 
Canada, including: (i) mining and metals, (ii) oil and petroleum, (iii) coal, (iv) forest-based industries, (v) transportation 
equipment and (vi) textiles. These separate sub-sectoral analyses for Canada and the EU are followed by a broader assessment 
on other third countries such as Mexico and the United States which addresses only those areas within industrial products that 
are likely to be impacted.  
 
The economic assessment is derived largely from a CGE model that estimates the impact of the CETA on output, exports, 
balance of trade and employment. Four liberalisation scenarios were modelled in the final simulations, with all four modelling 
100% reduction in tariffs of industrial products. Differences in the scenarios relate to the level of liberalisation in agricultural 
products as well as the assumed degree of services liberalisation.  
 
It is important to note that results (located in Annex 6) should be interpreted as reflecting the impact of the CETA itself on these 
indicators and does not necessarily imply overall changes in the country’s output or exports, which could be further affected by 
exogenous factors.  All estimated impacts are to be understood as occurring over the long-term (e.g. in 10+ years) after final 
implementation of an Agreement. As data limitations made it impossible to incorporate investment effects into the CGE model, 
the results take into account the impact of trade liberalisation only and do account for the impact from investment 
liberalisation, which is instead assessed qualitatively.  
 
More information on the CGE model, its assumptions and the scenarios employed can be found in Annex 1.  
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equipment (non-automotive), the modelling projects declines within the EU, worsening its balance of 
trade in these products.  
The CETA would likewise be expected to have a positive economic impact on the textiles industries of 
Canada and the EU over the long-term.  For Canada, the greatest gains would be expected to arise under 
an Agreement that obtained the greatest liberalisation of tariffs, with the modelling projecting increases 
in output and exports in its textiles and apparel sectors; though there could be some deterioration in its 
balance of trade in these products. While Canada is expected to experience declines in these indicators 
within its leather manufacturing sector, the EU is projected to see increases in output, exports and its 
balance of trade in all three sub-sectors over the long-term. Further gains for the EU would arise if the 
CETA leads to the removal of barriers to the free circulation of goods in Canada as well as improved 
enforcement of IPR. The impact on Canada and the EU will likely be significantly influenced by the rules 
of origin ultimately adopted. Canada stands to benefit from less restrictive rules while the EU would 
exhibit greater gains under a more stringent set of rules.  
The CETA has the potential to have a positive social impact, particularly with respect to quality and 
decency of work. Given the relatively high level of labour standards in Canada and the EU, the CETA does 
not carry with it the general concerns of social dumping, which are associated with agreements 
negotiated between two countries that possess significant variation in their level of standards. As such, it 
is not envisaged that the CETA will promote the erosion of labour standards in either Canada or the EU, 
limiting its ability to have a negative impact on Core Labour Standards (CLS) in each.  
The CETA does, however, have potential to improve the ratification of CLS in Canada while fostering 
greater implementation of CLS in both Canada and the EU. Probably the greatest impact would arise 
under a CETA that requires the ratification of all 8 Conventions that constitute the ILO’s Core Labour 
Standards as Canada has thus far failed to ratify 3 conventions pertaining to forced labour, the right to 
freely associate and bargain collectively and minimum age requirements. Given the large number of 
complaints by Canadian labour organisations made before the ILO, such an outcome would likely have 
the greatest impact on Canada’s rights to associate and collectively bargain. Nevertheless, such an 
outcome may be too ambitious to be realised given the need to reach approval from Canada’s Provinces, 
who would likely need to make adjustments to their provincial labour laws to make them conform to ILO 
standards.  
Nevertheless, the CETA can foster greater implementation of the existing CLS that both Canada and EU 
Member States have ratified. This could be achieved by a stand alone chapter on labour and trade that 
includes provisions on increasing awareness of legal rights and obligations, fostering social dialogue, and 
ensuring oversight and enforcement while also creating an impartial review panel that can hear and rule 
on complaints. Such a Chapter in the Agreement could also include provisions to improve implementation 
of the ILO’s Decent Work Agenda and foster greater levels of corporate social responsibility, creating a 
positive social impact for labour on both sides of the Atlantic.  
The environmental impact is likely to be heavily influenced by the CETA’s impact on industrial production 
within Canada and the EU. Based on the limited expected impact on the most environmentally harmful 
sectors – oil, coal, forestry and mining – it is not expected that the CETA will engender significant output-
related environmental impacts in either the EU or Canada. Further, to the degree that the CETA reaches 
significant levels of liberalisation within the services sectors of Canada and the EU, it is possible that, 
over the long-term, output within certain industrial sectors may see minor declines in production, 
creating a positive environmental impact by shifting resources towards the less-environmentally harmful 
services sectors.  
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At the same time, it should be noted that the model does not take into account the impact of investment 
liberalisation, particularly with respect to its ability to increase output in certain sectors. This could be 
particularly relevant should measures be included that stimulate significant increases in investment in 
Canada’s oil sands and mining industries over the long-term.   
A negative environmental impact is likely to arise as a result of projected increases in production within 
the automotive industries of the EU and Canada. While this could lead to greater GHG emissions in the 
transport equipment sector, it is expected that improvements in energy intensity can help offset these 
gains and mitigate the environmental impact.   
 
5.1. EU & CANADA 
 
5.1.1. Mining & Metal Manufacturing 
 
ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT293 
 
Mining 
 
INDICATOR: Output, trade and investment 
BASELINE 
While Canada is a major producer and supplier of a number of metals and non-metallic minerals (Table 
20), the EU is heavily reliant on external sources for a number of metals and minerals important to 
domestic downstream and end users. Mining of metals is largely absent in most Member States with 
only marginal activity occurring in Austria, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Poland, Portugal and Sweden, with 
only a limited number of ores being extracted (e.g. chromium, copper, lead, silver and zinc).294  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
293 Specifically, CGE results for the mining, metals and minerals sector are reported according to the groupings of the GTAP 
database which divide the industry across: mining and quarrying of metal ores, uranium and gems (mining); iron and steel; 
manufactured non-ferrous metals and metal products; and fabricated metal products.  The results of the simulations can be 
found in Tables 49-56 in Annex 6. 
294 DG Enterprise 
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Table 20: Canadian production of select metals & minerals (2007) 
Mineral Production World share of production  
(overall rank) 
Uranium 9,500,000t 23.0% (1st) 
Potash 11,000,000t (K2O equivalent) 33.3% (1
st) 
Nickel 255,000t 15.9% (2nd) 
Cobalt 8,261t 13.3% (2nd) 
Titanium 816,000t (ilmenite) 14.6% (3rd) 
Platinum group metals 23,042kg 4.4% (3rd) 
Aluminium 3,083,000t 8.1% (3rd) 
Gypsum 9,500,000t 7.5% (4th) 
Chyrsotile  185,000t 8.1% (5th) 
Zinc 623,000t 5.6% (5th) 
Molybdenum 6,841t 3.7% (5th) 
Salt 15,000,000t 6.0% (5th) 
Source: Natural Resources Canada 
 
Canada’s natural endowment of raw materials has led it to become a major exporter of metals, with 
exports in 2009 of $8.51 billion and a trade surplus of $4.61 billion.295 Conversely, the EU is a consistent 
net importer of ores with a deficit of $10.89 billion in 2009. The dynamic of this relationship has led to 
Canada playing an increasing and significant role in helping the EU meet its demand for raw materials. In 
2009, for example, Canada was the 3rd largest exporter to the EU of ores and other minerals ($805.83 
million), contributing 8.1% (by value) of total EU imports of these products. In particular, Canada 
provides a major share of EU imports of uranium (55.2% of total EU uranium imports in 2007) and nickel 
ores and concentrates (52.5%), while also being a significant source of iron ore and concentrates (7.7%), 
zinc ores and concentrates (7.5%), manufactured nickel products (7.6%) and ores and concentrates of 
molybdenum, niobium, tantalum, titanium, vanadium and zirconium (6.8%). Similarly, the EU is an 
important export market for Canadian producers of zinc ores and concentrates (61.7% of total Canadian 
zinc exports in 2007), molybdenum (53.8%), iron ore and concentrates (45.5%), nickel ores and 
concentrates (38.6%), manufactured platinum group metal (PGM) products (37.7%), and copper ores 
and concentrates (17.3%).296  
The EU’s reliance on imports to obtain many important raw materials as well as rising global prices in 
recent years has prompted the EC to take steps towards securing and improving access to raw 
materials.297 Herein, the EC has identified a list of critical raw materials that are essential for the 
European economy and whose supply is relatively insecure.298 Of the 14 listed in a DG Enterprise and 
Industry report, Canada is a significant global supplier of 3: cobalt, PGM and indium. In a fourth, 
tungsten, Canada has the capacity to serve as a significant supplier and could potentially revive the 
industry in the long-term, particularly in light of China’s quasi-monopoly on global production.299  
                                                             
295 UN Comtrade 
296 UN Comtrade 
297 See for example, EC (2008c) 
298 EC (2010a) 
299 Estimates by the USGS place Canada as having the 2nd largest reserves of tungsten after China with 260,000 tonnes. See: U.S. 
Geological Survey (2009).   
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Although Canada has historically been a relatively minor contributor of EU imports of PGM300 and 
indium, it has played a significant role in supplying the EU with cobalt. Canadian exports of Cobalt 
mattes and other intermediate products of cobalt metallurgy (HS 8105), for example, reached as high as 
$987.5 million in 2008 (before the global recession led to a drastic fall in the price of raw materials) 
accounting for 6.8% of total EU imports of this product group.301   
 
ANALYSIS 
Despite the existing situation where Canada is a major producer and global exporter of metals and the 
EU a major importer, the prospect of tariff liberalisation under the CETA is unlikely to have a noticeable 
economic impact on mining in either Canada or the EU, largely as a consequence of the zero tariffs 
already in place on imports of these products into the EU. Nevertheless, the CETA could still lead to an 
impact through investment liberalisation in Canada, particularly in the case of uranium, which is subject 
to foreign investment restrictions.  
 
Canada 
As noted, trade liberalisation will likely have a limited impact on output and exports from Canada, as an 
absence of duties in the EU on a number of metallic ores and manufactured metals is expected to limit 
the impact of tariff liberalisation under the CETA. This is supported by the CGE model results which 
suggest that the full removal of tariffs under the CETA could potentially increase output in Canada by 
only 0.15% (See Tables 49-54 in Annex 6). Alternatively, it is interesting to note that less ambitious 
liberalisation of tariffs (in Scenarios A and B) is projected to lead to very minor declines in output. In 
terms of trade, it is not expected that the CETA would lead to increased exports – either with the EU or 
third countries – suggesting that any change in output would be in response to changed demand from 
domestic downstream users.   
It is, however, important to note that the estimates from the CGE model do not take into account the 
potential impact associated with investment liberalisation in the mining sector in Canada. Canada’s 
wealth of metals and minerals, as outlined in the baseline, together with its strong investment 
protection, have helped it become a major destination for outward investment, making it the world’s 
leading recipient in 2006 with 19% of global mining investment.302 The EU has been a leading investor in 
the sector with 22% of its total FDI stocks in Canada in 2007 residing in the mining sector.303   
Investment liberalisation is likely to positively impact on FDI in the sector, in turn potentially leading to 
increases in output and exports. Although data limitations have made it impossible for the modelling 
framework to quantitatively reflect the precise impact that investment liberalisation is likely to have on 
output and exports in Canada’s mining sector, results from the gravity modelling suggest that a 
reduction in investment restrictiveness (as measured by the OECD) is likely to have a positive impact on 
investment in Canada’s mining sector. It could, therefore, be expected that provisions within the CETA 
may be able to help facilitate increased investment by the EU in Canada’s mining sector.  
                                                             
300 In imports of Platinum, unwrought or in semi-manuf. Forms, or in powder form(HS Code 7110), Canada provided only 1.6% of 
the total value of EU imports in 2008.  
301 UN Comtrade 
302 Mining Association of Canada (2008).   
303 OECD.stat 
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Specifically, provisions that grant national treatment in Canada’s mining sector to EU investors could 
eliminate or reduce burdens associated with Canada’s ‘net benefit test’. While Canada has not regularly 
invoked the net benefit test to deny investments in the mining sector, the recently failed attempt by 
BHP Billiton to take a controlling interest in Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan highlights the potential 
uncertainties foreign investors may face. To the degree that national treatment to EU investors is 
granted and enforced, it is likely that the investment environment will be strengthened, increasing EU 
FDI in the sector over the long-term (See section on Investment for further  discussion). While difficult to 
quantify, it would appear that this would lead to greater increases in output and trade than presently 
estimated by the CGE model.  
One area in particular where the CETA could spur investment by the EU is in uranium, where the Non-
Resident Ownership Policy (NROP) in the Uranium Mining Sector prevents non-Canadian residents from 
acquiring more than a 49% ownership interest in a uranium mining property or facility for producing 
uranium concentrate unless it is Canadian controlled. While exemptions to this policy are possible where 
it can be demonstrated that no Canadian partners can be found, the NROP nevertheless subjects EU 
investors to restrictions in the uranium sector.304 With several EU Member States having competitive 
nuclear industries, the removal or relaxation of such restrictions could result in greater levels of 
investment while also impacting output, particularly given the fact that Canada has a relative abundance 
of high quality uranium deposits.305 
 
EU 
Given the limited role the mining sector plays within the EU it is not expected that tariff liberalisation 
within the CETA will have an economic impact. This is supported by the CGE model, which shows that 
output and exports are not expected to change over the long-term (Tables 49-54 Annex 6).   
The greatest impact to the EU would be expected to arise through investment liberalisation in Canada’s 
mining sector. This would be contingent, however, on the extension of national treatment to EU 
investors, as well as potential removal of ownership restrictions in the uranium sector. Investment 
liberalisation, as discussed in the preceding section on Canada, would be expected to facilitate increased 
investment by the EU in the sector, particularly as it pertains to uranium. With increased investment 
subsequently leading to increases in output, it would be expected that the economic impact on the EU 
would be positive. While it should not be assumed that increases in output would necessarily lead 
directly to increased exports to the EU for use in manufacturing, the impact could still be indirectly 
positive by ensuring increased supply in global markets, placing downward pressure on world prices.  
 
INDICATOR: Employment 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Canada 
With limited expected changes in output and exports within Canada’s mining sector, the impact on 
employment is expected to be minor. Estimates from the formal modelling suggest that under the 
scenarios that model full removal of tariffs for all products (C and D), the demand for labour will exhibit 
modest increases. Alternatively, in scenarios that maintain sensitivities on certain products, very minor 
                                                             
304 Uranium exploration is not subject to foreign ownership restriction. 
305 McFetridge, D.G. (2008).   
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declines in labour are estimated to occur in the long-term. Employing approximately 53,000 in 2007, 
such minor percentage changes in sectoral employment would lead to very limited changes in overall 
employment. However, although the sector serves as a minor source of national employment, mining is 
an important source of economic activity for a number of remote areas across a number of provinces 
and territories and a significant employer of Canada’s aboriginal peoples, making it possible that any 
gains in employment could disproportionately benefit these groups.    
 
 
EU 
Due to a limited effect on output and exports, it is expected that employment within the EU’s mining 
sector will not be significantly impacted. CGE estimates support this claim and project that over the 
long-term the demand for labour in the EU’s mining sector will change by 0% to -0.02%.    
Metal manufacturing 
 
INDICATOR: Output and trade 
BASELINE 
Both Canada and the EU exhibit heavy downstream usage of metal ores with each serving as a leading 
global manufacturer of ferrous, nonferrous and fabricated metal products. With 16% of global output 
and turnover of approximately $200 billion, the EU is the world’s second largest producer of steel, 
excelling in the production of high-end products for downstream users. The EU is also the world’s largest 
consumer of nonferrous metals and has substantial processing and scrap capacity which generates over 
$190.5 billion in turnover. Though smaller in terms of overall size, Canada is likewise a major 
manufacturer of metallic products with turnover in 2007 of $47.5 billion and $33.2 billion in primary 
metal manufacturing (including both ferrous and nonferrous metals) and fabricated metal 
manufacturing, respectively.306 
While historically a net exporter of steel and other manufactured metal products, the EU has become a 
net importer in recent years. Further, as the EU relies on outside sources for 90% of its inputs, the 
industry has come under increasing competition for key inputs from emerging steel producing nations 
such as the BRIC countries.307  
Canada, conversely, consistently maintains an overall trade surplus in ferrous and nonferrous metal 
manufacturing, though this fell to approximately $6.2 billion in 2009 as external demand in the US 
declined. As of 2006, Canada has also maintained a trade surplus with the EU, though this also fell in 
2009, dropping to approximately $280 million. Within this bilateral relationship, Canada’s main 
advantage is in trade of nonferrous metal products, as their processing industries in Ontario and Quebec 
are well positioned to utilise Canada’s healthy endowment of metallic ores.  In terms of fabricated metal 
products, Canada typically operates a trade deficit well in excess of $5 billion and with the EU of 
approximately $1 billion.308   
 
ANALYSIS 
                                                             
306 Industry Canada 
307 DG Enterprise 
308 Industry Canada 
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Canada 
The CGE modelling results suggest that the CETA will have a limited economic impact on the metal 
manufacturing industry over the long-term. In all instances, tariff liberalisation under the CETA is not 
expected to produce significant changes in output or trade in Canada’s metal manufacturing sector, 
largely due to the fact that many products can already be imported into the EU duty free.  
In output, it is estimated that the tariff liberalisation under the CETA would likely produce different 
outcomes for ferrous, non-ferrous and fabricated metals. Given its healthy endowment of nonferrous 
metals, the CETA would be estimated to lead to slight increases in output with the full removal of tariffs 
ranging from 0.3% to 0.48% (Tables 49-54 Annex 6). Alternatively, under scenarios where sensitivities 
are maintained on certain products (A and B), the model estimates minor declines in output over the 
long-term, ranging from -0.2% to -0.39%.  
This is in contrast to production of fabricated metal products which is estimated to decrease across all 
scenarios, ranging from -0.04% in Scenario C to -0.56% in Scenario B. Production of iron and steel would 
not be expected to see noticeable changes in production under a less ambitious liberalisation of services 
and full removal of tariffs (Scenario C), but this is estimated to show a decrease across all other 
scenarios, ranging from -0.11% in Scenario D to -0.61% in Scenario B.   
In all three of these products, it is not expected that the CETA will stimulate increases in overall exports. 
Overall exports of iron and steel and fabricated metals are projected to decrease by as much as -0.91% 
and -1.12%, respectively, in Scenario B, with the lowest declines observed in a scenario that provides the 
greatest removal of tariffs and less ambitious liberalisation of services.309  Exports of nonferrous metals 
are estimated to increase by as much as 0.57% in Scenario C, with less ambitious cuts in goods 
estimated to lead to minor declines in overall exports over the long-term (Scenario A and B). Across all 
three products imports would be expected to increase by a larger amount than exports, leading to a 
slight decrease in the balance of trade. Tariff liberalisation is further expected to have only a limited 
impact on bilateral trade with the EU in these products as exports to and imports from the EU in ferrous 
and non-ferrous metal products see limited change under the simulations.   
  
EU 
The estimated impact on the EU’s metal manufacturing sector resulting from the CETA, while negative, 
is expected to be limited. In general, the CGE model estimates that the removal of tariffs under the CETA 
would have limited to no impact on the EU’s production and trade of fabricated and ferrous metals, with 
only a limited negative impact expected for its nonferrous metal manufacturing industry.    
Specifically, output and exports of ferrous and fabricated metals and estimated to exhibit little change 
as a result of the CETA regardless of the scenario. Output and exports of nonferrous metal products are 
expected to decrease by as much as 0.13% and 0.2%, respectively, in scenarios C and D, suggesting that 
increased imports from Canada would stimulate declines in domestic production over the long-term. 
This would be expected to worsen the EU’s overall balance of trade in these products (by as much as 
$140 million), with increased imports from Canada ($113 million) accounting for the majority of this 
reduction in the balance of trade. These increased imports, while perhaps leading to contraction in 
                                                             
309 It should be noted that simultaneously providing lower levels of liberalisation for goods (i.e. tariffs and NTBs) while providing 
more liberalization for services would stimulate more movement of resources away from the goods’ sectors (such as fabricated 
metals and iron and steel) and into the services sector over the long-term.  
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domestic output, would likely benefit downstream producers in the EU that rely on nonferrous metals in 
the production process.  
 
INDICATOR: Employment 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Canada 
With the model estimating limited changes in output or exports as a result of tariff liberalisation under 
the CETA, it is expected that there will also be a limited impact on employment in Canada’s metal 
manufacturing industry over the long-term. This is supported by CGE model estimates which generally 
project minor decreases in demand for employment (Table 54 Annex 6). Within the industry, the model 
projects that demand for employment will be most greatly affected in the ferrous and fabricated metal 
sectors, with the greatest declines estimated to occur under Scenario B (-0.7%).  
With over 74,000 directly employed within primary metal manufacturing (ferrous and non-ferrous) and 
a further 177,000 in fabricated metal manufacturing, declines would likely lead to limited nominal shifts 
in employment.   
 
EU 
It is similarly expected that declines in output and exports will lead to declines in employment within the 
EU’s metal manufacturing industry. Specifically, CGE model results project declines in the demand for 
labour by as much as -0.06% in ferrous metal manufacturing and -0.15% in nonferrous metal 
manufacturing (Table 55 Annex 6). As such, even with approximately 1.84 million employed in metal 
manufacturing in the EU, it is not expected that there will be a sizeable shift in employment into other 
sectors as a result of the CETA.  
 
SOCIAL ASSESSMENT 
 
INDICATOR: Worker displacement 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Canada 
The preceding economic assessment estimates that, over the long-term (i.e. 10 years after the signing of 
an agreement), trade liberalisation under the CETA will lead to minor declines in employment in (i) 
ferrous metal manufacturing, (ii) fabricated metal manufacturing; and (iii) non-ferrous metal 
manufacturing (though only under certain scenarios). Conversely, it is estimated that the CETA will lead 
to minor increases in employment within the mining sector and in manufacturing of nonferrous metals 
provided the Agreement takes a less ambitious approach to services liberalisation and fully liberalises 
tariffs across all products. Across each of these industries, greater liberalisation of services and limited 
removal of tariffs on certain products is expected to place downward pressure on the demand for labour 
in these sectors.     
These sectors directly employ over 300,000 people, with the majority employed in fabricated metal 
manufacturing (Table 21). Generally, it should be noted that all of the sectors listed below are relatively 
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minor contributors to employment in Canada. Given these employment figures, potential increases of 
0.11% in mining and quarrying and 0.16% in nonferrous metal manufacturing, would generally be 
expected to generate only marginal increases in employment for these sectors.  
 
 
Table 21: Employment in Canada’s mining and metal manufacturing sectors (2007) 
Sector Number employed  
Mining & quarrying (excl. coal, oil and gas) 52,877 
Primary metal manufacturing 74,009 
Fabricated metal manufacturing 176,642 
Total 303,528 
Source: Industry Canada, Natural Resources Canada 
 
 
With over 200,000 employed in Canada’s fabricated and ferrous metal manufacturing, estimated 
declines in employment of over -0.70%, while not substantial, could lead to short- to mid-term 
displacement of workers as a result of the CETA. While these workers would be expected to either shift 
into alternative professions or cycle out of the workforce over the long-term, they could potentially 
experience difficulties associated with their displacement over the short- to mid-term.  
Under the prospect of displacement for those employed in fabricated metal manufacturing, the severity 
of the impact is largely contingent on:  
1) how well areas particularly reliant on the sector adjust and shift towards alternative forms of 
economic activity; and 
2) how well displaced workers are able to shift into new areas of employment 
Focusing on the second point, Table 22 highlights the sectors expected to experience increased demand 
for labour in Canada as a result of the CETA as well as their average wages relative to those employed in 
fabricated metal manufacturing. As can be seen, the prospects of transitioning into an expanding sector 
that offers higher wages are more reasonable under a CETA that provides the greatest degree of 
liberalisation, with scenarios that model a full removal of all tariffs generating employment in a number 
of sectors that provide higher wages on average than in fabricated metal manufacturing. Exceptions 
could arise for workers who shifted into construction, trade, apparel, textiles or recreation services.  
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Table 22: Sectors in Canada expected to increase employment, by degree and liberalisation scenario 
and wage compared to fabricated metal manufacturing  
Sector Scenario 
A 
Scenario 
B 
Scenario 
C 
Scenario 
D 
Salary Compared to 
average wage in 
fabricated metal 
manuf.  
Mining    +  > 
Textiles   +  < 
Apparel   +  < 
Non-ferrous metal 
manuf. 
  +  > 
Automotive manuf.  +  + + > 
Other Transport 
manuf.  
  + + > 
Construction + + + + < 
Trade + + + + < 
Maritime transport  + ++ + ++ = 
Air transport + + + + > 
Communication 
services 
+ + + + > 
Recreation services + + + + < 
 
+ denotes marginal gain, ++ denotes significant gain, <,=,> denotes less than, equivalent or greater than 
Source: CGE model, Statistics Canada 
 
Alternatively, under less ambitious liberalisation (Scenarios A and B), decreases in employment would be 
expected to be greater, while the prospects for alternative employment would be largely limited to the 
services industries. In such instances, workers may have difficulty locating employment that provides 
comparable salaries .  
In further assessing the magnitude of the social impact, the relative skills of the workers employed metal 
manufacturing should be taken into account and cross-referenced with those generally required within 
the expanding sectors. With educational attainment in the metal manufacturing sector generally below 
the national average (particularly in terms of the number who have graduated from university), the 
average displaced employee would likely find herself under-qualified for those jobs that require a higher 
level of skills and education. At the same time, displaced workers would be potentially well suited to 
transition into nonferrous metal manufacturing which could provide them with higher wages over the 
long-term, mitigating the potentially negative impact on these workers as a result of the CETA. 
Overall, however, the prospects for displacement in Canada’s metal manufacturing sector are limited, 
with minor declines in employment likely to arise from the CETA and with the sector being a minor 
source of employment within Canada. As such, it should not be expected that any significant negative 
social impact hereto should be expected to arise.  
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Box 13: Mining and Canada’s aboriginals 
 
Based on the economic assessment, it is expected that the impact on Canada’s mining industry will be 
positive. While CGE estimates project very minor increases in employment as a result of trade 
liberalisation, it is possible that provisions leading to increased EU investment (i.e. national treatment or 
removal of equity restrictions on uranium) could result in greater levels of employment than presently 
estimated.  
These potential gains in employment could benefit Canada’s aboriginal communities in particular. The 
Minerals and Metals Policy of the Government of Canada, through the 1994 Whitehorse Mining 
Initiative Leadership Council Accord (WMI), specifically sets out a strategic vision for sustainable 
development within the mining industry with particular intentions of ensuring that opportunities 
created by the industry are shared with aboriginal peoples.  This includes: 
 Ensuring participation of Aboriginal peoples in mining; 
 Recognising and respecting Aboriginal treaty rights; 
 Settling aboriginal land claims; and 
 Guaranteeing stakeholder participation310 
 
To the extent that the principles laid out in the WMI are implemented and enforced, greater investment 
in Canada’s metals and minerals industry as a result of the CETA could produce positive social gains for 
aboriginal communities. However, such an outcome is contingent on inclusion of these communities 
where exploration encroaches upon their areas of residence and the successful resolving of land 
disputes.  
 
 
 
EU 
The economic assessment suggests that the CETA will lead to minor decreases in employment in the 
EU’s mining and metals manufacturing sectors. These declines in employment are generally expected to 
worsen under a scenario that provides greater liberalisation of services and full removal of tariffs for all 
products.  
With current employment in mining and metal manufacturing in the EU at approximately 2.1 million 
(Table 23), it is not expected that the decreases in employment predicted by the CGE model will lead to 
more than a limited number of workers being displaced.  With estimated declines in employment of as 
high as -0.15% for the nonferrous metal manufacturing industry in the EU, it would be expected that this 
sector would see the largest number of workers displaced. Overall, however, the total impact is 
expected to be limited.  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
310 http://www.nrcan-rncan.gc.ca/mms-smm/poli-poli/gov-gov/wmi-imw-eng.htm  
EU-Canada SIA Final Report 
132 
 
Table 23: Employment in the EU’s mining and metal manufacturing sector (2007) 
Sector Number employed 
(2007) 
Mining & quarrying (excl. coal, oil and gas) 295,000 
Iron & steel manufacturing 410,000 
Nonferrous metal manufacturing 334,700 
Fabricated metal manufacturing 1,100,000 
Total 2,139,700 
Source: Eurostat, DG Enterprise 
 
While wages may see limited downward movement due to decreases in demand for labour in these 
sectors, increases in productivity in the sector may potentially mitigate this effect. As the impacted 
industries discussed herein are predominantly populated by male workers, it is not expected that there 
will be an impact on gender equality or poverty.  
 
INDICATOR: Quality & decency of work 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Canada 
The labour market for mining, unlike in most other sectors, is particularly volatile with high rates of 
turnover and seasonality. Employment tends to fluctuate with metal prices, implying limited security 
and few career prospects, particularly with respect to lower skilled positions. While it is probable that 
workers transitioning into mining would be advantaged by higher wages, the high rate of turnover 
implies a low degree of stability and security in employment. As such, the degree with which the CETA 
leads to greater degrees of employment in Canada’s mining sector (particularly under greater levels of 
investment) workers may find themselves more generally exposed to insecure and unstable 
employment, negatively affecting this degree of quality and decency of work. 
Whereas the high degree of seasonality and demanding conditions generally lead most mining 
employees to seek alternative forms of employment at some point in their careers, this is not the case in 
metal manufacturing, were the vast majority are fulltime, permanent employees. Strong degrees of 
unionisation – particularly in the primary metal manufacturing sector – imply that the collective power 
of unions could be impacted by the CETA’s effect on employment: positively if it leads to increased 
employment (as projected for nonferrous metal manufacturing) or negatively if it leads to reductions in 
employment (as in ferrous and fabricated metal manufacturing).   
Collective bargaining and the rights of association could, however, be strengthened by the CETA’s ability 
to reaffirm the ILO’s core labour standards (CLS) and under provisions that require Canada to ratify the 
ILO’s Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949  (C.98). For detailed discussion on 
the social ramifications of the CETA as it pertains to core labour standards and the ILO’s Decent Work 
Agenda see Box 14.  
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EU 
Due to the limited expected effects on employment and displacement of workers, it is not expected that 
quality and decency of work will be significantly impacted. Shifts out of metal manufacturing and mining 
and into other areas could improve these workers’ overall work environment, though the impact is 
expected to be minor. Workers could however, be impacted by the CETA’s ability to foster greater 
implementation of the ILO’s Core Labour Standards and Decent Work Agenda (See Box 14).  
 
Box 14: Cross-sectoral social issue 
 
The CETA’s potential impact on (i) the implementation of the ILO’s Core Labour 
Standards, (ii) promotion of the ILO Decent Work Agenda, and (iii) Corporate 
Social Responsibility 
 
 
INDICATOR: Implementation/ratification of ILO Core Labour Standards 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Within bilateral trade negotiations, concerns over labour standards are most often invoked as a result of 
significant disparities in the labour standards between the two sides. Hereto, the concern is that 
providing the lower standards country (usually the economically lesser developed of the two) with 
preferential access to the higher standards country (usually the more developed) could create an 
unlevel playing field, leaving the higher standards country disadvantaged by having to uphold higher (i.e. 
more costly) standards. This in turn could lead to exploitation of workers in the country with lower 
standards and reduced wages in the country with the higher standards (the much publicised ‘race to the 
bottom’, or what the ILO terms ‘social dumping’).  
In order to avoid this outcome, and in an attempt to provide a framework for advancing labour 
principles and rights, both Canada and the EU have included labour components in their trade 
agreements.311 Labour clauses such as these not only create a ‘social floor’ through the listing of 
minimum commitments, but also generally establish an enforcement mechanism as well as a means of 
promoting cooperation and dialogue.312 It is noteworthy, however, that in contrast to many trade 
agreements previously negotiated by Canada and the EU, the CETA is not an agreement between two 
parties that possess drastically different levels of labour standards. Both Canada and the EU are 
generally regarded as having relatively high labour standards and both have expressed a strong 
commitment to ensuring core labour standards are adhered to in trade agreements.  As such, it would 
appear that the CETA would be largely precluded from typical concerns of social dumping as intrinsic in 
many other negotiations.    
Given the commitment to and enforcement of core labour standards by each, it is difficult to conceive of 
an outcome where the CETA leads to an erosion of labour standards and or social dumping in Canada or 
the EU. This being said, it is not necessarily the case that the CETA cannot have an impact on labour 
                                                             
311  ILO. http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/information-resources-and-publications/free-trade-agreements-and-labour-
rights/WCMS_115822/lang--en/index.htm 
312 ILO. http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/information-resources-and-publications/free-trade-agreements-and-labour-
rights/lang--en/index.htm 
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standards simply because there is an obvious lack of disparity in labour standards between the two 
sides. One area of particular interest is the Agreement’s ability to foster the ratification and 
implementation of the International Labour Organisation’s (ILO) Core Labour Standards.  
Specifically, the ILO’s Core Labour Standards (CLS) consist of 8 Conventions, which focus on 4 key areas:   
i) Freedom of association and collective bargaining (C.87 & C.98) 
ii) Elimination of forced and compulsory labour (C.29 & C.105) 
iii) Elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation (C.100 & C.111) 
iv) Abolition of child labour (C.138 & C.182) 
While each of the EU’s 27 Member States have ratified all eight of these Conventions, Canada has not 
yet ratified the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (C.29), the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining 
Convention, 1949 (C.98) or the Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (C.138).  
It should be noted, however, that while Canada is in the minority313 of countries to have not ratified 
these Conventions, it should not necessarily be taken to imply that its standards are significantly low in 
respect to forced labour, collective bargaining or underage workers. As an ILO member, Canada is still 
required under the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work ‘to respect, to 
promote and to realise, in good faith and in accordance with the [ILO] Constitution, the principles 
concerning the fundamental rights’314 which are embodied in these conventions, even though they have 
not been ratified. Further, it is not necessarily its opposition to the contents of these conventions, but 
rather Canada’s different approaches to labour policy among its 13 Provinces and Territories and 
difficulties in coordinating them that have limited the conventions’ ratification. To this end, in order for 
Canada to ratify these three conventions and make them legally binding at the national and 
international level, it is first necessary for the government to ensure compliance at the provincial level: 
something that is complicated by the legal difficulties involved.  
A particularly impactful outcome would therefore be if the CETA contains provisions that require 
ratification of the ILO’s 8 conventions of the CLS. Obviously, this would require Canada to ratify the 
Forced Labour Convention, the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention and the 
Minimum Age Convention. Specifically, such an outcome could have particular relevance for collective 
bargaining and freedom of association in Canada. The number of complaints submitted to the ILO’s 
Committee of Freedom of Association315 (CFA) that have originated from Canada is greater than those 
from any other ILO member state. A total of 78 ILO complaints were filed against Canadian federal and 
provincial labour legislation from 1982-2008, with over 90% found to have been in violation of freedom 
of association principles.316 As noted by the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), these 
complaints often originate over disputes at the provincial level as different legal systems ‘impose 
restrictions on trade union rights throughout the country’ despite the existence of rights to join trade 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
313 Canada is 1 of only 9 ILO members that haven’t ratified C.29, 1 of 29 that haven’t ratified C.98 and 1 of 58 that haven’t 
ratified C.138.  
314 ILO. http://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/textdeclaration/lang--en/index.htm 
315 The CFA examines complaints pertaining to violations of freedom of association, whether or not the country has ratified the 
relevant conventions. In terms of the ILO’s core labour standards, this would pertain to C.87 and C.98.  
316 http://www.labourrights.ca/ilocomplaints.htm 
317 EESC (2010).   
318 Shaheed, Z. (2007).    
319 EESC (2010).   
320 EESC (2010).   
321 ILO. Decent work agenda. http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/decent-work-agenda/lang--en/index.htm 
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unions in place at the federal level.317 
The frequency of complaints by Canadian labour organisations suggests that ratifying C.98 could lead to 
improvements in Canadian workers ability to freely associate and collectively bargain, benefitting 
employees across a number of professions. As confirmed by Table 24, the majority of the complaints to 
the CFA made by Canadian labour organisation have been against legislation implemented at the 
provincial level, making it likely that the impact on workers may vary depending on the province. Given 
the nature of the majority of recent complaints, it would further appear that government employees 
may stand to benefit the most by limiting the government’s ability to restrict the right to strike or 
impose salary freezes on its employees.  
 
 
          Table 24: Number of complaints to the ILO’s CFA by Canadian labour organisations, 1982-2008 
 Legislation challenged No. of complaints 
(1982-2008) 
No. of complaints 
(2000-2008) 
Government of Canada 10 0 
Government of Quebec 20 7 
Government of British Columbia 14 6 
Government of Ontario 13 5 
Government of Saskatchewan 3 2 
Government of Alberta 3 1 
Government of Newfoundland & Labour 3 1 
Government of Nova Scotia 3 0 
Government of Manitoba 3 0 
Government of New Brunswick 2 1 
Government of Prince Edward Island 2 0 
Government of Yukon 2 0 
               Source: Labourrights.ca 
 
At the same time, the very fact that C.98 would need to be coordinated with provincial labour laws in 
Canada, likely reduces the ease with which a CETA can require ratification. Ratifying C.98 (as well as C.29 
and C.138) would require Canada to comply with its technical requirements – both at the national and 
provincial levels – making it mandatory that it be incorporated into law so that it supersedes any existing 
state statutes that conflict with the Convention’s legal requirements. As such, ratifying the ILO 
conventions could (and likely would) come into conflict with provincial labour laws, requiring that they 
be altered to conform to ILO standards. The CETA’s ability to obtain consensus from the provinces is 
likely to be difficult, particularly as ongoing procedures implemented by the Government of Canada 
have yet to lead to ratification of these conventions. Nevertheless, the EU is in the advantageous 
position of being able to do so since the CETA has brought Canada’s provinces to the negotiating table.  
With or without mandatory ratification of the ILO’s 8 fundamental Conventions, it is possible for the 
CETA to include a number of additional/alternative provisions that can support and promote labour 
standards in Canada and the EU while also helping to strengthen implementation of CLS. Improvements 
in implementation of CLS in Canada and the EU could, specifically, be realised by the CETA’s ability to: (i) 
promote awareness by workers and employers of their rights and obligations under the law; (ii) provide 
a mechanism for social dialogue; (iii) establish a mechanism for dispute resolution; and (iv) ensure 
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adequate oversight and enforcement.318   
As a first step, a stand alone chapter within the CETA devoted to trade and labour would be beneficial. 
Within this chapter, both sides could reaffirm their commitment to maintaining and promoting core 
labour standards within trade agreements by issuing firm support for the ILO’s Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and declaring their unequivocal commitment not to lower 
labour standards or protection in order to encourage trade or investment.319  
This chapter could also include a number of provisions in relation to the four areas noted above that 
serve to improve implementation of CLS. Specifically, the CETA’s chapter on trade and labour could 
include provisions for fostering social dialogue on labour matters, using a tripartite structure to ensure 
involvement of workers, employers and government. Civil Society could also be encouraged to partake 
in the process of adopting labour standards. Additionally, the CETA could include provisions to promote 
public awareness of the labour laws and standards that are affected by the CETA, while ensuring future 
changes that arise will also be adequately disseminated to the public.  
Cooperation and enforcement could be enhanced under the CETA with the inclusion of provisions that 
call for regular exchange of information, including reports on progress in making advancements in 
labour standards.320 This could include dialogue on best-practice approaches based on the experiences 
of Canada and the EU. Additionally, provisions that put in place an inspection regime could further 
enhance enforcement, particularly provided the regime is accessible and responsive to relevant 
stakeholders and is imbued with the power to take action when violations are found. To this end, 
inspections and enforcement would be significantly strengthened by the establishment of a conflict 
resolution mechanism that can allow stakeholders to take action against infringements of labour laws. 
This impartial review panel would be tasked with hearing complaints regarding issues of trade and 
labour and making rulings.  
Beyond the core labour standards of the ILO, both Canada and the EU could agree to take similar 
measures to promote additional standards that may positively impact workers on both sides. These 
could include mutual commitments on working to prevent workplace injuries, on non-discrimination of 
migrant workers, and on minimum standards for wage earners.   
Overall, the CETA’s ability to harmonise standards and ensure adequate compliance on both sides will 
help establish a ‘social floor’, safeguarding an appropriate level of labour standards in both Canada and 
the EU while ensuring that no form of social dumping arises. Additional provisions that call for dialogue 
and the further advancement of labour standards could contribute to improved labour standards in both 
Canada and the EU, causing the CETA to have a positive social impact over the long-term. Cooperation 
on labour issues between Canada and the EU could be further extended to international fora such as the 
ILO and WTO, leading to the international promotion of improved labour standards and ratification of 
the ILO’s CLS in third countries.   
   
INDICATOR: Promotion of the ILO Decent Work Agenda 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
The ILO’s Decent Work Agenda (DWA) is designed to help foster the development of decent work across 
the globe through the implementation of four key objectives: creating jobs, guaranteeing rights at work, 
extending social protection and promoting social dialogue.321 While the CETA’s chapter on trade may not 
be able to obtain binding commitments for further implementation of the DWA’s key objectives, it 
could, nevertheless, contain provisions which explicitly express both sides’ commitment to decent work 
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under the ILO framework.  
Further, the EU and Canada could provide a cooperative framework for further advancing the DWA on 
both sides of the Atlantic by fostering regular meetings to discuss priorities, commit to targets and share 
information on best-practices in realising components of the DWA. This cooperation could extend into 
international fora and in dealing with third countries, including commitment to including DWA 
promoting components in future FTAs.  
 
INDICATOR: Corporate Social Responsibility 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
A Chapter on trade and labour within the CETA could have a positive impact on the promotion of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) within Canada and the EU, which could further support efforts to 
strengthen labour standards and decent work on both sides and in third countries. Specifically, the CETA 
could include provisions that call for Canada and the EU to make efforts to encourage the adoption of 
CSR by private stakeholders, particularly by multinational enterprises (MNE). Hereto, the CETA could 
include a mutual commitment to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the ILO’s 
Tripartite Declaration on Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy.  
 
 
 
INDICATOR: Health    
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Canada 
Mining and manufacturing, respectively, have above average rates of work-related fatalities and injuries. 
With employment in nonferrous metal manufacturing and mining poised to increase under the CETA, 
workers in Canada could, on average, be subjected to more occupational injuries.322 At the same time, a 
mechanism that fosters regular dialogue and cooperation between Canada and the EU could include 
commitments to and exchanges on reducing occupational injuries, perhaps fostering improved safety 
over the long-term (See Box 14 for more discussion). 
 
EU 
Metal manufacturing and mining in the EU, though safer than in most countries, remains subject to 
higher rates of work related injuries and physical health risks than most professions. Therefore, 
movement out of these occupations may improve overall worker health. However, due to the limited 
displacement of workers, the impact is expected to be minor.  
 
 
 
                                                             
322 Statistics Canada, Workplace and Employee Survey 2003 
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ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT323 
 
INDICATOR: Rate of depletion of minerals 
BASELINE 
Canada 
Canada’s base metal reserves (at mines in production or committed to production) have declined 
continuously for almost 30 years. As a result of this prolonged decline, reserves in 2008 were equal to 
45% of the 1980 level for copper, 43% for nickel, 40% for molybdenum, 18% for zinc, 17% for silver and 
7% for lead. Canada’s reserves of base metals decline at an annual average rate ranging from -2.5% for 
nickel to -8% for lead (from 1980 to 2008). High prices from 2001 to 2007 were not sufficient to reverse 
this overarching trend by stimulating exploration and discovery of new proven reserves. The recent 
economic recession (which caused large reductions in commodity prices) has reduced production levels, 
thus also reducing the rate of decline.  
Many marginal mines were put on hold or shut down entirely. The only metal whose proven reserves 
increased in 2008 were molybdenum (+4%). As of 2008, there were 947t of gold (4% decrease from 07), 
5665t of silver (17% decrease from 2007), 5.0Mt (-16%) of zinc, 636,000t (-7%) of lead, 7.456Mt (-1.4%) 
of copper, 222,129t (+4) of molybdenum and 3.605Mt (-4.5%) of nickel. The apparent life indices for 
major metals in Canada at the end of 2008 were 12 years for nickel, 10 years for copper, 9 years for gold, 
7 years for molybdenum, 6 years for zinc, 6 years for silver, and 4 years for lead. Nonetheless, land 
staking and claiming continues, with 19 million hectares of land staked and claimed in good standing in 
2008, covering 7.9% of Canada’s total landmass.  
 
EU 
EU mineral production experienced strong variations in its output over the past decade (Table 25).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
323 Notes: The predicted environmental impact of the CETA is much larger for Canada than for the EU (where it is in most cases 
negligible or marginal). Therefore the environmental assessments in the following sections expand more on Canada than on the 
EU.  
Canada and the EU apply different statistical definitions and procedures to gather, process and anlayse data on the 
environmental impact of their industries. For the following environmental assessments it was intended to use the most 
comprehensive and detailed data available for each region. As a result, the content and extent of the respective environmental 
assessment sections on the EU and Canada may appear uneven. 
Also, the mining and minerals sector in both regions is highly fragmented, comprising largely varying size of enterprises and 
operations, operational techniques, production volumes, etc. While there is some data available on the economics of the sector 
and on environmentally relevant outputs, a notable lack of data on prevailing business processes and techniques makes it 
virtually impossible to specify a single environmental profile for the whole sector in each region.  
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Table 25: EU mineral production324 
 EU Production in 
thousand tonnes, 
2007 
% change since 2002 % of world 
production, 2007 
Feldspar  7833 +57  35  
Perlite  1266 0  34  
Bentonite, fuller’s 
earth, attapulgite, 
sepiolite  
3898 +10  20  
Gypsum (natural)  30317 +11  20  
Kaolin  5051 –4  20  
Salt  48180 –4  20  
Diatomite (including 
moler)  
326 –18  16  
Talc  1330 +6  16  
Sillimanite minerals  65 +5  15  
Strontium minerals  142 –7  15  
Potash (K2O content)  4597 –2  14  
Magnesite  2949 –5  13  
Mica  36 –9  12  
Sulphur  8189 +3  12  
Titanium minerals 
(TiO2 content)  
441 +3  7  
Wollastonite  46 –2  7  
Fluorspar  237 –34  4  
Lithium minerals (Li 
content)  
744 +41  4  
Barytes  279 –32  3  
Bromine  0.1 –100  <1  
Graphite  3 –77  <1  
Phosphate rock  831 +4  <1  
Asbestos  no production  –100  0  
Borates no production   
Iodine no production   
Natural sodium 
carbonate 
no production   
Nepheline syenite no production   
Rare earth minerals no production   
Vermiculite no production   
 
 
 
                                                             
324 Hetherington et al. 2008   
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ANALYSIS 
Canada 
Scenarios A and B predict marginal declines in mining output while scenarios C and D predict a marginal 
increase in output for the mining sector over the long-term. These changes are both too small to 
significantly affect the depletion rates of most minerals. However, should CETA lead to increased 
investment and mining capacity in Canada, depletion rates could accelerate as a result of the Agreement. 
 
EU 
The past and current changes in EU mineral output are caused more by international commodity 
markets than by depletion of the resources.325 Therefore, and due to uncertain market conditions, the 
future rate of depletion cannot be predicted. 
The CGE model shows a limited decrease in the output of non-ferrous metals in scenarios C and D and 
no change in output in scenarios A and B. All other subsectors show insignificant change. Therefore, and 
due to the market uncertainties stated above, it is expected that a CETA will not have an impact on the 
rate of depletion of mineral resources in the EU. 
 
INDICATOR: Rate of overall land use of biodiverse areas 
BASELINE 
Canada & EU 
Mining can negatively affect biodiversity by reducing habitat areas and quality such that they no longer 
support the same population sizes. Certain types of mines, like pit mines, can disturb large surface areas. 
Infrastructure, like access roads, is also important to the exploration of new mines and can break up 
habitat as well. Economic incentives can lead to the creation of new roads and highways into virgin 
areas. A significant amount of funding for these projects comes from public and private partnership or 
individual ventures. More money for further infrastructure projects could potentially further encroach 
on currently undeveloped lands, with related impacts on biodiversity.  
Half of Canada’s national parks, which are an example biodiverse lands, have mining occurring in or 
around their park boundaries now or in the past. 90% of mines identified are outside park boundaries, 
although 39% are within 10km of park boundaries.326 The primary impacts of mines identified by 
National Parks are the impact on wildlife due to habitat fragmentation, loss of habitat, decrease in 
habitat effectiveness, and direct and indirect mortality risk.   
In the EU, mineral extraction uses relatively little land, as listed in Table 26: 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
325 Hetherington et al. 2008 
326 AXYS Environmental Consulting LTD (2002).  
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Table 26: land use by mineral extraction in the EU327 
Year area 
(km2) 
area (% of EU 
area) 
2000 6177 0.11 
2006 6678 0.12 
 
From 2000 to 2006 the area used for minerals extraction increased from 6177km2 to 6678km2 (+8.1%). 
This increase converted mostly agricultural, forest and semi natural areas, as listed in Table 27: 
 
Table 27: Sprawl of mines and quarrying areas in the EU 2000-2006328 
Previous land cover km2 converted to mineral 
extraction 
Artificial surfaces 0 
Agricultural areas 537 
Forest and semi natural areas 393 
Wetlands 5 
Water bodies 3 
Total 938 
 
In 2000 non-urban industrial and commercial sites covered 20 480km2 of land (0.38% of EU area), rising 
to 21 887km2 (0.40% of EU area) in 2006, an increase by 6.9%.329 It is not known how much of this land 
use can be attributed to the metal processing industry. 
 
ANALYSIS 
Canada 
Factors that would contribute to further exploration and deposit appraisal activity include strength of 
the price of minerals, capital infusions, favourable equity markets, and also greater demand outlook for 
base metals and interest in commodities like potash, uranium and REE, which are important traded 
commodities in the context of Canada-EU trade. Increased investment in the mining sector following the 
CETA may create incentives for further exploration and access to remote resources that are located in 
virgin areas of the Canadian boreal or arctic regions (in line with Canadian regulations), thus intensifying 
the rate of land use of these fragile, biodiverse areas. 
 
EU 
Since the CGE model shows only minor impact of a CETA on the output of the EU mineral and metals 
industries, no impact on land use for these industries in the EU is expected.  
 
                                                             
327 EEA data service 2010: land accounts data viewer 
328 Ibid.  
329 Ibid.  
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INDICATOR: Water depletion / Contamination of water from chemicals and wastes / Discharge of 
untreated effluents 
BASELINE 
Canada 
Water can also be affected by mining activity through water withdrawals, treatment of tailing, and the 
use of chemicals and local water sources for processing activities. Primary metal industries represented 
28% of surface water withdrawal intake by Canadian manufacturing industries in 2005, equating to 2178 
million cubic meters used for this industry.330 For the mining industry, 459 million cubic metres were 
withdrawn, three quarters of which went to metal mines. Gross water use was 2516 million cubic 
metres for mining industries, but over 2000 cubic metres of this was recycled, for a recycling rate of 
448%. The sum of the water discharged was 630 million cubic metres. The volumes of water are this 
large because mining operations must often remove groundwater to carry out extraction activities. Most 
of the water intake comes from self-supplied surface freshwater (76%), though nearly 20% comes from 
groundwater. The large majority, 82%, is used in processing; cooling, condensing and steam is used for 
8% while the rest is for sanitation purposes. Most of the effluent, 71%, is released back into surface 
freshwater, while 16% goes into tailing ponds. The water in the tailing ponds arises from water that was 
in the metal mines. Only 8% is sent to groundwater. Of all these effluents, 61% is not treated before 
being discharged. 30% of water goes through a primary or mechanical treatment. Minor quantities, 
around 4%, go through biological or advanced treatments.331 
According to the National Pollutant Release Inventory, metal ore mines release 54% of Canadian 
reportable substances in tailings, while iron ore mines produce 25%. Other mines for diamonds, 
asbestos and phosphate are smaller generators of pollutant substances, responsible for 5% of the 
total.332 Other causes of decreases in water quality may arise from pollutants spilling directly from 
mining operations, chemical spills and sedimentation effects. The metal industry is responsible for 
9.62% of total BOD (organic water pollutants)333 emissions.  
Quantity reported in tailings (tonnes) of reported substances by mining industry in Canada for 2009334 
Arsenic and compounds (as As) 13013 t 
Cadmium and compounds (as Cd) 189 t 
Chromium and compounds (as Cr) 10719 t 
Copper and compounds (as Cu) 57616 t 
Mercury and compounds (as Hg) 15 t 
Nickel and compounds (as Ni)  36495 t 
Lead and compounds (as Pb) 24399 t 
 
The Environmental Code of Practice for Metal Mines sets out guidelines for wastewater management. 
This code of practice supports the Metal Mining Effluent Regulations under the Fisheries Act. However, 
the guidelines act only as a means of encouraging best practices. For example, during mine operations, 
                                                             
330 http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/16-401-x/2008001/5003964-eng.htm 
331 Ibid.  
332 Vanderklippe, N. (2010). 
333 World Development Indicators Online. World Bank.  
334 Environment Canada. Pollution and Waste. 2009 NPRI Reviewed Facility Data Release: Overview of Tailings and Waste Rock 
Data for 2009.  
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mine water and seepage should be monitored and mine effluent should be treated so that it is physically 
and chemically stable. 335 
 
EU 
The EU mineral and metal processing industries release significant amounts of pollutants into water. For 
both industries these are mostly inorganic chlorides and nitrogen, organic carbon compounds, and 
various heavy metals. However, the discharge from the metal industry contains higher amounts of toxic 
contaminants, especially heavy metals, than from the minerals industry (Table 28; for details see the 
European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register). 
 
Table 28: Heavy metals releases into water by the EU metal processing industry, 2008336 
Arsenic and compounds (as As) 5.22 t 
Cadmium and compounds (as Cd) 1.86 t 
Chromium and compounds (as Cr) 480 t 
Copper and compounds (as Cu) 34.6 t 
Mercury and compounds (as Hg) 96.2 kg 
Nickel and compounds (as Ni) 71.3 t 
Lead and compounds (as Pb) 29.3 t 
Zinc and compounds (as Zn) 168 t 
 
The mining and minerals industry in the EU is subject to comprehensive environmental regulation, most 
importantly the mining waste directive (Directive 2006/21/EC on the management of waste from the 
extractive industries).337 This is complemented by Best Practice advice to the sector, e.g. for the 
management of tailings and waste-rock in mining activities.338 Most recently, in February 2011 the raw 
materials initiative, taken forward by DG Enterprise and Industry, was adopted by the Commission. It 
specifically calls for fostering sustainable supply within the EU as one pillar of a European raw materials 
policy, and for recycling and resource efficiency as another. It also includes various environmentally 
relevant guidelines, e.g. for resolving land use conflicts between mining and environmental interests.339  
 
ANALYSIS 
Canada 
Given that water withdrawals and discharges are directly correlated with production (assuming 
technology is constant), any marginal increase in mining output caused by the CETA (as predicted in 
Scenarios C and D) could lead to increased contamination and untreated discharges in this sector. 
Furthermore, if the CETA leads to increases in investment and production capacity in the mining sector, 
these impacts could be more pronounced. This could be especially important in the uranium sector. 
                                                             
335 Environmental Code of Practice for Metal Mines. Environment Canada.  
336 European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register 
337 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/environment/waste_management/l28134_en.htm 
338 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/mining/index.htm, http://eippcb.jrc.ec.europa.eu/reference/ 
339 European Commission: Communications from the commission to the European Parliament, the council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of The Regions tackling the challenges in commodity markets and on raw 
materials. Brussels, 2.2.2011. COM(2011) 25 final 
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However, investment could accelerate the introduction of cleaner technologies, thereby reducing water 
discharges. Overall, the CETA is not expected to have a major effect on water withdrawals, discharges 
and contamination but could nevertheless have more pronounced effects in certain sectors or regions.  
 
EU 
Since the CGE model shows that the CETA will only have a marginal impact on the output of the EU 
mineral and metals industries, no significant effect on water resources used by these industries in the 
EU are expected. Regulation measures, currently in place, should help to reduce any impact that were to 
arise. 
However, a marginal decrease in the EU production of non-ferrous metals will marginally reduce the 
industries’ environmental impact in terms of water depletion and contamination. 
It is notable that the mining and minerals sector in the EU is highly fragmented, largely varying in terms 
of sizes of enterprises and operations, operational techniques, production volumes, etc. While there is 
some data available on the economics of the sector and on environmentally relevant outputs, a notable 
lack of data on prevailing business processes and techniques makes it virtually impossible to specify a 
single environmental profile for the whole sector in the region.  
 
INDICATOR: Rate of other waste output / Rate of hazardous waste output 
BASELINE 
Canada 
Mining activity currently creates significant quantities of waste outputs. For instance, in order to 
separate the metal from the non-metal elements found in ore, high temperature processes are applied 
which create a non-metal by-product called slag, a granular rocky material. Depending on the slag form, 
some of it can be sold as a by-product for use in asphalt, concrete, fill, etc.  
Another example is waste generated by potash production. For every tonne of potash product produced, 
about 1.5 tonnes of residue is created. Canada produces 24.8 Mt of residue from potash operations 
annually. Most residues are disposed of in engineered dams and ponds, while some salt is used for de-
icing roads.  
Overall, 7 billion tonnes of metal-mine and industrial tailing plus a further 6 billion tonnes of surface 
waste rock have been accumulated over many years from mine waste. When considering mine wastes 
that are known or potential sources of acid, these figures drop to 1,878 Mt for tailings and 739Mt for 
waste rock.  Acid generation can occur from waste rock and from acid mine drainage.  
The Environmental Code of Practice for Metal Mines sets out guidelines for management of waste rock. 
This code of practice supports the Metal Mining Effluent Regulations under the Fisheries Act. However, 
the guidelines act only as a means of encouraging best practices. For example, during mine operations, 
waste rock should be used as backfill such that it will reduce the volume of waste accumulated in waste 
rock piles. First, the waste rock needs to be assessed for suitability as backfill. Moreover, the waste rock 
should be monitored for leaching, acidity levels, and groundwater contamination. 340 
 
                                                             
340 Environmental Code of Practice for Metal Mines. Environment Canada.  
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EU 
Mining and quarrying activities give rise to the single biggest waste stream at 29% of the total quantity 
of waste generated in EEA countries.341 However, this waste is comprised mostly of materials that must 
be removed in order to extract the mineral resource (such as topsoil, overburden and waste rock). This 
waste is mostly inert, causing no environmental hazard, but is a concern in terms of the large areas of 
land required for its disposal. A minor portion of mining waste has the potential to present hazardous 
substances into the waste stream and for causing environmental pollution if not properly controlled.  In 
response to these concerns, the EU has put in place initiatives that are designed to improve mining 
waste management.342 
While waste from the mineral industry is larger in volume than waste from metal production and 
processing (Tables 29 and 30), the environmental impact of the latter is much higher. 
 
Table 29: Waste transfers from mineral extraction, 2008343 
 Recovery Disposal Total quantity 
Non hazardous 43,067,003 t (78.0%) 12,166,820 t (22.0%) 55,233,823 t 
Hazardous 146,548 t (7.8%) 1,720,942 t (92.2%) 1,867,490 t 
 
 
Table 30: Waste transfers from metal production and processing, 2008344 
 Recovery Disposal Total quantity 
Non hazardous 33,698,512 t (65.3%) 17,942,998 t (34.7%) 51,641,509 t 
Hazardous 3,771,365 t (47.7%) 4,133,696 t (52.3%) 7,905,061 t 
 
ANALYSIS 
Canada 
The CETA could result in an increase in waste outputs equivalent to the increase in production predicted 
by the CGE model. Given the limited increase in output predicted in scenarios C and D and limited 
declines projected under scenarios A and B, it is expected that these increases will not be significant. As 
mentioned previously, increased investment as a result of CETA could amplify this effect and lead to 
increased waste outputs, or alternatively lead to the introduction of waste-reduction technologies.  
 
EU 
Since the CGE model shows only a marginal impact of a CETA on both output and exports for the EU 
mineral and metals industries, no significant effect on the waste production of the mineral and metal 
processing industries in the EU are expected. 
However, any minor decrease in the EU production of non-ferrous metals will marginally reduce the 
industries’ environmental impact in terms of waste production. 
                                                             
341 EU EIONET, http://scp.eionet.europa.eu/themes/waste/#5 
342 EC (2001). 
343 European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register 
344 Ibid.  
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INDICATOR: Air Quality / GHG emissions 
BASELINE 
Canada & EU 
Air quality can be affected by increased particulate emissions due to dust and coal. Processing plants 
and the burning of hydrocarbons to run heavy equipment can release chemicals and hydrocarbon by-
products into the air. The metal and mining industries also release contaminants into the air.  
According to the National Pollutant Release Inventory (NPRI), Canada’s GHG emissions for mining and 
metal manufacturing industries are as follows:  
 the aluminium industry: 11,043 tonnes of total particulate matter (TPM), 68,190 tonnes of SOx, 
384,014 tonnes of CO, 30 kg of mercury, 19,388 kg of B(b)f among others; 
 the iron and steel industries: 6,622 tonnes of TPM, 26,976 tonnes of SOx, 12,736 tonnes of NOx, 
1,126 tonnes of VOC, 35,562 tonnes of CO, as well as 5,934 kg of lead, 313 kg of cadmium, 915 
kg of mercury, 151kg of B(a)p, 160 kg of B(b)f among others; and 
 iron ore mining: 12,468 tonnes of TPM, 18,300 tonnes of SOx, 14,561 tonnes of NOX, 23,204 
tonnes of CO. Mining and rock quarrying release 180,250 tonnes of TPM, 4,903 tonnes of SOx, 
15,451 tonnes of NOx, 2,467 tonnes of VOC, 8,883 tonnes of CO.345 
Mining and oil and gas extraction in Canada increased markedly, from 6,190 kt CO2e in 1990 to 23,900 
kt CO2e in 2008. Manufacturing of iron and steel remained fairly stable, with 6,480 kt in 1990 and 6,170 
kt in 2008. Non ferrous metals emitted 3,480 kt CO2e in 2008. Emissions stem from combustion of fossil 
fuels during manufacturing processes. Metal production processes together went from 19,500 kt CO2e 
in 1990 to 15,300kt CO2e in 2008. 7,440kt CO2 came from iron and steel production, 7,400 kt CO2 came 
from aluminium production. Iron and steel decreased its economic emissions intensity by 13% between 
1990 and 2008. The steel industry did so by altering its consumption of fossil fuels and the use of electric 
arc furnaces. This method uses recycled steel scraps to avoid reducing iron ore into pig ore. This cuts 
emissions by about half. Steel production also decreased because of foreign competition, as there was a 
downturn in the automotive industry, the largest consumer of steel.346 
Smelting and refining produced 15.6 Mt of CO2e in 1990, which dropped to 8.46Mt CO2e in 2008. Its 
emissions intensity decreased 66% over the same time period. This improvement was thanks to changes 
in technology, such as computerised sensors and automated alumina feeders reduced the anode effects, 
helped to cut down on perfluorocarbon (PFCs), which are used as cooling and heating agents.347  
Mining emitted 6.05 Mt of CO2e in 1990, which stayed fairly stable with 6.69Mt in 2008. However, over 
the same time, its contribution to GDP increased 53%, meaning that its intensity reduced 28%.348 This 
rise in GDP is attributed to the growth of the diamond mine production, and a rise in commodity price 
for minerals like uranium and potash. Increases in heavy vehicles in mining operations contributed 1Mt 
of emissions from 1990 to 2008. 
Table 31 lists the GHG emissions and air pollution caused by the EU mineral and metal processing 
industries. 
                                                             
345National Pollutant Release Inventory (2008)  
346 Environment Canada (2010b) 
347 Ibid.  
348 Ibid. 
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Table 31: GHG emissions and air pollution for the EU mineral and metal processing industries, 2008349 
 mineral 
industry 
metal 
processing 
industry 
Greenhouse gases 202,325,336 t 187,975,720 t 
Methane (CH4) 878,182 t 10,649 t 
Carbon dioxide (CO2) 186,579,000 t 178,656,000 t 
Carbon dioxide (CO2) excluding biomass 14,866,000 t 9,308,000 t 
Hydro-fluorocarbons (HFCs) 19.2 t 12.4 t 
Nitrous oxide (N2O) 2,135 t 731 t 
Perfluorocarbons (PFCs) - 312 t 
Sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) 242 kg 13.9 t 
Confidential greenhouse gases - 2.09 t 
Other gases 1,983,066 t 3,095,682 t 
Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) e 105 kg 16.6 kg 
Chlorine and inorganic compounds (as HCl) 3,331 t 3,851 t 
Carbon monoxide (CO) 1,358,560 t 2,589,000 t 
Fluorine and inorganic compounds (as HF) 3,111 t 2,329 t 
Halons - 7.40 kg 
Hydrochlorofluorocarbons(HCFCs) 7.04 t 89.0 t 
Hydrogen cyanide (HCN) 21.6 t 63.3 t 
Ammonia (NH3) 8,665 t 1,985 t 
Non-methane volatile organic compounds 
(NMVOC) 
6,182 t 38,630 t 
Nitrogen oxides (NOx/NO2) 435,557 t 165,590 t 
Sulphur oxides (SOx/SO2) 166,626 t 294,145 t 
Confidential other gases 1,005 t - 
 
ANALYSIS 
Canada 
The E3MG model predicts a marginal increase in air pollutants and GHG emissions generated by the 
mining and metal manufacturing sectors. These increases range from 0.14% to 0.18% for iron and steel, 
from 0.01% to 0.24% for non-ferrous metals, and from 0.16% to 0.19% for ore-extraction. It should be 
noted that with increased European investment driven by world demand and higher prices, capacity 
could conceivably grow beyond the levels projected from trade liberalisation alone, thereby leading to a 
slight increase in GHG and other pollutants emissions. Although the metal manufacturing sector has 
reduced its GHG emissions intensity over time, the lack of GHG regulations or carbon pricing 
mechanisms in Canada significantly reduces incentives to improve energy intensity or reduce emissions. 
The introduction of a mandatory carbon pricing mechanism could more than offset the impacts of any 
growth on this sector’s GHG emissions.    
 
 
                                                             
349 European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register 
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EU 
Since the CGE model shows only marginal impact of a CETA on both output and exports for the EU 
mineral and metals industries, no significant effect on the GHG production and air pollution caused by 
these activities in the EU are expected. 
However, the minor decrease in the EU production of non-ferrous metals will reduce the subsector’s 
GHG emissions correspondingly, resulting in saving of 225,000 t GHG. 
The E3MG modelling also predicts only marginal effects on CO2 emissions (0% in the minerals subsector, 
-0.02% in the iron & steel subsector, -0.01% in the non-ferrous metals subsector). 
 
5.1.2. Oil & Petroleum products 
 
ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT350 
 
INDICATOR: Output, trade and investment 
BASELINE 
With oil and gas extracted from 12 of its 13 provinces, Canada is the world’s seventh largest producer of 
oil.351 Production has nearly doubled since 1980 with Canada currently producing over 2.6 million barrels 
of oil per day.352 Of Canada’s 175 billion barrels of estimated oil reserves, 97% are located in the oil 
sands situated in three deposits in Alberta and Saskatchewan.353 Whereas this availability would make 
Canadian reserves the second largest in the world behind only Saudi Arabia, a number of challenges are 
present in extraction. Technology requires improvements and additional sources of investment and R&D, 
while the present methods carry a heavier environmental impact (see environmental assessment).  
With a large endowment of oil resources, Canada’s exports of petroleum and petroleum products are 
substantial and in 2007 reached $52.3 billion, resulting in a trade surplus of $22.3 billion. The EU, 
conversely, is devoid of any significant reserves and therefore heavily reliant on outside sources to 
provide it with crude oil to meet its energy needs. This reliance on imports of oil, gas and petroleum 
products results in the EU running a consistent and substantial trade deficit ($272.1 billion in 2007).  
With the overwhelming majority of Canada’s oil exports directed towards the United States, oil plays 
only a limited role in EU-Canada bilateral trade with only 3% of exports from Canada shipped to the EU. 
Therefore, of the EU’s more than $350 billion in petroleum imports in 2007, Canada provided less than 
1% of the total value.354  
 
                                                             
350 Specifically, CGE results for the oil and gas industry are reported according to the product groupings of the GTAP database 
which divide the industry across: extraction of crude petroleum (Oil); extraction of natural gas (Gas) and refining and processing 
of petroleum products (Petroleum products). The results of the simulations can be found in Tables 57-64 in Annex 6. 
351 Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers 
352 Natural Resources Canada 
353 The remaining oil deposits are outside the oil sands and found primarily in Alberta, Saskatchewan and offshore of 
Newfoundland and Labrador. 
354 UN Comtrade 
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ANALYSIS 
Although Canada is a major producer and net exporter of oil and the EU a heavy importer, it is unlikely 
that tariff liberalisation from the CETA will significantly alter the existing conditions where the EU is only 
a minor market for Canadian oil. This is due largely to the fact that the MFN duties on crude in the EU 
are either low or at zero, limiting the impact tariff liberalisation is likely to have on the sector. 
Results from the CGE model suggest that tariff liberalisation under the CETA would induce negligible 
changes in the current levels of output (Tables 57-54 in Annex 6). Specifically, the modelling projects 
that Canada’s output of oil would increase by 0.04% to 0.05% over the long-term with full removal of all 
tariffs (Scenarios C and D), while less ambitious liberalisation (Scenarios A and B) is projected to lead to 
minor declines in output over the long-term (-0.05%).  Any change in output would likely result from 
changes in domestic downstream demand and would therefore not be expected to influence exports.  
With limited oil exploration and reserves within the EU as well as a heavy reliance on imports, it is not 
expected that the CETA would impact oil production and exports in the EU. This is reflected within the 
results of the CGE model, which suggest that liberalisation under the CETA would not significantly alter 
domestic production or trade. 
Nevertheless, the CETA could stimulate increased production in Canada’s oil industry through 
investment liberalisation. The Canadian oil sands in Saskatchewan and, primarily, Alberta have already 
been a major recipient of global investment, with capital spending of in situ, mining and upgrading of 
$16.9 billion in 2007 and a further $8.8 billion in 2009 despite a global tightening of capital.355 With 
respect to the EU, investment in oil and natural gas constitutes one of the largest forms of investment in 
Canada, representing 18.4% of the EU’s total FDI stocks in Canada at the end of 2007.356 Each of the 
three major EU petroleum companies – Shell, BP and Total – presently has some form of investment in 
the Canadian oil sands, either through a subsidiary or joint venture. Investment in the oil sands is 
expected to increase dramatically over the long-term with the Canadian Energy Research Institute 
estimating that investments will reach $192 billion over the next 25 years.357 Combining this with the 
significant revenue generating potential of the oil sands makes it highly possible that EU investment in 
this sector will increase over the long-term.  
While data limitations have made it impossible for the modelling framework to quantitatively reflect the 
precise impact that investment liberalisation is likely to have on output and exports in Canada’s oil 
sector, gravity model estimates designed to capture the impact from investment liberalisation in the 
coal, oil and gas industry predict that a reduction in investment restrictiveness (as measured by the 
OECD) is likely to lead to increases in investment within the sector in Canada. Hereto, Canada does not 
generally maintain overt restrictions on foreign investment in its domestic oil industry. Foreign 
investments are, however, subject to net benefit tests, and although these have not been proven to 
significantly limit investment by the EU, their removal could have a positive impact on FDI in the sector. 
Specifically, extension of national treatment to EU investors could lead to minor increases in the stock of 
EU FDI in the sector, leading to higher levels of output in Canada’s oil sector over the long-term. There is 
limited data, however, to suggest that national treatment in investment would significantly increase EU 
investment in Canada’s oil industry, particularly as EU investment in the sector is already robust.   
 
 
                                                             
355 Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers; Government of Alberta   
356 OECD.stat 
357 Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers 
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INDICATOR: Employment 
BASELINE 
In 2009, Canada employed 66,800 in oil and gas extraction and a further 16,400 in manufacturing of 
petroleum products.358 The vast majority of those employed in extraction are located in Alberta; largely 
in the oil sands. Estimates suggest that over the next 25 years, employment in the oil sands industry will 
increase substantially, making it a significant source of employment.359 In addition to Alberta, processing 
of petroleum finds the majority of employment within Ontario and Quebec, though the sector is a 
relatively minor source of overall employment in these provinces.  
 
ANALYSIS 
The modelling estimates that tariff liberalisation under the CETA will have almost no impact on 
employment in Canada’s oil industry. Consequently, any employment impact will be associated with 
investment, with the extension of national treatment to EU investors likely to place upward pressure on 
the demand for labour in Canada. While this investment would likely lead producers to upgrade their 
labour-saving technologies, increased FDI would not be expected to have a significant impact on 
employment, limiting the overall effect of the CETA on this indicator.  
 Employment in the EU’s oil and petroleum industry is not expected to be impacted to any significant 
degree as a result of the CETA.  
 
SOCIAL ASSESSMENT 
 
INDICATOR: Worker displacement  
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Canada 
As outlined in the economic assessment, the CGE model predicts that the CETA will lead to a negligible 
decrease in employment in Canada’s oil industry over the long-term. With approximately 67,000 
employed in oil extraction within Canada and estimated declines ranging from -0.01% to -0.16%, it is 
therefore estimated that the number of workers who would be potentially displaced as a result of trade 
liberalisation under the CETA would be very limited. Further, as the estimates do not take into account 
the potential upward pressure on employment which could result from investment liberalisation, it 
would appear unlikely that the CETA will lead to displacement within Canada’s oil industry.  
 
EU 
Based on current employment figures for the oil sector in the EU as well as the limited projected 
changes in output and employment as a result of the CETA, it is expected than any impact on worker 
displacement will be negligible.  
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INDICATOR: Quality & decency of work 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Canada 
Given a limited direct impact on employment, wages and worker displacement expected from the CETA, 
there is a limited envisaged impact on quality and decency of work. Labour standards for those 
employed in Canada’s industrial products sector could be strengthened by the CETA’s ability to reaffirm 
the ILO’s Core Labour Standards (CLS) and under provisions that require Canada to ratify all 8 of the ILO 
Conventions that underscore the CLS. Hereto, rights pertaining to collective bargaining and association 
could be specifically improved. For detailed discussion on the social ramifications of the CETA as it 
pertains to core labour standards and the ILO’s Decent Work Agenda see Box 14 in the social assessment 
on mining and metal manufacturing.  
 
EU 
Based on the expected negligible impact on employment, wages and displacement, it is not envisaged 
that quality and decency of work will be impacted within the sector. As in Canada, commitment to 
greater implementation of the ILO’s Core Labour Standards could contribute to greater protections and 
rights among those employed in the EU’s oil industry over the long-term (Box 14). 
 
INDICATOR: Health, education & culture 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Canada 
It is not envisaged that the CETA’s effect on the oil industry will lead to a significant impact on health, 
education or culture in Canada. Increased investment and its contribution to rapid development of 
boom towns in the oil sands areas of Alberta and Saskatchewan could, however, result in some short-
term negative impacts pertaining to health (Box 16), though the association with the CETA is likely to be 
minimal.  
 
Box 16: Oil sands development and the impact on local Canadian communities 
  
While it should not necessarily be expected that investment liberalisation resulting from the CETA will 
lead to substantial increases in investment in Canada’s oil sands, extension of national treatment to EU 
investors could lead to greater investment, contributing to development of rural areas surrounding the 
oil sands. 
Areas that are already heavily impacted by the oil sands such as Wood Buffalo have developed 
‘Sustainable Community’ indicators to track the social impact of oil sands development in these regions. 
The preliminary data suggests that local communities have seen substantial increases in wages and 
median income, but also rising costs of living that in some instances outpace growth in incomes, 
disadvantaging those households living on low or modest incomes.360 Further, rapid development and 
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the creation of ‘boom towns’ such as Fort McMurray tends to create infrastructure and housing 
challenges as towns cope with rapid migrations threatening healthcare provision (e.g. lower physicians 
per capita) and quality and availability of services, while raising instances of crime. 
While it is possible that increased investment arising from the CETA could contribute to these negative 
trends, there is also possibility for local governments and communities to leverage investments in a 
manner which could improve the sustainability of their communities. Further, including binding 
commitments in the chapter on trade and labour toward ensuring that provincial governments will not 
lower standards to attract investment could also allow the CETA to take steps towards avoiding the 
negative social outcomes attached to oil sands development.  
At the same time, other areas of impact that may accompany increased investment and development of 
the oil sands include government revenue as well as aboriginal groups that hold rights over land rich in 
bitumen. In terms of the former, it is noteworthy that oil sands are owned by the people of Canada 
through their governments and that revenue is generated as companies purchase rights to access these 
resources and pay royalties to government with respect to production. In 2007, for example, provincial 
royalties derived from the oil sands were C$3.4 billion. As such, it is likely that increased investment 
would benefit government revenue and provide greater funding for schools, healthcare and police in the 
areas affected.361 
 
 
EU 
Based on the limited impact on employment, wages and displacement, it is not envisaged that there will 
be a significant impact on health, education or culture in the EU.  
 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 
 
INDICATOR: Natural resource stocks Fossil fuel usage / Rate of depletion of fossil fuels 
BASELINE 
Canada 
The Athabasca oil sands, and the oil sand deposits in Peace River, Wabasca, and Cold Lake have an in-
place bitumen content of some 270,000,000,000m3 (1.7trillion barrels), with about three-quarters of 
this coming from the Athabasca oil sands. The other large deposit is in Melville Island, one of the Arctic 
islands in Nunavut, which has 500 billion barrels of in-place bitumen. Together, these account for more 
than double the world’s total current reserves of conventional crude oil. The amount that is 
economically recoverable is much smaller, and depends on production costs and crude oil prices.362  
As of 2009, Canadian production of crude oil was 433,300 m/d (2.73MMb/d). This represents a growth 
of less than 1% from 2008. Though reserves are reduced by production extraction every year, new 
discoveries, extensions to current projects, and revisions of past estimates replace much of what is lost. 
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For instance, from 2004 to 2007, 87% of light and heavy crude that was extracted from production was 
replaced by new discoveries. In 2008, new discoveries replaced approximately 80% of conventional 
crude oil production. However, estimates of remaining crude oil reserves began to lower, which can 
largely be attributed to production significantly outpacing reserves additions. Crude bitumen reserves 
decreased moderately.  
 
Table 32: Conventional Crude Oil Reserves, Additions and Production, 2004-20008  
(million cubic metres) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
Additions 66.9 134.7 27 50 62.5 341.1 
Production 82.7 78.8 82.1 76 77.9 397.5 
Total remaining reserves 640 696 640 614 599  
Total remaining reserves (mio. of barrels) 4,027 4,382 4,033 3,871 3,774  
Source: Provincial Energy Agencies, Offshore Petroleum Boards, NEB.  
 
 
Table 33: Oil sands reserves363 
  
Proven Amount in Place  8.7 billion tonnes 
Proved Recoverable Reserves 6.6 billion tonnes  
3.5 billion tonnes of bituminous 
3.1 billion tonnes of sub-bituminous and lignite 
Additional Resources in Place 192 billion tonnes 
92 billion tonnes of bituminous  
100 billion tonnes of sub-bituminous and lignite  
Recoverable Resources  120 billion tones 
 
EU 
A high proportion of EU oils (82%) and gas (60%) demand is covered by imports. All EU countries have 
high oil import shares, mostly 90-100% with the only notable exceptions being Denmark (as a net 
exporter), the UK (0.9% imports) and Romania (54% imports). With natural gas, most EU countries also 
depend on imports to provide 80-100% of demand, with only Denmark and the Netherlands being net 
exporters.364 These figures show that the EU is extremely dependent on oil and natural gas imports. 
In terms of the EU’s own production, total oil production in Europe amounted to more than 300 million 
tonnes in 2002, which represents a share of more than 40% of the total oil consumption, while total gas 
production amounted to more than 200 million tonnes in 2002, which is equivalent to a share of more 
than 60% of the total European gas consumption. However, production in the North Sea is declining or 
expected to decline (UK, Netherlands, Denmark) over the next 10 years, or to be maintained at current 
levels (gas in Norway).365 
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ANALYSIS 
Canada 
By increasing investment in the development of oil sands extraction facilities, CETA could contribute to 
increasing the rate of depletion of oil reserves in Canada. However, world demand and world prices will 
remain the key determinant of oil sands development. 
 
EU 
Oil production in the EU is already experiencing resource depletion. Given that a CETA has no impact on 
the production, there also is no direct impact on rate of depletion of the EU oil resources.  
Resources for the marginal increase in EU production of petroleum based products will be covered by 
trade diversion, also not affecting the EU resource stock and rate of depletion. 
 
INDICATOR: Rate of overall land use of biodiverse areas 
BASELINE 
Canada 
Oil sands are allegedly one of most important industrial undertakings in the world. The Athabasca oil 
sands deposit is situated wholly within Canada’s boreal forest, with the oil sands in Alberta covering 
140,000km2. As of June 2009, oil sands extraction leases cover 60% of this area. Mining uses 9.4 
hectares of land per million barrels, while in situ uses 1.4 hectares per million barrels. However, in situ 
operations create disturbances through seismic lines, roads, pipelines, power lines and well pads. 
Moreover, the land leased for in situ is 16 times larger than for mining oil sands. Fragmentation over 
such a large area could reduce the ecosystem functions of the boreal forest.366 An example of the 
disturbance to the ecosystem is the expected disappearance of caribou from North-eastern Alberta.367 
Land reclamation is promoted as only 1.04 km2 of 600km2 of land disturbed by oil sands mining has 
been certified by the government as being reclaimed. Mine operators state that an additional 54km2 
has been reclaimed, but there is a lack of public data to support this.368 Under current reclamation plans, 
a dramatically different landscape than the one that appeared before production began will appear. 
Wetlands will decrease 10%, more lakes will be created, and no peatlands will remain. Whether the 
proposed reclamation plans will succeed in their efforts is the subject of debate, as is the expectation 
that tailing ponds can be reclaimed into biologically productive lands. 369 
 
EU 
Specific data on the amount of land used for production of oil and of petroleum products in the EU is 
not available. 
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ANALYSIS 
Canada 
In terms of trade liberalisation, the results from the economic modelling suggest that the CETA’s impact 
on land use and biodiversity will be limited as it will not contribute to a significant increase in output. By 
increasing investment in the development of oil sands extraction facilities, however, it is possible that 
the CETA could contribute to greater expansion of the oil sands industry, but that expansion would 
continue to be concentrated in the existing area of industrial activity. The overall area is not expected to 
expand significantly, but the extension of the network of in situ extraction could contribute to further 
habitat fragmentation and eventually to the disappearance of vulnerable species such as the Caribou in 
Northern Alberta. While the impact of the CETA is expected to be minor, it could contribute to 
surpassing important habitat fragmentation thresholds for caribou and other species.  
 
EU 
Given that the CETA has no impact on the EU oil output, no impact on the oil industry’s use of biodiverse 
areas is expected. The marginal increase in EU production of petroleum based products could be 
absorbed by existing overcapacities in EU refineries, thus not requiring additional land resources either. 
 
Indicator: Water usage and quality / Contamination of water from chemicals and wastes / Rate of 
depletion of ground water 
BASELINE 
Canada 
Freshwater is needed during in situ extraction, which is the only way that 82% of Alberta established oil 
sands reserves can be extracted.370 As in situ oil extraction becomes more important, the freshwater 
needed to produce it will increase more than two-fold between 2004 and 2015, going from 5 million 
cubic litres to 13 million cubic litres. During steam assisted gravity drainage (SAGD), an oil recovery 
technology used to produce heavy crude oil and bitumen, 90 to 95% of the water used as steam is 
recycled. However, groundwater gets depleted. For every cubic metre of bitumen produced, 0.2 cubic 
metres of groundwater is extracted. In an effort to cut down on the amount of freshwater depleted 
from aquifers, SAGD projects combine freshwater from aquifers with saline groundwater. The downside 
of this approach is that large volume of solid waste is generated when treating saline groundwater. 
Release of contaminants, such as acids, hydrocarbon residues, trace metals and others, poses a threat to 
surrounding soil and groundwater when this waste ends up in landfills.371 
Oil sands mining uses significantly more water per barrel of oil extracted than in-situ oil sands. For every 
barrel of synthetic crude oil (SCO), it is necessary to use 2 to 4.5 barrels of freshwater. This water is 
mostly withdrawn from the Athabasca River. Licensing currently allows 370 million cubic metres of 
freshwater to be withdrawn from the Athabasca River. However, this figure should rise to 529 million 
cubic metres if currently planned oil sands mines are implemented. If all these planned oil sands 
operations go forward, the amount of freshwater requirements extracted could surpass what the 
Athabasca River flow can provide. If adequate river flows are not maintained, the ecological 
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sustainability of the river will be seriously hampered, especially during times of reduced precipitation. 372  
Oil sands tailings ponds are of significant concern. The surface area of these tailing ponds was 130 
square kilometres in 2009. The Energy Resources Conservation Board issued Directive 74, Tailing 
Performance Criteria and Requirements for Oil Sands Mining Schemes in February 2009, which calls for 
fluid tailings to be reduced, located in approved areas, and transformed into trafficable deposits. These 
trafficable deposits means that the areas must be firm enough to withstand heavy equipment.373  
The environmental impact on the Athabasca River has been significant. Tailing lakes endanger surface 
water and groundwater through seepage and cause mortality of waterfowl.374 Concerns are also 
increasingly expressed on the potential contamination of the Athabasca River and its impacts on 
downstream ecosystems and on the health of Mikisew Cree and Athabasca Dene First Nation 
communities.   
According to the National Pollutant Release Inventory, bitumen mines released most of Canada’s 
emissions of acenaphthene, a polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon, and their emissions of these toxic 
substances have increased 42% in 2009 since 2006. 375 Most of the PAC chemicals found are known for 
their embryotoxicity 376, as well as being carcinogenic, causing tumours in lungs, skin and the bladder.377 
Downstream residents in Fort Chipewyan are concerned that high cancer rates are the result of these 
pollutants.378 Moreover, a study by Environment Canada found that toxic mercury found in eggs of 
waterbirds downstream of oil sands has gone up close to 50% over the last three decades379.  
Arsenic and lead that ends up in tailing ponds has increased by 26% in four years according to new 
tailing data gathered by the National Pollutant Release Inventory in 2009. In 2009, 322 tonnes of arsenic 
were produced, 651 tonnes of lead, and quantities of mercury, chromium, vanadium, hydrogen sulphide 
and cadmium. Oil sands caused 10% of total substances released in tailing, contributing a little less than 
50,000 tonnes of substances. 380  
Groundwater is also impacted from oil sands. It is used in combination to Athabasca River water in the in 
situ and mining processes in rising quantities. Groundwater levels must also be reduced to prevent 
flooding of mine pits. This can reduce groundwater levels from larger areas, and have impacts on nearby 
peatlands, wetlands and other aquatic ecosystems.381 This is also a source of concern in the context of 
the expansion of oil sands production. 
 
EU 
Table 34 shows the amounts of major pollutants released into water by the EU oil production and 
refineries sector. 
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Table 34: Release of major pollutants into water by the EU oil extraction and refineries sector, 2008 382 
 Extraction of 
crude petroleum 
Manufacture of 
refined petroleum 
products 
Chlorinated organic substances    
Halogenated organic compounds (as 
AOX) 
5.13 t 12.8 t 
Heavy metals    
Arsenic and compounds (as As) 4.18 t 1.08 t 
Cadmium and compounds (as Cd) 969 kg 301 kg 
Chromium and compounds (as Cr) 1.34 t 4.23 t 
Copper and compounds (as Cu) 22.2 t 1.67 t 
Mercury and compounds (as Hg) 59.6 kg 260 kg 
Nickel and compounds (as Ni) 1.81 t 3.87 t 
Lead and compounds (as Pb) 2.45 t 1.45 t 
Zinc and compounds (as Zn) 21.2 t 16.3 t 
Inorganic substances   
Chlorides (as total Cl) - 143,750 t 
Fluorides (as total F) - 199 t 
Total nitrogen - 2,348 t 
Total phosphorus - 96.5 t 
Other organic substances   
Anthracene 150 kg 1.10 kg 
Benzene 1,747 t 3.11 t 
Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 23.7 kg  
Ethyl benzene 86.4 t 275 kg 
Fluoranthene 118 kg 9.44 kg 
Naphthalene 185 t 97.7 kg 
Phenols (as total C) 593 t 66.5 t 
Polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons 
(PAHs) 
79.0 kg 703 kg 
Toluene 1,199 t 1.72 t 
Xylenes 231 t 2.46 t 
 
ANALYSIS 
Canada 
As the current CGE analysis predicts a negligible increase of overall output from trade liberalisation, the 
CETA is unlikely to affect rates of water depletion. The impact of investment liberalisation in the 
development of oil sands extraction facilities, however, could cause the CETA to contribute to water 
withdrawals, groundwater depletion and freshwater contamination, especially in the Athabasca basin 
which is currently under stress. As mentioned before, world demand and world prices will remain the 
key determinant of oil sands development.  
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An independent review panel set up by Canada’s federal minister of the environment concluded in 
December of 2010 that the current water monitoring systems in the oil sand industry had major flaws. 
The panel report says that the Regional Aquatics Monitoring Program (RAMP) was ‘not producing world-
class scientific output in a transparent, peer-reviewed format and it is not adequately communicating its 
results to the scientific community or the public’.383 Commenting on this report, Canada’s minister of 
environment said that such a world-class monitoring system was urgently needed. Its implementation 
could result in diminished pressure from oil sand development on freshwater resources.  
 
EU 
Given that the CETA has no impact on the EU oil output, no impact on the oil industry’s use of water, 
water contamination pattern, or ground water depletion is expected. 
Oil and gas refineries already release marginal amounts of pollutants and will absorb the predicted 
limited increase in output with existing capacities, therefore it is expected that a CETA will have 
insignificant impact on use of water, water contamination pattern, or ground water depletion from 
these activities. 
 
INDICATOR: Environmental quality Air pollution / GHG emissions 
BASELINE 
Canada 
Energy industries account for 25% of GHG emissions in Canada (187 Mt CO2e). Moreover, they release 
70,658 tonnes of VOCs (volatile organic compounds) and 111,661 tonnes of sulphur dioxide into the air, 
among other emissions. 384 
Fossil fuel industries, including petroleum refining (up 3.9% from 1990 to 2008) and upgrading and fossil 
fuel production (up 45% from 1990 to 2008) emitted 68Mt of CO2e in 2008, compared to 52 Mt CO2e in 
1990. Mining and oil and gas extraction produced 23900kt of CO2e, fugitive sources from coal mining 
produced 800 kt of CO2e and from oil produced 5520 kt of CO2e in 2008. Emissions associated with 
gross exports of crude oil are 4008Mt of CO2e, up 16% from 1990. However, emissions from 
unconventional crude oil associated with gross exports were 33 kt of CO2e in 2008, up 248% since 
1990.385 
In terms of energy usage, petroleum and coal product manufacturing used 382 PJ of energy in 2007, this 
is 16% of the energy consumption of the manufacturing sector (third biggest). This is 30% more energy 
than in 1995.386 21,454 million kwh were consumed by crude petroleum fields and 8112 million kwh by 
petroleum refineries in 2007.387  
From 1990 to 2008, emissions stemming from oil sands increased more than two-fold. On current 
projections, GHG emissions will triple from 2008 to 2020. Oil sands related emissions represent 
approximately 5% of Canada’s total greenhouse gas emissions. There has been improvement in GHG 
emissions intensity in the past, as the operations moved from coal and petroleum coke to natural gas to 
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run their operations. Since then however, progress in emissions intensity has stagnated.388 
 
EU 
Table 35 shows the GHG emissions and air pollution caused by the EU oil production and refineries 
sector. 
 
Table 35: GHG emissions and air pollution for the EU oil extraction and refineries sector, 2008389 
 Extraction of 
crude 
petroleum 
Manufacture of 
refined 
petroleum 
products 
Greenhouse gases 14,906,990 t 209,202,491 t 
Methane (CH4) 54,235 t 7,767 t 
Carbon dioxide (CO2) 14,852,000 t 192,797,300 t 
Carbon dioxide (CO2) excluding biomass - 16,395,000 
Hydro-fluorocarbons (HFCs) 735 kg 121 kg 
Nitrous oxide (N2O) 754 t 2,424 t 
Other gases 94,213 t 831,585 t 
Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) 1.00 kg 62.5 kg 
Chlorine and inorganic compounds (as HCl) - 140 t 
Carbon monoxide (CO) 4,234 t 80,170 t 
Halons 640 kg - 
Hydrochlorofluorocarbons(HCFCs) 38.7 t 29.3 t 
Hydrogen cyanide (HCN) - 2.01 t 
Ammonia (NH3) 101 t 1,022 t 
Non-methane volatile organic compounds 
(NMVOC) 
37,244 t 147,910 t 
Nitrogen oxides (NOx/NO2) 50,798 t 156,549 t 
Sulphur oxides (SOx/SO2) 1,797 t 445,763 t 
 
The CO2 allowances of the petroleum refining sector decreased further by 10% between the first and 
the second EU ETS trading phase (from 2298 to 2081 Mio. t of CO2 equivalent per year).390 
 
ANALYSIS 
Canada 
The impact of trade liberalisation arising from the CETA is estimated to have a neutral impact on GHG 
emissions by contributing in a negligible way to a further increase of oil production in Canada. Increases 
in investment in the development of oil sands extraction facilities, however, could lead the CETA to 
contribute more significantly to the further expansion of the oil sands industry, thereby contributing to a 
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rise in GHG emissions in Canada. This could be offset by the introduction of more energy efficient 
technologies or processes. Canada’s GHG emissions reduction target is 17 percent below 2005 levels by 
2020.391 However, in absence of a concrete plan to reach that target, growth in the oil sands industry is 
likely to set Canada off target. Canada’s greenhouse gas emissions were 24% above 1990 levels in 2008. 
Although they constitute just about 2% of Canada’s GHG emissions, Oil sands emissions are rising 
steadily and are responsible for a significant portion Canada’s growing emissions. Mandatory carbon 
pricing mechanisms would significantly slow down this growth in emissions, should they be introduced 
in Canada.   
 
EU 
Given that the CETA has no impact on the EU oil output, no impact on the oil industry’s GHG emissions 
or air pollution pattern is expected. 
However, a marginal increase in the EU refinery output will increase the subsector’s GHG emissions 
correspondingly. 
The E3MG modelling does not provide sector specific results for this sector. 
 
INDICATOR: Other wastes (outside hazardous waste) output / Rate of other waste output  
BASELINE 
Canada 
One of the most important by-products of oil sands production is elemental sulphur. Its stockpiling is a 
challenge and by 2015 it is expected that sulphur recovery could create 5 million tonnes of residue a 
year. Companies have started marketing sulphur to external markets, such as China and India, as an 
alternative to burning pyrite in the production of fertiliser. In fact, China has already begun converting 
its fertiliser plants to use Canadian sulphur. Using this process instead of burning pyrite to extract the 
sulphur is estimated to have avoided the emission of 250,000 tonnes of CO2.  Sulphur can also be used 
in road asphalt and concrete.392  
 
EU 
The magnitude of waste transfers from petroleum extraction is higher than from refining, but the 
refining waste potentially causes higher environmental impact due to being mostly hazardous and non-
recoverable (Tables 36 and 37). 
 
Table 36: EU waste transfers from oil extraction of crude petroleum, 2008393 
 Recovery Disposal Total quantity 
Non hazardous 643,076 t (41.7%) 899,748 t (58.3%) 1,542,824 t 
Hazardous 440,799 t (29.0%) 1,076,737 t (71.0%) 1,517,536 t 
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Table 37: EU waste transfers from manufacture of refined petroleum products, 2008394 
 Recovery Disposal Total quantity 
Non hazardous 688,610 t (92.1%) 59,191 t (7.9%) 747,801 t 
Hazardous 9,391 t (16.8%) 46,367 t (83.2%) 55,758 t 
 
ANALYSIS 
Canada 
CETA impacts on the oil sands sulphur waste output is expected to be neutral or marginal. 
 
EU 
Given that the CETA has no impact on the EU oil output, no impact on the oil industry’s waste transfers 
is expected. 
The minor increase in the EU refinery output will marginally increase the subsector’s hazardous waste 
transfers.  
 
INDICATOR: Environmental policy space 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Canada & EU 
The environmental implications of trade and investment liberalisation have been discussed widely,395 
and the evidence suggests that trade agreements can limit policy space or open new common policy 
arenas, e.g. for introducing more stringent environmental regulation.396 Within the context of the CETA, 
this issue is addressed in other parts of the report (see specifically the section on Investment and 
investor-to-state disputes below). 
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5.1.3. Coal 
 
ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT397 
 
INDICATOR: Output, trade & investment 
BASELINE 
Canada has abundant coal resources, with the primary sources being the western provinces of Alberta, 
British Columbia and Saskatchewan which combined account for 99.8% of the 69,365 kilotonnes 
produced nationwide in 2007.398 Recoverable reserves are currently estimated at 6.6 billion tonnes, 
providing supply capable of meeting current production rates for a period of 100 years.399 Canada’s 
current production is sufficient to meet domestic demand resulting in Canada being an overall net 
exporter of coal, with exports of coal, coke and briquettes reaching $3.06 billion in 2007 and a trade 
surplus of $1.91 billion.400  
In 2007, the EU produced 154.8 million tonnes of coal, with the major producing Member States being 
Poland, Germany, the UK, the Czech Republic, Spain and Romania.401 However, as the EU relies on coal 
to meet approximately one-third of its energy needs, it is heavily reliant on imports. The EU coal 
industry has been in decline for decades and this trend is estimated to continue over the foreseeable 
future as Europe moves increasingly towards cleaner forms of fuel and with subsidies for the domestic 
industry set to begin being phased out in 2014.  
As a major importer of coal products, the EU accounts for a sizeable share of Canada’s exports of coal 
(29.9% by value in 2007). In total, the EU had a trade deficit in coal trade of $19.32 billion in 2007 with 
Canada providing 4.6% of the value of all EU imports.402 
Investment in coal makes up a minor share of total outward investment for both Canada and the EU, 
where it accounted for 2.2% and 0.76%, respectively, of all FDI stocks abroad in 2007.403 Understandably 
then, the coal industry is a minor recipient of bilateral FDI.   
 
ANALYSIS 
Canada 
Results from the CGE model suggest that full removal of tariffs under the CETA will have a negligible 
economic impact over the long-term. This is unsurprising given the low applied MFN tariffs already in 
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place in the EU on coal products (coal, briquettes, ovoids and similar solid fuels manufactured from coal 
can be imported duty free).  
The CETA’s impact on output and trade in Canada’s coal sector is therefore likely to arise from 
investment liberalisation. Hereto, gravity model results suggest that reducing Canada’s restrictiveness 
toward foreign investment (as measured by the OECD) is likely to have a positive impact on investment 
in the coal sector. However, the coal sector is not subject to overt limitations on foreign investment, 
making it likely that the CETA would be limited to affording national treatment to EU investors and 
allowing them to forego being subjected to Canada’s net benefit test. While this may stimulate 
increased investment in Canada’s coal sector, it is not expected that the increase would be pronounced, 
particularly given that the sector serves a minor role in EU outward FDI both in Canada and worldwide.   
 
EU 
The CETA is expected to have a negligible impact on coal production within the EU under all 
liberalisation scenarios, with demand continuing to be met largely by imports. A number of factors 
outside of the CGE model present the possibility, however, that output in the EU may decrease more 
than suggested. An end to subsidies for the industry, which are set to be phased out starting in 2014, 
will likely expedite the closure of mines, many of which are finding it increasingly difficult to continue 
operation without state funding. Further, movements away from fossil fuels such as coal are likely to 
place downward pressure on demand in the EU, further reducing output.   
 
INDICATOR: Employment 
BASELINE  
In 2008, coal was a direct employer of more than 6,000 people in Canada.404 The majority of coal mines 
are in Western Canada with 10 in British Columbia, 9 in Alberta, 3 in Saskatchewan and 1 each in New 
Brunswick and Nova Scotia. It is therefore, expected that changes in employment would be 
concentrated in these areas – particularly the 3 Western Provinces.   
 
ANALYSIS 
Canada 
Overall, it is not expected that the CETA will stimulate significant changes in the demand for labour in 
Canada’s coal sector. These limited expected percentage changes in employment coupled with the small 
amount of people directly employed in the industry limits the overall impact.   
 
EU 
Employment in the EU’s coal sector is not likely to be impacted to any significant degree regardless of 
the level of liberalisation.   
 
 
                                                             
404 Natural Resources Canada (2008) 
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SOCIAL ASSESSMENT 
 
INDICATOR: Worker displacement  
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Canada 
As discussed in the economic assessment, output and employment in Canada’s coal sector is expected 
to exhibit minor declines across all of the liberalisation scenarios modelled. Given direct employment of 
only 6,000 in Canada’s coal sector as well as projected declines ranging from -0.07% to -0.22%, it should 
not be envisaged that any noticeable amount of displacement will occur as a result of the CETA.  
 
EU 
Based on the small and decreasing level of employment in the EU’s coal sector as well as the expected 
neutral effect of the CETA, it is not envisaged that the indicators in this section will be significantly 
impacted.  
 
INDICATOR: Quality & decency of work 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Canada 
With the economic impact of the CETA expected to be minor, it is not envisaged that quality and 
decency of work will be significantly impacted over the long-term. Collective bargaining and the rights of 
association could, however, be strengthened by the CETA’s ability to reaffirm the ILO’s core labour 
standards (CLS) and under provisions that require Canada to ratify the ILO’s Right to Organise and 
Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949  (C.98). For detailed discussion on the social ramifications of the 
CETA as it pertains to core labour standards and the ILO’s Decent Work Agenda see Box 14 in the social 
assessment of the mining and metal manufacturing section.  
 
EU 
Based on the small and decreasing level of employment in the EU’s coal sector as well as the expected 
neutral effect of the CETA, it is not envisaged that quality and decency of work will be significantly 
impacted. Labour standards could be positively impacted with the inclusion in the CETA of a chapter on 
trade and labour that makes mutual commitments to foster better implementation and ratification of 
ILO Core Labour Standards (See Box 14). 
 
INDICATOR: Health, education & culture 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Canada & EU 
The expected impact on health is expected to be minor. Although both Canada and the EU maintain high 
levels of safety in their mining injuries, a mechanism within the CETA’s chapter on trade and labour that 
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fosters regular dialogue and cooperation between Canada and the EU could include commitments to 
and exchanges on reducing occupational injuries, perhaps fostering improved safety over the long-term 
(See Box 14 for more discussion). 
 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 
 
INDICATOR: Air quality – GHG emissions 
BASELINE 
The coal industry emits particulate matter (PM), sulphur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx), mercury 
and greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide (CO2).405 The emissions of SO2 are a major contributor to acid 
rain, though the low sulphur coal mined in Alberta and B.C. emits less SO2. Technological developments 
such as scrubbers in furnace stacks act to limit the amount of sulphur released into the atmosphere.406  
Fugitive GHG emissions, created during coal mining and handling, decreased by 1.2Mt from 2Mt 
between 1990 and 2008.  Most of the emissions from coal come from combustion for power generation. 
Between 2003 and 2008, GHG emissions from electricity production dropped by 16Mt, largely the result 
of a decrease in reliance on coal plants for energy production. For example, between 2007 and 2008, 
coal fired electricity dropped 18% in Ontario.407 In 2008, electricity and heat generation released 
335,000ktCO2e. The National Inventory Report does not distinguish how much of this came from the 
combustion of coal.408   
During the mining process, methane is released into the atmosphere. In 2008, 800KtCO2e of methane 
were released from coal mining.409 The rest of the process involved in bringing coal to production – from 
preparation, transportation, storage and processing – all emit methane emissions as well.  
Canadian policies are moving towards the reduction in reliance on coal power largely as a result of its 
harmful environmental impact. The Ontario government, for example, is working on its policy target of 
fully phasing out coal power by 2014.  Table 38 shows the GHG emissions and air pollution caused by the 
EU coal sector. Hard coal production accounts for only 26% of the coal mining sector’s CO2 emissions, 
while 74% arise from lignite mining. 
 
Table 38: GHG emissions and air pollution for the EU coal sector, 2008410 
Greenhouse gases 11,796,313 t 
Methane (CH4) 731,312 t 
Carbon dioxide (CO2) 11,065,000 t 
Hydro-fluorocarbons (HFCs) 1.14 t 
Other gases 63,500 t 
Chlorine and inorganic compounds (as HCl) 412 t 
                                                             
405 Environment Canada (2010a) 
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407 Environment Canada (2010b) 
408 Ibid. 
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Carbon monoxide (CO) 585 t 
Hydrochlorofluorocarbons(HCFCs) 6.79 t 
Non-methane volatile organic compounds 
(NMVOC) 
10,034 t 
Nitrogen oxides (NOx/NO2) 26,231 t 
Sulphur oxides (SOx/SO2) 26,231 t 
 
INDICATOR: Water usage and quality 
BASELINE 
During the combustion of coal, wet scrubbers are often used to reduce emissions of air pollutants. 
However, these wet scrubbers require large amounts of water, resulting in the creation of wastewater. 
Conversely, when wet scrubbers are not used, the rise in emissions creates long-range dispersal of acidic 
air pollutants and mercury that eventually find their way to surface and groundwater. Coal fired facilities 
also create wastewater effluents from drainage and storm-water runoff which makes its way through 
the plant site and ash landfill. These polluted waters are generally treated on-site at wastewater 
treatment facilities.411 The main water pollutants released by the EU hard coal mining sector are 
chlorides (1,617,110 t in 2008), organic carbon (1,010 t) and relatively small amounts of heavy metals 
(40 t of zinc, 3.8 t of chromium, 2.2 t of copper, 1.8 t of lead, 1.7 t of arsenic). 412 
 
INDICATOR: Natural resource stocks – resource usage 
BASELINE 
Canada accounts for approximately 193 billion tonnes of the world’s coal resources of which significant 
amounts (6.6 billion tonnes) are proven to be recoverable coal reserves that will provide for more than 
100 years of production at the current production rate. Most large-scale coal mines are located in 
western Canada. In 2007 Canada produced 69.1 million tonnes of coal and 68.1 million tonnes in 2008. 
Of the total coal production, 26.7 million tonnes was metallurgical coal for export, about 5.6 million 
tonnes was bituminous thermal coal for export and 36.5 million tonnes was thermal coal for domestic 
coal-fired power generation use.413The EU has significant coal reserves (about 4.4% of the proven 
worldwide reserves). The largest hard coal reserves are located in Poland, with significant reserves also 
available in Czech Republic, United Kingdom, Germany and Spain.414 Lignite (brown coal) reserves are 
located mostly in Germany. Over 97% of German coal resources are lignite, making it one of the world’s 
largest lignite producers (20% of global output). In terms of production, Europe (without the former 
Soviet Union) presently accounts for about 315 Mtce coal output representing 12% of the world's total 
annual output (2550 Mtce). Germany and Poland are by far the largest coal producers in the EU as 
together they account for about two-thirds of all coal presently produced in the EU.415  
 
 
 
                                                             
411 Natural Round Table on the Environment and the Economy (2010a)  
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413 Coal Industry Advisory Board (2010).  
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INDICATOR: Wastes 
BASELINE 
In order to reduce the quantity of suspended particulate matter, known as fly ash, released into the air, 
coal mine technologies use electrostatic precipitators to contain and collect this waste matter. It can be 
used as backfill in the course of mining operations, and can be used as an add-in in concrete production. 
Some is placed in dumping sites. The heavier bottom ash, which is found at the bottom of the coal 
furnaces, is brought to landfill sites that have been designed to reduce the leaching of pollutants.416The 
EU coal mining sector produces large amounts of waste (Table 39). However, this waste is comprised 
mostly of materials that must be removed in order to extract the coal resource (such as topsoil, 
overburden and waste rock). This waste is mostly inert, causing no environmental hazard. Furthermore, 
as 95% of non hazardous waste is recovered, it causes little concern in terms of land required for 
disposal.. 
 
Table 39: EU waste transfers from Mining of hard coal, 2008417 
 Recovery Disposal Total quantity 
Non hazardous 20,968,281 t (95.0%) 1,098,030 t (5.0%) 22,066,311 t 
Hazardous 24,341 t (57.2%) 18,218 t (42.8%) 42,559 t 
 
 
INDICATOR: Land usage and quality 
BASELINE 
The clearing and excavating of land undertaken in coal mining disrupts the landscape of large swaths of 
land, reducing its capacity for biodiversity. Surface mines in particular are responsible for environmental 
damage on this front.418 There are efforts by various companies in the industry to reclaim these 
disturbed lands.419Land use in coal mining in the EU originates mostly from open cast lignite mining, 
predominantly in Germany. For example, in the “Rheinische Revier”, the most important German lignite 
mining area, 300 km2 were consumed since the beginning of industrial mining in the 19th century until 
2009. Over 69% of this area has been recultivated as natural areas, water bodies or for agricultural or 
leisure use. The remaining 31% (93 km2) still used for open cast lignite mining comprise pits, dump sites 
and storage areas420. 
 
ANALYSIS (for all relevant indicators) 
As the CGE model suggests that high levels of liberalisation under the CETA would have very limited 
effects on this sub-sector, the environmental impacts of coal from the CETA would also be minimal. 
Moreover, many of the environmental impacts associated with coal come from its combustion, the 
impacts of which occur in the country of power production (other than GHG emissions, the impacts of 
                                                             
416 Environment Canada (2010a) 
417 European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register 
418 Coal. Environment Canada. 2010. http://www.ec.gc.ca/energie-energy/default.asp?lang=En&n=21FAF93C-1 
419 Ibid.  
420 DEBRIV (2010), 125 Jahre DEBRIV – Braunkohle im Zeitraum 1985-2010, p. 88. 
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which are global because of their role in climate change). As Europe works to meet its climate change 
targets of 20% reduction in GHG emissions by 2020 compared to 1990 levels, they will rely less on coal 
as a power source. This policy could potentially further reduce its import of coal from Canada.  
Given that the CETA is expected to have a marginal impact on EU coal output, the associated 
environmental impact will also likely be limited on the EU. Based on present CGE model results, the 
CETA would lead to almost no changes in the EU coal sector’s GHG emissions and emission of water 
pollutants, while not being expected to contribute to the depletion rate of EU coal resources, the 
sector’s waste output or land use.  
Investment liberalisation could potentially raise EU investment in Canada’s coal sector over the long 
term. Where these investments increase output, the environmental impacts from coal, including 
polluted wastewater, land destruction from surface mining, and fugitive emissions, would rise. The 
E3MG model predicts a rise of 0.43-0.46% of SO2, a rise of 0.61-0.72% in NOx, a rise of 0.75-0.76% in 
methane, of which coal industry could be a contributing sector. CO2 emissions from power generation, 
of which coal could be a component, are expected to rise 0.37% under less ambitious liberalisation and 
0.33% under more ambitious liberalisation. Overall, the investment impact is not expected to be 
significant give coal’s minor role in global investments.  
 
5.1.4. Forest-Based Industries 
 
ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT421 
 
INDICATOR: Output, trade & investment 
BASELINE 
As the world’s second largest country in terms of size, Canada has an abundance of forested land. Its 
294.84 million hectares (MHa) of non-reserve forest land represents 45.4% of Canada’s total landmass 
and accounts for 10% of the world’s forest cover and 30% of its boreal forest.422  At the provincial level, 
Quebec, British Columbia and Ontario serve as the largest sources of forestry in Canada. In 2007, 
Canada’s forest-based industries accounted for $63.86 billion in revenue.423 Within this, pulp and paper 
manufacturing accounted for 43.4%, while wood product manufacturing and forestry and logging 
contributed 39.1% and 17.5%, respectively.424 
The EU, for its part, has approximately 177 MHa of forest and wooded land, occupying 44% of its surface 
and representing 5% of the world’s forests.425 In 2007, The EU’s wood product manufacturing industry 
generated approximately $240 billion in turnover.426 In both the pulp and paper and paper product 
                                                             
421 Specifically, results for the forest-based industries are reported according to the groupings of the GTAP model which divides 
the industry across forestry, logging and related services (Forestry), wood and wood product manufacturing, and paper and 
paper products. The results of the simulations can be found in Tables 65-72 in Annex 6.  
422 Statistics Canada; National Forestry Database; Natural Resources Canada 
423 Statistics Canada 
424 Natural Resources Canada 
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manufacturing sectors, the EU provides a significant portion of the world output as in 2007 it accounted 
for 21.3% of global production in the former and was the world’s largest manufacturer of the latter (26% 
of world output).427  
Its abundance of forested land has allowed Canada to establish itself as the world’s largest exporter of 
forest-based products with exports of $31.4 billion in 2007 and a trade surplus of $22 billion.428 Major 
export products include paper products excluding newsprint (26.8% of total forest-based exports), wood 
pulp (21.2%), softwood lumber (21.1%) and newsprint (11.9%).429 The EU, conversely, is a net importer 
of forest-based products and in 2007 had a trade deficit of $707 million. Approximately 90% of the wood 
needed in manufacturing is sourced from sustainable forests within the EU, with the remaining 10% 
acquired through imports, primarily from Russia and North America.430  
In terms of bilateral trade with Canada, however, the EU operated a trade surplus of $71 million in 2007, 
predominantly in paper and paper products.431 For Canada, the EU remains an important destination for 
exports of forest-based products, serving as the second largest destination after the United States and 
accounting for 6.4% of Canadian forestry exports in 2007.432   
Overall, the forest-based industries serve as a minor recipient of EU and Canada outward FDI. In 2007, 
for example, forest-based industries accounted for only 2.1% and 0.63% of all FDI stocks abroad for 
Canada and the EU, respectively. These trends extend to bilateral investment, as outward FDI in 
Canada’s forest based industries by the EU in 2005 (and vice versa for 2007) accounted for less than 
0.4% (3.5%) of total FDI stocks.433 
 
ANALYSIS 
Modelling results suggest that the CETA will have a limited negative impact on Canada’s forest-based 
industries. Specifically, the CGE model’s simulations estimating a complete cut in tariffs suggest that 
output and overall exports in the forest-based industries would be expected to decline by a minor 
amount under the CETA, as expansion in other industries stimulates a minor movement of resources 
into other sectors (See Tables 65-72 in Annex 6). These declines become exacerbated in the scenarios 
that maintain existing tariffs on certain sectors (A and B). The absence of gains from cuts in tariffs is 
unsurprising given the low or non-existent duties on a number of forestry, wood and paper products in 
the EU.  
Similar to Canada, the EU is expected to see limited changes in output and exports as a result of tariff 
liberalisation under the CETA, with the absence of duties on many forestry, wood and paper products in 
Canada limiting the potential gains for the EU. 
Instead, the ability of the CETA to directly affect output and trade within Canada’s forest-based 
industries is more likely to occur through investment liberalisation. Although data limitations have made 
it impossible for the modelling framework to quantitatively reflect the precise impact that investment 
liberalisation is likely to have on Canada’s forest-based industries,  results from the gravity modelling 
suggest that a reduction in investment restrictiveness (as measured by the OECD) is likely to have a 
positive impact on investment in Canada’s manufacturing sector. At the same time, it should not 
                                                             
427 DG Enterprise 
428 Natural Resources Canada 
429 Ibid. 
430 DG Enterprise.  
431 UN Comtrade 
432 Natural Resources Canada 
433 Eurostat (2008); OECD.stat 
EU-Canada SIA Final Report 
170 
 
necessarily be assumed that the CETA’s provisions on investment will lead to significant increases in EU 
investment in Canada’s forest-based industries. To begin with, overt restrictions are limited and while 
the CETA could extend national treatment to EU investors, the investment-inducing effect of this may be 
limited since it may only serve to eliminate net benefit tests. Further, as noted in the baseline, the 
forest-based industries make up a very minor portion of EU investment both worldwide and in Canada. 
Finally, EU investment in forest-based industries has in recent years shifted towards Latin America and 
while it is possible that the CETA could stimulate some increase in investment towards Canada, it should 
not be expected that it could easily reverse the role Latin America now plays for EU investment in the 
sector.  
 
INDICATOR: Employment  
BASELINE 
Canada’s forest-based industries directly employed 217,900 people in 2008, representing 1.6% of total 
employment (Table 40). While employment in the industry occurs in most provinces and territories, the 
majority of jobs are concentrated in Quebec, British Columbia and Ontario. Over the past several 
decades, employment in the sector has decreased, with the greatest percentage losses occurring in 
paper and paper product manufacturing which has seen employment decrease by almost 30% since 
1998.  
 
Table 4-: Employment in Canada and the EU’s forest-based industries, 2008 
Sector Canada  EU 
Wood product manufacturing 110,300 1,270,000 
Paper manufacturing 73,600 715,000 
Logging 34,000 490,000 
Source: Natural Resources Canada; DG Enterprise 
 
Employment in the EU’s forest-based industries in 2008 was approximately 2.5 million. Within this, 
wood and wood product manufacturing serves as the single largest employer, followed by paper 
manufacturing and logging. Low-skilled workers make up a significant portion of the EU’s workforce in 
both logging and wood manufacturing.   
 
ANALYSIS 
Canada 
According to the modelling results, employment in Canada’s forest-based industries is expected to 
experience limited declines across all sectors and skill levels as a result of liberalisation in the CETA. 
These declines are generally exacerbated under an Agreement that provides greater liberalisation in the 
services sector and that limits tariff liberalisation on all sectors, suggesting the declines are a result of 
employment and resources shifting toward expanding industries. Greater levels of investment 
liberalisation could serve to mitigate against potential movement of employment out the sector, 
however, limiting the potential impact on employment associated with the CETA.  
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EU 
Results from the CGE model suggest that employment in the EU’s forest-based industries will not be 
impacted by the CETA.  
 
SOCIAL ASSESSMENT 
 
INDICATOR: Worker displacement  
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Canada 
The economic assessment estimates that the CETA will lead to limited decreases in employment in 
Canada’s forestry and logging, wood and wood product and paper and paper products sectors over the 
long-term, with more workers expected to be affected under a CETA that achieves greater liberalisation 
in the services sector and that maintains sensitivities in certain goods-producing sectors.  
Across the forest-based industries in 2008, 34,000 were employed in forestry in logging with a further 
110,000 and 74,000, respectively, in the manufacturing of wood and wood products and paper and 
paper products.434 Therefore, with estimated decreases in employment in these sectors of as much as 
0.65%, -0.96% and -0.55%, respectively, it is not expected that the impact on displacement will be 
pronounced. Nevertheless, a number of workers could find themselves affected over the short- to 
medium-term, specifically in the wood manufacturing sector, with those potentially displaced facing 
adjustment costs as they search for alternative employment or cycle out of the labour force. Any 
displacement that were to arise – while likely minimal – would likely be concentrated in rural areas 
where the forest-based industries remain an important source of employment and economic activity 
and which are typically characterised by limited industrial diversity. Nevertheless, estimated declines in 
labour of at most -0.96% over the long-term (10 years after completion of the agreement) would imply a 
negligible impact as a result of the CETA.  
 
EU 
It is not expected that the CETA will lead to worker displacement within the EU’s forest-based industries. 
 
INDICATOR: Quality & decency of work 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Canada 
The forest-based industries are characterised by a high degree of seasonality, particularly in forestry and 
logging, resulting in temporary separation between employer and employee and creating instability in 
income. To this end, movement into other areas may lend itself to greater income stability, especially 
insofar as newly acquired positions are permanent.  
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Labour standards could be strengthened under the CETA over the long-term, particularly to the degree 
that the CETA is able to improve the implementation and ratification of the ILO’s Core Labour Standards 
(CLS). Hereto, Canadian employees could have their rights of association and collective bargaining 
strengthened by the ratification in Canada of the ILO’s Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining 
Convention, 1949 (C.98). For detailed discussion on the social ramifications of the CETA as it pertains to 
core labour standards and the ILO’s Decent Work Agenda see Box 14 in the social assessment on mining 
and metal manufacturing.  
 
EU 
The CETA could contribute to improved labour standards with the inclusion of a chapter on trade and 
labour that makes commitments to better implementation of the ILO’s Core Labour Standards and 
Decent Work Agenda (See Box 14).  
 
INDICATOR: Health, education & culture 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Canada 
As forest-based industries have higher rates of work-related fatalities and injuries, movement into other 
sectors is likely to produce positive health benefits.435  Further, a mechanism that fosters regular 
dialogue and cooperation between Canada and the EU could include commitments to and exchanges on 
reducing occupational injuries, perhaps fostering improved safety over the long-term (See Box 14 for 
more discussion). 
In terms of education, positive impacts may occur in several respects. First, workers transitioning into 
other sectors are likely to need to undertake additional education or training, increasing their 
educational attainment. Second, a study by Natural Resources Canada found that rural areas in Canada 
that are reliant on forest-based industries tend to have lower levels of education than other rural areas. 
Where these areas are particularly affected, its residents are likely to find additional incentive to attain 
higher levels of education.436  
Overall, the impact on culture in Canada is expected to be negligible. Minor impacts may occur in rural 
areas that have historically been reliant on the forest-based industries. As decreases in employment 
could potentially result in migration to other areas there could be a disruption of social relations in 
affected areas.  
 
EU 
While generally lower than in other countries, workers in the EU’s forest-based industries are still 
subject to a series of health risks including work-related injuries and exposure to excessive amounts of 
wood dust and adhesive constituents that may act as carcinogens under certain conditions.437  Greater 
dialogue and cooperation between Canada and the EU, if promoted under the CETA’s trade and labour 
chapter, could help improve the sharing of knowledge of best-practices to avoid occupational injuries 
encountered in the sector.  
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ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 
 
INDICATOR: Rate of depletion of forested land 
BASELINE 
Canada 
As of March 2006, Canada had 6.84% protected forest area according to UN reports. About 19% of 
productive forest land is under policy constraint where it either cannot be harvested or is subject to 
legislative guidelines.438 With respect to forestry, it is notable that Canada has already implemented an 
ambitious sustainability agenda with legislation mandating that all harvested forestland must be 
successfully regenerated. 8% of Canada’s forest is already under protection and 40% subject to various 
levels of protection through integrated land-use planning or defined management. Overall, less than 1% 
of Canada’s forests are harvested annually.439 About 72% of harvested land owned by the Crown is 
regenerated through use of tree planting and direct seeding. The rest is regenerated naturally.440 
Deforestation rates dropped from 68,000 hectares in 1990 to 45,000 hectares in 2008. Agriculture was 
the primary cause of deforestation, responsible for 24.6 thousand hectares, followed by industry and 
transportation (9.7 thousand hectares), municipal development (4.9 thousand hectares) and forestry 
(4.7 thousand hectares).441 
 
EU 
In 2000 29.7% (1,608,475 km2) of the EU land surface was covered by forests, in 2006 the forest cover 
had decreased to 29.2% (1,586,121 km2), a loss of 22,354km2 or 1.4%.442 
 
ANALYSIS 
Canada 
Under the trade liberalisation scenarios modelled in the economic assessment, the CETA is expected to 
result in a marginal decline in the forestry and logging sector, thereby potentially reducing harvests and 
depletion rates. Overall, whereas the CETA does not undermine the sustainability goals already in place 
in Canada, it is likely that the environmental impact will not be significant.  
 
EU 
The CGE model suggests that a CETA will lead to minor increases in the output of all forest-based 
products in the EU, which consequently will lead to a minor increase in the area to be harvested. This 
increase will likely have a limited impact on the stock and depletion rate of forested land. 
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INDICATOR: Rate of overall land use of biodiverse areas / Number of threatened/endangered 
species/rate of change of this number 
BASELINE 
Canada 
Canada has 340 forest associated species at risk, which accounts for 55% of the COSEWIC listed 
species443, including the woodland caribou, wild ginseng, and various reptile species.444 The primary 
causes of their decline are habitat loss, climate change, predation, competition and invasive species.445 
152 species saw no change from 1999-2010, 65 were moved to a highest risk category, 6 to a lower risk 
category, and 117 were newly assessed.446 Woodland caribou are decreasing, as are American marten 
and this is seen as a sign of poor landscape connectivity in the boreal forest.  
Canada has 58 native tree species that are in need of protection, and conservation plans have been 
enacted for these.447 Plant species represent 36% of forest associates species at risk. There are 53 forest 
associated fish species at risk, of which 32% are under endangered designation.448 There are 8 forest 
associated arthropods at risk, and nine molluscs. The state of forest associated species at risk has 
deteriorated from 1999 to 2004.449 Some of this can be due to deforestation and forest management, as 
some species rely of stand age, forest structure, ecological processes and stand composition of mature 
forests for survival and reproduction.450 The Breeding Bird Survey finds that there has been a decrease in 
population of certain bird species dependent on old forests.451  
 
EU 
Wood production from managed forests and plantations (the common practice in Europe) mostly 
operates in monocultures, which reduces biodiversity and degrades soil fertility. 
 
ANALYSIS 
Canada 
While the Canadian forest industry has made significant progress in reducing deforestation rates, 
concerns remain as to the impact of forestry activities on threatened and endangered species. However, 
the CETA is not expected to significantly impact the rate of decline/recovery of these species given the 
limited expected impact on output in downstream sectors.  
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EU 
With only marginal increases in the forest-based industries expected, the CETA will not have a significant 
impact on biodiversity in the EU. 
 
INDICATOR: Water usage and quality / Contamination of water from chemicals and wastes  
BASELINE 
Much of the contamination of water from chemicals and waste relating to forestry comes from the pulp 
and paper industry which is the third largest industrial polluter of air, water and land. 22.05% of total 
BOD (organic water pollutants)452 emissions came from pulp and paper industry in 2002, while 5.38% of 
total BOD emissions came from the wood industry in 2002. A number of different wastes can be 
released, and effluents can include fibres, suspended solids, colour, turbidity, organic and nutrient 
enriching compounds. This is the result of debarking, pulp washing, bleaching, and regenerating cooking 
chemicals.453 However, the industry has implemented drastic improvements since the 1950s and 1970s, 
with end of pipe technologies and greater transparency454, while facilities must comply with regulations 
under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act and the Fisheries Act.455 Chlorinated dioxins and 
furans emissions have decreased by 99%. Moreover, industry has decreased the use of products that 
have nonylphenol and its ethoxylates (NPE), toxic substances, by 99.8%. Biochemical Oxygen Demand 
(BOD) discharges have dropped 94%, and total suspended solids have dropped by 70%.456 Nevertheless, 
toxic effluents continue to be discharged, and impacts on wildlife, such as alteration to endocrine and 
reproductive functions in fish, continue to occur.457 Another result can be eutrophication of water, 
which in certain instances can be severe. This has been seen to result in change of gonad and liver 
weights of fish, among other ecosystem impacts.458 
Paper industries are also responsible for a huge portion, 45%, of the 7,778.9 million cubic meters of 
surface water withdrawn by Canadian manufacturing industries in 2005.  69% was used for processing 
and 28% for cooling, condensing, and steam generation.459 
Table 42 shows the amounts of major pollutants released into water by the EU paper manufacturing 
sector. 
 
Table 42: Release of major pollutants into water by the EU paper and paper products manufacturing 
sector, 2008 460 
Chlorinated organic substances   
1,2-dichloroethane (DCE)  46.5 kg 
Halogenated organic compounds (as AOX) 2,321 t 
Heavy metals   
Arsenic and compounds (as As) 1.84 t 
                                                             
452 World Development Indicators Online. World Bank.  
453 Environment Canada (2003)  
454 Ibid. 
455 Natural Resources Canada (2004). 
456 Ibid. 
457 Environment Canada (2003) 
458 Ibid. 
459 Statistics Canada (2005).  
460 See European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register 
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Cadmium and compounds (as Cd) 1.37 t 
Chromium and compounds (as Cr) 4.55 t 
Copper and compounds (as Cu) 25.2 t 
Mercury and compounds (as Hg) 157 kg 
Nickel and compounds (as Ni) 8.16 t 
Lead and compounds (as Pb) 3.14 t 
Zinc and compounds (as Zn) 187 t 
Inorganic substances  
Chlorides (as total Cl) 114,490 t 
Fluorides (as total F) 8.42 t 
Total nitrogen 7,743 t 
Total phosphorus 1,080 t 
Other organic substances  
Total organic carbon (TOC) (as total C or 
COD/3) 
249,428 t 
 
ANALYSIS 
Canada 
Results of the economic modelling predict that the CETA will not significantly affect output in the paper 
and paper products sector, which is the most water intensive in the forestry sector. Overall, it is unlikely 
that it will lead to negative impacts on water contamination. CETA should have a neutral effect on water 
discharges from the pulp and paper sector, assuming technology remains constant.  
 
EU 
The CGE model suggests that a CETA will lead to a minor increase in the output of the wood products 
industry and in the paper products industry. The corresponding increase in use and contamination of 
water is only marginal. 
 
INDICATOR: Environmental quality Air pollution - GHG emissions 
BASELINE 
Canada 
Forestry-related GHG emissions can be divided in two categories: (i) emissions resulting from land use 
change, and (ii) emissions resulting from energy consumption in the forestry industry. Managed forest 
land acted as an overall carbon sink, sequestering 18000 kt of CO2e in 2008. Afforestation and 
reforestation sequestered 738 kt of CO2e, while deforestation created 14,644 kt of CO2e in emissions.461   
The forest sector is one of largest single industrial energy users in Canada462, though energy use 
decreased 4% between 1990 and 2007.463 However, the industrial emission it causes is proportionally 
lower because of the industry’s increasing use of bioenergy. In 1990, 38% of energy came from fossil 
                                                             
461 Environment Canada (2010b).  
462 Natural Resources Canada (2010)  
463 Ibid. 
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fuels, and this decreased to 26% in 2007, the difference coming from energy from bioenergy, hydro, and 
nuclear.464  Wood waste has been used as an energy source, and other efficiencies resulted from 
cogeneration and switching from fuel oil to natural gas.465    
Direct emissions from the forest-based industries are the result of fossil fuel usage. Agriculture and 
forestry emitted 2.2Mt of CO2e in 2008 from stationary fuel combustion, down from 2.4Mt of CO2e in 
1990.466 Pulp and paper industries emitted 4,540 kt of CO2e in 2008, down from 13,700 kt of CO2e in 
1990.467 The Pulp and Paper Green Transformation Program, created in 2009 by the federal government, 
will help improve the environmental performance of the pulp and paper industry.468 Indirect emissions, 
mostly from fossil fuel electricity consumption approximately doubled, according to the Canadian 
Council of Forest Ministers.469  
Other air contaminants are released as a result of pulp and paper production. Namely, 23,723 tonnes of 
total particulate matter (TPM), 41,082 tonnes of SOx, 33,948 tonnes of NOx, 15,853 tonnes of VOC, 
65,838 tonnes of CO, 1,932 kg of Pb, 281 kg of Cd, 51 kg of Hg. The wood industry caused the release of 
19,701 tonnes of total particulate matter (TPM), 2,251 tonnes of SOx, 11,577 tonnes of NOx, 60,878 
tonnes of VOC, 337,799 tonnes of CO in 2008.470 
 
EU 
As with water use and pollution, air pollution and GHG emissions are attributed most directly to 
production and processing of paper, rather than to forestry and wood product manufacturing. 
Depending on the production technology used, the pulp and paper industry can require large amounts 
of energy and be responsible for the corresponding GHG effect. In 2007, the EU-27 pulp and paper 
industry accounted for only 0.61% of GHG emissions (31 out of 5045 million tonnes CO2 equivalent). 
This occurs with large regional variation: in some EU countries the pulp and paper industries account for 
minimal emissions of CO2, including in Germany with 0.0%; the highest shares are in Finland (5.6% of 
the country’s CO2 emissions), Sweden (2.7%), Austria (2.5%) and Slovenia (2.2%).471 
Table 43 shows the GHG emissions and air pollution caused by EU manufacturing of paper and paper 
products. 
 
Table 43: GHG emissions and air pollution for EU manufacturing of paper and paper products, 2008472 
Greenhouse gases 69,554,492 t 
Methane (CH4) 228 t 
Carbon dioxide (CO2) 67,627,000 t 
Carbon dioxide (CO2) excluding biomass 1,926,467 t 
Hydro-fluorocarbons (HFCs) 478 kg 
Nitrous oxide (N2O) 796 t 
                                                             
464 Ibid. 
465 Environment Canada (2010b) 
466 Ibid.  
467 Ibid. 
468 Natural Resources Canada (2010) 
469 Forestethics (2006)  
470 National Pollutant Release Inventory (2008)  
471 EC (2010b) 
472 European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register 
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Other gases 178,272 t 
Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) 59 kg 
Chlorine and inorganic compounds (as HCl) 1,032 t 
Carbon monoxide (CO) 44,274 t 
Fluorine and inorganic compounds (as HF) 350 t 
Hydrochlorofluorocarbons(HCFCs) 2 t 
Ammonia (NH3) 2,125 t 
Non-methane volatile organic compounds 
(NMVOC) 
28,129 t 
Nitrogen oxides (NOx/NO2) 104,485 t 
Sulphur oxides (SOx/SO2) 30,077 t 
 
ANALYSIS 
Canada 
Given its limited impact on output in the forest-based industries, it is not expected that the CETA will 
significantly change emissions patterns or increase direct or indirect emissions.  According to the E3MG 
model, the paper and pulp sector should see its emissions reduced by 0.19% to 0.22%. Overall it is not 
expected that the CETA will have significant impacts on GHG and other air pollutant emissions from the 
forestry sector.  
 
EU 
Given that a CETA has only marginal impact on the EU forest-based industries, only a marginal increase 
in the sector’s GHG emissions is expected. 
The E3MG modelling also predicts no impact on this sector. 
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5.1.5. Automotive & Other Transportation Equipment 
 
ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT473 
 
INDICATOR: Output, trade & investment 
BASELINE 
Manufacturing of transportation equipment in Canada is led by the automotive industry, which is the 8th 
largest in the world. In 2007, Canada’s manufacturing of transportation equipment generated turnover 
of $106.3 billion, representing growth of 12.5% since 1998 (Table 44). 474  Herein, motor vehicle 
manufacturing (i.e. assembly of finished of vehicles) accounts for 51.2%, though growth over the past 
decade has been relatively stagnant with rising input costs pushing down the total value added 
production in the industry. A further 4.2% of industry turnover is generated from motor vehicle body 
and trailer manufacturing and 25.2% in motor vehicle parts manufacturing. Aerospace product and parts 
manufacturing contributes 13.9%, though it serves as the fastest growing sector within Canada’s 
transportation equipment industry. 
 
Table 44: Turnover in Canada’s transportation equipment industry 
 Turnover (2007, 
bn. US$) 
Growth since 
1998 
Total 106.3 12.5% 
Motor vehicles 54.4 1.0% 
Motor vehicle 
parts 
26.8 10.0% 
Transportation 
equipment 
Aerospace 
products and parts 
14.9 67.4% 
Source: Industry Canada 
 
Canada is engaged in a significant amount of trade in transportation equipment with total trade of 
$164.15 billion in 2007 and a trade deficit of $5.9 billion.475 Within this, trade in the automotive sector is 
the largest with total exports of $63.04 billion in 2007. To that end, trade in motor vehicle 
manufacturing (50.2%), motor vehicle parts (30.5%) and motor vehicle body and trailer manufacturing 
(2.7%) accounted for 83.4% of all Canadian trade in the transportation equipment sector.476  
                                                             
473  CGE results for the transportation equipment sector are reported according to the groupings of the GTAP database which 
include the manufacturing of cars, lorries, trailers and semi-trailers as well as related parts and accessories (Motor vehicle) and 
all other transport equipment (e.g. aerospace and ship building). The results of the simulations can be found in Tables 73-80 in 
Annex 6.  
474 Industry Canada 
475 Statistics Canada 
476 Ibid.  
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The transportation industry in the EU generated turnover of $188 billion in 2008. As in Canada, the 
transportation equipment industry in the EU is led by the automotive sector, which accounts for 
approximately 25% of global production.477 In addition to the automotive industry, the EU’s aerospace 
industry serves as an important hi-tech sector and is the world’s second largest producer of civil aircraft.  
The sector is particularly export oriented with 56% of its turnover in 2008 generated through exports. In 
both the automotive and civil aviation sectors, the EU operates a trade surplus, as in 2009 exports 
exceeded imports by $64.1 billion in the automotive sector and $21.6 billion in civil aviation.478 
Due to Canada’s high degree of integration with its NAFTA partners, the EU is a relatively minor market 
for Canadian automotive exports having received just 0.7% by value in 2007. Of this, the EU accounted 
for 2% and 2.9% of Canada’s motor vehicle parts exports and imports, respectively, and a miniscule 
0.25% of all Canadian exports of assembled motor vehicles in 2007. The EU does, however, play a 
significant role in Canada’s trade of aerospace and aerospace parts accounting for 21% of all Canadian 
exports ($2.5 billion) and 21.9% of all imports ($2.2 billion) in 2007.479  
Foreign investment in transportation equipment makes up a relatively minor share of outward and 
inward investment in both Canada and the EU. The transportation equipment sector accounted for only 
3.3% of Canada’s total FDI stocks abroad in 2007, and only 1.51% of all EU stocks abroad.480 With 4.6% of 
Canada’s total investment in the EU located in the transportation equipment sector, the sector plays a 
more important role for Canada outward bilateral investment than it does for the EU, where only 0.6% 
of stocks in Canada in 2005 were directed toward the transportation equipment sector.481 
 
ANALYSIS 
Canada 
Results from the CGE model suggest that the CETA could potentially lead to increases in output and 
trade of transport equipment in Canada, with the most beneficial outcome arising under full removal of 
tariffs and provisions that facilitate the inflow of FDI into the sector. Potential gains for the industry 
stand to be significantly reduced, however, under a less liberalised Agreement and where more 
stringent rules of origin for automotive products are adopted.  
With respect to trade liberalisation, the model projects that the CETA will have a positive impact on the 
automotive industry, with the most beneficial outcome arising where all tariffs are removed and 
liberalisation in the services is less ambitious (i.e. Scenario C; see Tables 73-80 in Annex 6). The removal 
of tariffs is estimated to lead to increases in output of automotive products ranging from 0.21% to 
0.86%. This increased output would be expected to stimulate increases in trade, with overall exports 
expected to increase for automotive products (0.36% to 1.11%). In all scenarios except Scenario B, the 
increase in exports would be expected to improve Canada’s overall balance of trade in these products by 
as much $359 million over the long-term. These gains can be primarily attributed to the removal of MFN 
tariffs in the EU, which are as high as 10% on motor vehicles and auto parts, with Canada’s bilateral 
exports to the EU estimated to increase by as much as $447 million ($305 million in automotive products) 
over the long-term; though imports from the EU would be expected to be significantly larger than 
exports to the EU, worsening the bilateral balance of trade, Canada would be expected to witness 
                                                             
477 DG Trade website; DG Enterprise 
478 DG Trade website 
479 Statistics Canada 
480 OECD.stat 
481 Eurostat (2008).    
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improvements in its trade with the EU of other transport equipment. Although it appears contradictory 
to expect the CETA to simultaneously lead to a worsening  in the balance of trade in automotive 
products with the EU and improvements to the overall balance of trade in these products, it should be 
noted that this would be expected to occur as a result of i) increased Canadian exports of automotive 
products to third countries over the long-term as a result of expansion and upgrading fostered by the 
CETA; and ii) very minor changes in the value of imports from third countries.  
In terms of other transportation equipment, the CGE model again predicts that Canada could 
experience increases in output and trade, but that this would be contingent on an Agreement being 
reached that provides the greatest degree of liberalisation (e.g. as in modelled in Scenarios C and D). 
Output is estimated to increase by as much as 0.85% in Scenario C, though less ambitious removal of 
tariffs is not projected to produce increases and in Scenario B is estimated to contract slightly (-0.2%) 
over the long-term. This is similarly the trend in terms of overall exports with Canadian exports of other 
transport equipment projected to rise by as much as 1.08% in Scenario C, with Scenario B projecting a 
minor reduction in exports (-0.15%) over the long-term. Where exports increase, Canada would be 
expected to experience an improvement to its sectoral balance of trade (as much as $78m), though a 
reduction in exports would alternatively be expected to lead to a worsening of the trade balance (-
$44m).  
Further to tariff liberalisation, the CETA could also lead to increased investment in Canada’s 
transportation equipment industry, subsequently leading to greater increases in output and exports 
than estimated by the CGE model. Although attempted, data limitations have made it impossible for the 
modelling framework to quantitatively reflect the precise impact that investment liberalisation is likely 
to have on output and exports in Canada’s transportation equipment sector. Nevertheless, results from 
the gravity modelling suggest that a reduction in investment restrictiveness (as measured by the OECD) 
is likely to have a positive impact on investment in Canada’s manufacturing sector.  
With respect to the auto industry, Canada does not maintain overt restrictions on foreign investment, 
making it unclear how provisions within the CETA can significantly alter EU investment in Canada. 
Inclusion of national treatment provisions could potentially stimulate investment by removing the 
screening procedures currently in place (i.e. net benefit tests), though it is not certain that such 
provisions would greatly increase the stock of EU FDI within Canada’s auto industry. Extending national 
treatment to EU investments in Canada’s aerospace industry could potentially lead to significant inflows 
of FDI over the long-term as the Investment Canada Act (ICA) allows foreign investments to be blocked 
on the basis of national security. At the same time, due to these national security concerns, it is 
questionable whether  national treatment would be extended to include investments in the aerospace 
sector. Nevertheless, it is possible that the CETA continues to allow Canada the right to invoke security 
concerns over EU investments in the aerospace industry, while to some degree liberalising investment. 
In particular, the ICA does not provide a specific definition of what may be ‘injurious to national security’, 
leaving investment bids subject to a degree of uncertainty.482  Hereto, it is possible that the CETA could 
increase EU investment in Canada’s aerospace sector through the establishment of a dispute settlement 
body that could make impartial rulings on whether or not an investment qualifies as ‘injurious’ to 
national security as well as increased transparency on what an injurious investment would entail (See 
Chapter on Investment for more discussion).  
Underlying the ability of tariff and investment liberalisation under the CETA to generate gains for 
Canada’s automotive industry will be the rules of origin (RoO) that are ultimately agreed to. At issue is 
Canada’s high degree of integration with the auto industry of the U.S., which would make it particularly 
                                                             
482 Pawluch et al (2010).  
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difficult for Canada to realise the level of potential gains estimated should the CETA adopt a set of 
stringent RoO that are more in line with EU preferences. Specifically, the EU would likely prefer to 
maintain the 60% local content requirement that is used to confer origin, while Canada would likely 
prefer RoO that are closer to 30%.483 Given the noted high degree of integration with the U.S. it would 
appear – at least over the mid-term – that if the CETA adopts RoO that are more in line with EU rules, 
the impact of the agreement would be far less positive than that estimated under the CGE model, since  
a large portion of Canadian produced products would not be able to qualify for preferential tariffs. While 
it is difficult to quantify the exact impact from adopting such a set of RoO, it should be expected that the 
positive impact would at least be mitigated, with a more negative potential outcome being limited to 
moderate levels of reduction in output and Canada’s balance of trade of automotive products.  
Additionally, differences in emission standards between Canada and the EU could serve to further 
reduce estimated gains for the Canadian auto industry (See Box 17). This is largely dependent, however, 
on the level of market access granted to Canadian auto manufacturers under the CETA, with significant 
improvements in market access likely to stimulate Canadian producers to make the necessary 
investments in order to meet the stricter EU standards. 
 
EU  
The CGE model suggests that the CETA may produce mixed results for the EU’s transportation 
equipment sector, with increases in output, exports and the balance of trade estimated for the EU’s 
automotive industry and decreases projected for its other transportation manufacturing sectors. For 
both industries, the most beneficial outcome appears to be in the less ambitious scenarios (e.g. A and B).  
For the EU’s automotive industry, modelling projects minor increases in output ranging from 0.05% to 
0.1%.  The increases in production appear to be driven largely by increased exports, with total exports of 
automotive products estimated to grow by 0.08% to 0.17% over the long-term. Exports will likely grow 
more than imports, leading to improvements in the EU’s total balance of trade in auto products, with 
modelling results suggesting the trade balance to see an improvement of $194 million to $608 million 
(Tables 73-80 Annex 6). While the CETA would also lead to significant percentage increases in imports 
from Canada, the existing low level of imports from Canada suggests that bilateral exports would be far 
greater, leading to an improvement in the bilateral balance of trade of upwards of $870 million.484   
These projected gains for the industry in the EU would likely be improved under a CETA that adopted 
more stringent rules of origin. As noted in the assessment on Canada, the inability of Canada to 
capitalise from RoO that favoured EU preferences would likely imply reduced imports from Canada, 
making the benefits from tariff liberalisation more one-sided and lead to greater gains in the EU’s 
balance of trade.  More stringent emission standards are not likely to negatively impact the EU’s auto 
industry, though it could serve to more greatly improve the EU’s bilateral balance of trade (see Box 17).  
Conversely, these same scenarios project limited declines in the EU’s output of other transportation 
equipment over the long-term (-0.06% to -0.17%) as well as in overall exports (-0.07% to -0.24%). In turn, 
this projected decline in exports arising from the CETA would be expected to lead to a worsening of the 
                                                             
483 Gauthier, A. and M. Holden (2010b) 
484 As noted, the greatest gains for the EU industry appear to actually arise in the least liberalised scenario (Scenario A), with the 
most beneficial impact appearing to be when tariffs are not liberalised in certain sensitive sectors. While there is no direct 
difference in these scenarios with reference to the transport equipment industry, the different outcome is being largely driven 
by changing incentives and the implications it has for the allocation of resources, which over the long-term is stimulated in 
different ways given the different levels of liberalisation for goods and services.  
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EU’s total balance of trade in these products of as much as $300 million, making the overall impact on 
the balance of trade for transport equipment negative.  
 
Box 17: Differences in EU-Canada automotive emission standards   
 
Standards on automotive emissions in both Canada and the EU serve an important role in protecting the 
environment. While both have as its aim the reduction of harmful GHG emissions, the standards and 
systems employed in each differ.485 The problem herein arises from the potential for differences in 
standards to serve as an obstacle to trade and production, making it possible that the impact from the 
CETA could be altered based on emissions regulations.  
At the same time, while differences in standards may serve to restrict trade, harmonisation of standards 
can help facilitate trade. It is largely in recognition of this that Canada has sought to ensure 
harmonisation of auto emission standards with the United States. The practice of harmonising emissions 
standards with those of the U.S. is a practice that has been in place since 1988, and which was most 
recently reaffirmed by Canada’s decision to follow the U.S. lead in applying more stringent GHG 
emission standards for new passenger autos and light trucks for 2011-2016 model years. While the 
move is clearly beneficial from an environmental perspective, it also makes economic sense as the high 
degree of U.S-Canada integration within the industry implies that harmonising standards can foster a 
level playing field while enhancing competitiveness.486 As beneficial to U.S.-Canada auto trade and 
production as the alignment of standards may be, it raises questions, however, over whether the 
continued difference in standards between Canada and the EU may serve to undermine potential gains 
for Canada under tariff and investment liberalisation provided by the CETA.  
Under the U.S. proposal, Canada would impose a series of increasingly stringent regulations to ensure 
that an average fuel efficiency standard of 35.5 miles/gallon for passenger cars and light-duty trucks can 
be produced industry-wide by 2016.487 While this accelerates advancements in emission standards by 
requiring a GHG emission performance of 250 g CO2e/mile (155.34 g CO2e/km), it is less stringent than 
the legally binding standards implemented in the EU under the Euro 5 and Euro 6 emission limits. 
Hereto, Euro 5 and Euro 6 will ensure that the fleet of cars sold in the EU will be aligned with 130g 
CO2/km, with 65% of a manufacturer’s fleet obliged to comply with these standards by 2012 and 100% 
beginning in 2015.488  
As Canadian standards are less stringent that the EU’s (and phased in over a longer time horizon) there 
is potential for Canadian produced motor vehicles and parts to have added difficulties in capturing gains 
from liberalisation provided under the CETA (even if Canadian preferred RoO are adopted). The overall 
impact on Canada is, however, difficult to quantify as there appear to be a number of possible outcomes 
over the long-term. The first influencing factor would likely be the increased market access provided to 
Canadian producers under a CETA, with this largely determining whether the Agreement could be 
viewed as creating large enough revenue generating effects so as to shift production away from the U.S. 
market and towards the EU market. If large enough opportunities were created, it is likely the case that 
over the long-term, Canadian manufacturers would be inclined to make the necessary investments in 
ensuring that their products meet the stricter EU standards.  
                                                             
485 WTO. http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm4_e.htm#TRS; Swann, G.P. (2010). ‘  
486 Government of Canada (2010).   
487 Ibid.  
488 Europa. http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/environment/air_pollution/l28186_en.htm 
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At the same time, the existing regulatory changes requiring stricter emission standards in Canada would 
already be expected to stimulate changes in production and investment in the Canadian automotive 
industry. With added access to the EU market, these producers could deepen their already planned 
investments to ensure that they can also comply with EU standards, while perhaps viewing such a choice 
as rational under the likelihood of further amendments to emission standards in the U.S. and Canada in 
the future. On this note, to the degree that Canadian firms increased investment and enhanced their 
capacity to produce parts and vehicles that surpass the U.S. standards, they could potentially improve 
their competitiveness vis-à-vis U.S. manufacturers once standards move beyond those presently 
planned in the U.S.  
Where the CETA limits ultimate access to the EU either through restrictive rules of origin and/or limited 
tariff reductions, the difference in standards may serve to further limit increased investment among 
Canadian producers so as to upgrade production to meet EU standards and will likely serve to 
exacerbate the potentially negative effect such a CETA could have on the Canadian industry. In this 
regard though, it would not be expected that differences in standards would play a prominent role, with 
the major impact likely to be derived from the restrictiveness of the RoO and/or limited tariff 
liberalisation.  
From the standpoint of the EU, the difference in standards does not appear to be as detrimental to 
trade and production. This assessment stems largely from the acknowledgment that more stringent 
standards in place within the EU would likely allow EU automobiles and parts to more easily adhere to 
Canadian standards without requiring additional investment, limiting the difference in standard’s ability 
to serve as a TBT.  
 
 
INDICATOR: Employment 
BASELINE 
Canada’s transportation equipment sector employed 209,880 in 2007, though this represents a decrease 
in employment of 10.7% since 1998.489 The automotive manufacturing sector accounts for the largest 
portion of this employment, providing jobs for 81% of all people employed in the sector. Of this, 80,324 
are employed in manufacturing of motor vehicle parts, 46,970 in motor vehicle manufacturing and 
20,778 in motor vehicle body and trailer manufacturing. Aerospace manufacturing employs a further 
42,703, predominantly in Ontario and Quebec.490  
Approximately 3.2 million are employed in the transportation equipment sector in the EU. Of this, more 
than 2.3 million are employed in the automotive sector, representing approximately 7% of all 
manufacturing employment in the EU. Germany represents the largest single source of this employment 
with approximately 36% of the total employment in the sector. A further 375,000 are employed in the 
EU’s aerospace sector, though this is concentrated in a handful of Member States.491   
 
 
                                                             
489 Industry Canada 
490 Ibid.  
491 DG Enterprise 
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ANALYSIS 
Canada 
The impact on employment is likely to be tied to the degree of liberalisation achieved as well as the 
Agreement’s rules of origin. Scenarios that model less liberalisation of tariffs project that the CETA will 
have a limited positive or negative impact on employment in Canada’s auto industry (-0.07% to 0.09%) 
and other transport equipment (-0.45% to -0.16%) over the long-term. Alternatively, scenarios that 
model the full removal of tariffs on all goods (C and D) project that the demand for employment in 
Canada’s transport equipment sector may increase by as much as 0.5% over the long-term. 
Improvements in employment of this magnitude would be concentrated in Ontario and Quebec. While 
the benefit could potentially be greater under a CETA that included provisions that increased the inflow 
of FDI into the sector, restrictive rules of origin could ultimately serve to eliminate these gains and could 
potentially lead to reduced demand for labour in the industry over the long-term.   
 
EU 
The impact on employment in the EU’s transportation equipment sector is estimated to vary by 
subsector and degree of liberalisation, with the CGE model projecting a limited increase in the demand 
for labour in the EU’s automotive sector over the long-term (0.03% to 0.09%) and a decrease in 
manufacturing of other transport equipment (-0.18% to -0.07%). While the percentage decrease in 
demand for labour in other transport equipment is greater than the estimated increases in the 
automotive sector, the much greater number of employed in the latter would generally imply that the 
two outcomes would largely cancel each other out, making the impact of tariff liberalisation under the 
CETA negligible. The overall impact on employment could shift to become more positive with the CETA 
adopting more stringent rules of origin and provisions that increased Canada’s FDI in the sector. Further, 
unlike in Canada, any impact on employment in the EU is likely to be more dispersed given the lower 
degree of concentration in the EU.  
 
SOCIAL ASSESSMENT 
 
INDICATOR: Worker displacement 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Canada 
As discussed in the economic assessment, the CETA is expected to have a positive impact on 
employment in Canada’s transportation equipment sector, with gains contingent on the rules of origin 
that are ultimately agreed to. To the degree that rules of origin are not overly restrictive and 
employment is generated by the CETA, it is not likely that the agreement will engender any degree of 
displacement in Canada’s auto industry. In turn, the social impact would be largely positive particularly 
as it would create manufacturing jobs that are higher paying than the Canadian average. The positive 
impact would likely be intensified given the regional concentration of the industry, with the auto 
industry that is clustered along the 260 mile corridor that stretches from Windsor to Oshawa particularly 
likely to benefit.  
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EU 
The initial results from the CGE model suggest that the CETA will lead to minor increases in employment 
in the EU’s automotive manufacturing sector with declines in manufacturing of other transportation 
equipment. Given that over 70% of sectoral employment is in automotive manufacturing, smaller 
percentage increases in employment within the industry should be expected to compensate for the 
larger estimated declines in labour within the other transport sector. While perhaps leading to some 
degree of displacement, the overall impact of the CETA is expected to be marginal. 
 
 
INDICATOR: Quality & decency of work 
 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Canada 
As Canada’s automotive sector is heavily unionised, it is possible that increased employment in the 
sector could strengthen the collective bargaining of Canada’s autoworkers while providing those who 
move into the sector with a high level of labour standards. Collective bargaining and the rights of 
association could be further strengthened by the CETA’s ability to reaffirm the ILO’s core labour 
standards (CLS) and under provisions that require Canada to ratify the ILO’s Right to Organise and 
Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949  (C.98). For detailed discussion on the social ramifications of the 
CETA as it pertains to core labour standards and the ILO’s Decent Work Agenda see Box 14 in the social 
assessment on mining and metal manufacturing.  
 
EU 
The CETA could contribute to the further improvement of labour standards in the EU with the inclusion 
of a chapter on trade and labour that makes commitments to better implementation of the ILO’s Core 
Labour Standards and Decent Work Agenda (See Box 14).  
 
INDICATOR: Health, education & culture 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Canada 
Work related accidents for the manufacturing industry are significantly above the Canadian average. A 
mechanism that fosters regular dialogue and cooperation between Canada and the EU could include 
commitments to and exchanges on reducing occupational injuries, perhaps fostering improved safety 
over the long-term (See Box 14 for more discussion). At the same time, employment in the 
transportation equipment sector provides workers with some of the highest rates of worker-provided 
health benefits, providing potential for the CETA to confer greater health benefits on the Canadian 
workforce.492 
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EU 
The CETA’s impact on the EU transportation equipment sector is not expected to significantly affect 
health, education or culture in the EU.   
 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 
 
INDICATOR: Air Quality / GHG emissions 
BASELINE 
Canada 
The vehicle manufacturing sector (including engines, parts, assembly and painting) emitted 741 tonnes 
of total particulate matter (0.0017 % of total industrial emissions), 826 tonnes of S0x (0.0007%), 103 
tonnes of NOx (0.00015%), 8646 tonnes of VOC (0.0134%), 1824 tonnes of CO (0.0012%), 31 tonnes of 
NH3 (0.0016%), 156 kg of lead (Pb),(0.00069%) in 2008.493 
The Canadian automotive parts manufacturing sectors spends C$930 million annually on energy 
expenses. The automotive parts manufacturing sector has a low energy intensity, with only 1% of 
manufacturing energy use (25,467 TJ)494 in 2002. The most energy intensive processes include assembly, 
plastics moulding, and surface coating/paintings. The fuel mix for these activities is 47% electricity, 45% 
natural gas, and 8% other.495 The transport equipment manufacturing sector has an energy intensity of 
2MJ/$GDP, which is low compared to the overall manufacturing average of 13Mj\$GDP in 2007.496 
 
EU 
In 2009, the production of a motor vehicle in the EU caused approximately 2 800 kWh energy use, 
3.6m3 water use, 0.9 tonnes of CO2 equivalent, and 11kg of waste products.497 
Table 45 shows the GHG emissions and air pollution caused by EU manufacturing of automotive and 
transport equipment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
493 National Pollutant Release Inventory (2008).  
494 Natural Resources Canada (2005)  
495 Ibid.   
496 Natural Resources Canada (2009) 
497 The Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (2010) 
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Table 45: GHG emissions and air pollution for EU manufacturing of automotive and transport 
equipment, 2008498 
 Manufacture of 
motor vehicles, 
trailers and semi-
trailers (NACE 29) 
Manufacture of other 
transport equipment, incl., 
railway locomotives and 
rolling stock, aircrafts, 
ships (NACE 30) 
Greenhouse gases 183,037 t 2,001,000 t 
Carbon dioxide (CO2) 183,000 t 2,001,000 t 
Hydro-fluorocarbons (HFCs) 21 t - 
Nitrous oxide (N2O) 10 t - 
Sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) 6 t - 
Other gases 53,240 t 9,303 t 
Chlorine and inorganic compounds 
(as HCl) 
22 t 22 t 
Hydrochlorofluorocarbons(HCFCs) 1 t 79 t 
Hydrogen cyanide (HCN) - 1 t 
Non-methane volatile organic 
compounds (NMVOC) 
50,736 t 7,045 t 
Nitrogen oxides (NOx/NO2) 2,207 t 1,785 t 
Sulphur oxides (SOx/SO2) 274 t 371 t 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
Canada 
Ongoing improvements in energy intensity are likely to offset in part the increase in GHG emissions 
caused by the expansion in production in this sector. This is predictable in light of the major investments 
made in the past two years in the US and Canadian automotive sector to increase productivity and 
competitiveness. It is likely that the transport equipment sector will remain stable in this sector.  
 
EU 
The CGE model indicates that a CETA will have only marginal impact on the EU manufacturing of 
automotive and transport equipment, with all impacts on output, import, export, sales, and market 
prices being insignificant. The only noteworthy impact on sectoral output is in the production of other 
transport equipment, with estimates projecting a minor reduction of the sector’s GHG emissions. 
 
                                                             
498 European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register 
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5.1.6 Textiles 
 
ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT499 
 
INDICATOR: Output, trade & investment 
BASELINE 
Canada’s textiles, apparel and leather (including footwear) industries have experienced declines in 
output, revenue and market share over the past decade as increased competition from low-cost 
producers and the dismantling of the quota system has forced the domestic industry to undertake 
structural adjustments. Since 1998, turnover for these sectors has fallen substantially, while the 
domestic industry has increasingly lost market share to imports (Table 46). 
 
Table 46: Turnover and market share for Canada’s textile, apparel and leather industry 
Domestic market 
share 
 Turnover 
(2007) 
Mio. US$ 
Change since 1998 
2004 2008 
Total 4,115 -31.3% 42.1% 36.1% 
Textile mills 2,060 -46.3%  
Textiles 
Textile product 
mills 
2,060 -4.3%  
Apparel  3,930 -40.0% 40.2% 23.2% 
Total 430 -51.7%  Leather 
Footwear 250 -55.7% 14.3% 8.8% 
 Source: Industry Canada 
 
With 47% of its revenue generated through exports, Canada’s textile and apparel industry is highly 
export oriented. Nevertheless, the industry maintains large trade imbalances, largely with developing 
countries, resulting in substantial increases in the market’s import share, which has risen from 
approximately 35% in 1992 to over 60%.500 
The EU’s textiles industry (including clothing and man-made fibres) generated approximately $233 
billion in turnover in 2009, though growth has been relatively stagnant since 2004. Within the industry, 
the textiles (54%) and clothing (41%) sectors account for the majority of this activity, with the largest 
producers being Italy, France, the UK, Germany and Spain, which together account for roughly 75% of 
production.501 The EU is a global leader in upmarket and high quality textiles and clothing, and in 2009 
maintained a 3.6% share of global textile exports ($42.4 billion).502 As with Canada, however, the EU 
                                                             
499 CGE results for the textiles industry are reported according to the product groupings of the GTAP database which divide the 
industry across: textiles and man-made fibres (Textiles); clothing, dressing and dyeing of fur (Apparel); and leather products 
(tanning and dressing of leather; luggage, handbags and footwear). The results of the simulations can be found in Tables 81-88 
in Annex 6.  
500 Industry Canada 
501 Eurostat. http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/textiles/files/statistics/textiles_en.pdf 
502 DG Trade website 
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operates a sizeable trade deficit, particularly with developing nations, which has been increasing in 
recent years.   
Trade in textiles, apparel and footwear between the EU and Canada is limited with trade in these 
products respectively reaching only $338.68 million, $601.18 million and $228.75 million in 2007.503 This 
limited bilateral trade can likely be explained, in part, by the existing barriers between the two sides. 
Losses in domestic market share, output and employment have made Canadian producers of textiles, 
apparel and leather particularly sensitive to further liberalisation and this is reflected in Canada’s high 
applied MFN tariffs on textiles, apparel and footwear, which average 6.2%, 16.3% and 13.5%, 
respectively, with tariff peaks as high as 18%.504 The EU also applies relatively high MFN rates that 
average 9.4% for textiles, apparel and footwear, with peaks of 17%.505 
In addition to tariffs, the EU textile industry has expressed concern over NTBs such as the lack of 
transparency and harmonisation at the provincial level in Canada (e.g. in labelling requirements for 
textile products) and inadequate IPR enforcement (e.g. in border seizures of counterfeit goods).  
 
ANALYSIS 
Canada 
The CETA could potentially benefit the Canadian textiles, apparel and leather manufacturing sector, with 
such an outcome largely contingent on an Agreement that agrees to ambitious as well as adoption of 
rules of origin that are not overly restrictive to Canadian exporters.  
As noted, tariffs on textiles, clothing and footwear remain comparatively high in the EU, making it likely 
that Canada’s industry could realise gains from the removal of these duties under the CETA. Such an 
assertion is supported by the CGE modelling results which show that the removal of tariffs would lead to 
increases in output for Canada’s textiles and apparel sectors across almost all scenarios as well as overall 
increases in exports over the long-term (See Tables 81-86 in Annex 6).506 This increased production 
would stimulate overall increases in exports of up to 3.1%, though this would likely not translate into 
improvements in the balance of trade as estimates suggest that Canada’s increase in exports to the EU 
would be offset by an increase in imports. 
 The estimated effect of tariff liberalisation on Canada’s apparel sector is similar, with CGE results 
projecting increases in output (across all scenarios except Scenario B) and in overall exports. Despite this 
increase in exports, the CGE modelling predicts a worsening of the balance of trade in apparel by as 
much as $72 million over the long-term. Again, Canada would be expected to experience sizeable 
growth in exports to the EU (by as much as 58%), but that this would be eclipsed in value by imports 
from the EU, worsening the bilateral balance of trade by as much as $342 million. The wide discrepancy 
between the impact on overall balance of trade in apparel products and that with the EU stems largely 
from EU imports substituting for imports from third countries as well as increased exports to other 
countries such as the United States.  
Within the leather manufacturing sector, the CETA is expected to lead to declines in output (as much as -
1.21%), though it would be expected that exports would experience increases: both overall (4.9% to 6%) 
                                                             
503 Herein, the majority of bilateral trade occurs in exports from the EU to Canada with the former maintaining trade surpluses 
in both clothing and accessories ($282.43 million in 2009) and footwear ($160.97 million in 2009). 
504 European Commission and Government of Canada (2008).   
505 Ibid.  
506 The lone exception is in Scenario B, which projects minor declines in output of textiles (-0.15%) and apparel (-0.07%)_over 
the long-term.  
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and with the EU (50%). Minor reductions in the Canada’s balance of trade are estimated, both overall (-
$38m) and with the EU (-$200m).  
While the CGE model generally projects minor gains for the Canadian textiles and apparel industry as a 
result of the removal of tariffs, the rules of origin adopted under the CETA may serve to place downward 
pressure on these estimates and, in turn, lead to declines in output and overall exports over the long-
term (See Box 18 for further discussion).  
For both Canada and the EU, outward FDI in the textiles sector is limited both globally and bilaterally. 
Further, with few restrictions in Canada or EU it is not envisaged that investment liberalisation would 
significantly alter the impacts already reported.  
 
Box 18: The CETA and rules of origin for textiles  
 
An issue of concern for the textiles, apparel and footwear sector in both Canada and the EU will be the 
rules of origin adopted under the Agreement.  
Under NAFTA, the rules ultimately agreed to, which are known as ‘yarn forward’ or ‘triple 
transformation’ (from yarn to fabric to clothing), represent perhaps the most protectionist RoO adopted 
under the Agreement. Except for fibres, it requires that all materials and transformation processes of 
textile products be of North American origin, making it so that a textile product is considered as 
‘originating’ only if the material used in each of the successive stages of fabricating textile products – the 
yarn itself, the fabric, and the sewing thread – originate in a NAFTA country. While there are exceptions 
to these requirements,507 the NAFTA RoO for textiles and apparel generally went against the wishes of 
manufacturers in Canada, with Canadians originally aiming to extend CUSFTA rules which employed the 
less protectionist ‘fabric forward’ or ‘double transformation’ rule.508 Canada’s preferences for such an 
approach in NAFTA stemmed largely from the fact that many of its products – such as its wool suits and 
high-priced, design-intensive apparel (mostly concentrated in Quebec) – relied on non-North American 
imports of special kinds of fabrics and other inputs for luxury clothing.509  
Given this preference, it would appear that Canada would approach the CETA negotiations with the 
intention of adopting less restrictive RoO than those that presently exist in NAFTA. While EU rules of 
origin are less restrictive than those employed in NAFTA, they may still serve to be too restrictive to 
confer gains on Canadian manufacturers under the CETA. Historically the EU has maintained double 
transformation RoO on textiles and apparel, and while reforms to this policy have opened up the 
possibility of LDCs being allowed to use single transformation, it would appear unlikely that Canada – a 
                                                             
507 These include: (a) for many individual product categories, substantial transformation or change in tariff classification must 
occur; (b) NAFTA-made yarn, fabric, apparel not meeting strict NAFTA content requirements can be eligible for preferential duty 
treatment up to agreed annual levels. Further, on 1 July 2009, Canada and the US implemented measures to liberalise the 
NAFTA rules of origin applicable to certain textile goods which are made from acrylic staple fibres, that are not available from 
domestic producers in commercial quantities – the so-called ‘short-supply’ goods. 
508 The US obtained Canadian approval by providing Canada with concessions that in practice represented an important 
exception for the Canadian industry regarding the rule of origin. This entailed annual quotas for yarn and fabric imports that 
“do not meet the rule of origin but still qualify for the preferential treatment”. The text of NAFTA refers to this mechanism as 
‘tariff preference levels’ and it allows Canadian apparel producers to keep importing the yarns and fabrics they need to 
maintain production in the market niche of design-intensive or luxury apparel goods. 
509 Morgenstern et al (2007) 
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member of the G7 – would be able to receive such lenient RoO under the CETA; particularly as this may 
erode preferences bestowed on the world’s poorest countries.510  
It therefore would appear that the EU would push for the CETA to incorporate rules of origin that 
require a system of double transformation, which, as its name suggests, mandates that the exporting 
country (in this case Canada) transform the textile or clothing product across two distinct stages. In the 
case of textiles, this would therefore imply that Canadian manufacturers would be required to convert 
the fibre to yarn within Canada while also ensuring the conversion of yarn into fabric. In the case of 
apparel, Canadian producers would be required to convert the yarn into fabric and the fabric into 
clothing in order for exports to qualify for any reduced tariffs provided by the CETA. 
The problem herein is that as a result of NAFTA, Canadian manufacturers of textile and apparel have 
been given an incentive to source inputs from NAFTA partners, making it uncertain (if not unlikely) that 
a number of Canadian products would be able to adjust to the competing incentives of the CETA and 
qualify as ‘originating’ under EU RoO. Further, with the global restructuring that has occurred as a result 
of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC), Canadian manufacturers have been under intense 
pressure to ensure that they source inputs in the most cost effective means possible, making it 
increasingly unlikely they would be able to both adjust to the incentives fostered under NAFTA and be 
able to qualify under EU RoO as the former has, as noted, led to increased sourcing from Mexico and 
U.S.  
The issue, therefore, is one where under more restrictive rules of origin, the impact on Canadian 
manufacturers is likely to be less beneficial than projected under the CGE model, with the CETA 
potentially leading to declines in output and exports for Canada’s textiles and apparel industry. At the 
same time, if the CETA adopts RoO that are unrestrictive enough to stimulate gains for Canada, it is 
possible that such an outcome would be detrimental to the EU as it would likely allow third countries 
such as the U.S. to benefit from the Agreement between the two sides.  
 
 
EU 
Estimates suggest that the CETA could result in positive gains for the EU’s textiles, apparel and leather 
sectors with tariff liberalisation, in particular, resulting in increases in output, exports and the balance of 
trade in these products over the long-term. The modelling results project that the most beneficial 
outcome will arise under a less ambitious agreement, with the rules of origin ultimately agreed to and 
the resolution of NTBs and IPR enforcement issues in Canada expected to further influence the outcome 
for the EU.  
With respect to tariff liberalisation, the CGE model’s results suggest that the EU would benefit from the 
removal of tariffs in Canada, which as noted in the baseline are relatively high and likely to act as a 
deterrent to the EU’s trade of textiles, clothing and leather products with Canada. Specifically, the 
model projects that textiles, apparel and leather would all be expected to experience increases in output 
(Tables 81-86 Annex 6). Increases in overall exports across all three sub-sectors would similarly be 
expected over the long-term, with bilateral exports of apparel increasing by over $400 million over the 
long-term and exports of textiles and leather increasing by $235 million and $208 million, respectively. 
These increases in exports would be expected to improve the EU’s balance of trade of these products 
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with Canada by as much as $750 million over the long-term, helping to improve its global trade balance 
in textiles, apparel and leather by as much as $550 million.  
As noted in Box 18, the impact of tariff liberalisation under the CETA will be influenced by the rules of 
origin adopted. Less restrictive RoO may place slight downward pressure on the projected gains for the 
EU while allowing third countries such as the United States greater access to the EU’s market for textiles 
and apparel. However, where the CETA adopts rules that reflect EU preferences, it is likely that potential 
gains for Canada would be reduced, perhaps leading to greater gains for the EU industry. 
The CETA could enhance the gains projected to arise under tariff liberalisation if it is able to address a 
number of non-tariff barriers that have been identified as trade restricting by EU manufacturers. 
Specifically, the CETA could generate increased exports to Canada by ensuring that barriers to free 
circulation within Canada (e.g. in different labelling requirements at the provincial level) are eliminated. 
Further, the CETA’s chapter on IPR may also generate gains for the EU if it provides for greater 
enforcement of anti-counterfeiting measures and border seizures.  
For both Canada and the EU, outward FDI in the textiles sector is limited, and the sector represents a 
marginal amount of the EU’s investment in Canada and vice versa. Further, with restrictions on 
investment in the sector limited in both the EU and Canada, it is not envisaged that investment 
liberalisation would significantly alter the impacts already reported.  
Overall, the CETA is expected to benefit the EU’s manufacturers of textiles, clothing and leather 
products, with the removal of tariffs and resolution of NTBs likely to produce the greatest gains. Within 
the EU, the largest beneficiary is likely to be Italy (most notably in leather products, textile yarn and 
fabric, clothing, hand bags and travel goods and footwear) with lesser gains accruing to Germany 
(clothing, footwear and textile yarn and fabric) and France (leather products, handbags and travel goods, 
clothing and footwear). While small in terms of overall value, relative gains may also be significant for 
new Member States such as Bulgaria and Romania in the area of apparel.  
 
INDICATOR: Employment 
BASELINE 
Employment in Canada’s textile and clothing industry has witnessed significant declines in recent years, 
with the number employed in the textiles, apparel and footwear sector falling 45.4% since 2004 alone 
(Table 47).511  
 
Table 47: Employment in Canada’s textiles industry, 2004 & 2008 
Sector 2008 Employment Change since 2004 
Textiles 24,300 -45.6% 
Apparel 44,400 -46.5% 
Footwear 2,700 -28.9% 
Total 71,400 -45.4% 
Source: Industry Canada 
 
The EU textile industry employed 2.04 million in 2009, with the majority employed in the production of 
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clothing and apparel.512 As in Canada, the EU’s textile and clothing sector has experienced decreases in 
employment in recent years as increased exposure to competition from low cost providers has placed 
increasing pressure on EU manufacturers to adjust. As a result, the EU industry has shifted its focus 
towards production of more high value products, innovation and design and increasingly shifted 
production to such areas as the Euro-Mediterranean Zone. These trends are also similar across the EU’s 
footwear and leather industries with both exhibiting losses in employment in recent years.  
 
ANALYSIS 
Canada 
The overall impact on employment from the CETA will depend on the level of liberalisation as well as the 
rules of origin agreed to. The most positive impact would likely arise under full removal of tariffs and 
rules of origin that allowed a significant amount of exports from Canada to qualify for preferential tariffs. 
Hereto, CGE model results suggest that the full removal of all tariffs would likely have a small positive 
impact on employment in the textiles and apparel sector, with limited declines in employment for those 
engaged in the production of leather products. Conversely, scenarios that model less ambitious 
liberalisation of tariffs project minor declines in employment across all three sectors over the long-term. 
Across all scenarios, the overall impact on employment in Canada is observed to be limited (Table 88 
Annex 6).  
Restrictive rules of origin would likely stifle these small increases in employment for the sector or 
exacerbate projected declines in the demand for labour across the industry as whole. These declines in 
employment would most directly affect the industries in Quebec and Ontario as they are the leading 
producers of textiles, apparel and leather products in Canada.    
 
EU 
Overall, it would appear that the CETA is likely to positively impact employment in the EU’s textiles, 
apparel and leather sectors, with the magnitude of potential gains dependent on the level of tariff 
reductions, the removal of NTBs and the rules of origin agreed to.  Specifically, the CGE model estimates 
that the removal of tariffs in Canada would stimulate gains in employment within the EU by as much as 
0.1% in the textiles sector, 0.14% in apparel and 0.19% in leather manufacturing. Across all three 
industries, the greatest gains are observed in Scenario A. 
These gains would be particularly concentrated in the EU’s SMEs (less than 50 employees) as they are 
the driving force of activity and employment in the sector, accounting for more than 90% of 
employment and 60% of value added.513 As the industry’s largest producers are Italy, France, the UK, 
Germany and Spain – which together account for approximately 75% of production – it is likely that job 
increases will be concentrated in these Member States. Gains in the apparels sector, however, may 
provide greater relative benefits to southern and new Member States, particularly as this sector is more 
labour intensive. In terms of leather production, moreover, gains are again likely to benefit SMEs 
(around 20 employees) and in particular areas that have limited industrial diversity, most notably in the 
southern Member States of Italy, Spain and Portugal.514  
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SOCIAL ASSESSMENT 
 
INDICATOR: Worker displacement  
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Canada 
The CETA is not expected to lead to significant degrees of displacement in the textiles, apparel and 
leather manufacturing sectors and may in fact lead to job creation in these sectors. The outcome is 
largely contingent on the CETA fully removing tariffs in the EU while adopting rules of origin that are not 
overly restrictive to Canadian exports. Under such a scenario, it is possible that the CETA will generate a 
limited amount of jobs that could benefit lower skilled workers, particularly for migrants and women. If 
the CETA adopts restrictive rules of origin, it is possible that there may be minor amounts of 
displacement in these sectors, negatively impacting these social groups. Overall, however, the impact is 
expected to be minor.  
 
EU  
The economic modelling results suggest that employment within the EU’s textiles, apparel and leather 
manufacturing sectors will increase as a result of the CETA. Gains in employment would likely be 
greatest in the apparel and textiles sectors, with smaller nominal increases expected in the leather 
manufacturing sector.   
 
Table 48: Employment in the EU’s textile, clothing and leather manufacturing sectors   
Sector Employment  
Textiles 862,000 
Apparel 1,175,000 
Leather 50,800 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Overall, the CETA is expected to have a positive impact, though overall it is limited. The workforce in 
apparel and leather products is generally lower skilled than the industrial EU average and as such, gains 
for the industry could provide greater employment opportunities for lower skilled individuals who are 
typically more greatly impacted by prolonged periods of unemployment. To this end, expansion of the 
industry’s workforce could have a positive impact on poverty.  
Women make up a larger share of the apparel and leather sectors’ workforces, implying that increased 
employment could have positive gender effects. Further, with expansion of the industry into Eastern 
Europe, it is likely that women in these areas would disproportionately gain through the increased 
opportunities for employment.  
With respect to leather, employment in the sector often occurs in regions that have limited industrial 
diversity. To this end, increases in employment could benefit these regions by increasing opportunities 
and wages, while ensuring that communities that thrive on a specific type of production can continue to 
ensure an adequate livelihood.  
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INDICATOR: Quality & decency of work 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Canada 
The high rates of job losses in the textiles, apparel and leather manufacturing sectors in recent years are 
likely to engender feelings of job insecurity among those who have not lost their jobs. To the degree 
that the CETA adopts restrictive rules of origin, inducing labour to shift out of the sector, these 
perceptions of insecurity are likely to worsen, lowering job satisfaction and overall enjoyment of life. On 
the other hand, where tariff liberalisation is combined with less restrictive rules of origin, it is unlikely 
such an outcome will arise. 
Unionisation rates in textiles, apparel and leather products are lower than the national average and 
have exhibited significant decreases in recent years. Collective bargaining and the rights of association 
could, however, be strengthened by the CETA’s ability to reaffirm the ILO’s core labour standards (CLS) 
and under provisions that require Canada to ratify the ILO’s Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining 
Convention, 1949  (C.98). For detailed discussion on the social ramifications of the CETA as it pertains to 
core labour standards and the ILO’s Decent Work Agenda see Box 14 in the mining and metal 
manufacturing sector.  
 
EU 
According to Eurofound, the textiles, apparel and leather sector performs worse than the EU average in 
a number of work quality indicators, including515:  
 exposure to ambient and ergonomic risks; 
 control over the work process; 
 intensity of work; and 
 satisfaction with working conditions 
 
With increased employment in these sectors, it is possible that workers will be more greatly subjected 
to these negative aspects, lowering the overall quality level of work. Workers could see their labour 
standards improved somewhat over the long-term, however, through the inclusion of a chapter on trade 
and labour that makes commitments to better implementation of the ILO’s Core Labour Standards and 
Decent Work Agenda (See Box 14).  
 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 
 
 
Canada 
Given the minor projected changes in output that is expected to arise in the Canadian textiles industry 
as a result of the CETA, it is not expected that there will be a significant environmental impact.   
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EU 
Pressure placed on the EU textiles, clothing and leather industries to comply with environmental 
regulations has intensified in recent years.516 The primary issues revolve around reducing waste water 
levels, as well as combating the amount of chemicals contained in this water. In this regard, the leather 
industry, concentrated mostly in southern Europe, is the most hazardous. In addition to the liquid 
effluents produced in the clothing and textiles industry, the production of leather goods creates solid 
wastes which often contain chromium residue.  As well, leather ‘dust’ can be carcinogenic and causes 
allergies, both of which represent a threat to the local population.  Combined, the industries face a 
major challenge regarding its compliance with environmental legislation, not least due to a lack of 
trained individuals able to integrate these policies into the day-to-day running of the businesses 
The CGE model indicates for the EU that a CETA will have only moderate impact on output in the EU 
textiles, apparel and leather industries, leading to no changes in GHG emissions. 
Within this sector most companies operate at relatively small scale, thus are not obliged to submit 
pollutant data to the E-PRTR. Therefore very little data on the environmental impact of the industry is 
available, making a quantitative assessment difficult. Nonetheless, it is likely that the negative 
environmental effects of these industries – chemical waste and effluents, inefficient water usage – 
increase moderately, although with improved regulatory enforcement, these problems may be 
mitigated. 
 
 
5.2. USA, MEXICO & OTHER THIRD COUNTRIES 
 
USA 
Overall, the impact of the CETA on the industrial products sector in the United States is expected to be 
limited, with the magnitude of the impact dependent on the level of liberalisation. The primary impact is 
likely to be derived from the erosion of preferences with Canada vis-à-vis the EU and the accompanying 
trade diversion that is stimulated by increased integration between the two signatories of the 
Agreement. 
The elimination of tariffs between Canada and the EU could have the most direct impact on the textiles 
and transportation equipment sectors in the United States, given the high degree of integration 
observed in these industries in the U.S. and Canada. CGE estimates suggest that in the auto industry, full 
liberalisation could potentially lower output and exports in the United States, as Canada substitutes 
trade with the U.S. with trade with the EU. However, such an outcome is likely to be contingent on the 
CETA providing low rules of origin so as to allow Canadian manufacturers to qualify as ‘originating’ under 
the Agreement. Where the CETA adopts more stringent RoO, it is likely that the negative impact on the 
U.S. would be far less pronounced. Conversely, tariff liberalisation could stimulate increased output and 
exports of other transport equipment in the U.S. providing benefits to manufacturers of such 
equipment in the United States.  
With respect to textiles and apparel, the impact on the U.S. is likely to again be influenced by the rules 
of origin agreed to under the CETA. Given the significant degree of integration stimulated by NAFTA, it is 
                                                             
516 Eurofound (2004).  
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possible that a CETA that adopts less stringent rules of origin could foster declines in output and exports 
within the industry in the United States. Hereto, Canada’s trade with the U.S. would be diverted to the 
EU, worsening the US trade balance with Canada in these products.  
Other sectors are likely see limited changes in output and exports, though the overall impact is expected 
to be minimal.  
The social impact within the industrial products sector is generally expected to be minor. Overall gains, 
though small, in manufacturing would likely lead to the creation of jobs in this sector which would likely 
be seen as beneficial in many of the US’ declining manufacturing bases. Further, these sectors would 
likely provide a disproportionate amount of lower skilled jobs, benefitting those with lower skill sets and 
educational attainment.  
In terms of the environment, the outcome of the CETA would likely be negative as production in the U.S. 
would shift away from sectors such as the services and towards those that are generally marked by 
production processes that generate more of an environmental toll, including mining and metal 
manufacturing and transportation equipment. However, given the marginal increases in output 
predicted by the CGE model, environmental impacts should be modest.  In terms of GHG emissions, the 
results of the E3MG model show a neutral impact on the aggregate in the United States. 
 
 MEXICO 
Overall, the CETA is expected to have a negligible economic impact on Mexico’s industrial products 
sector. As with the United States, the primary impact is likely to be derived from the erosion of 
preferences with Canada vis-à-vis the EU but also of preferences enjoyed as a result of an FTA Mexico 
has with the EU. Changes at the sub-sectoral level are generally estimated to be limited, with the most 
prominent changes likely to again be observed in the automotive and textiles/apparel sectors.  
Specifically, CGE estimates suggest that full liberalisation could potentially lower output and exports in 
Mexico’s auto industry, largely as Canada diverts trade away from its NAFTA partner and toward the EU. 
However, such an outcome is likely to be highly contingent on the CETA providing low rules of origin so 
as to allow Canadian manufacturers to qualify as ‘originating’ under the Agreement. Where the CETA 
adopts more stringent RoO, it is likely that the negative impact on Mexico would be far less pronounced.   
With respect to textiles and apparel, the impact on Mexico is again likely to be influenced by the rules 
of origin agreed to under the CETA. Given the significant degree of integration stimulated by NAFTA, it is 
possible that a CETA that adopts less stringent rules of origin could foster declines in output and exports 
within the industry in Mexico.   
Other sectors would likely see limited changes in output and exports, though the breadth of the impact 
is expected to be minimal overall.  
In general, the limited economic impact of the CETA on Mexico will also likely engender a limited social 
and environmental impact.  
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OTHER THIRD COUNTRIES 
In most of the industrial sectors, the expected impacts from the CETA on Third Countries are not likely to 
be significant. This is due to the current high concentration of industrial activity within the EU and of 
existing trade patterns between the EU and other large economies such as China, India, the USA and the 
Russian Federation. The predicted shift in Canada with interests moving away from the extractive 
sectors and instead moving more towards developing profitable upstream industries, combined with a 
higher output from the EU, would open space for higher levels of imports of raw materials from Third 
Countries. Given the likeliness of higher input demands from the EU and an eventual expansion of FDI 
from the EU and Canada towards resource-rich LDCs, the impact might be more noticeable in the 
specific subsectors of the LDCs’ extractive industries.  
According to the preliminary CGE model results, the CETA will affect the EU and Canada differently in 
each sector, which, in turn, will produce varying effects on Third Countries. Table 49 summarises these 
effects and identifies the more affected Third Countries. 
The positive economic impact on Third Countries may be accompanied by positive social effects in terms 
of employment and income. In addition, if labour standards and domestic social policies are adequately 
formulated and implemented, a reduction in poverty and other vulnerabilities could also be expected. 
LDCs might also benefit from stronger regulation that could be introduced under CETA in order to 
harmonise environmental regulation between the EU and Canada.517  
                                                             
517 An example of this could be the Bill C-300 proposed in the House of Commons of Canada to promote corporate 
accountability for the activities of mining, oil or gas in developing countries. (Second Session, Fortieth Parliament, 57-58 
Elizabeth II, 2009) (http://www.parl.gc.ca). 
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Table 49. CETA expected effects on Third Countries (based on Scenario D – Full trade liberalisation and ambitious services liberalisation)  
  Sector EU Canada Effects on Third countries 
according to the CGE model 
Third Countries most likely affected 
(EU's providers at 90%) 
Observations 
Wood – 
logging 
Insignificant Positive and 
moderate 
Expected decrease in South 
American countries which the EU 
has trade agreements with. 
Potential increase in countries such 
as Uruguay, Paraguay, Brazil, 
Chile. Likely direct effect on 
demand of wood from Russia and 
the USA 
China, Russian Federation, USA, Latvia, 
Brazil, Switzerland, Indonesia, Estonia, 
Malaysia, Norway, Cameroon, Ukraine, 
Gabon, Lithuania, Cote d'Ivoire, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Thailand, Belarus 
This could change 
with agreements on 
investments 
Forest 
Paper Insignificant Negative 
and fairly 
insignificant 
  Pulp of wood: Brazil, USA, Chile, 
Norway, Uruguay, South Africa  
  
Coal Insignificant 
change 
Insignificant 
change 
Expected slight increase in USA, 
none in Mexico. 
   Mineral 
fuels 
and oils Petrol. 
and 
petrol. 
products 
Insignificant 
change 
Insignificant 
change 
No expected effects other than a 
minor increase due to a decrease in 
Canadian oil exports. 
Russian Federation, Norway, Libya, 
Algeria, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Nigeria, 
Saudi Arabia, USA, Iraq, Iran, Angola, 
Switzerland, Australia, Venezuela, 
Egypt, Qatar, Syria 
Liberalisation of 
investments may 
increase Canadian 
production of sand 
oil, which may reduce 
imports from Third 
countries 
Metal 
ores, 
gems 
Insignificant Insignificant Potential increase might come from 
other sectors demand of raw 
minerals.  
Brazil, South Africa, Peru, Chile, USA, 
Australia, Ukraine, Argentina, Mauritania, 
Russian Federation 
Overall positive effect 
on the USA and 
Mexico 
Mineral 
metals 
and non 
metals Ferrous 
metals 
(iron 
and 
steel) 
Insignificant 
decrease of 
steel 
Insignificant Increased competition from BRIC 
countries for raw materials 
Russian Federation, Ukraine, China, 
South Africa, Korea, USA, India, Turkey, 
Switzerland, Norway, Brazil, Japan, 
Serbia and Montenegro, Chinese Taipei, 
Macedonia, Kazakhstan, Mexico, 
Venezuela 
  
Auto. Increase Decrease   Japan, Turkey, USA, China, Korea, 
Mexico, India, Chinese Taipei, Brazil, 
South Africa 
  Auto 
and 
other 
trans. Other Decrease Decrease Increase in Mexico and USA idem   
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equip. trans. 
equip. 
Textile Moderate 
increase 
Insignificant Potential significant increase in 
LDCs 
China, India, Turkey, Pakistan, Korea, 
Mexico, Japan, Switzerland, USA, 
Chinese Taipei, Indonesia, Thailand, 
Egypt, Israel, Brazil, Tunisia  
  
Apparel Moderate 
increase 
Moderate 
increase 
Potential significant increase in 
LDCs 
 China, Turkey, Bangladesh, India, 
Morocco, Tunisia, Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Viet Nam, Sri Lanka, 
Pakistan, Thailand, Macedonia, Ukraine, 
Switzerland, Cambodia 
  
Textile, 
apparel 
and 
leather 
Leather Moderate 
increase 
Moderate 
decrease 
Potential moderate decrease in 
USA leather production 
China, Viet Nam, India, Indonesia, 
Tunisia, Brazil, Thailand, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Morocco 
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Environmental impacts 
In terms of environmental impact, the preliminary modelling shows that CETA may lead to insignificant 
changes in the Canadian and EU production of minerals, and a fairly insignificant decrease of coal 
exports. This last effect could be compensated for by increases in third countries, mostly in the ACP and 
MERCOSUR, thus shifting environmental impacts from Canada to these regions. However, given that 
most of the CETA effects refer to insignificant changes in the GDP of USA, Mexico, and China, and an 
overall decrease of GDP in most of the rest of third countries, the environmental impact of this 
reduction cannot be fully assessed due to a lack of quantitative environmental data on Third Countries 
by the specific sectors that will be affected.  
 
Metals and minerals 
INDICATOR: Natural resources stocks – Mineral usage, pollution 
BASELINE 
Under the current trade regime, the EU imports metal and mineral based commodities from Canada, but 
also from a large number of other trade partners. Table 50 lists the metal based commodities imported 
by the EU-27 to more than 2% from Canada, and the main other sources of imports. 
Table 50. Main sources of metal and mineral product import to the EU-27, 2007, in Mio. US$518: 
26 : ORES, SLAG AND 
ASH 
 28 : INORGANIC CHEMICALS; 
ORGANIC OR INORGANIC 
COMPOUNDS OF PRECIOUS 
METALS, OF... 
 71 : NATURAL OR 
CULTURED PEARLS, 
PRECIOUS OR SEMI-
PRECIOUS STONES, 
PRECIOUS... 
MERCOSUR 6,384  Canada 4,150  ACP 11,451 
Brazil 5,603  Russian Federation 3,242  South Africa 8,592 
ACP 3,350  United States 2,969  Switzerland 7,367 
United States 2,953  ACP 1,584  United States 5,067 
OPEC 2,835  China 1,513  Russian Fed. 3,584 
Chile 2,631  Norway 723  SAARC 3,213 
ASEAN 2,575  MERCOSUR 483  China 3,011 
Indonesia 2,553  Jamaica 478  India 2,907 
Australia 2,429  Niger 477  Israel 2,816 
Peru 2,086  Brazil 465  Canada 2,696 
Canada 2,033  Chile 457  OPEC 2,491 
 
                                                             
518 OECD 
EU-Canada SIA Final Report 
203 
75 : NICKEL AND ARTICLES 
THEREOF 
 76 : ALUMINUM AND ARTICLES 
THEREOF 
Russian Fed. 2,213  Norway 5,931 
Canada 1,858  Russian Fed. 4,335 
Australia 1,237  ACP 2,683 
United States 1,200  MERCOSUR 1,806 
Norway 442  Switzerland 1,772 
New Caledonia 291  Brazil 1,750 
MERCOSUR 239  Mozambique 1,616 
Brazil 238  China 1,547 
ACP 166  United States 1,304 
South Africa 144  OPEC 1,271 
Switzerland 70  Canada 1,225 
 
78 : LEAD AND ARTICLES THEREOF  81 : OTHER BASE METALS; CERMETS; 
ARTICLES THEREOF 
Australia 414  United States 1,706 
Morocco 120  China 1,371 
Peru 76  Russian Fed. 479 
Poland 70  Japan 443 
Kazakhstan 61  ACP 343 
Russian Fed. 52  Congo, Dem.Rep. 158 
OPEC 48  Canada 140 
Israel 48  Switzerland 137 
Canada 29  Kazakhstan 136 
Switzerland 29  Zambia 111 
China 29  Australia 82 
 
ANALYSIS 
The results from the CGE model and the additional considerations outlined above suggest insignificant 
change in Canada and the EU outputs, and a moderate decline in coal exports from Canada. Nonetheless, 
the EU will continue to consume large amounts of metals, minerals and mining products. Under this 
scenario the demand from the EU manufacturing industries will require importing a larger percentage of 
its commodities of these metals from Third Countries, potentially causing environmental impacts in 
these countries. However, this expansion is likely to induce the increase of wages for skilled labour. It 
might also have some effect on government revenue.  
Specifically, the imports of inorganic chemicals and ores from countries other than Canada are expected 
to increase, most notably from Brazil, the USA, Chile, and the Russian Federation. Assuming that these 
countries aim to meet the increased demand from the EU by increasing their production, the CETA will 
contribute to accelerated depletion of non-metal mineral resources in these countries.  
Regarding nickel, aluminium and lead products, the EU will substitute decreasing Canadian production 
of these materials with imports from third countries, notably from the Russian Federation, Australia, 
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Norway, the USA, and China.519 Therefore, in these countries the CETA will contribute to accelerated 
depletion of metal mineral resources in addition to water and air pollution due to the highly polluting 
production processes for these materials. 
Modelling results also predict limited increase in output of most of the rest of industrial sectors. This 
could lead to potential positive social impact by increasing employment opportunities. Its impact on the 
environment is not predictable at aggregated level 
 
                                                             
519 OECD 
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6. SERVICES SECTOR ASSESSMENTS520 
 
Summary 
Liberalisation in the services sector is likely to have a positive economic impact in the EU and Canada 
and has the potential to produce the greatest gains on both sides with a CETA that provides ambitious 
liberalisation in trade and investment in the services industries.  
The CETA is likely to lead to increases in output and exports of maritime transport services for both the 
EU and Canada. Increased merchandise trade resulting from the CETA will directly increase the demand 
for maritime transport services, increasing output and exports. Provisions in the CETA that would 
enhance the positive gains in these indicators would include liberalisation of feeder services and 
repositioning in Canada which would lower costs, increase competitiveness and efficiency and also spur 
greater levels of FDI in Canada’s maritime transport sector.  
While the CETA could contribute to the development of Canada’s underdeveloped short-sea shipping 
industry, it is less likely that the CETA would lead to wider liberalisation of cabotage in general.  
Additional related benefits include the upgrading of Canada’s maritime fleet through the potential 
removal of prohibitive tariffs on imported new vessels as well as increased investment in Canada’s ports 
and greater attractiveness as ports-of-call vis-à-vis U.S. ports along the Atlantic, St. Lawrence and Great 
Lakes. In the EU, large shipping firms are likely to benefit directly through increased access to Canada as 
well as through improved global competitiveness.  
The CETA has the potential to significantly impact the Canadian telecom sector, primarily through its 
ability to liberalise Canada’s foreign ownership restrictions. If the CETA results in the removal of these 
restrictions, it is likely that the economic impact in Canada will be pronounced, with sizeable increases in 
inward FDI, output and exports occurring over the long-term. Additional benefits would occur through 
improved competitiveness in the industry, which would serve to enhance technological acquisition of 
                                                             
520 Introductory notes: This section contains an analysis of the economic, social and environmental impacts expected from the 
CETA on the services industry in the EU and Canada as well as in third countries. The scoping analysis has flagged 4 sub-sectors 
within the services industry which will be individually assessed for the EU and Canada: transportation services, 
telecommunications, financial services and business services. These four sub-sectoral analyses for Canada and the EU are 
followed by a broader assessment for other third countries such as Mexico and the United States which addresses only those 
areas within their services industries that are likely to be impacted by the CETA.  
 
The economic assessment is derived largely from a CGE model that estimates the impact of the CETA on output, exports, 
balance of trade and employment. Four liberalisation scenarios were modelled in the final simulations, with each modelling full 
removal of tariffs on all industrial products and cuts in service trade costs as noted in Annex 1. The difference between these 
four scenarios is in i) tariff liberalisation applied to sensitive agricultural products; and ii) the assumed liberalisation of the 
services sector, with Scenarios B and D employing a more ambitious liberalisation in services (taking as its basis the cuts used in 
the 2008 Joint Study) and Scenarios A and C a less ambitious liberalisation in services (taking the cuts in Scenario B/D multiplied 
by a factor of 0.6).  
 
It is important to note that results (located in Annex 6) should be interpreted as reflecting the impact of the CETA itself on these 
indicators and does not necessarily imply overall changes in the country’s output or exports, which could be further affected by 
exogenous factors.  All estimated impacts are to be understood as occurring over the long-term (e.g. in 10+ years) after final 
implementation of an Agreement. As data limitations made it impossible to incorporate investment effects into the CGE model, 
the results take into account the impact of trade liberalisation only and do account for the impact from investment 
liberalisation, which is instead assessed qualitatively.  
 
More information on the CGE model, its assumptions and the scenarios employed can be found in Annex 1. 
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Canadian telecom companies and help to stimulate their expansion into foreign markets. Canadian 
consumers would likely benefit substantially from reduced prices, improved service and wider selection. 
EU telecom companies would also benefit by increased access to the Canadian market, spurring 
increased investment through establishment and acquisitions. While such an outcome may not impact 
output and cross-border trade within the EU, it would benefit EU exports via mode 3. Additional benefits 
could be achieved by the CETA’s granting of non-discriminatory access to infrastructure and networks, 
though this is likely to have less of an impact than the removal of ownership restrictions.  
The CETA is unlikely to have a pronounced economic impact on output, trade (as it pertains to cross-
border trade and sales through foreign affiliates) and investment in the financial services sector of either 
Canada or the EU. Restrictions are already generally low in both jurisdictions, with the main barriers to 
trade and investment generally viewed as prudential. Specifically, the ‘widely-held’ rule is generally 
credited with fostering the soundness of the Canadian financial system and is also non-discriminatory by 
applying equally to Canadian and foreign firms. Where the CETA is likely to impact the financial services 
sector is through its ability to legally bind the existing levels of liberalisation, ensuring their future 
continuation and providing a positive signal to investors on both sides of the Atlantic. Further, the CETA 
could improve transparency by requiring Canadian Provinces to list their limitations to financial services. 
Such an outcome, while unlikely to engender significantly different levels of production, trade and 
investment, would nevertheless be positive, if limited, in its overall impact. 
The CETA is expected to have a positive economic impact on non-financial business services within both 
Canada and the EU, with greater gains likely to accrue under an agreement that provides higher degrees 
of liberalisation. However, given the absence of restrictions for most sub-sectors within the business 
services sector, the overall impact from the CETA may be limited, and instead serve to make the existing 
level of liberalisation legally binding. Nevertheless, liberalisation could yield benefits in certain subsectors 
where specific barriers are present, while improvements in the temporary movement of labour could 
serve to benefit trade and investment across the entire sector. Liberalisation of both at-the-border and 
behind-the-border restrictions on temporary movement of professionals would likely serve to increase 
the level of cross-border trade as well as the investment and trade occurring via foreign affiliates, 
providing greater benefits than those estimated in the CGE model. In order to realise the greatest gains, 
it will be important for the CETA to foster mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) allowing professionals 
to have their qualifications/certificates recognised in both Canada and the EU. This, however, is 
complicated by the fact that the authority to sign MRAs resides with professional organisations at the 
national/provincial level. The CETA could, however, help to facilitate MRAs by developing a framework 
for their negotiation, which could help facilitate temporary movement of professionals between the two 
sides.  
The social impact arising from the CETA’s effect on the services sector is likely to be limited. While it is 
questionable that the CETA will require all EU Member States to ratify the ILO’s Maritime Labour 
Convention (MLC), it could nevertheless have a positive impact on quality and decency of work by 
putting in place a mechanism for cooperation and dialogue on labour issues as well as promotion of the 
ILO’s MLC in third countries. The CETA could also commit to greater collaboration on safety and security 
issues associated with maritime transport services. 
There are concerns in Canada that the liberalisation of foreign ownership restrictions in telecom could 
indirectly compromise Canadian cultural objectives given the increasing vertical integration of telecom 
companies that is blurring the line between carrier and content provider. It is unclear whether carriage 
can be effectively separated from content, though to the degree that domestic policy can be effectively 
structured so as to maintain Canadian content requirements, it is envisaged that any adverse effect on 
culture can be mitigated.  
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The CETA’s environmental impacts arising from liberalisation in the services sector are likely to be minor 
in the EU and Canada. The greatest impact is likely to arise in the transportation services as significant 
growth in maritime transport across the Atlantic is expected. This could lead to increased pressures on 
watercourses as a result of increased traffic and infrastructure demand as well as increased GHG 
emissions. At the same time, any adverse impact could be partly offset if EU investment in Canada 
supports a shift from road to maritime transportation, particularly through the development of Canada’s 
short-sea shipping industry.  
To the degree that expansion in the services sector attracts resources away from more environmentally 
harmful sectors (such as in the manufacturing and extractive industries), the environmental impact from 
the CETA could be mitigated over the long-term.  
 
 
6.1. EU & CANADA 
 
As is typical in developed economies, the services sector has become the predominant source of 
economic activity in both Canada and the EU. Services account for nearly 60% of Canada’s total value-
added and over 70% of its employment, and for approximately 65% and 63% of value-added and 
employment, respectively, in the EU.521 With both economies more heavily oriented towards services, 
there is significant potential for a CETA between the EU and Canada to generate its greatest gains as a 
result of liberalisation within the sector.522  
This potential is further influenced by the fact that the existing applied tariffs on goods in EU-Canada 
bilateral trade are, on average, low.523 Services, on the other hand, are not levied with tariffs due to 
their high degree of intangibility, and are instead subject to a number of non-tariff barriers (NTBs). Non-
tariff barriers to trade and investment in services can take a number of forms such as foreign equity 
restrictions and commercial presence requirements but are largely based – especially between OECD 
countries such as Canada and many EU Member States – on the degree to which sectoral regulations 
differ between two jurisdictions.524 While NTBs are prevalent in the bilateral trade of goods (e.g. SPS 
issues in agriculture), they are particularly pronounced in trade and investment within the services 
sector; most notably due to the sector’s greater contribution to GDP in both economies as well as the 
fact that all restrictions are in the form of NTBs.  
However, the fact that restrictions to trade in services are solely in the form of NTBs makes analysis of 
the impact of liberalisation through the CETA inherently more complicated than in the goods sector. This 
is largely a result of the difficulty in both identifying these barriers and quantifying them, with a widely 
agreed to methodology for doing so still in its early stages.   
                                                             
 
521 WTO Statistical Database 
522 See specifically the 2008 Joint Study as well as The Conference Board of Canada’s 2010 study ‘Canada’s “Missing” Trade With 
the European Union’ which have reached similar conclusions as to the CETA’s potential impact.  
523 According to the 2008 Joint Study, Canadian goods exported to the EU faced an average applied tariff rate of only 2.2% in 
2007, whereas EU exports to Canada faced a rate of only 3.5%.  
524 Nordas, H.K. and H. Kox (2009).  
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Further complicating an assessment of services trade and investment and the impact from liberalisation 
is the fact that trade in services can generally be conceptualised as occurring (independently or 
simultaneously) across four modes, which as defined by the WTO consist of525: 
 Mode 1 – Cross border supply: services from one country flowing to another country; 
 Mode 2 – Consumption abroad: where a service consumer moves into another county to obtain 
a service;  
 Mode 3 – Commercial presence: where a service supplier establishes a presence in another 
country to provide  a service; and 
 Mode 4 – Presence of natural persons: where persons of a country enter another country to 
supply a service. 
The existence of these different modes implies that when measuring the potential impact of 
liberalisation one must have an understanding of not only the barriers to trade, but also how these 
barriers manifest themselves across each of the four modes through which services can be delivered. 
OECD countries (like Canada and many EU Member States) typically have low explicit barriers to services 
trade, with the majority of the factors inhibiting market access stemming from different approaches to 
regulation.526 Differences in regulations between Canada and the EU raise compliance costs, impacting 
trade both with respect to overall trade flows but also by determining which of these 4 modes serve as 
the dominant method of trading the service. 
Liberalisation of the services sector, therefore, cannot be captured in the same way as liberalisation of 
trade in goods – i.e. primarily through analysis of cross-border trade. While cross-border trade in 
services (mode 1) is significant – and has been bolstered through advancements in ICT that have 
lowered communication costs and enhanced the ability of service providers to serve customers in 
distant locales – for many subsectors within the services industry, the majority of trade occurs not 
across borders but rather by establishing a commercial presence in a foreign market (mode 3). This is 
particularly the case in terms of EU-Canada bilateral trade in services, as commercial presence tends to 
be more dominant when two countries share similar regulations, business environments and a common 
language.527 To this end, a 2010 study by The Conference Board of Canada finds that sales by foreign 
affiliates serve a far larger role in bilateral trade than do cross-border exports and that this is particularly 
the case for the services sector.528  
This conceptualisation of trade in services as including other modes of delivery besides just cross-border 
trade highlights several key points. First, trade in services is generally underrepresented in trade 
statistics. Second, with foreign affiliate trade in services (FATS) playing such a predominant role in not 
only bilateral trade in services, but also total bilateral trade, the issue of establishment (i.e. Mode 3) 
becomes a focal point of any assessment on liberalisation in the services sector.  
                                                             
525 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/gatsqa_e.htm#4 
526 Nordas, H.K. and H. Kox (2009).  
527 Ibid. 
528 Goldfarb, D. & L. Theriault (2010).  
 
In fact, under the authors’ methodology, it is found that when including sales from EU affiliates located in Canada, trade in 
services from the EU to Canada are nearly identical to EU goods trade with Canada in 2008.  
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It is therefore, almost impossible to conduct an assessment of a CETA’s impact on the services sector 
without examining potential barriers to establishment by foreign firms. And, as establishing a local 
presence in a foreign market is most commonly accomplished through FDI (with mergers and 
acquisitions constituting the primary form of establishment),  an assessment of the CETA’s impact on the 
services sector must also take into account the role of potential liberalisation in investment within the 
sector (See Box 19 for problems in measuring FATS and FDI).529  
 
Box 19: FDI versus FATS530 
 
While foreign direct investment and foreign affiliate trade statistics are closely related there is an 
important difference in the manner which they are statistically measured. Within the EU, for example, 
Eurostat has clearly defined rules for classifying when and to whom to accumulate statistics on 
investment and foreign affiliate trade. One such rule is the 50%-10% rule, which counts outward FATS 
only when the company established abroad is majority EU owned. This is in contrast to FDI statistics 
which count outward FDI as occurring when an EU company controls 10% or more of voting power. 
Another distinction is in the ultimate controlling institution (UCI) and immediate counterparty country, 
where FATS are assigned to the UCI (or parent company) while FDI may be misrepresented by being 
assigned to its most immediate destination even though it may be destined for a third country.531  
These classifications certainly lead to discrepancies in the statistics, with FATS likely to be 
underrepresented and FDI not necessarily reflecting the actual level of investment that may take place 
bilaterally between two trading partners.  
 
 
Canadian FDI in the EU has grown substantially over the past several decades and has been a primary 
driver of foreign affiliate sales in the EU. Of the total stocks of Canadian FDI located in the EU in 2008, 
80% ($121 billion) was held in the services sector, further supporting the claim that mode 3 trade in 
services plays an important role in bilateral trade of services. While services play a less predominant role 
in EU FDI in Canada (39.6% of $164 billion invested by the EU in Canada in 2008), the sector has 
experienced annual growth in investment of approximately 10% since 2000, which is nearly twice the 
rate of growth in EU investment in Canada’s goods sector.532  
An additional restriction on bilateral trade in services relates to the temporary movement of business 
persons between jurisdictions (mode 4).533 These restrictions generally come in the form of difficulties 
with regards to the recognition of professional qualifications (e.g. licences or certifications); difficulties 
in receiving work visas; and citizenship requirements that restrict the ability of a professional to deliver a 
service in a jurisdiction in which they are not a citizen/resident.  In a bilateral context, mode 4 is likely to 
play a more prominent role in EU-Canada trade of services than it would with other trade partners. This 
                                                             
529 Ghemar et al. (2005).  
530 See: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Balance_of_payments_-_FATS 
531 For example, investments that are sent from Canada to the Cayman Islands and then to the EU would be classified as being 
investment from the latter.  
532 Goldfarb, D. & L. Theriault (2010).   
533 See specifically: Goldfarb and Theirault (2010), Ghemer et al (2005) and the 2008 Joint Study among others.  
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is supported by data from the 2006 Canadian census which shows that Europeans make up 
approximately 21% of all temporary workers in Canada.534  
Measuring mode 4 is, however, again complicated by a lack of data, and by the fact that it is often 
complementary to other modes (most notably 1 and 3). So, while modes 1 and 3 may account for more 
than 80% of global trade in services, mode 4 is often a key facilitating factor to trade in services that is 
measured primarily through cross-border trade or a sale by a foreign affiliate.535 Further, as mode 4 
commitments tend to entail a greater degree of sensitivity than modes 1 and 3, its liberalisation is 
generally crafted along different parameters.536   
In summary, the economic assessment of the CETA’s impact on the services sector is complicated by: 
 the 4 modes through which trade in services can occur; 
 the lack of data on trade in services – particularly through modes 3 and 4 – and the possibility of 
several mode occurring simultaneously in certain delivery of services; and  
 the fact that restrictions to trade in services are entirely made up of NTBs and the limited data 
on these restrictions leading to inherent subjectivity in quantifying their cost and impact on 
trade. 
It is important to recognise these limitations when interpreting the results of economic modelling, and 
to note that the results estimated by the CGE model are likely to be understated by failing to account for 
the sizeable role that services have in bilateral trade and investment.  
 
6.1.1. Transportation Services 
 
ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT537 
 
INDICATOR: Output, trade & investment 
BASELINE 
Transportation services are crucial to the global economy. They facilitate the trade of goods and 
movement of people while ensuring that countries are able to receive a stable supply of food, energy 
                                                             
534 Thomas, D. (2010).   
535 Roy, M., et al (2006).    
536 Ibid.  
537 CGE results for the transportation services sector are reported according to the GTAP database sectoral aggregation which 
divides the industry across maritime transportation services (water), air transportation services, and all other transportation 
services sectors. The latter of these primarily includes land transportation such as road and rail, but also pipeline transport and 
travel agencies.  
 
The impact of the CETA on Canada and the EU’s air transportation services is likely to be minimal, as the recently agreed to 
Canada-EU Air Transport Agreement has addressed measures to improve bilateral trade in this area (See Box 20). As such, the 
primary impact of the CETA on transportation services is expected to be largely in maritime services, and the focus of the 
following assessment will largely be placed here.  
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and other key commodities. Changes in technology538  and increased liberalisation have allowed 
transportation services to function more effectively and efficiently while improving service and 
ultimately pushing down prices for consumers worldwide.  
Within the EU, transportation services539 generated turnover of $1.66 trillion in 2007, contributing 
approximately $685 billion in gross valued added (4.6% of the EU total). Of this, maritime transportation 
accounted for $144.3 billion in turnover.540 Similarly, transportation services accounted for 4.5% of 
Canada’s GDP in 2009.541 Herein, truck transportation is the largest sector, followed by transit and 
ground passenger transportation, air transportation and rail transportation. Maritime transport, as 
shown in Figure 5, accounts for only a minor percentage of output in the transportation services sector 
in Canada.  
 
Figure 5: Output of transportation services in Canada by subsector (2009) 
 
Source: Statistics Canada 
 
While the above statistics show that maritime transport services provide only a marginal direct 
contribution to GDP in both Canada and the EU, this data does not reflect the essential role the sector 
has as a facilitator of trade. Approximately 90% of the world’s freight is delivered by sea and, in many 
                                                             
538 As an example, containerisation is one of the most important technological advancements in the history of maritime 
transport services, with standardisation of intermodal containers drastically improving efficiency in shipping and lowering 
transport costs.  
539 Includes storage, warehousing and other auxiliary activities 
540 EC (2010b)  
541 Statistics Canada 
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instances, maritime transport serves as the only means of effectively delivering goods to foreign 
markets.  Maritime transport is particularly important in the EU, with approximately 40% of its internal 
trade occurring via short sea shipping and 90% of its external freight delivered through maritime 
services.542 The EU, as a whole, serves as a global leader in maritime transport services with three of the 
world’s five largest container lines based in the EU.543 While only about 20% of the world’s fleet flies an 
EU flag, EU ownership is over 30%, with Greece and Germany serving as two of the leading shipping 
countries worldwide.544 The EU’s maritime industry displays a sophisticated level of technology and 
specialisation, boasting some of the world’s most technologically advanced off-shore service companies, 
and the largest roll-on/roll-off (Ro-Ro) and merchant fleets.545  
Canada, in contrast, does not own a significant portion of the global shipping industry, maintaining only 
approximately 1% of the world’s fleet.546 Nevertheless, Canada does place similar importance on the 
shipping industry as a facilitator and promoter of trade. Canada boasts a significant amount of coastline 
as well as important commercial inland waterways in the Great Lakes/St. Lawrence system that 
stretches from the Atlantic to the central United States. While maritime transport accounts for only one-
fifth of Canada’s trade with the U.S. (due to the extensive land border between the two), it accounts for 
approximately 95% of merchandise exports from Canada to other countries, making it particularly 
important in terms of bilateral trade with the EU.547 
In trade of maritime transport services, modes 1 and 3548 serve as the most relevant means by which 
international trade in maritime services occurs, with the former generally entailing liner shipping and 
bulk/tramp and other international shipping. For both Canada and the EU, international trade in 
transport services constitutes the second largest traded service (after travel services) occurring via mode 
1. For Canada, transport services accounted for approximately 20% of the value of all cross-border trade 
in services (mode 1) in 2007 ($29.5 billion), with maritime transport accounting for 38.1% of this 
amount.549 Canada, however, operates a significant trade deficit in mode 1 trade of transportation 
services with imports of $18.5 billion in 2007, compared to exports of $11.1 billion.550 This is similarly 
the case for its trade in maritime transport services, with total imports reaching $7.8 billion in 2007 
compared to exports of $3.5 billion. In the EU, transportation services account for approximately one 
quarter of all mode 1 trade in services.551 Exporting $168.65 billion in transportation services in 2007, 
the EU maintained a trade surplus of $27.95 billion in the sector.552 As with Canada, the largest 
externally traded transportation service in the EU is maritme transport, which accounted for over half of 
the value (73% by volume) of the EU’s total external trade in transportation services in 2008.553  
With total bilateral trade of $7.62 billion in 2007, transportation services form the single largest traded 
service (via mode 1) between the EU and Canada, accounting for approximately 31% of total bilateral 
cross-border trade in services. Unsurprisingly then, the EU is Canada’s second most important partner in 
mode 1 trade of transportation services (behind the US), accounting for a quarter of Canada’s total 
                                                             
542 European Commission (DG TREN). http://ec.europa.eu/transport/maritime/index_en.htm 
543 AP-Moller-Maersk (Denmark), CMA CGM (France) and Hapag-Lloyd (Germany) 
544 Optimar (2010).   
545 Group of Senior Shipping Professionals (2008).   
546 Optimar (2010).   
547 ACPA. http://www.acpa-ports.net/ 
548 See opening discussion under the Services Sector Assessments for a description of the 4 modes of trade in services as well as 
an outline of the nuances in measuring them.  
549 UN Service Trade database 
550 Ibid.  
551 Eurostat 
552 Ibid.  
553 EC (2010b) 
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mode 1 imports of transport services and and about 27.5% of its total mode 1 exports.554 Separated by 
the Atlantic, trade in maritime transport services plays an even larger role in bilateral cross-border trade 
in services. With the EU accounting for 27% of Canada’s total cross-border trade in maritime services 
(42% of Canada’s exports and 20% of its imports), the EU represents Canada’s largest parter for mode 1 
trade in maritime transport services.555 Overall, the EU maintained a slight trade surplus in 2007 with 
exports of maritime transport services to Canada totalling $1.57 billion compared to imports of $1.46 
billion, which combined represented 12.3% of total trade in services (mode 1) between the two sides.  
For Canada and the EU, mode 3 trade in transportation services generally entails the establishment of 
registered companies for the purpose of operating a fleet under the national flag of either Canada or an 
EU Member State, and other forms of establishment for provision of international maritime transport 
services. These ‘other forms’ can be broad but in many instances may take the form of an affiliate office 
that specialises in marketing (e.g. in securing sales for its services from customers located abroad). In 
both instances, the issue is difficult to separate from foreign investment and complicated further by the 
lack of detailed data on foreign establishments in the maritime transport sector in both the EU and 
Canada.  
Outward investment in maritime transport services is greater than inward investment for both Canada 
and the EU. This is generally unsurprising given the movement over the past several decades to register 
fleets in open registry countries (e.g. Panama and Liberia) in order to capitalise from less restrictive 
regulations and cheaper labour markets. For example, maritime transport services accounted for 
approximately 36.3% (€12.9 billion) of the EU’s FDI stocks in transport services abroad in 2005 and 
exceeded inward FDI stocks by over €5.5 billion.556 Canada, however, serves as an almost non-entity in 
the EU’s foreign investment in maritime transport services, accounting for less than 0.2% of all stocks 
the EU had invested abroad in maritime transport as of 2005.557 Canada, meanwhile, has directed 
limited funds to the EU’s transport sector with only €27 million in FDI stocks in the EU’s maritime sector 
in 2005.  Overall, the transportation services sector has been a marginal recipient of Canada’s outward 
and inward FDI with the sector holding only 3.7% of all Canadian stocks residing abroad in 2009 (C$22.05 
billion) and 1.6% (C$8.9 billion) of all inward FDI stocks.558  
 
Box 20: Canada-EU Air Transport Agreement 
 
As noted in the introduction, the impact of the CETA on air transport services is likely to be minimal due 
to the Agreement on Air Transport between Canada and the European Community and its Member 
States (the Agreement) which was reached in December 2009.  For both Canada and the EU, the 
Agreement marks one of the most ambitious air agreements reached to date and establishes an Open 
Aviation Area between the two sides.559 The Agreement replaces bilateral agreements between Canada 
and individual EU Member States and is particularly noteworthy as 8 Member States previously had no 
such agreement with Canada (Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia and 
Slovenia).  
                                                             
554 UN Service Trade database 
555 Ibid.  
556 Eurostat (2008).  
557 Eurostat (2008).  
558 Statistics Canada. While this is a fairly limited amount for Canada, it should be noted that the sector saw its total inward 
investment increase by over 123% from 2008 to 2009. 
559 DG Transport. http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air/international_aviation/country_index/canada_en.htm 
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The Agreement is comprehensive and covers a number of areas including traffic rights and investment, 
safety and security, competition policy, consumer interests, environment and air traffic management. In 
terms of traffic rights and investment, specifically, the Agreement provides for a significant degree of 
liberalisation between the two sides, including560:  
 unrestricted direct air service between Canada and EU Member states without limitations on 
price and the number of flights; 
 flexible pricing arrangements; 
 improved flexibility for cargo; and 
 gradual liberalisation of foreign ownership rules that will allow EU nationals (Canadian nationals) 
to establish operations in Canada (the EU) while allowing investment in domestic airlines. 
 
For both sides, the Agreement will allow for greater penetration into each others’ respective market 
while fostering competition and the development of new services. Further, according to a study 
commissioned by the EC, the Agreement has the potential to bring economic benefits totalling a 
minimum a €72 million and the creation of 1,000 direct jobs in the first year alone.561 
Given the Agreement’s scope and significant degree of liberalisation, it is envisaged that the CETA would 
be limited in its ability to liberalise the sector and impact the 3 pillars of sustainability discussed in this 
report. As such, and as mentioned above, this sector will forego detailed discussion on air transport 
services and the subsequent impact that a CETA would have on these services in Canada, the EU and 
other third countries.562  
 
 
ANALYSIS 
The CETA has the potential to impact maritime transportation services in Canada and the EU in a 
number of ways. Most directly, transport services, particularly maritime transport, are inextricably tied 
to trade. So, to the degree that the CETA increases merchandise trade between Canada and the EU, it is 
likely that transportation services will directly benefit from increased traffic and demand.   
Given its global nature, the maritime transport industries in the EU and Canada would likely be best 
served by approaching liberalisation in a multilateral context rather than through bilateral preferential 
agreements such as the CETA. However, binding commitments on maritime services in the WTO have 
been largely unsuccessful (Box 21), providing opportunity for the CETA to address specific issues 
bilaterally that could ultimately benefit the maritime transport industries of both sides beyond just 
increased trade. 
 Preferential agreements in maritime transport can generally include three types of preferences: (i) 
cargo sharing agreements (CSAs); (ii) commercial presence; and (iii) access to ports and related services 
for foreign vessels.563  
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
560 DG Transport: http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air/international_aviation/country_index/canada_en.htm; Transport Canada. 
http://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/mediaroom/releases-nat-2008-08-h237e-2737.htm 
561 http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1963&format=HTML&language=en 
562 While estimates derived from the CGE analysis on air transportation services can be observed in the Annex, it is strongly 
recommended that the reader interpret these loosely. 
563 Bertho, F. (2010).   
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Box 21: WTO negotiations on maritime transport services 
 
As noted, WTO negotiations have failed to result in a binding multilateral agreement on maritime 
transport services. Under WTO negotiations, commitments on maritime transport services have been 
structured around three main pillars of access: (i) international ocean transport (international transport 
less cabotage, for which a number of countries have limited enthusiasm to include in negotiations), (ii) 
maritime auxiliary services (e.g. cargo handling services, storage and warehousing, customs clearance 
services, container station and depot services, maritime agency services, and maritime freight 
forwarding services) and (iii) access to and use of ports. In 2005, WTO members collectively 
recommended the maritime model schedule (MMS) calling for the ‘elimination of cargo reservations, of 
restrictions on foreign equity participation and on the right to establish a commercial presence both for 
international freight transport and for maritime auxiliary services’ as well as for ‘additional 
commitments on access to/use of port services and multimodal transport services as well as for the 
elimination of MFN exemptions’.564 The MMS remains the basis for making commitments on maritime 
transport services under multilateral negotiations.  
 
 
The first of these, CSAs, are a type of cargo reservation and constitute one of the most common forms of 
protectionism in maritime transport.565 CSAs have, however, largely disappeared from the international 
landscape and are not present in terms of bilateral trade between Canada and the EU. Further, given the 
protectionist nature of CSAs and their negative impact on consumers, it would appear highly unlikely 
that the CETA would include such measures. Instead, the CETA would most likely serve to guard against 
the future outbreak of possible protectionist measures such as CSAs between the EU/Canada and a third 
country.  
In terms of the second, most major ship-owning countries – with the exception of open registry 
companies – attach conditions to ownership and management before a ship can be accepted on their 
register. These conditions usually relate to minimum requirements on equity participation by nationals, 
and national requirements in management, among others. While there is potential for the CETA to 
extend national treatment to the EU and Canada in terms of establishment, it is not clear that the 
Agreement would significantly alter the status quo of establishment already in place in each. Canada, 
specifically, requires that a foreign company must open an office in its territory if it wishes to operate an 
international line to or from Canada. This requirement is in place, at least partially, to grant Canada 
jurisdiction over a company for safety and security reasons (e.g. in cases of shipwreck) and not likely a 
measure designed to grant preferences to domestic companies.566  
With respect to port and auxiliary services, market access restrictions are most commonly present in 
terms of restrictions on providers of port services (e.g. cargo handling, stevedoring, freight forwarding, 
storage and warehousing, and customs clearance services) and the restriction on foreign ownership of 
                                                             
564 WTO. http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/transport_e/transport_maritime_e.htm 
565 Cargo reservation schemes require that part of the cargo carried in trade with other states must be transported only by 
flagships or ships interpreted as national. Cargo sharing with trading partners is formed under the auspices of bilateral or multi-
lateral agreement. In essence, CSAs are protectionist measures and therefore welfare reducing, by ultimately raising prices for 
consumers.  
566 Bertho, F. (2010).   
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ports. The CETA is likely to ensure national treatment in terms of access to and use of port services (e.g. 
pilotage, towing and tug assistance, etc.), though it unclear whether it will liberalise port ownership. 
Port ownership regulations can vary not just between Canada and the EU but also between Member 
States, with many governments wishing to maintain varying degrees of control/ownership over ports 
due to security concerns.567  
Further to these three types of liberalisation, the EU has been active in pushing for liberalisation in 
maritime transport services on two issues that go beyond those based on the MMS as outlined in Box 21. 
These include: (i) ‘repositioning of equipment (mainly empty containers)’; and (ii) ‘opening of "feeder" 
services for international cargo (i.e. operation of ships between hubs and local ports within a 
country)’.568 Were these to be included in the CETA, it is likely that their inclusion would have a positive 
impact on the maritime transport services sector in both countries, but primarily for providers from the 
EU.  
In terms of ‘reposition of equipment’, if EU carriers were allowed to reposition empty containers within 
Canada by their own means, costs could conceivably be reduced, improving the efficiency with which 
providers delivered their service. This assertion is based on assessments that cite that the costs of 
repositioning as fairly significant, particularly given the degree of competitiveness within the industry.569 
Such costs are usually derived from the fact that once containers are delivered to their final customer, 
they become scattered across different locations, requiring that they must be returned to the carrier or 
a container depot for reloading, which can be a costly procedure to organise externally.570  
With respect to ‘feeder’ services between hubs and local ports within a country, such a commitment is, 
in essence, a type of cabotage that is directed towards achieving cost reductions. In international trade, 
the feeder system is intricately involved in the evolution of the more efficient hub and spoke system, 
which in maritime transport, takes the form of long shipments from main ports (hubs) followed by the 
distribution of cargo via smaller vessels called feeders.571 Higher capacity utilisation ratios allow vessels 
to achieve economies of scale, with the higher the ratio, the lower the unit cost. However, the large 
sizes such economies of scale engender (as would be the case in trans-Atlantic shipping), limit the 
number of port of calls of a vessel due to the draught and cargo handling capacity limitations at most 
ports.572 Likewise, a vessel would desire to limit the number of ports of call in order to reduce such costs 
as handling costs, port dues and port dwell time. Feeder services address both issues by allowing cargo 
to be shipped by feeder vessels from a few hub ports to local ports across a territory. Such a system 
allows large vessels to carry larger amounts of cargo (i.e. a higher utilisation rate) and hence realise 
economies of scale, while it also allows for costs to be saved in storage and handling costs by – when run 
effectively – reducing the overall time containers need to be stored in container yards on terminals.573 
Further, the ability for large international carriers to be more directly involved in the entire transport 
chain implies that these carriers would more easily be able to trace cargo and control quality, limiting 
the likelihood that the process of logistics would experience problems. These aspects further combine to 
ultimately lower cost.   
                                                             
567 Ports in Canada are government owned and managed with terminals, in some cases, leased to third parties (including 
foreign operators). Whereas the UK has completely privatised its port system, other major economies in the EU maintain some 
level of government ownership/control. France, Italy and Germany, for example, maintain ownership of some (if not all) ports 
choosing to allow private operators to run them through a leasing arrangement.  
568 EC (2004b).    
569 Hastings (1997) claims that these costs may reach 8% of the overall costs entailed in a shipment.   
570 Brooks, M.R. (2009).   
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572 Zhang, H.B. (2005 ) 
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Canada 
In and of itself, the CETA’s likelihood of increasing merchandise trade implies that the Agreement is 
likely to positively impact output and trade in maritime services in Canada. This assertion is supported 
by the CGE modelling results which project that output will increase by 1.89% to 3.52%, with greater 
increases occurring under a CETA that provides greater liberalisation of goods and for the sector (Tables 
89-96 Annex 6). While such an increase represents a significant percentage change, it should be 
remembered that the maritime transport services’ contribution to total output in the transport services 
is minor. Nevertheless, liberalisation would be expected to positively and significantly impact output 
with similar results expected for trade in maritime transport services. To this end, the CGE model 
projects that Canada’s total exports of maritime transport services (mode 1) could increase by as much 
as 5.6%, helping to improve Canada’s balance of cross-border trade in these services by as much as $170 
million.  
The CETA could, however, lead to an outcome that either surpasses or falls short of the estimates 
projected by the CGE model depending on the provisions of the CETA and the degree of liberalisation 
reached. Of particular relevance is the Agreement’s ability to include the two measures pertaining to 
repositioning and feeder services as advocated by the EU. Inclusion of these factors would stand to 
significantly increase the competitiveness of Canada’s short-sea shipping industry, while improving the 
overall efficiency of maritime transport services in Canada. Not only would this lead to a reduction of 
costs, benefitting consumers, but it would also very likely lead to an influx of investment from the EU 
impacting output and exports. To this end, allowing EU shipping liners access to Canada’s feeder services 
would likely lead EU shipping companies to make notable investments which over the long-term would 
likely serve to increase output and trade in maritime transport services beyond those estimates 
generated under the CGE model.   
Overall, the removal of investment restrictions and the upgrading of Canada’s short-sea shipping 
through improved feeder services would serve to allow both EU and Canadian firms greater cost saving 
opportunities through the fostering of triangulation. Liberalisation in Canada is, however, likely to meet 
opposition, since allowing EU shipping companies to provide feeder services may be identified as 
liberalisation of cabotage, which has generally been excluded from liberalisation around the world due 
to beliefs that doing so benefits employment and ensures the continued existence of the domestic 
maritime industry.574 
Additionally, the Canadian maritime transport services sector would likely benefit from the removal of 
the high duty imposed on new vessels (25%). The Canadian Shipowners’ Association notes that Canada’s 
merchant fleet is in need of renewal, but that the excessively high duty discourages them from 
effectively doing so.575 They further note that the ships Canadians must purchase are those that aren’t 
produced domestically and could, in large part, be satisfied by EU producers (e.g. lakers and self-
unloaders). This punitive tariff also acts as a deterrent to Canada’s short-sea shipping market by further 
increasing the costs of complying with requirements to convert a vessel in order to meet marine safety 
requirements and contributing the aging problem endemic of the Canadian-flag fleet.576  
                                                             
574 However, the OECD has recently questioned claims that restricting foreign competition preserves employment and the 
capacity of national maritime industries, particularly in light of the success experience by the EU, making it possible that such 
claims are unfounded. See: OECD (2001b)  
575 www.shipowners.ca/index.php?page=fleet-renewal 
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While the CETA may lead to liberalisation of feeder services in Canada, it would appear unlikely that this 
liberalisation would be extended to include cabotage in general and provide unrestricted access to 
Canada’s domestic short sea shipping markets. The 1992 Coasting Trade Act reserves domestic maritime 
traffic in Canada for national-flag ships, restricting foreign access to the domestic market. As a means to 
stimulate the Canadian shipping industry, foreign-owned international ship management companies are 
effectively excluded from participation in short-sea shipping though they can reside in Canada.577 
Canada would likely benefit from greater foreign access to the short sea shipping sector, particularly as 
its volume of short sea shipping does not match the potential for a country of such an extensive 
waterway system.578 
A final benefit relevant to the CETA’s potential impact on maritime transport services could arise 
through the increased cargo which passes through Canada’s primary ports. Canada’s ports generally 
compete with a number of those in the United States over status as being the preferred port of call. 
With preferential access for EU goods, the CETA could increase the competitiveness of a number of 
Canadian ports along the Atlantic, St. Lawrence and Great Lakes.579 This in turn could result in further 
expansion of Canada’s ports, leading to capital investments in infrastructure and employment.   
 
EU 
As in Canada, the CETA could positively impact the EU’s maritime transportation sector, with the size of 
the impact dependent on the liberalisation achieved. The likelihood of increased merchandise trade will 
directly benefit the EU, leading to increased output and cross-border trade in the sector. CGE results 
confirm this, estimating that the EU would witness a 0.04% to 0.07% increase in output over the long-
term. These increases in output would be expected to coincide with increased exports (mode 1), with 
CGE model results suggesting overall exports of maritime transport services would increase by 0.07% to 
0.12% over the long-term and to Canada by as much as 15.6% (Tables 89-94 Annex 6).  
There are, however, a number of additional factors which if included in the CETA could potentially lead 
to greater gains for the EU over the long-term. As noted above, liberalisation of feeder services and 
repositioning under the CETA could stand to benefit the EU industry. Their inclusion would enhance the 
ability for Europe’s largest international carriers to further reduce costs helping to improve efficiency as 
well as their ability to succeed in an increasingly competitive global market that has become increasingly 
cost sensitive. EU shipping companies would also be able to increase the scope of operations in the 
Canadian market by increasing the number of services they are able to provide. Liberalisation of feeder 
services, in particular, would likely stimulate an increase in exports via mode 3 while also serving to 
drive an increase in EU investment in Canada.  
 
INDICATOR: Employment 
BASELINE 
In 2009, the maritime transport industry employed approximately 29,000 people in Canada. Of these 
approximately 13,000 were in support activities for maritime transport (employment related to port and 
harbour operations; marine cargo handling; navigational services to shipping; marine salvage services; 
ship piloting services and other navigational services for shipping), 13,200 in maritime transport (deep 
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sea, coastal and Great Lakes water transport and inland transport), and 2,300 in scenic sightseeing for 
maritime transport.580 
The EU employs approximately 610,000 in maritime transport services with around 184,000 in maritime 
transport and the remainder involved in onshore auxiliary services in such areas as cargo handling and 
logistics.581 The Member States with the greatest employment in maritime transport services are 
Germany, Italy, Greece and Sweden, but in terms of relative importance, Denmark, Malta, Cyprus, 
Finland, Sweden and Greece have the greatest reliance on the industry as a source of employment. 
  
ANALYSIS 
Canada 
Employment in Canada’s maritime transport services sector is expected to be positively impacted over 
the long-term by the CETA. Results from the CGE model show increases ranging from 1.75% to 3.2% over 
the long-term depending on the level of liberalisation (Table 96 Annex 6). Additionally, increases in 
inward FDI resulting from liberalisation of feeder services and expansion of ports could increase the 
overall gains in employment for the sector.    
 
EU 
The EU is similarly expected to experience increases in the demand for labour in its maritime transport 
services sector. These gains are likely to be less pronounced than in Canada with CGE estimates 
projecting increases in the demand for labour of approximately 0.02% to 0.04% over the long-term 
(Table 95 Annex 6).  
  
 
 
SOCIAL ASSESSMENT 
 
INDICATOR: Worker displacement 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Canada 
Results from the economic modelling suggest that the CETA will likely lead to significant increases in 
employment in Canada’s maritime transportation services. Expansion of the industry implies that 
workers in Canada’s maritime transport industry would not be subjected to displacement, with new jobs 
likely to be created, particularly in Canada’s Atlantic Provinces and along the St. Lawrence and Great 
Lakes. At the same time, increased employment would likely coincide with decreased demand for labour 
in the land transportation sector, particularly if the CETA diverts trade from the United States to the EU. 
Given that land transport is a much more important source of employment in Canada, even very small 
percentage declines as predicted by the CGE model, would likely serve to cancel out the larger 
percentage gains in maritime transport, limiting the associated benefits from expansion in the sector.  
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Table 51: Employment in Canada’s transportation services sectors   
Sector Employment 
Maritime 29,000 
Air 68,036 
Other transport 404,000 
Source: Statistics Canada; Transport Canada 
 
If displaced by the CETA, workers in the land transportation services sector could potentially transfer 
into maritime or air transportation services as well as the sectors expected to expand over the long-term 
as shown in Table 52. As shown in the right-hand column, movement into most of these sectors would, 
on average, provide higher salaries than presently enjoyed. Although this implies greater economic well-
being, it also important to consider the expected ease with which such a transfer could be made.  
 
Table 52: Sectors in Canada expected to increase employment, by degree and liberalisation scenario 
and wage compared to the average for other transportation services 
Sector Scenario 
C 
Scenario 
D 
Salary Compared to 
average wage in other 
transport  
Mining  +  > 
Textiles +  < 
Apparel +  < 
Non-ferrous metal 
manuf. 
+  > 
Automotive manuf.  + + > 
Other Transport manuf.  + + > 
Construction + + > 
Trade + + < 
Maritime transport  + ++ = 
Air transport + + > 
Communication services + + > 
Recreation services + + < 
 
+ denotes marginal gain, ++ denotes significant gain, <,=,> denotes less than, equivalent or 
greater than 
 
Generally, individuals employed in other transportation services have lower levels of educational 
attainment than the national average. As such, individuals employed in driving a truck or handling cargo, 
may not easily secure higher salaried employment in the above sectors, which may require a higher 
degree of specialisation and job specific training. While this would not be the case for construction, 
trade, mining or maritime transportation, it would likely be so for other areas. As such, changes in wages 
after displacement would likely remain comparable if the worker did not seek to upgrade her skills 
through additional training.  
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With respect to maritime transportation specifically, it is also important to note that movement into this 
profession could require relocating as the majority of jobs are located at ports along major bodies of 
water (e.g. the Great Lakes, Saint Lawrence or Atlantic/Pacific Oceans).  
 
EU 
According to the economic assessment, the EU is projected to see minor increases in employment 
within the maritime transport services sector. Given the expansion of employment, it is not expected 
that the CETA will engender any degree of displacement for those employed in the EU’s maritime 
transport industry.  
 
Table 53: Employment in the EU’s transportation services sectors   
Sector Employment 
Maritime 184,000 
Air 409,100 
Other transport 8,619,600 
Source: Eurostat 
 
 
INDICATOR: Quality & decency of work 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Canada & EU 
Given its global nature, the promotion of labour standards for the maritime transport sector is generally 
approached through international fora such as the ILO. In 2006, the ILO adopted the Maritime Labour 
Convention (MLC) which ensures freedom of association and collective bargaining and calls for an end to 
child labour and discrimination (See Box 22). While Canada has ratified this convention, only 2 EU 
Member States had done so as of 1 January 2011 (though more are in the process of ratification and EU 
Member States remain subject to those rules and regulations which they previously ratified but which 
are not consolidated under a single convention). While it is questionable that the CETA will call for 
mandatory ratification, it could include a mechanism for greater and regular cooperation and dialogue 
on maritime labour issues, including commitments to maintaining and improving working conditions in 
the maritime sector along the framework of the ILO, with emphasis on cooperation in promoting these 
standards in third countries so as to ensure an appropriate social floor is in place globally for seafarers. 
This cooperation could further consist of commitment to strengthening the minimum qualifications 
applied globally and in international improvement to training of seafarers.  
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Box 22: The ILO’s Maritime Labour Convention, 2006 
 
Given the global nature of the maritime transport sector, international standards are needed to ensure 
that ships will not register in countries with poor enforcement of standards in order to improve 
competitiveness. This is particularly relevant given the movement over the past several decades to 
register fleets in open registry countries (e.g. Panama and Liberia) in order to capitalise from less 
restrictive regulations and cheaper labour markets.  
In response to these challenges and concerns, the ILO adopted the Maritime Labour Convention (MLC) in 
2006 in an attempt to ensure that all seafarers would not be subjected to unacceptable working 
conditions. The MLC consolidates over 68 international labour standards that have been adopted to deal 
with maritime working conditions over the past 80 years.582 The Convention sets out the rights to decent 
work for all seafarers and takes an important step towards levelling the playing field so as to ensure that 
shipping companies will not seek to improve competition by eroding labour standards for their 
employees.583 
Still in its early stages, the MLC has not yet been ratified by the number of countries necessary to 
achieve the entry-into-force formula (only 12 countries have thus far ratified the recently devised MLC). 
Canada has, however, already ratified the MLC and has been active in assisting other countries with 
ratification through high-level tripartite missions.584  While the EU-27 has been a strong advocate of the 
MLC and remains committed to fostering its ratification among members, only 2 of the 27 Member 
States (Spain and Bulgaria) had ratified the MLC as 1 January 2011.585 However, EU MS are still subject to 
the legal effects of the ILO instruments which the MLC is seeking to replace.   
In terms of the CETA, it is questionable that the Agreement will have a pronounced impact on 
ratification of the Convention in the EU. Nevertheless, both sides could still commit to ensuring that 
labour standards in the ILO maritime labour convention are in place while expressing their firm 
commitment to jointly cooperating in promoting these standards in third countries.  
 
 
 
INDICATOR: Health & safety 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Canada & EU 
Maritime transport services are subject to some of the highest incidences of work related injuries in 
Canada and the EU, while port security remains an important issue of national security for all 
countries.586 The CETA could include provisions that foster greater collaboration on security measures 
                                                             
582 ILO. http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/maritime-labour-convention/lang--en/index.htm 
583 ILO. http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/maritime-labour-convention/faq/lang--en/index.htm#P47_9051 
It should be noted that the MLC can be ratified without a country having ratified all fundamental ILO conventions, which while 
designed in part to ensure that open registry companies can more easily ratify the agreement, has allowed Canada to play a 
more active role in advocating its ratification in third countries.  
584 ILO. (2010).  
585 Italy and Luxembourg appear close to ratification. Europa. http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32007D0431:EN:NOT 
586 International Labour Organization 
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relevant to the maritime industry, with commitment and cooperation on better implementation of 
measures included in the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and International Ship and Port 
Facility Security Code.587 Such cooperation could, over the long-term, lead to a reduction of shipping 
accidents and the subsequent risks associated with them (injuries, exposure to hazardous materials).  
 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 
 
 
INDICATOR: Water usage and quality / Contamination of water from chemicals and wastes  
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Water transportation affects water quality and ecosystems in three major ways: through dredging and 
habitat modification, discharges of toxic contaminants in watercourses, and the introduction of invasive 
species. Increases in water transportation impact all three of these indicators. 
 
Canada 
As water traffic increases – as is predicted under the economic assessment – demands for port 
infrastructure expansion are also likely to multiply. Such infrastructure projects can impact water and 
coastal ecosystems. Dredging can alter water flow patterns and release contaminated sediments. Both 
of these impacts can have detrimental effects on vulnerable or endangered species. In the first case, 
dredging can reduce minimal water flows or seasonal flooding that sustains marshes and other 
important habitat for fish and other species’ reproduction. In the second case, contaminated sediments 
can bio-accumulate and impact species dozens of kilometres from the source of these sediments. 
Impacts can also be felt on humans, especially on the St-Lawrence River that is the primary source of 
water for over half the population of the province of Quebec. The St-Lawrence seaway has very high 
levels of water transportation traffic. In 2009, 30.8 million cargo tonnes were transported: 27% of which 
was grain, 61% was bulk goods, and 9% was coal. This cargo was transported by 3,631 vessel transits in 
2009.588 
Demand for dredging is likely to increase under the CETA as average tonnage increases and water levels 
fall as a result of climate change. Every time the water level drops 1 cm, vessels must transport 6 less 
containers. Dredging in the past has made it possible for the St-Lawrence shipping lane to keep a 
minimum depth of 11.3 meters. If water levels drop, more dredging could be necessary.589 This is likely 
to become a problem in the coming years as higher tonnage ships enter the market. This will also push 
demand for enhanced port infrastructure. 
Voluntary or accidental discharges of contaminants (oil, waste or other chemical products) occur every 
year on commercial navigation routes. According to the Canadian Commissioner of the Environment and 
Sustainable Development, ‘a total of about 4,160 pollution incidents involving spills of oil, chemicals, or 
other pollutants into Canadian waters were reported to the Canadian Coast Guard. About 2,000 of these 
incidents involved vessels ranging from pleasure craft and fishing boats to barges, cargo vessels, and 
tankers’.590 On the St-Lawrence River only, over 150 such spills are inventoried every year. In addition, 
an unknown number go unreported. Most of these accidents are minor but nevertheless significant at 
                                                             
587 European Commission and Government of Canada (2008).   
588 The Saint-Lawrence Seaway Traffic Report 2009. The St. Lawrence Seaway Management Corporation.  
589 Transport Québec.    
590 Report of the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development to the House of Commons (2010) 
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the point of impact.  For example, it only takes 1 litre of gasoline to make 1 million litres of water unsafe 
for consumption.591   
Another point of environmental concern is the spread of exotic species, in particular from ballast water 
from water transportation. The increased growth in the water transportation sector predicted under 
CETA increases the likelihood of introducing highly invasive species, such as the zebra mussel, originally 
from the Caspian Sea. The zebra mussel population has exploded, taking advantage of the lack of 
predators, reaching densities of 3,000,000per m2 in some cases.592 About one third of the 140 invasive 
species in the Great Lakes came through ballast water. 
 
EU 
In recent years, European maritime transport administrations and the European shipping industry have 
made significant efforts to improve the environmental record of maritime transport. The EU regulatory 
framework has been strengthened and cooperation with Member States has been increased to tackle 
issues including the prevention of accidents and incidents, atmospheric emissions, ballast water 
treatment and ship recycling.593 For example, the number of oil spills at sea in the last 30 years has 
decreased significantly to approximately one-third of the occurrences and volume of oil spilled.594 
Given that the only noticeable effect of a CETA on transport activities in the EU is a limited increase in 
trans-Atlantic water transport, most of the environmental impact is expected to be related to the 
maritime industry. In standard operations this subsector causes hardly any significant water usage or 
contamination. The major water related risks associated with the industry are accidents, leading to 
contamination of the sea, coastal areas and/or ports.  
 
Indicator: Air pollution / GHG emissions 
Canada 
BASELINE  
Transportation is of course an important contributor to GHG emissions. In fact transportation accounted 
for 26% of GHG emissions, and used 31% of all energy consumed in Canada in 2004.595 Air transportation 
has the highest energy intensity, followed by transit and ground passenger transportation. Rail 
transportation is the least energy intensive. Transportation represents 28% of emissions growth since 
1990, increasing by 45 megatonnes of CO2e from 1990 to 2004. 596 Aviation emitted 8,500 kilotonnes of 
CO2eq, road transportation emitted 135,000 kilotonnes of CO2eq, railways emitted 7000 kilotonnes of 
CO2eq, and domestic marine emitted 5800 kilotonnes of CO2eq in 2008.597Marine vessel shipping emits 
between 4.5 and 12 g of CO2e per tonnes-km, rail transportation emits 18 g CO2e/tonnes-km, and truck 
                                                             
591 Statistics Canada (2006).  
592 Statistics Canada (2006). 
593 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52009DC0008:EN:HTML:NOT 
594 EU Energy and Transport in Figures Statistical Pocket book 2010, p.222 
(http://ec.europa.eu/transport/publications/statistics/doc/pocketbook2010_contractor.pdf) 
595 Statistics Canada (2006). 
596 Ibid.   
597 Environment Canada (2010b)  
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transportation emits 114 g CO2e/tonnes-km.598 In stark contrast, aviation emits 1,025 g CO2e/tonnes-
km.599 
Air pollution is another concern. In 2004, three quarters of carbon monoxide emitted came from 
transportation, over one half of nitrogen oxides, and over a quarter of volatile organic compounds 
(VOCs). These contribute to smog, acid rain, and have health impacts. However, these emissions have 
decreased through the use of technologies like catalytic converters and fuel efficiency standards. NOx 
emissions decreased 19% from 1990 to 2004, CO and VOC each decreased 37% over the same period. 
Most of the emissions come from road transportation, and within that, most from heavy-duty vehicles 
(for instance 25% of transportation NOx).600 
 
ANALYSIS 
The CETA’s impacts on GHG emissions in the transportations sector are likely to be marginal for rail 
transportation but significant for the road, air and marine transport sectors. According to the E3MG 
results, road transport should see its emissions grow by 0.60% to 0.68% (between 135,810 and 135,918 
kt of CO2e emitted), air transport by 0.92% to 1.45% (between 8578 kt and 8623 kt of CO2e emitted), 
and by 0.71% to 1.12% for other transport services, including maritime transportation (between 12890 
an 12943 kt of CO2 emitted). Given that road transportation represents the largest share of transport-
related emissions in Canada, the rise in emissions caused by CETA can be considered significant. 
Increased EU investment in the Canadian transportation sector could further increase GHG emissions. 
However, if EU investment leads to the introduction of new fuel efficient technologies it could 
contribute to offsetting this increase, or even reducing emissions. Emissions reduction measures such as 
a shift to natural gas for freight transportation or new energy efficiency standards could also offset this 
growth in emissions. Air and maritime transportation represent only 10% of transport-related emissions. 
Therefore the growth in these sectors will not have a major impact on overall transport-related 
emissions in Canada. Should CETA lead to investments in short-sea shipping infrastructure, it could 
support a shift from road to maritime transportation and lead to a reduction in GHG emissions. 
 
EU 
BASELINE 
Transport and logistics services cause a variety of environmental impacts (e.g. depletion of land, 
depletion of fuel resources), but by far the most significant impact are the greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions that are produced as a by-product: 601 
 
Table 54: GHG emissions, 2007, EU-27 
 Mio. t CO2 equivalent % of total EU GHG emissions 
Year Total All 
transport 
Air 
transport 
Road 
transport 
Water 
transport 
Total All 
transport 
Air 
transport 
Road 
transport 
Water 
transport) 
1990 5740 956 83 715 131 100 16.7 1.4 12.5 2.3 
2000 5301 1165 136 858 151 100 22.0 2.6 16.2 2.8 
2007 5360 1297 161 920 198 100 24.2 3.0 17.2 3.7 
                                                             
598 http://www.cn.ca/en/greenhouse-gas-calculator-emission-factors.htm 
599 Transport Canada (2008).  
600 Statistics Canada (2006). 
601 Ibid. 
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The main producer countries of transport related GHG within the EU are Germany, the UK, France, Spain 
and Italy: 602 
 
Table 55: GHG from Transport, 2007 
 GHG from Transport, Mio. 
t CO2 equivalent, 2007 
EU27 1297.6 
EU25 1275.1 
DE 188.9 
UK 174.9 
FR 163.6 
ES 149.9 
IT 147.5 
NL 98.4 
BE 61.8 
PL 40.9 
EL 36.8 
SE 30.6 
 
ANALYSIS 
As outlined above, a CETA would be expected to lead to marginal increases in transport activity and 
consequently in GHG emissions. The EU countries most likely to be affected are transit countries like 
Germany, Austria and France, and also countries with significant port facilities like the Netherlands, 
France, Spain and Italy. 
The limited impact on water transport and other transport will cause correspondingly additional GHG 
emissions, which equates to additional GHG emissions of 140,000 t and 180,000 t CO2 equivalent, 
respectively. 
Regarding air transport, as outlined above the recently agreed to Canada-EU Air Transport Agreement 
has already put in place measures to improve bilateral trade in this area, therefore the marginal impact 
of the CETA on air transportation services and subsequent environmental impacts are likely to be 
negligible. 
The E3MG modelling also predicts no impact on GHG emissions from this sector. 
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6.1.2. Telecom Services 
  
ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT 
 
INDICATOR: Output, trade & investment 
BASELINE 
The telecom industry and its services play a key social and economic role. Advances in the industry 
through technological development and regulatory reform over the past several decades have driven 
down communication costs, providing consumers with greater access to a wider array of services while 
also helping to increase productivity. In recent years, advances in telecommunications – led by the 
expansion of the internet and digitisation – have increasingly blurred the line between the traditional 
areas of telecom and broadcasting with service providers in each industry competing over a similar 
package of services such as voice, internet and video services.603  
In the EU, value-added generated by the telecom industry reached $237 billion in 2005 with the sector 
having benefited substantially from regulatory reform that has liberalised the sector across Member 
States. As a subsequent result of the improved competitive environment these reforms have fostered, 
the EU has enjoyed lower prices and better service while providing consumers with greater choice and 
coverage. Although the majority of the sector’s value-added is concentrated in four Member States – 
the UK, Germany, France and Italy – the sector is relatively less concentrated than other industries in the 
EU.604 Part of the reason behind this lies in the fact that, despite regulatory reforms, the internal market 
has remained fragmented due to non-uniform application of the EU framework by national 
regulators.605  Nevertheless, the recently established European Telecoms Body should help to rectify this 
problem with the EU taking strides towards ensuring that the industry meets its goal of fostering an 
‘information society’ that will improve the quality of its citizens’ lives and allow them to thrive in a 
changing global environment. 
The Canadian telecom industry accounts for over $40 billion in revenues and 3.3% of the country’s 
GDP.606 In contrast to the EU, however, the Canadian telecom sector is viewed as less competitive than 
other OECD countries. Both the Telecom Policy Review Panel (TPRP) and the Competition Policy Review 
Panel have both issued support for increased competition in the Canadian telecom sector, claiming that 
the current market structure limits the full potential of the domestic industry, while disadvantaging 
consumers.607   
One of the primary means of improving competitiveness in the Canadian telecom sector would be to 
liberalise the foreign ownership restrictions currently in place. Canada remains one of the few OECD 
countries to have foreign ownership restrictions in the telecom sector, with the OECD itself stating that 
Canada’s telecom sector is the most restrictive among members.608 This restrictiveness stems from the 
                                                             
603 Competition Policy Review Panel (2008).   
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605 http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/tomorrow/index_en.htm  
606 Industry Canada (2010).   
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Telecommunications Act, which promotes domestic ownership of the industry through a 46.7% 
threshold on foreign equity in domestic telecom companies (20% cap on foreign ownership of the voting 
share of operating companies and 33.3% among holding companies) while mandating that four-fifths of 
the board of directors must be Canadian nationals 609    
These restrictions not only imply limited levels of FDI in Canada’s telecom sector but, in limiting 
ownership, also restrict the level of mode 3 trade610 that foreign telecom companies can make within 
Canada.611 By establishing a local presence or acquiring a majority stake in a local incumbent, mode 3 
serves as the primary mode through which telecom services are traded internationally. Without 
sufficient data to disentangle FDI from mode 3 trade, it can only be surmised from the existing data on 
FDI in Canada that trade is negatively impacted by the restrictions on foreign ownership. For example, of 
the EU’s total stocks of outward FDI in the telecom sector in 2005, 3% (€74.7 billion) was located in the 
telecom sector. 612 Of this, however, Canada received only 0.3% with the sector serving as the recipient 
of 0.2% of all EU stocks in Canada (€250 million).613 Comparatively, this level of investment is far lower 
than that observed for EU investment in the US, where telecom held 3.2% of all EU stocks invested in 
the US in 2005.614  
Cross-border trade in telecom services (via mode 1), moreover, plays a relatively minor role in both the 
EU and Canada’s international trade in services, compounding the negative impact that limitations on 
foreign ownership appear to have in terms of trade in telecom services. In 2007, for example, Canada’s 
exports and imports of telecom services occurring via mode 1 totalled just $1.35 billion and $1.04 billion, 
respectively, representing only 1.6% of total mode 1 cross-border trade in services.615 Similarly, trade in 
telecom services by the EU accounted for only 2% of mode 1 trade in services in 2007 (compared to 
5.4% of all outward EU FDI in the services).616 In total, these statistics support the importance mode 3 
has for trade in telecom services, and as such reflect the trade inhibiting effects that limits on foreign 
ownership in Canada are likely to have on bilateral trade.  
 
ANALYSIS 
Canada 
Canada could experience a number of gains from commitments under the CETA that provide for greater 
ownership in the domestic telecom sector to EU investors. Canadian telecom companies would likely 
benefit by having greater access to capital at a reduced cost. Further, increased direct investment from 
EU telecom companies would likely lead to improved acquisition of technology and managerial expertise. 
Further, greater exposure to competition would likely force domestic firms to upgrade their operations, 
which would in turn make them more competitive internationally over the long-term. Finally, consumers 
would be expected to benefit from this increased competition, resulting in improved service and quality, 
greater choice in services and lower overall costs. Taken together, these benefits to the domestic 
telecom sector and its end users could significantly and positively impact Canada. 
                                                             
609 Competition Policy Review Panel (2008).   
610 See opening discussion under the Services Sector Assessments for a description of the 4 modes of trade in services as well as 
an outline of the nuances in measuring them. 
611 This would particularly be the case with respect to trade from the EU as Eurostat only counts sales from affiliates as EU 
exports when the companies are majority EU owned.  
612 Eurostat (2008).    
613 Ibid.  
614 Ibid. 
615 UN Services Trade Database 
616  WTO Statistics Database. http://stat.wto.org/ServiceProfile/WSDBServicePFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=E27,CA 
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The degree of these impacts is, however, largely dependent on whether the CETA leads to liberalisation 
in foreign ownership within the telecom sector and, if so, to what degree. To this end, all indications are 
that Canada intends to liberalise foreign ownership, though it unclear whether the CETA will be directly 
attributable. As noted, for example, both the TPRP and the Competition Policy Review Panel have both 
issued their support for using greater foreign ownership as a means of bolstering competition in the 
Canadian telecom sector.617 Further, in February 2010 the Harper government pledged to liberalise 
foreign investment in the sector while consultations with Industry Minister Tony Clement were launched 
the following June. While the Harper government has since delayed plans to do so until some 
undisclosed point in 2011 or 2012, it nevertheless appears that the opening of the sector to greater 
competition is a goal of the current government. One issue influencing the timing of liberalisation may 
be uncertainties over how to design the next auction of wireless frequencies for mobile phone 
companies (not scheduled to take place until late 2012), specifically with regards to how spectrum will 
be allocated and who will able to compete for it. Given these hold ups, it is unclear whether the CETA 
will make any concrete allowances for increased EU ownership in the industry; and it is further possible 
that removal of foreign ownership restrictions will occur even in the absence of a CETA. In short, if the 
CETA is responsible for the removal of ownership restrictions – either directly or indirectly – it will likely 
have a significant impact on the telecom sector.  
With respect to the formal modelling, although CGE estimates do not generally take into account the 
impact from increased investment618, the results nevertheless indicate that the CETA will lead to 
significant increases in output and exports within Canada’s telecom sector. Specifically, the CGE model 
predicts  that output could increase by upwards of 0.7% over the long-term with total exports (mode 1) 
potentially increasing by as much as 9.4% and the balance of trade by nearly $200 million (Tables 97-102 
Annex 6).619 
Given that the impact on trade would likely be driven predominantly by mode 3 trade in telecom 
services, it is expected that the impact on Canada would be more pronounced than estimated under the 
CGE model. Further, it is likely that removal of ownership restrictions would lead to an influx of 
investment in the sector likely having a pronounced impact on sectoral output and exports, resulting in 
greater estimates than presently projected by the CGE model.  
 
EU 
A CETA that liberalised ownership restrictions in Canada’s telecom sector would almost certainly benefit 
the EU by removing a major barrier to market access. Establishing a local presence is particularly 
important in terms of EU trade with Canada as their separation by the Atlantic increases the preference 
of establishing a commercial presence in order to deliver services to the Canadian market. As such, the 
restrictions on EU ownership in Canada’s telecom sector significantly limit the involvement of EU 
telecom companies in the Canadian market and largely relegate them to participation through satellite 
services and reselling, for which Canada does not maintain foreign ownership restrictions.   
It is therefore expected that removal of foreign ownership restrictions would serve to lead to both 
increases in output, exports and investment by the EU telecom sector. As noted above, however, it is 
                                                             
617 Competition Policy Review Panel (2008).    
618 The assumed cut in service trade costs used for the sector may proxy for investment liberalisation to some degree, though it 
is not expected to fully account for this.  
619 Again note that the GTAP database aggregates telecom services with postal services, complicating the interpretation of the 
results.  
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unclear to what degree the CETA will directly or indirectly contribute to liberalisation of these ownership 
restrictions in Canada.  
CGE estimates largely do not reflect this assertion, however, with estimates projecting almost no change 
in output and overall exports as a result of the CETA. However, it is important to note that CGE 
estimates do not account for increased investment and the relative increase in mode 3 trade in services 
likely to be fostered by liberalisation. Notably, the removal of restrictions on ownership would likely lead 
to sizeable increases in investment in Canada, particularly as it pertains to acquisitions and 
establishment, in turn leading to greater levels of foreign affiliate sales (mode 3 trade in services).   
An additional area where the CETA would likely lead to benefits for EU firms would be in ensuring non-
discriminatory use of and access to telecom transport networks. The current limitations on foreign 
ownership have ‘perpetuated a regime in which foreign-owned competitors are forced to rely on 
incumbents for facilities, a regime that is characterized by continual regulatory disputes over terms and 
conditions of access’.620 To the degree that the CETA ensured non-discriminatory access, EU telecom 
companies would likely benefit, though likely not to the degree that they would under investment 
liberalisation.  
 
INDICATOR: Employment 
BASELINE 
Total EU employment in the telecom services sector reached 1.2 million in 2005. Employment by 
Member State varies, being a far more important source of jobs in Bulgaria where it accounts for 2% of 
the non-financial service jobs.  Overall, however, the majority of people employed in telecom services 
are in the UK, Germany and France with these three countries accounting for half of total EU 
employment in telecom services.621  
As of July 2010, Canada employed 106,400 in the telecom sector which marked a decrease of 10,300 
from the same period a year earlier. At the provincial level, the leader in employment in the telecom 
sector is Ontario with 47.1% of total Canadian employment in 2009. As in Europe, the sector has a low 
degree of concentration with it finding its greatest relative importance in Manitoba where it employs 
1.3% of the workforce.622  
 
ANALYSIS 
Canada 
Employment in Canada’s telecom sector is likely to be positively impacted by the CETA, with the size of 
the impact determined by whether the Agreement leads to the removal of foreign ownership 
restrictions. CGE estimates project increases in the sectoral demand for labour ranging from around 
0.13% to 0.33%. However, the removal of ownership restrictions would likely lead to more pronounced 
increases in the demand for labour, as a likely influx of FDI into Canada could stimulate more 
pronounced increases in output and exports over the long-term.  
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EU 
The impact on employment in the EU’s telecom sector is likely to be limited. Although the EU stands to 
gain from the CETA, the potential impact is likely to arise from the removal of ownership restrictions in 
Canada. To this end, the CETA would likely stimulate greater investment in Canada’s telecom sector and 
trade via mode 3, limiting the direct impact on employment within the EU itself.  
 
 
SOCIAL ASSESSMENT 
 
INDICATOR: Worker displacement 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS  
Canada 
With potential for gains in employment within the telecom sector, the CETA’s social impact is likely to be 
positive. Growth in employment within the sector would likely serve as an important source of job 
creation, allowing for workers displaced in alternative sectors to shift into a position that is generally 
well paying compared to the national average. As the industry within Canada exhibits limited degrees of 
concentration, these gains would be more evenly dispersed throughout the country.  
 
EU 
With no expected change in employment, it is not expected that the CETA will have an impact on worker 
displacement in the EU’s telecom sector.  
 
INDICATOR: Quality & decency of work 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS  
Canada 
Survey data suggests that the telecom sector is subject to higher rates of job related stress and 
dissatisfaction with balancing work with other activities.623 With employment growth projected for the 
industry, it is possible that the national average for these indicators could increase, negatively impacting 
quality and decency of work. Collective bargaining and the rights of association could, however, be 
strengthened by the CETA’s ability to reaffirm the ILO’s core labour standards and under provisions that 
require Canada to ratify the ILO’s Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949  (C.98). 
For detailed discussion on the social ramifications of the CETA as it pertains to Core Labour Standards 
and the ILO’s Decent Work Agenda see Box 14 in the social assessment on mining and metal 
manufacturing.  
 
EU 
The CETA could contribute to the further improvement of labour standards in the EU with the inclusion 
of a chapter on trade and labour that makes commitments to better implementation of the ILO’s Core 
Labour Standards and Decent Work Agenda (See Box 14).  
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INDICATOR: Health, education & culture 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS  
Canada 
Canada’s telecommunications industry generally provides better work related health benefits than the 
national average, while having lower instances of work related injuries. As such, increased employment 
within the industry is likely to positively impact health.624  
In terms of education, the higher skills demanded in the telecom services sector – particularly as it 
pertains to higher paying jobs – would likely have a positive impact on the Canadian workforce’s 
educational attainment by providing greater incentive to acquire the necessary entry requirements.  
 
With respect to culture, there are concerns from stakeholders in Canada that liberalisation of foreign 
ownership restrictions could adversely affect Canadian culture (See Box 23).  
 
 
Box 23: Does liberalisation of telecom mean liberalisation of  
Canada’s cultural industries? 
 
Complicating the issue of liberalising foreign ownership restrictions in Canada’s telecom sector is the 
increasing overlap between telecom and broadcasting, particularly in terms of distribution networks.625 
Due to shifts in technology, it is now commonplace for companies traditionally relegated to one of these 
spheres to cross over into the other and offer competing services (e.g. a cable company offering internet 
services). With Canada heavily guarding the content industry, concerns over liberalisation of telecom 
may be based on the notion that in so doing, they would essentially also be liberalising the content 
industry. Based on this current overlap between telecom and broadcasting, does removing restrictions 
on foreign ownership in telecom also imply that Canada’s cultural industries will become necessarily 
open to increased foreign investment, undermining cultural objectives in place within Canada?  
The answer is unclear. On the one hand, it appears that the EU has no expressed desire to seek 
liberalisation within Canada’s content/cultural industries, making it entirely plausible that any 
liberalisation of the telecom industry could attempt to ensure that liberalisation of carriage can be 
effectively structured as separate from content. The possibility of creating such a divide has received 
support by the Canadian House of Commons Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, 
which in 2003 concluded that telecom could be liberalised without endangering cultural policy 
objectives that aim to ensure that cultural industries support and distribute Canadian content.626 
On the other hand, doubts have been raised among stakeholders in Canada that a separate structuring 
of content and carriage could effectively occur given the increasing vertical integration within the 
industry. Specifically, consultations with the Canadian Media Production Association (CMPA) has 
expressed concern that liberalising foreign ownership restrictions in light of industrial developments 
would ‘inevitably lead to comparable liberalisation of FDI rules for broadcasting and broadcasting 
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625 Competition Policy Review Panel (2008).   
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distribution – irrespective of the fact that the EU professes that it is currently not seeking liberalisation 
of FDI rules as they apply to Canada’s cultural industries’.627   
To the degree that domestic policy can be designed to effectively separate content from carriage, it is 
likely that Canada’s cultural policy objectives can continue to be met. There would, in this regard, 
appear to be room for policy space to ensure the continued enforcement of cultural objectives, 
particularly given that the EU appears to have little expressed desire to liberalise Canada’s content 
industry. Additionally, the CETA’s impact on Canadian cultural objectives is further unclear given (i) the 
CETA may itself not be able to achieve liberalisation of Canada’s foreign ownership restrictions in 
telecom; and (ii) the Harper government appears poised to liberalise foreign ownership restrictions by 
2012 regardless. 
 
 
 
EU 
Given the limited impact on employment and job displacement in the sector, it is not envisaged that 
there will be a significant impact on health, education or culture in the EU.  
 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 
 
Canada 
No significant effects predicted. 
 
EU 
The EU telecom sector uses insignificant amounts of material inputs and outputs, causing only minor 
environmental impacts. The CGE model predicts an only insignificant increase in output for the EU 
telecoms sector. It is therefore expected that the CETA will not produce a significant environmental 
impact.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
627 Bolen, N. (2011).  
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6.1.3. Financial services 
  
ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT 
 
INDICATOR: Output, trade (modes 1 & 3) & FDI 
BASELINE 
Financial services are a pillar of any market economy, serving as a fundamental source of growth, 
investment, savings and economic stability. The EU and Canada in particular, as two developed 
economies, have mature financial systems that are populated by globally competitive firms offering a 
wide array of services. In recent years, financial services in both Canada and the EU have become 
increasingly integrated, with large financial groups being formed that provide a number of different 
types of services. This is particularly evident in the EU, where competition facilitated under the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has allowed the EU to develop 13 of the world’s 20 largest 
financial groups. While this integration of services has somewhat blurred the line between the different 
types of services and their providers, the discussion herein will, where relevant, make distinctions along 
two broad categories of financial services: (i) banking and other non-insurance financial services; and (ii) 
insurance and insurance-related services.  
Within these two groups, non-insurance financial services, led by banking, constitute the largest 
contributor to output, trade and investment for both the EU and Canada. In the EU, financial services 
are largely concentrated in the original EU-15 members with these countries in 2007 holding 97.8% of all 
commercial banking assets and 84.7% of all banks in the EU.628 Similarly, Canada’s financial services 
industry is dominated by Quebec and, in particular, Ontario while three-quarters of all national assets 
have become concentrated within the country’s six largest banks.629  
This pronounced concentration of assets in the financial services sector – particularly in banking – has 
placed increased pressure on financial institutions to expand into international markets in order to 
generate growth. In Canada, the incentive for internationalisation has been further reinforced by limits 
on acquisitions of large banks and life insurance companies under Canada’s ‘widely held’ rule. Under this 
rule, Canada’s large banks (equity over C$8 billion) and demutualised life insurance companies (equity 
over C$5 billion) are restricted from having more than 20% of voting shares or 30% of non-voting shares 
controlled by a single legal person.630 While these ownership restrictions protect the domestic financial 
services sector from foreign takeover through acquisition, they also serve to limit the ability of financial 
groups to grow domestically. The implications of the latter are that it limits the creation of major 
Canadian financial groups which can rival those found in the US, Europe and Japan, while placing greater 
pressure on Canada’s larger banks and life insurance companies to seek out opportunities in foreign 
markets.631  
                                                             
628 Kaisergruber, D. & K. Volger-Ludwig (2009).   
629 These include: Royal Bank of Canada, Toronto-Dominion Bank, Bank of Nova Scotia, Bank of Montreal, Canadian Imperial 
Bank of Commerce and the National Bank of Canada. See: Department of Finance Canada (2005).  
630 This is in contrast to medium banks and life insurers which can be closely held and are subject only to a 35% public float, and 
small banks and life insurers which have no restrictions 
631 Mandel-Campbell, A. (2008).   
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At the same time, it should be noted that the widely held rule is based largely on prudential grounds, 
with the procedure being a means of limiting self-dealing while contributing to transparency and 
improved corporate governance. The Canadian financial system is widely regarded as being one of the 
world’s soundest. The Bank of International Settlements, for example, ranks Canada as having ‘the 
strongest banks in the world’, while the World Economic Forum (WEF) has ranked Canada’s financial 
system as the world’s soundest for the past three years.  
This combination of stability and limited systemic risk has helped Canada maintain a highly regarded 
financial system. Under its 2010 Financial Development Index, which ranks national financial systems 
across a number of indicators and services, the WEF recently ranked Canada as high as 6th worldwide.632 
As the below table suggests, this ranking places Canada’s financial services sector on equalling footing 
with the most competitive Member States in the EU-15 and well ahead of those in the New Member 
States.  
 
 
Table 56: World Economic Forum 2010 Financial Development Index, Canada and EU Member 
States633 
Country WEF Ranking 
(2010) 
Country WEF Ranking 
(2010) 
UK 2 Ireland 18 
Canada 6 Austria 19 
Netherlands 7 Finland 20 
Belgium 10 Italy 25 
France 11 Czech Republic 33 
Sweden 12 Poland 35 
Germany 13 Slovak Republic 36 
Spain 14 Romania 44 
Denmark 16 Hungary 45 
Source: World Economic Forum (2010) 
 
In terms of trade, official statistics from Eurostat show that the EU’s exports of financial services totalled 
$80.7 billion in 2009 ($60.1 billion for financial intermediation services and $20.6 billion for insurance 
services), making it one of the EU’s leading sectors for services exports.634 This is significantly larger than 
exports from Canada, which totalled nearly $7 billion in 2007 ($3.22 billion in non-insurance and $3.76 
billion in insurance services) and represented 10.8% of total services exports.635  
Although these numbers appear low when compared to trade in goods, it is almost certainly the case 
that these statistics (for both the EU and Canada) are largely reflective of cross-border trade in financial 
services (mode 1) and, therefore, do not sufficiently account for the major role played by sales through 
affiliates (mode 3).636 As the latter is a far more significant means of exporting financial services for both 
Canada and the EU – particularly across the Atlantic – it is therefore exceedingly difficult to analyse 
                                                             
632 WEF (2010).    
633 Only lists those MS for which rankings are provided 
634 Eurostat: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-10-037/EN/KS-SF-10-037-EN.PDF  
635 UN Services Trade Database 
636 See opening discussion under the Services Sector Assessments for a description of the 4 modes of trade in services as well as 
an outline of the nuances in measuring them. 
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trade in financial services as separate from foreign investment, which serves as the main means of 
establishing a commercial presence abroad in the financial services sector (primarily through mergers 
and acquisitions).637   
The role of foreign affiliates in bilateral trade in financial services is likely to be particularly strong given 
that the financial services sector serves as the largest source and recipient of outward and inward FDI 
for both Canada in the EU. Outward investment, in particular, plays similar importance for both sides 
accounting for 43.1% of all EU FDI stocks outside the EU in 2005 and 37.4% of all Canadian outward 
stocks in 2007.638 This investment is reflective of the preponderance of the sector to deliver its services 
through local presence rather than through cross-border trade. As such, it is likely that the export 
figures listed above (reflective of mode 1) significantly under-represent the trade that both Canada and 
the EU are engaged in within the financial services sector.   
With respect to inward investment, the financial services sector plays a relatively far more important 
role for the EU where it accounted for 42% of all inward stocks (extra-EU) in 2005 compared to only 
13.5% for Canada in 2007.639 While the reasons for this disparity are no doubt multifaceted, Canada’s 
significant endowment of natural resources (particularly in oil and gas extraction and mining) and 
investor protections – which are in stark contrast to many other countries with similar endowments –  
has resulted in major inflows of FDI, particularly in recent years, lowering the overall role the financial 
services sector plays. Further, as mentioned, overt limitations on the amount of equity in Canada’s 
largest providers of financial services, have almost certainly limited the amount of direct investment via 
acquisitions that would perhaps otherwise occur.  
In terms of bilateral investment, financial services make up a significant share of Canada’s investment in 
the EU (and vice versa). Total stocks of FDI in EU financial services represented 41.5% of all Canadian 
investment in the EU as of 2007, with the EU being the recipient of 26% of Canada’s worldwide outward 
investment in the sector. Similarly, Canada’s financial services sector was the recipient of 23.2% of all EU 
FDI stocks in the country as of 2009, accounting for 34.8% of total direct foreign investment in the sector 
and placing the EU behind only the U.S. in terms of foreign investment in Canada’s financial services 
sector.640  
Comparing figures on inward investment to those for cross-border imports of financial services (mode 1), 
it is observed that the EU has played only a moderate role in cross-border trade in financial services in 
Canada, accounting for 28.5% of its imports of non-insurance financial services in 2007 ($1.16 billion) 
and 8% of insurance services imports ($486 million).641 As this equates to a total of 16.2% of Canada’s 
overall imports of financial services, it could be surmised that the much larger role of FDI further 
reinforces the idea that trade through establishment of a local presence (mode 3) is playing a greater 
role in bilateral trade in financial services. This is likely to be particularly true in the case of insurance 
services as the EU’s import market share (8%) is significantly lower than its share of the global market 
(40%) and since the industry is less restricted by investment barriers.642 Although there are no equity 
caps in insurance, multiple regulatory requirements are imposed by provinces acting as a trade barrier 
with market conduct rules imposed at provincial level. These assertions are likely to similarly hold true 
for Canada’s exports to the EU. For example, in 2007 it is already noted that the EU held 26% of 
                                                             
637 DFAIT: http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/services/canada-ts.aspx?lang=en; Goldfarb, 
D. and L. Theriault (2010).   
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Canada’s outward FDI stocks in the financial services sector. In that same year, however, the EU received 
only 16.8% of Canada’s total cross-border exports in financial services.  
 
ANALYSIS 
Given a limited degree of restrictions in place within the financial sector, it is not expected that the CETA 
will have a pronounced impact on trade, investment or output in either Canada or the EU over the long-
term. The major financial service providers in the EU, like Canada, are members of the OECD and, as 
with the majority of OECD countries, both tend to have open markets for banking and other financial 
services while providing national treatment to financial information and advisory services (FIAS).643  
Overt restrictions on mode 3 do exist in Canada with the aforementioned widely held rule, which limits 
establishment. These, however, are non-discriminatory and apply equally to both domestic and foreign 
investors. Additionally, under the Investment Canada Act (ICA), Canada implements an automatic 
screening process for any investments over C$299 million for WTO members.644 Under this review, 
foreign investments are required to display that the investment will provide a ‘net benefit’ for Canada. 
While this threshold and burden to prove a net benefit may act to restrict investments through 
acquisitions, it is unlikely that the CETA would provide lower thresholds for Member States, particularly 
in the financial services which can be subjected to prudential measures. However, if the CETA were to 
extend national treatment to EU investors, it is possible that the agreement could stimulate limited 
increases in EU FDI in Canada’s financial services sector the long-term through the removal of screening 
procedures. Nevertheless, amendments were made to the ICA in 2009 that will increase these 
thresholds to C$600 million for all WTO members over the short-term, and eventually C$1 billion over 
the mid-term, limiting any impact that a CETA is likely to have in this regard.  
In addition to the equity restrictions, Canada maintains requirements that a majority of the board of 
directors must be Canadian citizens.    
In the EU, explicit restrictions on modes 1 to 3 are generally not present. In terms of investment in the 
financial sector, the OECD FDI restrictiveness index is generally lower for a number of EU countries than 
it is for Canada, generally implying greater ease to establish local presence either through establishment 
of an affiliate or through acquisition. However, a Conference Board of Canada paper highlights a number 
of flaws in this index and claims that barriers within the EU do exist, but that they are more opaque in 
nature (e.g. political interference) though nevertheless are as or more restrictive than barriers found in 
Canada.645 Specific examples of limiting investment and attempts at acquisitions include ‘the lack of 
market discipline exercised by German’s state-owned regional savings banks’ as well as ‘the threat 
implied by the Bank of Italy’s right to veto mergers’.646 To the extent that these statements reflect actual 
barriers faced by Canadian service providers wishing to invest in the EU financial services sector, 
particularly in certain Member States, it is potentially the case that the CETA could enhance investment 
through the creation of investor-state provisions that provide national treatment. This would be 
contingent, however, on the creation of such a provision as well as the inclusion of it being enforced in 
the financial services sector (See Chapter on Investment for more discussion on this issue).  
In general, the CETA is likely to make the existing levels of liberalisation more legally binding, thereby 
limiting the extent to which any increase in liberalisation takes place, but at the same time ensuring that 
                                                             
643 OECD (2001a).   
644 Expected to CAD$312m for year 2011 according to Industry Canada. http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ica-
lic.nsf/eng/h_lk00050.html 
645 Mandel-Campbell, A. (2008).   
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liberalisation will be maintained at least at the current levels into the future. National treatment will 
likely be enshrined for cross-border trade in financial services and establishment and it is also likely that 
the CETA will legally require that regulations pertaining to the financial services sector are transparent 
and mandate that access is provided to national payment and clearing systems. Under such an outcome, 
it is again noted that there is likely to be limited further liberalisation than that already in place given the 
openness of the two sides’ financial service sectors and the limited discriminatory measures against 
foreign access. Long-term increases in investment may be fostered somewhat given assurances provided 
to investors under measures being bound by the legal provisions of the Agreement 
CGE modelling results generally confirm this assessment projecting limited changes in output, exports 
and the balance of trade in either Canada or the EU (Tables 105-110 Annex 6). As it is not expected that 
a significant degree of liberalisation will occur beyond the cut in service trade costs modelled, it is 
further estimated that the long-term impact of the CETA on output, trade and investment in the 
financial services sector will be limited.  
 
INDICATOR: Labour mobility (temporary presence for business purposes) 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
In the context of the present assessment, labour mobility takes on key importance, particularly as the 
temporary movement of labour constitutes one of the modes through which services are traded (mode 
4). As noted in the introduction to the services section, approximately one in five of the temporary 
workers located in Canada are from the EU, with the majority of these being professionals and 
technicians. While the EU does not maintain similar statistics, it is not overly presumptive to believe that 
many of the Canadians who reside temporarily in the EU are employed in similar capacities.  
Stakeholders in both Canada and the EU have, however, identified barriers to temporary entry as one of 
the most prominent barriers restricting business activities between the two sides.647 These barriers take 
the form of at-the-border restrictions, such as difficulties in obtaining entry/work permits, spousal visas 
and labour market tests, and behind the border restrictions, which include a lack of mutual recognition 
of professional qualifications and licences. Therefore, with relatively limited barriers to cross-border 
trade in the financial services sector, restrictions on the temporary presence of natural persons who 
enter either Canada or the EU for business purposes constitute one of the most prevalent barriers which 
could be addressed by the CETA.  
It is herein important to note that the CETA’s provisions on labour mobility are likely to reserved for 
temporary entry/presence and herein only for a limited segment of the workforce (e.g. professionals 
such as senior managers or skilled technicians). In terms of financial services these would deal primarily 
with individuals responsible for establishing a presence, making sales of financial services, intra-
corporate transferees who possess a specific degree of specialisation (e.g. senior managers and 
specialists) and those who have reached a contract with a Canadian-based establishment and must 
deliver the service within Canada. While detailed data on such movement of labourers within the 
financial services sector does not exist, it is likely that the overall impact of easing movement of these 
workers would be minor in the context of present bilateral economic relations.  
It is difficult to provide ex ante quantification of the impact that could be derived though 
removal/reduction in the restrictions to temporary entry. In the financial services sector, improvements 
in the at-the-border restrictions (e.g. through streamlining or elimination of visas for temporary workers 
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or easing intra-company transfers between the two Parties) would likely have a positive impact on 
investment and exports by enhancing the ability for Canadians to provide services in the EU and locate 
investment/sales opportunities (and vice versa), though the overall contribution to this is likely to be 
limited in terms of overall trade and investment.  
Mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) for specific professions within the financial services sector could 
likely produce gains for specific types of service providers such as securities dealers who would likely 
benefit from mutual recognition of stock exchange standards.648 However, MRAs are not negotiated at 
the national level in Canada and are instead under provincial jurisdiction; and most often under the 
competence of professional bodies.649 It is therefore, not clear whether the CETA will be able to directly 
result in the formation of MRAs for professionals engaged in financial services.  
 
INDICATOR: Employment 
BASELINE 
Approximately 682,600 people in Canada are employed in the financial and insurance services sector. 
Ontario and Quebec serve as the predominant sources of employment in the industry providing 66.8% 
of total financial services jobs. In terms of relative importance, however, Manitoba has the highest 
concentration of jobs in the sector with 6.3% of total employment in the province located in financial 
services. This is followed by Ontario (5.4%), Saskatchewan (4.9%), Nova Scotia (4.6%) and Quebec 
(4.6%).650    
In the EU, the financial services sector employed approximately 5.3 million people in 2007, with 65% 
employed in banking, 20% in the insurance industry and 15% as intermediaries (agents and brokers).651 
The majority of employment is concentrated in only a handful of Members with the UK and Germany 
alone accounting for approximately 43% of employment. Together, the UK, Germany, France, Italy, 
Spain, the Netherlands and Poland account for over 80% of all financial services positions in the EU.652  
In terms of relative importance, however, the financial services sector is by far the greatest source of 
employment in Luxembourg, where it accounts for nearly 12% of all jobs. Other countries relatively 
more reliant on the sector include Ireland (4.9%), the UK (4.8%) and Malta (4.7%). Generally, with the 
exception of Spain, Portugal, Finland and Sweden, the sector accounts for over 3.3% of employment in 
each of the EU-15 countries.653  
 
ANALYSIS 
Canada 
Given the limited expected impact on output and trade, employment in Canada’s financial services 
sector is unlikely to be significantly affected by the CETA over the long-term. CGE model results project a 
very minor decrease in employment, with demand for workers in the insurance industry projected to 
decrease by as much as -0.17% over the long-term (Table 112 Annex 6). This is a relatively negligible 
                                                             
648 Ibid. 
649 Ibid.  
650 Statistics Canada (2010).  
651 Kaisergruber, D. & K. Volger-Ludwig (2009).   
652 Ibid.  
653 Ibid.  
EU-Canada SIA Final Report 
240 
change in employment, which does not take into account the potential positive impact of the CETA’s 
potential provisions on temporary movement of labour and portfolio flows. 
 
EU 
It is not expected that the CETA will significantly impact employment in the EU’s financial services sector. 
This is supported by CGE results, which project very limited changes in both insurance services (0% to 
0.03%) and other financial services (-0.01% to 0.01%) over the long-term.  
  
 
SOCIAL ASSESSMENT 
 
INDICATOR: Worker displacement 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Canada 
As shown in Table 57, the financial services sector is a significant source of employment in Canada, 
providing jobs for 4.6% of the country’s workforce. While it is estimated that the financial services sector 
will see declines in employment, it is not expected to lead to any pronounced degree of displacement. 
This assessment is largely derived from presently low expected declines which are approximately -0.01% 
for financial intermediation and -0.17% for insurance services.  
 
Table 57: Employment in Canada’s financial services sector, 2009 
Sector Employment  
Financial intermediation 464,048 
Insurance 195,470 
Source: Statistics Canada 
 
EU 
Employment in the EU’s financial services sector is not expected to change as a result of the CETA, 
limiting the likelihood that the Agreement leads to any noticeable instance of displacement.  
 
INDICATOR: Quality & decency of work 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Canada & EU 
With limited worker displacement and generally good prospects for transferring into expanding 
industries, it is not envisaged that quality and decency of work will be significantly impacted in either 
Canada or the EU.  
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INDICATOR: Health, education & culture 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Canada & EU 
It is not envisaged that health, education or culture will be significantly impacted in either Canada or the 
EU.   
 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 
 
 
Canada & EU 
Financial services have few direct environmental impacts other than those related to office supplies and 
energy use. They can have indirect impacts on the environment through the financing they make 
available to other industries, which then in turn impacts the environment (e.g. preferential financing of 
oil sands contributes to environmental issues).  
Given that financial services represent the most important share of foreign direct investment in Canada, 
they could also have impacts through investment practices. However, unless the CETA would radically 
alter current practices in the financial industry, or related regulatory frameworks, something that cannot 
be demonstrated through the lens of the SIA, it is unlikely that CETA will have direct effects on the 
environment in these sectors.  
Similarly, with limited changes in output in the EU projected, it is therefore expected that the CETA will 
not produce a significant environmental impact.  
 
Indicator: GHG emissions 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Canada 
One area where financial services can have a direct impact is on GHG emissions. According to the 
economic modelling scenarios conducted for this assessment, the CETA could lead to a shift of resources 
in Canada from the natural resources to the services sector. This would result in lower environmental 
impacts overall. However, this could increase GHG emissions in the financial sector if energy 
consumption increases. Unfortunately, the E3MG estimates do not provide disaggregated results for 
these specific sub-sectors of the services sector. 
Commercial and institutional emissions were 34,900 kt of CO2e in 2008, up from 25,700 kt of CO2e in 
1990. As the Canadian economy restructures, more jobs are being created under the services industry. 
This reduces the country’s overall GHG emissions, as there is a structural shift from carbon intensive 
primary industry, to less carbon intensive service industries. Heating and cooling of buildings, electricity 
use for lights, electronics and appliances are the primary culprits of energy use.  
However, between 1990 and 2008, direct emissions from fuel use in the services sector (not electricity 
consumed) increased 47%, or by 19Mt, though this mostly occurred between 1990 and 2003. The cause 
of this rise in emissions can be attributed to the increase in office floor space (up about 34% from 1990 
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to 2007) and the growth in office equipment. Energy intensity hit its highest point in 2003, and had been 
diminishing to a level slightly lower than what it was in 1990. However, if electricity were factored in, 
emissions would increase as electricity use has gone up 27% from 1990 and 2007, mostly because and 
electronic equipment and space cooling. Since 2004, direct emissions have stayed fairly stable because 
of programs to encourage reductions in energy use and warmer winters requiring less heating.654 
 
EU 
In 2008 the only GHG emissions reported by the financial services, insurance and auxiliary subsectors to 
the EU were 171 t of methane.655 
Due to low resource utilisation in the sector and only marginal impact of a CETA no environmental 
impact is expected. The E3MG modelling also predicts no impact on GHG emissions from this sector. 
 
6.1.4. Business Services  
 
ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT656 
 
INDICATOR: Output, trade, investment & labour mobility (temporary presence for business purposes) 
BASELINE 
Business services are comprised of a wide range of heterogeneous sub-sectors that can vary in the 
specifics by which they are traded, produced and in the market access barriers they are most 
prominently exposed to. Regardless of these differences, business services tend to share the trait of 
being high value-added services that can improve the productivity of the customers they serve. Firms 
can improve their competitiveness, for example, by choosing to outsource business services that they 
use only sparingly – and hence economise on the ability to forego employing these experts full-time – 
while at the same time enjoying access to a wide range of expertise that cannot be matched in-house.657 
As such, business services can be particularly crucial for SMEs, which cannot afford to maintain internal 
competence in areas such as law, market research or accounting.  
For both Canada and the EU, business services make up one of the most dynamic sectors, serving as one 
of the key sources of employment, trade and output. In Canada, output from the business services 
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sector has increased 44.5% since 1999 with its GDP reaching $51.5 billion (5.1% of GDP) in 2009.658 
Among the subsectors within business services, output is generally evenly dispersed between legal and 
accounting services, architectural and engineering services, computer and IT services and other business 
services, with each accounting for 22-25% of total sectoral output (Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6: Output of business services in Canada by subsector, 2009 
 
Source: Statistics Canada 
 
The EU’s business services generated approximately $2,214 billion in gross turnover in 2006.659 Within 
this, legal, accounting, auditing and business management services was the largest sector accounting for 
29.8% of turnover, followed by computer and related activities (21%), architecture and engineering 
(15.3%) and advertising (8.2%).660 The UK serves as the sector’s leading Member State, providing over a 
quarter of the total value added in the EU, with Germany, France, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands 
serving as other major contributors of EU value added.  
Trade in business services can offer a number of benefits, including lower costs through increased 
competition as well as providing smaller economies with greater access to different types of services.661  
While modes 1 (cross-border trade) and 3 (establishment)662 – as with other services sectors – 
contribute significantly to trade in business services, mode 4 (temporary movement of labour) plays a 
far greater role than in other services. Mode 4 trade in business services can be difficult to disentangle 
from modes 1 and 3, however, making a separate analysis of it difficult (see Box 25). Further 
compounding this problem is the fact that data on mode 4 is widely unavailable and difficult to quantify.  
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662 See opening discussion under the Services Sector Assessments for a description of the 4 modes of trade in services as well as 
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Box 25: Mode 4 trade in business services  
and its relation to Modes 1 and 3  
 
While it is widely acknowledged that temporary movement of labour plays a significant role in the trade 
of business services, attempts to quantify the importance it plays in international trade have been 
largely unsuccessful. Data on temporary movement of labour is widely absent from national accounts 
and, in instances where such data is collected, it is lacking in the level of detail and disaggregation 
necessary for making statistical inferences. Further compounding the issue of measuring temporary 
movement of labour and its impact on trade in business services is the fact that it is often 
complementary to modes 1 and 3 and often bundled together with them in the final delivery of the 
service.  
For example, consider the following: 
 an architect designing a blueprint in her office in Milan travels to Vancouver to survey the site 
for which her plans are intended;  
 an independent consultant based in Ottawa needs to reside in Brussels for three months to 
work on a specific project commissioned by the EU; 
 a manager of a small engineering firm based in Edmonton travels to Frankfurt to meet with 
potential clients in order to secure business for her firm’s services; 
 a lawyer based at an international law firm’s headquarters in London is temporarily transferred 
to its office in Toronto to provide advice to local clients. 
 a Senior Partner of a Montreal-based accounting firm travels to Paris to seek out opportunities 
for establishing a branch office. 
All of the above examples include the temporary movement of labour from the home territory to a 
foreign territory for the purposes of delivering a service (mode 4). At the same time, the occurrence of 
mode 4 is being combined either with mode 1 or mode 3, illustrating the difficulties present in properly 
quantifying the isolated role mode 4 has on international trade in services. For this reason, as well as the 
absence of data, it is extremely difficult to properly quantify the impact mode 4 liberalisation would 
have on trade. 
  
 
Mode 1 trade plays an important role for all subsectors of the business services. This is particularly true 
given that providers of business services are generally small in size, increasing the cost of establishing a 
local presence in foreign markets. Further, advances in technology – particularly with regards to telecom 
– have provided greater scope for business services to be delivered via cross-border trade. For example, 
engineers and architects can more easily transmit blueprints and designs electronically, while IT 
programmers can more easily provide contracted services to customers in distant locales.  
Canada is competitive in a number of business services. Its engineering industry is strong in resource-
based, energy-related infrastructure projects, while its usage of both common law and civil law (Quebec) 
make its legal professionals well positioned to provide expertise in a multi-juridical context.663 In 2007, 
Canada’s total cross-border exports of business services (delivered via mode 1) reached $25.44 billion, 
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producing a trade surplus of just under $6 billion.664 Canada’s leading export subsectors were in business 
and management consulting and public relations ($7.88 billion) and computer and information services 
($7.06 billion), with the latter producing the highest trade surplus of any subsector in the business 
services ($2.09 billion). Other leading export sectors include architectural and engineering services 
(exports of $6.27 billion in 2007) and R&D services ($4.22 billion), with both producing a trade surplus in 
2007.665   
For the EU, total mode 1 trade in business services reached $472.5 billion in 2007.666 Among the 
subsectors of business services, the largest traded services are computer and information services 
($135.47 billion); legal, accounting, management, consultant & public relations services ($115.49 billion); 
R&D services ($83.59 billion); architectural, engineering and other technical services ($75.73 billion); and 
advertising and market research ($74.66 billion).667 Within these subsectors, the EU maintained a 
sizeable surplus in mode 1 trade of computer & information services ($44.36 billion), architectural, 
engineering and other technical services ($16.29 billion) and legal, accounting, management, consultant 
and public relations services ($5.59 billion), resulting in an overall trade surplus of $51.48 billion in 2007.  
In bilateral trade in these subsectors, Canada maintained a surplus in mode 1 trade within all except 
architectural, engineering and other technical services, in which the EU had a surplus of $170 million in 
2007.668 Overall, EU-Canada bilateral mode 1 trade in business services accrued to $3.8 billion in 2007, 
accounting for 14.9% of Canada’s total mode 1 trade in business services and resulting in a trade surplus 
of $729 million for Canada. In terms of relative importance, the EU serves as a significant destination for 
Canadian mode 1 exports of R&D services (26.9% of total mode 1 exports in this subsector), business 
and management consulting and public relations (14.8%) and computer and information services 
(12.3%). Similarly, the EU is a major supplier of Canadian mode 1 service imports, with a significant 
import share in R&D services (24.2%), computer and information services (14.2%), business and 
management consulting and public relations (13.6%) and architectural, engineering and other technical 
services (11.3%).669  
While cross-border trade represents an important mode through which business services are delivered 
internationally, establishment (mode 3) may, in many cases, be the primary method of trade and has 
been increasing in importance in recent years. The establishment of foreign affiliates not only provides a 
channel through which to deliver services to the end user located in a foreign market, but also a means 
of identifying and increasing sales in that market. This is particularly true in the subsector of accounting 
services, which is dominated internationally by larger firms. Most notably, the ‘Big 4’ (Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu, PwC, Ernst & Young and KPMG) operate in approximately 150 countries worldwide and in 
some markets maintain three-fourths of all revenue generated in the national industry. 670 These firms 
have become heavily reliant on markets outside their home countries, with approximately 65% of their 
revenues generated internationally.671  
The subsector of legal services provides another example of the importance of establishment for the 
international trade in business services. While the sector is overwhelmingly populated by small firms or 
individual practitioners, the recent wave of globalisation has led to increased internationalisation and 
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consolidation of law firms, who have followed their clients into international markets. Clients have 
exhibited greater demand for a law firm that can provide integrated services and expertise on a number 
of legal and regulatory systems.672 The industry’s increasing consolidation – particularly among the 
common law countries of the USA and UK – have further increased this wave of mode 3 trade in legal 
services, by helping create larger law firms that can offer a wider range of legal services to meet 
customer needs, while also having the means of more easily expanding into foreign markets. 673   
Nevertheless, most international law firms are fairly small in nature with the world’s largest – Baker & 
McKenzie – employing only 3,900 lawyers worldwide (2006) and the world’s top 10 law firms 
representing only 4% of output and 1% of employment.674  While this highlights the continued 
importance alternative modes675 are likely to have in trade of legal services, it also suggests that firms 
will be more negatively impacted by restrictions that raise the cost of establishing a local presence in a 
foreign market. This is particularly likely given the lack of dominant large firms as well as the general 
preference of multi-national companies located abroad to contract legal services from firms who have 
offices in their home country.676  
Data on FDI in the business services supports the importance mode 3 has in trade of business services 
for both Canada and the EU.677 For the EU, 22.5% of all stocks of inward FDI in 2005 were directed 
towards business services, while 11.7% of its total outward stocks were in the business services 
sector.678 Given its much larger market, the EU plays a much greater role in Canada’s outward 
investment (5.4% of all stocks in EU’s business services sector) than Canada does in EU outward 
investment in business services (2.1% of the EU’s total outward investment in business services). With 
the majority of this investment being made in order to deliver services internationally, it is therefore 
clear that mode 3 plays an important role in the international and bilateral trade of business services for 
both Canada and the EU.  
As noted, the ability to deliver services via a temporary presence (mode 4) serves an important role in 
the international trade of business services and complements trade through modes 1 and 3. This is likely 
to be particularly true within the EU-Canada bilateral relationship, where nearly 22% of temporary 
workers in Canada are from Europe.679 However, given the sensitivities surrounding the international 
movement of workers, restrictions on mode 4 delivery of services tend to be some of the most prevalent 
barriers to trade in services among OECD countries. These restrictions most commonly take the form of 
residency/nationality requirements for service providers as well as visa restrictions and issues with 
licensing and qualification requirements. 
Residency requirements limit the ease with which foreign service providers can temporarily operate 
within a jurisdiction while also inhibiting the ability of a company to engage in intra-office transfers 
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between countries. These restrictions can not only limit bilateral trade in services but can also limit a 
country’s FDI as mode 3 can lose significance when a company lacks the ability to transfer professionals 
from their home country.680 Difficulties in recognising foreign credentials serves as one of the primary 
‘behind the border’ issues relevant to the business services sector.681 This is particularly true given the 
fact that many of the subsectors within business services belong to the group of ‘accredited’ 
professional services (e.g. engineering, architecture, law, accountancy). Within these services, it is 
typically the case that a country will require that an individual obtain a license before being able to 
practice the profession within its territory. While public policy objects serve as one of the primary 
reasons behind this requirement, the hesitance or inability to recognise qualifications and licences for 
professionals accredited in a different jurisdiction hinders the unrestricted movement of professionals 
between jurisdictions, and hence limits trade in business services. 
This is likely to be particularly true in the Canada-EU context, where similar standards tend to be used in 
terms of professional experience, education and overall competence. However, the high standards to 
which some professions may be held, tends to lead to these services being heavily regulated. This is 
particularly the case in the legal and accountancy services, which are often strictly regulated, and less so 
with engineering and architecture. One way of overcoming the restrictions on trade in business services 
as a result of differences in qualifications and licensing – while keeping in place public policy objectives – 
is a mutual recognition agreement (MRA), which can facilitate recognition of professional qualifications 
between the EU and Canada. 
In summary, trade in business services tend to be restricted in a number of ways relevant to modes 1, 3 
and 4. In an EU-Canada context, these restrictions are most likely to prominently feature in the 
temporary movement of business persons. While restrictions specific to cross-border trade or 
establishment are also likely to be present, it should be noted that restrictions on mode 4 will also likely 
restrict the bilateral trade in services that possess properties relevant to mode 1 and/or mode 3. 
 
ANALYSIS 
The business services sector – particularly in a bilateral context – raises fewer sensitivities than those 
found in other services sectors (e.g. financial, telecom, maritime transport services), with the most 
prominent market access issues between the EU and Canada related to the temporary movement of 
business professionals. Given the less sensitive nature – temporary movement of labour 
notwithstanding – it would appear that the CETA could contain wide ranging commitments for business 
services. This could potentially include national and MFN treatment on cross-border supply and 
investment, while ensuring that neither side is able to impose limitations on business service suppliers 
via such circumstances as foreign equity restrictions, quotas, economic needs tests, the number of 
employees or services that can be provided, the type of legal entity the foreign company is allowed to 
take or nationality requirements for senior management.  
For a number of sub-sectors within the business services, the impact of such provisions may, however, 
be minimal given the already low level of restrictiveness. For these industries, the impact of the CETA 
may, therefore, largely consist of making the existing level of liberalisation legally binding. Nevertheless, 
there are sub-sectors within the business services that tend to be more restricted, providing potential 
for a CETA to provide improvements in market access by removing restrictions on cross-border trade 
and/or establishment issues. This is likely to be particularly true within legal and accounting services, 
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which are the most restricted sub-sectors within the business services sector.682 Further, cross-border 
trade (mode 1) could be further improved under the CETA by provisions ensuring that firms cannot be 
forced to incorporate locally in order to provide services within a jurisdiction. This could likely be of 
particular benefit to SMEs that lack the size or resources to establish a local presence in either Canada 
or the EU.  
One area where the CETA could provide benefits to business service providers on both sides would be in 
the removal of restrictions on the temporary movement of labour between the Canada and the EU. 
While movement of labour tends to be a sensitive issue in trade agreements, the CETA would be 
expected to deal with temporary presence, and herein only for a specific sub-sector of professions. 
Specifically, the CETA likely has the greatest potential to make improvements in the temporary bilateral 
movement of key personnel, graduate trainees, business services sellers and contractual service 
suppliers. With reference to key personnel, the CETA could potentially facilitate the temporary 
movement of senior professionals – either for setting up an establishment or as an intra-corporate 
transferee – or specialists, while also allowing contracted service suppliers to temporarily reside in 
Canada or the EU without needing to have an establishment in the territory. By providing significant 
improvements in the temporary bilateral movement of professionals between the EU and Canada, the 
CETA would likely foster improvements in bilateral trade in business services (mode 1) as well as 
increased investment (and hence greater trade via mode 3).   
Results from the CGE model suggest that the CETA is likely to positively impact output and trade for 
both Canada and the EU’s business services, with the greatest benefits arising under an Agreement that 
provided the greatest level of liberalisation, with output expected to increase by as much as 0.03% in 
the EU and 0.27% in Canada over the long-term (Tables 113-118 Annex 6). This increase in output is 
largely a result of increased opportunities for cross-border trade in services between Canada and the EU 
with overall exports (mode 1) estimated to increase by as much as 3.3% and 0.26%, respectively, leading 
to improvements in the overall balance of trade of $267 million for Canada and $587 million for the EU.  
These figures are, however, likely an underrepresentation of the potential gains that could occur under 
a high degree of liberalisation for the sector. While improvements to the temporary movement of 
professionals between the two sides is at least partially accounted for in the CGE estimates, they would 
only be able to account for the mode 1 effects of such liberalisation. As the estimates on exports do not 
take into account mode 3 trade occurring through foreign affiliates, and since increased movement of 
professionals will likely foster greater investment and establishment, it should be expected that the 
CETA would have a more pronounced impact on trade and output than estimated by the CGE model. 
While, as noted, it is difficult to quantify the impact of the removal of restrictions on temporary 
movement of labour, the business services sector would likely be the most greatly impacted. 
 
Canada 
Canada could specifically benefit in a number of ways in addition to those noted above. The EU serves as 
a key market for architectural and engineering services, making the increased liberalisation arising from 
the CETA potentially beneficial to Canadian providers of these services.683 Hereto, the CETA could 
enhance market access for Canadian architectural and engineering services through the inclusion of 
provisions that ensure the removal of citizenship requirements and restrictions related to establishment 
of commercial entities and foreign investment as well as improved commitments for the temporary 
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entry of architects and engineers.684 Specifically, Canada has flagged the Member States of Greece, Italy 
and Portugal as being particularly prohibitive, providing for potentially increased exports (mode 1 and 3) 
and FDI into these countries as result of the CETA.685 
Further, Canada has identified barriers in the EU which are prohibitive to Canada’s trade and investment 
in R&D and legal services, and has specifically noted market access barriers in accounting services 
present in Austria, Belgium and France.686 Stakeholders in Canada have also raised concern over the 
requirements and time necessary to secure work permits.687 To the degree that the CETA deals with 
these issues, it could enhance Canada’s cross-border exports to these Member States while also 
increasing Canada’s investment and sales through foreign affiliates.   
 
EU 
In addition to those points noted above, the EU could potentially realise benefits through the 
elimination of establishment requirements at the provincial level, which could produce increases in 
cross-border trade of some business services. EU providers of business services would also likely benefit 
from recognition of EU qualifications and the removal of citizenship requirements for accreditation 
present in some professions. This appears to be particularly true in the field or architecture and 
engineering where EU professional certifications are not recognised.688  
The CETA’s ability to concretely establish mutual recognition of qualifications/certificates is, however, 
dependent on it resulting in a bilateral MRA, which becomes complicated due to the fact that such an 
agreement is decided upon by the relevant professional organisation in Canada and not by the federal 
government. Hereto, the government can only ‘encourage and support the negotiation of MRAs 
between professional bodies through the development of appropriate frameworks and provisions 
contained in its international trade agreements’.689 Nevertheless, to the degree that the CETA results in 
such a framework, it is possible that greater bilateral recognition of qualifications can be realised over 
the long-term; in turn fostering the temporary movement of professionals between Canada and the EU 
and leading to greater cross-border trade in business services. At the same time, the ability to reach 
such an agreement and foster movement of professionals will be complicated by the fact that Canada 
itself suffers from issues pertaining to inter-provincial barriers to labour mobility. As such, any effective 
MRA would require that certifications/qualifications be recognised by all provinces and territories and 
that service providers not be required to obtain approval from separate approving bodies located at the 
provincial level.   
The CETA may also improve the flow of temporary labour from the EU to Canada by improving upon the 
current framework present in Canada’s Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP). With the TFWP 
requiring a company to demonstrate a ‘needs test’ showing that they are unable to satisfactorily fill the 
position from within the Canadian labour market and that the entry of the worker will not be 
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detrimental to the Canadian labour market, such a provision limits intra-corporate transfers and 
ultimately the ability for professionals to move between labour markets.690 Further, to the degree that 
cooperation under the CETA can facilitate the removal of delays in obtaining work permits, temporary 
movement of labour may be facilitated, adding to the potential benefits outlined herein. 
 
INDICATOR: Employment 
BASELINE 
In 2006, 22.2 million people in the EU were employed in business services.691  With respect to 
concentration, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and the UK are particularly reliant on the sector with a 
significant portion of their workforce employed in business services. Employment in Canada’s business 
services was 740,200 at the end of 2009.692 Within Canada, the largest source of employment for 
business services is Ontario, with 41.6% of Canada’s employment in the sector, followed by Quebec, 
Alberta and British Columbia (Table 58). In terms of concentration, business services provided the 
largest source of employment in Alberta with 6.2% of the workforce engaged in the sector. This was 
followed by Ontario, British Columbia and Quebec. Generally speaking, however, Canada has a far lower 
regional concentration in the sector than observed in the EU.  
 
Table 58: Employment in business services in Canada, by province and importance (2009) 
Province Employment 
(in thousands)  
Share of total 
workforce (%) 
Newfoundland and Labrador 6.6 3.4 
Prince Edward Island 1.8 2.8 
Nova Scotia 13.8 3.5 
New Brunswick 10.0 3.2 
Quebec 165.8 4.9 
Ontario 308.0 5.5 
Manitoba 16.6 2.9 
Saskatchewan 12.3 2.8 
Alberta 106.5 6.2 
British Columbia 100.4 5.3 
Yukon 0.6 2.9 
Source: Statistics Canada 
 
ANALYSIS 
Canada 
As a result of the CETA, Canada’s business services sector is not expected to experience significant 
changes in the demand for labour. CGE estimates project that, despite increases in output and exports, 
the CETA will place very minor downward pressure on the demand for labour over the long-term. The 
estimated change is negligible, and is explained by greater substitution of capital for labour given the 
former becoming cheaper relative to latter. At the same time, the inability of the model to properly 
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account for increased investment and trade via mode 3 (foreign affiliates), suggests that the CETA could 
very well lead to limited increases in employment in the sector in Canada, particularly to the degree that 
the EU increases its sales via foreign affiliates.   
 
EU 
The overall impact of the CETA on employment in the EU’s business services is likely to be negligible 
over the long-term. CGE estimates project that employment will not change as a result of the 
Agreement, though it possible that very minor increases may arise from increased investment by 
Canada and greater sales via foreign affiliates. Nevertheless, no significant impact is expected.  
 
SOCIAL ASSESSMENT 
 
INDICATOR: Worker displacement 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Canada 
The economic modelling projects very minor decreases in employment within Canada’s business 
services sector. Nevertheless, as one of the most important sources of employment in Canada, even 
minor declines in employment could result in a relatively larger number of displaced. Still, CGE estimates 
project very minor declines in employment (-0.06% to 0%) with potential increases in investment that 
are not captured by the model expected to place upward pressure on the demand for labour. As such, it 
is not expected that the CETA will have a pronounced impact on displacement. 
 
EU 
Although the preliminary CGE model projects limited increases in output within the EU’s non-financial 
business services sector, it estimates that employment will not be impacted. Given that increased 
Canadian FDI may place very minor upward pressure on the demand for labour, it is not expected that 
the CETA will lead to displacement in the EU’s business services sector. 
 
INDICATOR: Quality & decency of work 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Canada & EU 
Generally, working conditions in business services are good with the majority of employees provided 
with safe and comfortable surroundings. These professions, however, are typically above the national 
average in unpaid overtime and job induced stress. To this end, employees in these occupations on 
average report dissatisfaction with their work-life balance. Nevertheless, with limited expected change 
in employment in Canada or the EU’s business services, these indicators should not be affected by the 
CETA.  
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INDICATOR: Health, education & culture 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Canada & EU 
It is not envisaged that the CETA’s impact on business services will have a significant impact on health, 
education or culture in the EU or Canada.  
 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 
 
 
Canada & EU 
The business services sector has few direct environmental impacts other than those related to office 
supplies and energy use. However, through their influence on customers and suppliers, they have 
important upstream and downstream effects on sectors of the economy that may have a direct 
environmental footprint. For example, architecture or engineering services influence downstream 
construction, transportation and building energy use, as well as upstream supply of materials. They 
therefore have influence on the upstream supply chain and downstream customer behaviour.   
Unless the CETA would radically alter current practices in these industries, or related regulatory 
frameworks, something that cannot be demonstrated through the lens of the SIA, it is unlikely that CETA 
will have direct effects on the environment in these sectors.  
 
INDICATOR: GHG emissions 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Canada 
One area where business services can have a direct impact is on GHG emissions. According to the 
economic modelling scenarios conducted for this assessment, the CETA could lead to a shift of resources 
in Canada from the natural resources to the services sector. This would result in lower environmental 
impacts overall. However, this could increase GHG emissions in the business services sector if energy 
consumption increases within the sector. Unfortunately, the E3MG estimates do not provide 
disaggregated results for these specific sub-sectors of the services sector. 
Commercial and institutional emissions were 34,900 kt of CO2e in 2008, up from 25,700 kt of CO2e in 
1990. As the Canadian economy restructures, more jobs are being created under the services industry. 
This reduces the country’s overall GHG emissions, as there is a structural shift from carbon intensive 
primary industry, to less carbon intensive service industries. Heating and cooling of buildings, electricity 
use for lights, electronics and appliances are the primary culprits of energy use.  
However, between 1990 and 2008, direct emissions from fuel use in the services sector (not electricity 
consumed) increased 47%, or by 19Mt, though this mostly occurred between 1990 and 2003. The cause 
of this rise in emissions can be attributed to the increase in office floor space (up about 34% from 1990 
to 2007) and the growth in office equipment. Energy intensity hit its highest point in 2003, and had been 
diminishing to a level slightly lower than what it was in 1990. However, if electricity were factored in, 
emissions would increase as electricity use has gone up 27% from 1990 and 2007, mostly because of 
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electronic equipment and space cooling. Since 2004, direct emissions have stayed fairly stable because 
of programs to encourage reductions in energy use and warmer winters requiring less heating.693 
 
EU 
In 2008 the various subsectors694 reported GHG emissions of 692,000 t CO2 to the E-PRTR.  
Due to low resource utilisation in the sector and only marginal impact of a CETA no environmental 
impact is expected. The minor increase caused by the CETA would equate to insignificant additional CO2 
emissions. The E3MG modelling also predicts no impact on GHG emissions from this sector. 
 
 
6.2. USA, MEXICO & OTHER THIRD COUNTRIES 
 
USA 
Liberalisation of the services sector under the CETA, and the expected gains it would produce for Canada 
and the EU, would likely have a negative but limited economic impact for the United States. U.S. exports 
and output of telecom, insurance and other business services are estimated to be the most negatively 
impacted by the CGE model, with the U.S. expected to lose some market share in Canada and the U.S. as 
a result. Erosion of preferences would likely be the primary factor behind this impact. Not only would 
competition from the EU in the Canadian market increase, but potential improved efficiency in Canadian 
companies would likely further threaten American market share while also serving to make Canadian 
firms more suited to compete in the US market over the long-term. 
The negative economic impact would also likely extend to the social sphere, with decreases in US output 
and exports expected to have a negative impact on employment. Decreases in employment would likely 
have a negative social impact as those displaced may have difficulties finding alternative employment 
that provided comparable benefits (e.g. in wages). Nevertheless, the overall social impact would be 
expected to be limited. 
Environmentally, the specific impact on the services would likely be positive due to reduced output. 
However, if this production would instead shift towards manufacturing, the overall impact would likely 
be negative.  
A notable area of interest is telecom. As noted in the assessment on Canada and the EU, the primary 
market access restriction in Canada is the foreign ownership restrictions in place. It is unclear to what 
extent the CETA will lead to a removal of these restrictions, but to the degree that it does, it is possible 
that these preferences will be extended to the United States given provisions under NAFTA. If this were 
to occur, the impact on the U.S. would likely be significant as the removal of investment barriers would 
likely spur increased investment in the Canadian telecom sector, increasing mode 3 exports. More 
discussion on this can be found in the chapter on investment.  
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MEXICO 
Estimates suggest that Mexico’s services sector would be negatively impacted over the long-term by the 
CETA between Canada and the EU. Mexico would likely suffer from the erosion of preferences both with 
Canada and the EU, leading to limited declines in output and exports of insurance and other business 
services, in particular. However, this impact is expected to be minor.  
 
OTHER THIRD COUNTRIES 
The EU and Canada are almost 100% net exporters of services to LDCs,695 making it unlikely that the 
CETA will have an economic, social or environmental impact on these countries.696 Trade in services 
takes place mainly with the US, followed by the EFTA countries (Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, and 
Liechtenstein) 697 and changes might be expected in these countries. Services, excluding transportation 
and travel, dominate. 
In addition, limitations on foreign investment in facilities based telecommunication enterprises in 
Canada as well as limits on competition in the Northern Territories; commercial presence market access 
limitations in Finland, France, Poland and Slovenia, and national treatment limitations for cross-border 
services in Cyprus and Malta may not change under CETA.698 
While the total of internationally purchased services in the non-manufacturing sector initially appears to 
be insignificant,  it has been found that purchased services from low-wage countries have a statistically 
significant (but small) negative impact on employment. For the manufacturing sector, while purchased 
services from low-wage countries is not significant, the outsourcing of intermediate materials to low-
wage countries appears to have a relatively small negative impact on the demand for labour. The effect 
might be more pronounced for intermediate materials from China and the East Asian countries than for 
those from Central and East European countries.699 In the instance that investment liberalisation is 
included in the CETA, potential increased EU FDI into Canada in the telecommunications sector may 
boost the demand for labour from countries such as India. In the ambitious scenario of services 
liberalisation, changes in the world prices of electricity, air transport, communication, financial services, 
insurance, and business services, can lead to minor welfare losses in China, EUPTA, LDCs, ACPexLDC and 
ROW countries. 
Significant environmental impacts on third countries, directly related to services liberalisation, are not 
expected. However, the moderate increase of land transportation services in the EU could increase its 
demand for fuels from third countries, which would negatively affect the environment in these countries 
(see the assessment of this subsector in section 3.2.2.2). 
                                                             
695 Mattoo et al (2008)   
696 Due to data limitations, direct estimates of impact indicators are not available for all sectors (trade, other finance, insurance 
and consumer services). For these sectors, estimates for the aggregate services sector were then used. 
697 Eurostat. Statistics in Focus (59) 2009, August 3. 
698 European Commission and the Government of Canada 2008 
699 Falk and Wolfmayr (2008).  
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7. CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES  
 
7.1 PUBLIC PROCUREMENT700 
 
Summary:  
The logic behind liberalising public procurement (also known as government procurement [GP]) rules in 
trade agreements is to improve the transparency, efficiency, and effectiveness of the procurement 
process, as well as to increase market access into GP markets. This is expected to ensure accountability in 
GP, combat corruption (particularly when involving countries with corruption problems), as well as 
provide governments the best value goods and services for their money. It is likely that the majority of 
sensitive GP provisions in CETA, and thus the focus of this assessment, deal particularly with GP market 
access issues. 
Economic assessment: The main effect of GP provisions in CETA would be to encourage competitiveness 
in the bidding process. At the most macro scale, Canada may experience some minor benefits in terms of 
GDP increases partially from GP provisions under CETA, although the extent of these gains is uncertain, 
and would be linked with the benefits from other directly relevant CETA provisions. The EU is not 
expected to see significant gains given the already highly competitive nature of its GP market.  
GP provisions in CETA would limit Canada’s flexibility in making economic policy, and to a lesser extent 
limit the EU’s flexibility in economic policymaking. In assessing CETA’s impact on regulatory flexibility it is 
prudent to compare Canada’s and the EU’s 1994 GPA commitments with potential CETA commitments. 
Through such analysis it is clear that CETA will remove the wide discretion that the Canadian government 
was afforded in its 1994 GPA commitments to favour certain domestic companies in its tendering process 
in terms of entities, sectors/services and goods, and exceptions. CETA would also reduce the discretion of 
the EU in favouring its own companies in the GP process, although given the comparative openness of 
the EU GP market at present, the magnitude of this additional opening under CETA would not be as great 
as that experienced by Canada.  
GP provisions in CETA could create a loss of some policy space in Canada in particular, although this 
needs to be contextualised in terms of thresholds, as it is unlikely that CETA will apply to Canadian 
contracts worth less than the lowest current GPA thresholds of SDR 130,000 (approximately $202,420 in 
current USD), which means the significant amount of GP contracts falling under this threshold would not 
be legally subject to CETA GP provisions. Generally, CETA will likely impact policy space for governments 
of different provinces and territories in Canada more significantly than the federal government, and 
areas with comparatively more contracts above thresholds would experience more significant impacts on 
policy space. (The resulting effects on market share, employment, cost and quality of public services, 
quality and decency of work, and the environment are discussed below.)  
                                                             
700 Introductory notes: This section, unlike the other cross-cutting sections, provides a baseline and analysis per each indicator 
due to the specificity of the background information required per each indicator. It also considers the US alongside the 
assessment of the EU and Canada given the relevance of NAFTA, the GPA, and the AGP to CETA. It is worth noting that while 
this assessment attempts to present as much relevant data as possible, comprehensive data on GP is difficult to compile, 
particularly as it relates to contracts subject to trade agreements. 
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Overall, EU companies would likely see some increase in market share as a result of GP provisions in 
CETA, and Canadian companies are likely to see some, although a comparatively less, increase in market 
share. WTO data suggests that domestic companies in GPA Parties like Canada and the EU control the 
overwhelming percentage of market share in their home GP markets and empirical evidence suggests 
any significant competition from foreign companies is through foreign subsidiaries. Thus, CETA will likely 
not lead to any notable shifts in domestic to “direct” cross-border trade; however, EU firms may gain 
market share through “indirect” cross-border trade (through a foreign subsidiary). They may take 
advantage of the potential allowances in CETA to gain market share in the Canadian utilities and other 
sectors, as well as in sub-central GP above CETA thresholds. The extent of these gains importantly 
depends on a number of factors of competitiveness and not just market access afforded in CETA, as a 
wide range of foreign subsidiaries are already competitive in the Canadian GP market. Also, as a result of 
CETA, in the mid- to longer-term EU companies may become more competitive in Canadian GP contracts 
both above and below thresholds. Canadian companies may increase their market share of EU GP 
contracts as a result of CETA, although this would be made difficult given the EU’s GP environment is 
more open and thus more accustomed to competition than the GP market in Canada. 
The effect of GP provisions in CETA on employment in Canada is mixed. CETA is unlikely to result in any 
significant loss of domestic employment to companies operating in the GP market that have not 
established a foreign presence in Canada and are not employing people living in Canada. The precise 
impact of CETA on employment in specific localities within Canadian borders is unclear, although there is 
some indication of potentially negative impacts even if minor. Prohibition of offsets could have some 
negative impacts on employment in the short-term at least, but a comprehensive analysis would be 
needed to gauge the full impacts therein.  
If set-asides for Aboriginal and minority businesses are prohibited, it would have some negative effects 
on employment (and culture), at least in the near term, on those currently benefiting from such 
preferences. And this would create a negative social impact in addition to the economic impact. However, 
such concerns over Aboriginal businesses may be unnecessary as consultations with the EC suggest they 
intend to respect “set-asides with a social dimension.” 
Social assessment: Evidence from a number of studies suggests that the competition caused by GP 
provisions, like those in CETA, will likely result in increases in welfare. And these increases may translate 
into lower cost public goods and services. However, the extent of these welfare gains will also depend on 
changes in competition and investment rules, among other provisions in CETA.  
CETA would encourage more firms to participate in the GP process, allowing wider choice for 
governments in the companies contracted to deliver goods and services, which should reinforce the trend 
that companies that provide quality services win contracts; however, beyond this theoretical statement 
there is not enough available evidence to suggest this will have a significant positive or negative impact 
on the end quality of goods and services tendered in the EU and Canada, including water delivery and 
management, and health and education services. 
Moreover, quality in GP would likely be maintained in that it seems any agreeable CETA would include 
key provisions for quality standard in GP agreements. These provisions include discretion to use “most 
advantageous offer” in terms of price and quality; denial of contracts if there are no suitable offers/the 
option not to award a contract if not in the “public interest”; the ability to institute or enforce measures 
to protect several fundamental societal interests; and the ability to use selective or limited tenders. Also, 
the democratic process and well developed institutions in the EU and Canada provide a solid foundation 
to ensure quality in procured goods and services and that the aforementioned provisions are properly 
enforced. Additionally, even if CETA included mechanisms for challenging GP bids and projects via 
investor-state cases, which does not clearly exist in NAFTA, or bid challenges, which are normally allowed 
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in GP agreements, there is no conclusive evidence to suggest these would have a net positive or negative 
effect on the quality of government-procured goods or services in Canada or the EU.  
CETA would likely have less of an impact on quality and decency of work in the GP sector than some 
stakeholders have predicted, although there are still issues of concern and related questions that cannot 
be answered without further details of CETA. Empirical evidence suggests that production costs, wages 
inclusive, do not correlate to winning of GP projects. Companies in the EU are required by domestic laws 
to meet core requirements in terms of treatment of workers. Companies in Canada must likewise comply 
with domestic Canadian laws on treatment of workers. While there are still discrepancies in the quality 
and decency of work environments within localities in the EU and Canada, there does not appear to be 
sufficient evidence to suggest these will be significantly exacerbated by GP provisions in CETA. However, 
without further details of the Agreement it is not clear how CETA would affect current initiatives towards 
“fair wages” and other “social considerations” as it is not obvious that these policies would be an 
“unnecessary obstacle” to trade. If CETA disallows these initiatives it would have a negative impact on 
quality and decency of work in certain areas, although consultations with the EC suggest the 
commitment of Canada and the EU to maintain these policies would likely mean they are unaffected by 
CETA. 
Environmental assessment: A GP Chapter in CETA would likely have mixed environmental impacts, 
although the full extent of these impacts is unclear without further details of the Agreement. Generally, 
given the high level of support in the EU and Canada for environmental considerations in GP, also known 
as “green procurement” policies, such policies could very well still remain in place under CETA. To be 
clear, the EU and Canada have made some exceptions in the GPA to allow for environmental 
considerations in GP, and NAFTA more generally stipulates it should not prevent parties from 
implementing measures to protect animal or plant life or health. If CETA removes flexibility in green 
procurement enjoyed under agreements like NAFTA and the GPA it would reduce environmental policy 
space in Canada and the EU, creating certain negative impacts; however, consultations with the EC 
suggest the commitment of Canada and the EU to maintain these policies would likely mean they are 
unaffected by CETA. Still, this does not fully address specific concerns over CETA’s disallowance of offsets. 
 
7.1.1. EU, Canada, and USA 
 
ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT 
 
INDICATOR: Institutional and regulatory environment  
BASELINE 
The WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), NAFTA, 2010 US-Canada Agreement on 
Government Procurement (AGP), and domestic legislation and regulations currently govern the GP 
framework between the EU, Canada and US. For simplicity, major components of GP agreements are 
broken down as follows: 
1. General commitments and procedural provisions (framework rules) – which may include 
provisions on national treatment; transparency; standards; type of tendering* (open, selective, 
single/limited) and tendering procedures (invitations to tender, selection procedures, tendering 
documentation, procedure for submission of tenders, timing, award procedures etc.); technical 
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co-operation; negotiations; bid challenge procedures; consultations and dispute settlement; and 
special and differential treatment  
2. Monetary thresholds– obligations only apply to contracts at or above the agreed thresholds 
3. Entities listed (negative or positive list) – specific entities or a range of entities through which 
procurement opportunities may (positive list) or may not (negative list) be sought  
4. Goods and services – goods and services not subject to exceptions (non-construction and 
construction services are usually listed separately) 
5. Exceptions/exclusions/derogations (safeguards) – any range of exceptions to commitments. For 
example, exclusions of certain types of entities, scope of goods and services, offsets, set-asides, 
among others. Exceptions may be organised according to a specific area or generally apply to GP 
commitments in their entirety. 
*The following are generally the 3 different types of procurement mechanisms: Open tendering – 
tendering where any entity that meets the basic requirements of the tender is allowed to bid. In terms 
of goods in particular, this tendering is said to be most suitable for standard items bought in large 
numbers. Selective tendering – tendering to a list of qualified suppliers, the number of which is set by 
purchasing entities/contracting authorities. It is generally used for more complex contracts. Rules are 
established for how to get onto a list of qualified suppliers. As an example, under NAFTA selective 
tendering is allowed if it is in-line with the efficient operation of the GP system and it allows opportunity 
for participation from both domestic suppliers (e.g. those in Canada) and suppliers from the other 
countries party to the agreement (e.g. the US and Mexico). Single/limited tendering – tendering to one 
specific Party. This type of tendering is normally used for an item where there is only one supplier or 
under certain rather restricted circumstances. As an example, under NAFTA, limited procurement can 
only be used in certain circumstances where there is evidence of collusion among suppliers, 
justifications in the interest of protecting intellectual property rights, or an imbalance of competition for 
technical reasons. 
 
1994 GPA 
The GPA is a plurilateral WTO agreement, meaning that not all WTO members are obliged to become 
parties or observers to the agreement. Only those that are Parties to the GPA are obliged to follow it 
and the specific commitments they negotiated therein.701 The GPA was established in 1994, and as such 
this agreement is often referred to hereafter as the “1994 GPA.” It first came into effect for a number of 
members, including the US, Canada and the EU-15 on January 1996, whereas the additional members of 
the EU-25 and EU-27 acceded on May 2004 and January 2007, respectively. The GPA functions as an 
international mechanism for regulation of the procurement activities of its Parties. The GPA contains a 
version of the major components of GP agreements as outlined above.  
The specific market access commitments of Parties to the GPA are contained in Appendix I to the GPA 
(there are 4 appendices), which contains 5 annexes, each of which contain a notes section establishing 
exclusions for the specific commitments and a General Notes section setting exclusions for the coverage 
afforded in all those annexes/the GPA collectively. The 5 GPA annexes are: Annex 1: Federal entities, 
Annex 2: Sub-central government entities, Annex 3: Federal enterprises/all other entities allowed to 
procure under the GPA, Annex 4: Services (committed to for entities listed in Annexes 1-3), and Annex 5: 
Construction services (to be committed for entities listed in Annexes 1-3). 
                                                             
701 Members to the GPA can be found at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/memobs_e.htm#parties 
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Canada  
Canada committed a broad range of its central entities, i.e. department and agencies, to the 1994 GPA. 
However, while Canada wrote Annex 2 and 3 commitments, these annexes are not currently binding 
under the 1994 GPA as the negotiations required to make them binding were not successful.702 Thus, 
Canada is not bound by any of its specific 1994 GPA commitments on sub-central entities or entities in 
Annex 3 under the 1994 GPA. Canada did not cover municipal governments in its 1994 GPA 
commitments.  
Additionally, the exceptions in Canada’s 1994 GPA commitments exclude federal or sub-central Crown 
corporations (state-owned enterprises); certain goods and construction and non-construction services, 
including utilities;703 and provide for a number of other important exceptions. Some of Canada’s GPA 
exclusions relate to the issue of reciprocity, where it has excluded certain commitments, to the US and 
EU for example, on the basis that the EU and US have excluded certain commitments to Canada. See 
Table 59 below for an overview of Canada’s key GPA exclusions and commitments. 
 
EU 
Within the 1994 GPA, the EU commits a range of goods and services across a broad range of 
departments, ministries and agencies, including for each MS. In fact, the EC’s GPA commitments are the 
“most comprehensive” out of all GPA members in terms of procuring entities and procurement areas, 
covering procurement opportunities at the central and sub-central levels as well as procurement from 
these entities in utilities, among other goods and services.704 However, while the EU affords these 
commitments to other GPA members, it does not on the basis of reciprocity extend certain access to 
certain other countries, including blocking Canadian access to a number of areas of EU GP. 
Like the US and Canada, the EU has a number of exemptions in its 1994 GPA commitments. A notable 
amount of these specifically pertain to the aforementioned reciprocity issue: for example, exclusions of 
service suppliers in terms of water, electricity airports, ports, urban transportation705 for the US and 
Canada, among other countries, until such countries provide “comparable and effective” access for EU 
undertakings in such areas. Some exclusions in the EU’s 1994 GPA are external to the issue of reciprocity. 
See Table 59 below for an overview of key exclusions and commitments. 
 
US 
The US, like the EU and Canada, commits a range of goods and services across a broad range of 
government entities in its GPA commitments. On the state level, the US makes GPA commitments for 37 
                                                             
702 Note 6 under the General Notes section in Canada’s offer stipulates: "The offer by Canada, with respect to goods and 
services (including construction) in Annexes 2 and 3, is subject to negotiation of mutually acceptable commitments (including 
thresholds) with other Parties, with initial commitments to be specified on or before 15 April 1994 and specific commitments to 
be confirmed within eighteen months after the conclusion of the new Government Procurement Agreement." (emphasis added). 
Mutually acceptable commitments were not negotiated with other Parties between April 1994 and October 1995. 
703 Canada’s 1994 GPA, Annex 4 (services) (4)  
704  EC (2009). Report from the Commission: COM(2009)592 final.  http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52009DC0592:EN:NOT 
705 See General Notes 1 a-e of the EU’s 1994 GPA schedule   
EU-Canada SIA Final Report 
260 
states.706 The US provides a number of exclusions in its commitments, which include among others Buy 
American provisions on federally-funded mass transit and highway projects, as well as federal and state 
set-asides on behalf of small and minority businesses. Of note, it explicitly excludes Canada from those 
goods and services, including construction services, in Lists A and B in its Annex 3.707  
 
Basic comparison of Canadian, EU and US commitments in 1994 GPA 
There are key differences between the commitments of the EU, Canada and US. As established, the EU is 
said to have made the most ambitious GPA offers in terms of procuring entities and types of 
procurement opportunities. All GPA Parties except Canada offer some GP access to their utilities, 
although the extent of this coverage differs. Additionally, these three GPA parties have committed to 
somewhat different contract thresholds.  
A brief (non-exhaustive) comparison of the scope of Canada’s and the EU’s GPA market access 
commitments can be found in Table 59 below. Additionally, a comparison of the GPA contract 
thresholds among the EU, US and Canada can be found in Table 60 below. 
Table 59: Key goods, construction services and other services excluded in EU and/or Canada GPA 
commitments 
General GP area EU and Canada both 
exclude 
Canada (only) EU (only) 
Goods, services and construction services 
below the thresholds set out in the GPA 
X   
Generally -- Goods, services and 
construction services purchased by sub-
federal entities 
 X 0 
Goods, services and construction services 
purchased by Canada’s Crown 
Corporations (federal or provincial)  
 X 0‡ 
Goods of a military nature X   
Goods, services and construction relate to 
international aid and joint projects 
X   
Shipbuilding and ship repair  X 0 
Urban rail and transportation X   
(Certain+) *Transportation services  X 0* 
Dredging  X 0 
Some communications equipment  X 0* 
Information technology equipment  X 0 
Research and development X   
(Certain+) *Utilities services  X  0* 
(Certain+) **Education, health and social 
services 
 0** X*** 
Printing, advertising and public opinion 
research services 
 X 0 
Agricultural products for agricultural 
support programmes and human feeding 
X   
                                                             
706 These 37 states are: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, 
Kansa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New York, 
Nebraska, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, 
Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.  
707 See US 1994 GPA General Notes 1 and 5, respectively 
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programmes ++ 
Source: Box 2.3, pg 77, 2008 Joint Study; Canada and EU 1994 GPA annexes 
Key:  
X = country excluded this area in their GPA commitments (but see * and ** notes) 
0 = although the country/area has included commitments on this or related areas for other GPA members, it explicitly excludes 
them due to lack of reciprocity from the other country/area (but see * and ** notes) 
‡ As a result of Canada’s lack of reciprocity in this area the EU has excluded goods, services and construction services in the 
utilities to Canada 
+denotation added to Box 2.3 from the Joint Study 
++category added to Box 2.3 from the Joint Study 
*This denotation follows the analysis in the 2008 Joint Study; however, one may argue about the extent of its accuracy. At a 
minimum, it should be applied with the qualification that the EU 1994 GPA, General Notes, note 6. excludes “contracts awarded 
by entities in Annex 1 and 2 in connection with activities in the field of drinking water, energy, transport or telecommunications”; 
and note 7. “This Agreement shall not apply to contracts awarded by entities in Annex 3 for the purchase of water and for the 
supply of energy or of fuels for the production of energy.”  
** This denotation follows the analysis in the 2008 Joint Study; however, one may argue about the full extent of its accuracy. At 
a minimum, it should be considered with the qualification that Canada does apply certain related exceptions, for example in 
Canada’s 1994 GPA, note 5, Annex 2 notes, provides specifically for exclusions for goods or services transferred to social 
services  
***This denotation follows the analysis in the 2008 Joint Study; however, for context it should at least be also noted that Annex 
I of the EU’s GPA commitments allows GPA member procurement from a number of higher education institutions and 
ministries of culture and education in the EU.  
 
Table 60: Threshold comparison between EU, Canada and US for Annex 1, 2 and 3 of Appendix I of the 
GPA (Numbers in terms of Special Drawing Rights) 
WTO 
Party 
Annex I Annex 2 Annex 3 
 Goods Services 
except 
construc
t-ion 
services 
Constr-
uction 
service
s 
Goods Services 
except 
construc
t-ion 
services 
Construc
t-ion 
services 
Goods Services 
except 
construct-
ion 
services 
Construc
t-ion 
services 
Canada 130,00
0 
130,000 5,000,0
00 
355,0
00 
355,000 5,000,000 355,0
00 
355,000 5,000,000 
Euro-
pean 
Comm-
unities/ 
EU 
130,00
0 
130,000 5,000,0
00 
200,0
00 
200,000 5,000,000 400,0
00 
400,000 5,000,000 
US 130,00
0 
130,000 5,000,0
00 
355,0
00 
355,000 5,000,000 250,0
00 
(USD) 
or 
400,0
00 
250,000 
(USD) or 
400,000 
5,000,000 
Source: WTO data  
 
Revised Canadian, EU and US GP proposals in the WTO 
The US, EU and Canada have continued to make proposed revisions under the GPA framework, although 
GPA negotiations are not part of the Doha Round. In general, these revisions aim to update the GPA 
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given modernisation of IT and procurement methods, extend coverage of the agreement, eliminate 
remaining discriminatory measures, as well as consider the addition of other signatories. Some of these 
revisions, for example the October 2006 revised offer from the US and the November 2007 revised offer 
from Canada, have become particularly important in 2010 as they are specifically referenced in the AGP 
agreement to be discussed hereafter. The EC offered a revised GPA offer in 2005, including on utilities, 
although given the reluctance of some GPA Parties to reciprocate, it then offered a newly revised offer 
in February 2008 considering the feasibility of reciprocation. The new submission has been said to offer 
about 85% of all above threshold procurement of the EU.708 The EC also continues to promote an 
agreement on government procurement under the GATS, another WTO agreement which although 
excluding GP does establish a WTO negotiating mandate on services procurement. 
 
NAFTA 
Chapter 10 of NAFTA sets forth rules on GP between Canada, the US and Mexico. It is similar to the GPA 
in framework, containing a section of general commitments and procedural provisions, and establishing 
a scope of commitments covering GP in goods, non-construction services and construction services with 
exceptions. NAFTA Chapter 10 only applies to federal government agencies and “government entities.” 
It does not require state, provincial or local buyers to provide equal treatment to offerors from outside 
their jurisdictions (even if for projects using federal funds); however it “encourages” such treatment.709 
NAFTA also only included commitments on 53 US central government entities, whereas 79 were listed in 
Annex I in the US 1994 GPA.710 
In this regard, written 1994 GPA commitments of Canada and the US are in certain senses more 
stringent than those GP commitments in NAFTA, although as mentioned only sections of the countries’ 
GPA commitments are actually binding due to reciprocity issues. In addition to the aforementioned 
exclusion of state, provincial or local buyers within NAFTA, the agreement also includes exclusions of 
specific goods and services that are provided for in the GPA. For example, NAFTA excludes “health and 
social services” in Canada,711 which are not excluded in Canada’s initial 1994 GPA commitments 
although are ultimately made non-binding due to reciprocity issues.  
Notably, NAFTA includes requirements for extending certain core provisions to agreements with other 
countries that NAFTA members may sign. There are provisions for extending national treatment and 
MFN treatment in investment via Article 1102 1103 and in services via Article 1202 and 1203, 
respectively, to NAFTA parties engaging in subsequent international agreements. It is notable that 
NAFTA’s Article 1102, 1103 and 1106 (on performance requirements) do not apply to government 
procurement.712 
 
 
 
                                                             
708 EC (2009). Report from the Commission: COM(2009)592  
709 Government of Canada. Government Procurement Opportunities and NAFTA. 
http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/sell2usgov-vendreaugouvusa/opportunities-opportunites/opportunities-
debouches.aspx?lang=eng 
710 Woolcock, S. (May 2008). “Public Procurement and the Economic Partnership Agreements: assessing the potential impact on 
ACP procurement policies.” Commonwealth Secretariat; London School of Economics.  
711 Note G., Section B exclusions for Canada, Chapter 10 of NAFTA 
712 Re Article 1102, 1103 (and 1107) as stipulated by Article 1108 (Reservations and Exceptions), sub-article 7(a) of NAFTA. Re 
Article 1106, as stipulated by Article 1108, sub-article 8 (and for example, confirmed by DFIAT. “NAFTA – Chapter 11 – 
Investment: Municipalities and NAFTA Chapter 11.” http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/disp-diff/Mun-FAQs.aspx?lang=en) 
EU-Canada SIA Final Report 
263 
 
 
Box 26: NAFTA contract thresholds 
According to Article 1001.1(c) of NAFTA, contract thresholds are, subject to other provisions of NAFTA including 
those in Article 1001.2c, as follows: 
1. for federal government entities, US$50,000 for contracts for goods, services or any combination thereof, 
and US$6.5 million for contracts for construction services, 
2. for government enterprises, US$250,000 for contracts for goods, services or any combination thereof, and 
US$8.0 million for contracts for construction services,  
3. or state and provincial government entities, the applicable threshold, as set out in Annex 1001.1a-3 in 
accordance with Article 1024. 
 
US-Canada Agreement on Government Procurement (AGP) 
The AGP, which went into effect on 16 February 2010, was specifically negotiated in response to the US 
Recovery Act, the US stimulus bill passed in February 2009 in response to the financial crisis. The 
Canadian government asked for exemption from Buy American provisions in the Recovery Act and in 
return offered access to Canadian provincial and municipal government procurement. The AGP was 
subsequently established, and which for simplicity may be organised into 3 main functional parts: (1) 
permanent changes under the GPA; 2) temporary allowances until Sept. 30, 2011; and (3) commitment 
to scope for further access to procurement markets.  
The AGP commits the US and Canada to increased GP market access. It should be noted that although 
the AGP makes changes in commitments between Canada and the US under the GPA, it does not change 
the mutually agreed upon, or lack of mutually agreed upon (due to reciprocity issues), coverage afforded 
by either country to other Parties under the GPA. The thresholds for procurement in the AGP are 
consistent with those in the GPA.  
Under the first functional component of the AGP the US extends its 1994 GPA commitments at the state 
level to Canada, further revising its “revised October 2006” GPA offer. Canada is committed to 
subjecting those sub-central entities it listed in Annex 2 (of Appendix I) of its 1994 GPA to its “revised 
2007 GPA” offer.  
The second component of the AGP provides temporary commitments, i.e. until 30 September 2011. It 
exempts Canadian companies from the US Recovery Act’s Buy American requirements for seven 
programs,713 notably allowing construction projects to use Canadian iron, steel and manufactured goods. 
Certain estimates show that this exemption allowed Canadian suppliers to compete for a maximum of 
                                                             
713 See List C of Annex 3, Appendix I, of the US GPA (see schedule dated 19 March 2010): 1. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
Rural Utilities Services, Water and Waste Disposal Programs; 2. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Rural Housing Service, 
Community Facilities Program; 3. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Energy 
Efficiency and Conservation Block Grants; 4. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, 
State Energy Program; 5. U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Community Planning and Planning 
and Development, Community Development Block Grants Recovery (CDBG-R); 6. U. S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, Office of Public and Indian Housing, Public Housing Capital Fund; 7. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Clean 
Water and Drinking Water State Revolving Funds, for projects funded by reallocated ARRA funds where the contracts are signed 
after February 17, 2010  
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$US4-5 billion of procurement projects.714 In return, Canada granted the US access to a range of goods 
and services, mainly from government ministries. It granted access to certain municipal and Crown 
corporations’ construction projects, collectively estimated by certain sources to be worth more than 
$CAD 25/$US24.7 billion. However, Canada did not grant the US access to a range of other procurement 
entities, programs and sectors present in Canada’s GPA commitments.715   
The third component of the AGP sets forth a mechanism for expanding upon the AGP. The mechanism 
allows for both extension of the temporary provisions of the agreement, and a wider expansion of GP 
market access commitments at large.  
 
Domestic legislation 
Canada 
Laws govern GP at both the federal level and among and within Canadian provinces and territories. The 
level of cooperation among all provinces/territories in particular is often criticised as limited, although 
some examples of key agreements for inter-provincial trade include the Agreement on Internal Trade 
(AIT), the British Columbia-Alberta Trade, Investment, and Labour Mobility Agreement (TILMA), and the 
recent Trade and Cooperation Agreement between Ontario and Québec (TCA). Individual territories and 
provinces and their localities have regulations governing the many aspects of their GP processes. Laws 
regulating competition, including the Competition Act and Investment Canada Act, are also relevant to 
GP regulation in Canada to the degree that competition policy informs and conditions GP rules and 
seeks to prevent uncompetitive practices in significant GP sectors/areas. 
 
EU 
EU treaties and policy set forth fundamental GP requirements. Article 12 of the EU Treaty prohibits 
discrimination on grounds of nationality, which applies to GP. The Lisbon Treaty, in force on 1 December 
2009, provides a number of GP reforms, including support for increasingly sustainable procurement. EU 
competition policy is relevant to GP to the degree that it informs and conditions GP rules and prevents 
uncompetitive practices in significant GP sectors/areas. 
Individual MS have their own regulations for GP that transpose the EU Directives. Recent EU-wide policy 
initiatives have pushed Social Considerations on Public Procurement (SCPP) to foster fair wages among 
other benefits, and have been adopted in different forms by various MS. Individual MS and localities 
have regulations governing the many other aspects of their GP processes. 
In terms of specific GP directives, the EU has experienced a wave of reform throughout the last few 
decades. The most recent wave of GP reform was initiated in 1996 through a Green Paper. The EC 
submitted a proposal in May 2000 and the European Council and European Parliament reached an 
agreement on the reform package, passing a number of GP reforms in 2004. The reforms consists of two 
new core directives: One on the public sector via Directive 2004/18/EC procedures for the award of 
public works, supply and service contracts; and the second on the utilities sector via Directive 
2004/17/EC on procurement procedures of entities in the water, energy, transport and postal services 
sectors. MS were required to implement the regulations by 31 January 2006. These directives create 
certain changes to technical specifications; allow for the possibility of incorporating social and 
environmental considerations, particularly via listing of specific environmental considerations in 
                                                             
714 Sinclair, S. (April 2010). “Negotiating from Weakness: Canada-EU trade treaty threatens Canadian purchasing policies and 
public services.” Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives. pg 9.   
715 Ibid  
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procurement; exclude those engaged in criminal activities from GP; indicate criteria for contract awards 
and weighting of such criteria; provide for competitive dialogue procedures; clearly allow for framework 
agreements; develop rules on central purchasing entities; and attempt to streamline and improve 
electronic accessibility of procurement information and make purchasing systems more dynamic.716   
 
US 
Like Canada and the EU, the US has laws regulating GP at the national, and sub-national (including state 
and local) levels. Key federal laws regulating GP include the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), and, 
for authorisation and appropriating of GP, the Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA) and Federal 
Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA). The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (TAA) and a related executive 
order allows the US to provide treatment of GPA countries as bound by the GPA. Federal procurement 
in the US below the WTO GPA’s thresholds are with few exceptions governed by the Buy American Act 
of 1933 and related executive orders and implementing regulations. In US federal-level GP, country of 
origin is not determined by the ‘substantial transformation test,’ but rather by domestic manufacturing 
and content requirements. Some state and local governments have enacted similar requirements. Most 
states have anti-trust laws (the US version of what other nations call competition laws) as does the 
federal government, which are relevant to GP to the degree that they inform and condition GP rules and 
prevent uncompetitive practices in significant GP sectors/areas. Individual states and localities also have 
a system of other regulations governing the many aspects of their GP processes.  
 
ANALYSIS 
Canada 
CETA will have significant impacts on the regulatory and institutional environment for GP in Canada. 
Outside of this general point, and with the exception of the discussion on the potential electronic 
system requirement in CETA and an introduction of thresholds in CETA, the institutional and regulatory 
changes CETA may produce are discussed in terms of more specific indicators hereto. 
Some stakeholders note that there may be a requirement in CETA for Canada to create a “single 
electronic point of access for procurements by all Canadian jurisdictions and entities,”717 and argue that 
this would be a costly burden on institutions. If such a requirement is included in the final CETA indeed it 
would cost time and money in the near term, which would likely be of particular burden to municipal 
governments. However, creation of such a system would also benefit both Canadian and foreign 
enterprises by providing easy access to information. The system would not necessarily be started from 
scratch as Canada does already have comprehensive online GP sources.718 Any new or upgraded 
electronic system may actually save Canada significant costs in the long term, as evidenced by EC 
                                                             
716 Beuter, Rita. (2005) “European Public Procurement Reform: Main Innovations in the Public Sector Directive.”  
717 Sinclair (April 2010), pg 12.  
718 MARCAN is a government-funded website for procurement opportunities established under the AIT: 
http://www.marcan.net/english/index2.htm. (In terms of other services, MERX is a for-profit [but also with some free services, 
e.g. for accessing federal procurement opportunities] Canadian website that provides comprehensive tendering information. It 
includes federal and provincial tenders in Canada as well as federal, state and local tenders in the US. MERX includes GP 
opportunities from Alberta, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, the territory of Nunavut, Ontario, Prince 
Edward Island, and Saskatchewan. Most provincial and federal government agencies and departments are required to post 
tenders over CDN$25,000.)  
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estimates that an electronic procurement system in the EU will contribute to yearly expenditure savings 
of EUR 19 billion by 2010.719 
Regarding thresholds, CETA’s impact on Canada’s regulatory environment for GP contracts depends on 
the degree to which thresholds are lowered from GPA commitments and the extent to which CETA 
commitments on entities, goods and services and prohibitions/limitations on exceptions go beyond 
Canada’s GPA commitments. Certain thresholds are needed to ensure companies are capable of carrying 
out contracts.  
Analysis of the thresholds in GPA commitments (found in Table 60) suggests a number of trends. The EU 
currently protects certain smaller GP contracts awarded by all entities covered by Annex 3 relatively 
more than Canada does for equivalent contracts; specifically, the EU has 11% (by 45,00O SDR) higher 
thresholds than Canada for goods and services outside construction services for all entities covered in 
Annex 3. Canada protects certain smaller GP contracts awarded by sub-federal enterprises significantly 
more than the EU does for equivalent contracts; specifically, Canada has 44% (by 155,000 SDR) higher 
thresholds than the EU for goods and services except construction services for sub-central entities 
(Annex 2). For other areas, both sides afford the same level of protection/liberalisation; specifically, all 
Annex I thresholds are the same for the EU and Canada, and their thresholds are the same for 
construction services, at SDR 5 million, across all 3 annexes (i.e. Annex 1, 2 and 3).  
As mentioned throughout this analysis, 90% of Canadian (federal) Government contracts are worth less 
than $100,000.720 This statistic appears to only apply to Canadian federal government contracts, and 
study team research to date has not found statistics that clearly distinguish what percentage of 
Canadian sub-central level GP contracts are worth less than $100,000. 
According to consultations with the Contracting Authority, it is reasonable to use certain GPA thresholds 
as a general proxy for CETA thresholds.721 CETA may not lower thresholds below the lowest GPA 
threshold (found in Annex 1 of the GPA) of SDR 130,000 (approximately $202,420 in current USD). 
However, and as discussed below, this does not preclude the possibility that CETA may lower certain 
individual thresholds within each of the 3 main GP annexes to below GPA levels.  
Without further details of what is being committed it is unclear what percentage of GP contracts will be 
subject to CETA thresholds. 722 Without improved statistics and details on CETA it is not possible at the 
current stage of the study to calculate the percentage of Canadian federal or sub-central level contracts 
subject to CETA, but it should be noted that sub-central level contracts appear to account for well over 
half of the GP market in Canada.723  
                                                             
719 EC (2005). “Cutting public procurement costs in the EU.” Single Market News, No. 38.  
720 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (2010). “Doing Business with the Federal Government.”  
721 Consultations with Contracting Authority at the project Steering Committee Meeting in November 2010 
 
722 Using one method of calculation, it appears around 14% of Canada’s federal contracting is subject to thresholds under the 
GPA. Source: Author’s calculations using WTO statistics mentioned in the “market share” indicator hereto: The federal 
government of Canada buys approximately $14 billion worth of goods and services each year. Canada’s federal contracts in 
2007 for entities listed in Annex I of the GPA and above GPA thresholds (SDR130,000 for goods, SDR130,000 for services except 
construction, and SDR 5,000,000 for construction services) were listed to constitute $CAN 1.9 billion. $CAN 362.74 million of 
these contracts were subject to limited tendering, making $CAN 1.54 billion of above GPA thresholds contracts subject to non-
limited tendering. This suggests 14% of federal government contracts were subject GPA thresholds, although approximately 
2.6% were limited tendering and thus less competition.  
 
723 The Canadian federal government buys approximately $14 billion of goods and services a year. Statistics suggest the value of 
GP contracts for sub-federal Canadian entities for 2007 is $CAN 17.2 billion, although this number excludes a wide range of 
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It may be useful to consider potential deviations in individual CETA thresholds from similar thresholds in 
Canada’s GPA annexes, while being mindful of the likelihood that the lowest CETA threshold may not be 
lower than the lowest threshold in Canada’s GPA commitments. The below Table 61 provides a 
hypothetical example of CETA’s GP thresholds and compares such thresholds to Canada’s 1994 GPA 
thresholds. Given that other indicators in this report mention thresholds, for example in terms of policy 
space, costs of goods and services, market share, GDP, employment and quality of goods and services, 
the analysis in this section will only provide a general framework for future assessment of the impacts of 
changing thresholds in terms of potential regulatory changes. (Note: an assessment on the regulatory 
and institutional impacts of the specific thresholds actually agreed upon in CETA would be required to 
make a more accurate assessment herein).  
 
Table 61: Hypothetical/sample CETA thresholds for Canada vs. Canada’s 1994 GPA thresholds (in 
Special Drawing Rights [SDR]) 
WTO 
Party 
Annex I Annex 2 Annex 3 
 Goods Services 
except 
construct
-ion 
services 
Construc
t-ion 
services 
Goods Services 
except 
construc
t-ion 
services 
Construc
t-ion 
services 
Goods Services 
except 
constru
ct-ion 
services 
Construc
t-ion 
services 
HYPOTH
ETICAL/
SA-
MPLE 
CETA 
threshol
ds 
130,0
00 
200,000 5,000,00
0 
200,0
00 
200,000 5,000,000 200,0
00 
200,000 
 
5,000,000 
Canada’s 
1994 
GPA 
commit-
ment 
threshol
ds 
130,0
00 
130,000 
 
5,000,00
0 
355,0
0 
355,000 5,000,000 355,0
00 
355,000 5,000,000 
Source: Canada’s GPA commitments and hypothetical example created by author 
A number of sample trends can be discerned from the above hypothetical example. For example, in the 
above hypothetical CETA the EU has requested that Canada actually increase its threshold for “services 
except construction services” for federal entities in Annex I by 35% (SDR70,000). Such a reduction in 
threshold amount might be present in the actual CETA if the type and number of entities requested in 
CETA are expanded beyond those currently included in Canada’s GPA Annex 1 – reflecting an effort to 
allow Canada to better protect contracts of these newly added entities than would otherwise be 
possible if the according GPA threshold were used.724 On the other hand, Canada’s GPA Annex 2 and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
different entities. Numbers are not readily accessible for the amount of sub-federal procurement that would be subject to 1994 
GPA thresholds. 
724 Still, there could certainly be situations where reduction of thresholds in Annex 1 would not necessarily be justified simply as 
a result of moving of entities between Annex 3 and/or 2 and Annex 1. For example, moving an entity like the National Capital 
Commission of Canada from Canada’s GPA Annex 3 to Annex 1 of the abovementioned sample CETA would in fact have no 
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Annex 3 thresholds for goods and “services except construction services” are approximately 44% 
(SDR155,000) higher than the thresholds of Annex 2 and 3 in the above hypothetical example CETA, thus 
implementing such thresholds under this hypothetical version of CETA would mean lesser protection of 
contracts in these categories. The thresholds for “construction services” are the same in Canada’s GPA 
and the above hypothetical CETA across all 3 annexes.   
 
EU and US 
Institutional and regulatory changes that may take place in CETA and their impacts on the EU and the US 
are considered in terms of other more specific indicators below. The relatively most important impacts 
for the EU are found under the “Market share,” “Decency and quality of work,” and “Environmental 
policy space” indicators. The relatively most important impacts for the US are found under the 
“(Economic) policy space” indicator. 
 
INDICATOR:  Impact on economic policy space (and spill-over effects to other types of policy space) 
BASELINE 
Canada 
In Canada, flexibility in policy space with regards to GP liberalisation to date has been contingent on 
internal agreements and, in terms of foreign relations, in terms of NAFTA and the GPA and recently in 
terms of the AGP with the US. Canadian public procurement has included policies for fair wages in GP, 
has instituted Green Procurement and otherwise used GP as a tool of local development. It should be 
noted these areas not only relate to economic policy space, but also directly to social and environmental 
policy space. 
EU 
EU economic policy space does not appear to be restricted in an overly negative way by GP provisions it 
has made in its 1994 GPA commitments, FTAs or economic agreements,725 or domestic policy initiatives, 
which have been quite ambitious. In line with the Global Europe 2020 strategy, EU FTAs, like CETA, have 
also included provisions liberalising public procurement. The EU made the most ambitious 1994 GPA 
proposal out of any GP Party, which was made even more ambitious in its 2008 revised offer which 
included further access to EU utilities among other areas. EU public procurement has recently included 
liberal policies of Social Considerations in Public Procurement and Green Procurement. It should be 
noted these areas not only relate to economic policy space, but also directly to social and environmental 
policy space. 
 
US 
There is little evidence to suggest that the US is currently experiencing significantly restricted economic 
policy space in the area of GP agreements with Canada. In fact, the US has proven its ability to expand 
past agreements with Canada on government procurement, for example through the 2010 AGP.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
significant regulatory effects to the extent that most of the National Capital Commission’s contracts appear to be in the 
construction services market, which has a SDR 5,000,000 threshold in both the 1994 GPA and sample CETA. 
725 It should be noted that this statement does not take a position on if EU GP provisions in other FTAs/trade agreements have 
restricted the policy space of other signatories to the agreement 
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ANALYSIS 
Canada 
The current Canadian government and numerous Canadian businesses are pushing for further 
liberalisation of Canada’s GP market of the type that will likely be proposed in CETA. For example, a 
series of 2008 surveys for DFIAT found 72% of Canadian executives polled were not opposed to opening 
up Canada’s GP markets at all levels (federal, provincial and municipal) to foreign companies in 
exchange for similar access abroad, and 49% indicated clear support.726 Additionally, the government in 
recent years has been openly encouraging development of public-private partnerships and liberalisation 
initiatives.  
On the other hand, it is clear from a number of stakeholder consultations that there is also opposition to 
the opening of Canada’s GP market as potentially instituted in CETA. Stakeholders have expressed 
concerns over specific potential commitments CETA may make in terms of entities, sectors, and scope of 
goods and services. Herein, one could make the distinction between the level of economic policy space 
that the government decision-makers desire and the level desired by certain stakeholders, as well as the 
impacts they predict from these various levels of economic policy space.   
In assessing how stakeholders’ concerns might affect Canadian economic policy space, as well as the 
sometimes directly linked impacts on social and environmental policy space, it is prudent to consider the 
potential inclusion of new commitments on entities in CETA together with the potential expansion of 
sectors and goods in services in CETA, and compare these components with Canada’s 1994 GPA 
commitments. This will provide a more holistic understanding of the degree of any proposed changes 
beyond a pre-existing international framework to which both the EU and Canada are party (the GPA), 
albeit one not fully in force due to reciprocity issues. Box 27 provides this assessment. 
 
Box 27: Key Canadian stakeholder concerns on CETA compared with Canada’s 
1994 GPA commitments 
 
Provisions alleged to reduce policy space and according comparative analysis 
General commitments and procedural provisions 
Certain Canadian stakeholders have criticised a number of provisions that may be in CETA as providing 
an undue competitive advantage to the EU via creating an overly rigid institutional and regulatory 
framework. One area of concern has been a GP national treatment provision in the CETA. Some 
stakeholders have noted that the CETA may include compulsory tendering, which includes reporting 
requirements and mandatory time limits before closing tenders.  
These provisions in and of themselves are not new restrictions to Canadian federal-level regulatory 
flexibility, as analysis suggests they are included in currently binding commitments in the EU’s and 
Canada’s GPA commitments. National treatment provisions are an integral part of the 1994 GPA (see 
Article III). All of the other aforementioned elements are standard in agreements like NAFTA and the 
1994 GPA. However, to the degree that these CETA provisions are combined with obligations on federal-
level entities not previously subject to binding commitments in the GPA, they do reduce the regulatory 
                                                             
726 Phoenix Strategic Prospectives, Inc. (2008). “Final Report: Business Survey on Government Procurement Market Access 
Priorities.” Report for DFIAT. 
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flexibility once held at the federal level under the GPA. 
It also should be noted that these provisions are applied currently only under binding provisions of 
Canada’s GPA with the EU, and so do not apply to the Canadian sub-central level, to municipalities or to 
sectors and areas excluded in the GPA through lack of reciprocity. As such, making such commitments 
binding under CETA and adding more commitments at the sub-central level will limit regulatory 
flexibility at the sub-central level.  
The mechanism for bid challenging, because it creates a risk for litigation for public authorities (bid 
challenges go through the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT)), is further singled out as being a 
particularly negative aspect of a potential CETA, in part contributing to loss of policy space. Stakeholders 
fear it will slow the procurement process as private companies appeal the loss of tenders to other 
bidders. Some sources have implied that the GP provisions in the CETA could lead to the increased risk 
of litigation and thus force Canadian municipalities to provide monetary compensation to certain 
firms.727  
The bid challenge mechanism is standard in GP agreements. It is standard in NAFTA and the 1994 GPA, 
although it should again be noted that these elements are applied currently only under binding 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
727 Shrybman, S. (May 2010). “Municipal Procurement Implications of the Proposed Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Union.” Legal Opinion for Centre for Civic Governance, Vancouver.  
728 Sinclair (April 2010), pg 12 
 
730 Ibid, pg 13 
731 Ibid, pg 13 
732 Ibid, pg 13 
7331994 GPA. Article XVI (offsets), sub-article 1, pg 23, footnote 7 
734 Among others see Sinclair (April 2010), pgs 7, 11 and 16 
735 Despite this listing, the EU’s 3-point strategy for GP liberalisation does not explicitly list Canada as a target in terms of 
liberalisation small businesses exceptions (the US is listed). This is inferably due to the fact that Canada does not have a general 
system of exceptions for small businesses or for specific types of small businesses (outside Aboriginal-owned businesses) on par 
with the US.   
736 Note 1: The GPA prohibits offsets in one sub-article (Article XVI, sub-article 1), but allows for offsets for developing countries 
under certain circumstances in the following sub-article (Article XVI, sub-article 2). Specifically, the latter sub-article allows 
offsets for developing countries in light of general policy considerations if they are used only for qualification to participate in 
the procurement process and not as criteria for awarding contracts, and if such conditions are objective and non-discriminatory 
(See Article XVI:2 of the GPA). Canada, however, is not a developing country and such these allowances do not clearly apply; 
still, it is clear from its written commitments that Canada negotiated to include offsets in its GPA schedule. 
Note 2: It is worthwhile to note that if Canada’s 1994 GPA as originally written were fully binding then offsets for the sub-
central level would legally be notably more restricted than they are at present, e.g. confined to the specific circumstances 
mentioned in the paragraph on Annex 2 exclusions.   
737 See Annex 1001.2b General Notes, Schedule of Mexico, 6(a) and (b). “Turnkey” projects herein could be considered a type of 
offset. Also see Trade Compliance Center. “What is Chapter 10 of the NAFTA and what does it do?” 
http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/Exporters_Guides/List_All_Guides/NAFTA_chapter10_guide.asp 
738 Note 1: As noted in Table 40, Canada and the EU have excluded goods of a military nature from their 1994 GPA 
commitments. Note 2: Also, Article XXIII of the GPA (Exceptions to the Agreement) provides an exception that may be used by 
countries to justify using offsets specifically in defence-related procurement. Sub-article 1 states: “Nothing in this Agreement 
shall be construed to prevent any Party from taking any action or not disclosing any information which it considers necessary for 
the protection of its essential security interests relating to the procurement of arms, ammunition or war materials, or to 
procurement indispensable for national security or for national defence purposes.” Note 3: For examples of countries employing 
defence offsets see U.S. Department of Commerce (2007). “Impact of Offsets in Defence Trade: An Annual Report to Congress.” 
http://www.bis.doc.gov/defenseindustrialbaseprograms/osies/offsets/final-12th-offset-report-2007.pdf 
739 See Annex 1001.2b, General Notes, Schedule of Canada, sub-article 1(d) 
740 See Annex 1001.2b, General Notes, Schedule of Canada, sub-article 1(f)  
741 Consultations with Contracting Authority at Steering Committee Meeting in November 2010 
742 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (2010)  
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provisions of Canada’s GPA with the EU, and so do not apply to the Canadian sub-central level. To the 
degree that the mechanism is increasingly utilised under CETA it will cost time and resources of 
reviewing authorities. Although local/municipal governments currently have generally open and 
transparent tendering in which EU companies can already participate, the bid challenges under CETA 
may increasingly burden these levels of government given they require commitments that go well 
beyond the currently binding provisions of Canada’s 1994 GPA. Still, based upon an initial review, it 
appears difficult to establish that the majority of bid challenges under CETA would have substantial and 
direct negative impacts in terms of costs to government and quality of government-procured goods and 
services. (See the “Quality of goods and services” indicator for more on bid challenges.) 
 
Entities 
CETA will likely add significant commitments for entities not currently included in Canada’s GPA 
commitments, many of which stakeholders believe will create overstretched regulatory and institutional 
commitments. Some areas of concern mentioned by stakeholders are as follows: 
 Commitments on all central government and all other central public entities. The Canadian 
Wheat Board is an example of an entity that stakeholders fear may be bound in CETA.728   
 Commitments on all sub-central government entities, including those at the regional, local or 
municipal level, as well as “all other entities in all Canadian Provinces and Territories whose 
procurement policies are substantially controlled by, dependent on, or influenced by central, 
regional or local government and which are engaged in non-commercial or non-industrial 
activities.” 729  Inclusion of Nunavut, which was excluded from the AGP, as well as all 
municipalities with populations over 50,000 people.730 
 Commitments on “all entities” and “any corporation or entity owned or controlled by one or 
more of” such entities in the municipalities, municipal organisations, school boards and publicly 
funded academic, health and social services (MASH) sector.731 
 Commitments on all provincial Crown corporations involved in the electricity sector. 
 Commitments on all entities involved (in terms of contracts, or commercial or industrial 
activities and whose procurement policies are controlled by government) in exploring and 
operating in a geographical area for the purpose of extracting oil gas, coal or other solid fuels.  
 Commitments for the same entities in the abovementioned point involved in the production, 
transport or distribution of drinking water, or supply of drinking water to such networks.732  
These potential CETA provisions go substantially beyond Canada’s 1994 GPA commitments, as can 
clearly be determined through a comparative analysis using the text of Canada’s 1994 GPA. Moreover, if 
CETA included these provisions it would provide substantially new access not only beyond Canada’s 
currently binding commitments, but also would go beyond the written commitments in the 1994 GPA 
that are not currently binding due to reciprocity issues. The impact of such commitments on regulatory 
flexibility is of course limiting; however, the full economic, social and environmental effects of such 
commitments in terms of actually reducing economic policy space as defined in this SIA are best 
assessed in combination with other provisions of CETA. These are analysed in the below section on 
exceptions and scope of CETA, and as outlined throughout analysis on other relevant indicators. 
 
Exceptions/exclusions for sectors and scope of goods and services in GPA vs. potential CETA 
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Stakeholders’ have expressed a number of concerns over reduced policy space resulting from CETA’s 
potential prohibition of exceptions and expansion of the scope of goods and services Canada is currently 
allowed in its GP market (although it appears many stakeholders have typically not directly linked these 
to the GPA, they have acknowledged the obligations exist somewhere in the legal realm). First, concerns 
have been expressed that CETA will remove exceptions and/or make new commitments for sectors like 
urban and rail transportation equipment, roads, and ports; telecom; waste, water, electricity and other 
utilities; and other essential services. Second, concerns have been expressed over the impact of 
removing general exceptions, like those to contribute to “economic development” via an absolute 
prohibition of “offsets” (“offsets” are defined in the 1994 GPA as “measures used to encourage local 
development or improve the balance-of-payments accounts by means of domestic content, licensing of 
technology, investment requirements, counter-trade or similar requirements”).733 Collectively, these 
concerns translate into a general worry from stakeholders that the government will be unable to use 
GP-linked initiatives to foster fair wages, create employment, and foster local innovation (for example, 
in green technology), among other benefits relating to public welfare.734  
In addressing these specific concerns, as with the previous analyses, it is important to understand the 
extent of exclusions and limitations on the scope of GP commitments set out in Canada’s GPA. One can 
then make an assessment as to how far the CETA provisions in according areas would go beyond a key 
international agreement on GP. In certain cases, NAFTA will also be used as a reference. 
As found in the General Notes section, Canada’s GPA commitments notably exclude, among other areas, 
(e) agricultural products made in furtherance of agricultural support programs or human feeding 
programs, (d) set-asides for small and minority businesses,735 and (b) urban rail and urban transportation 
equipment. As found in the notes to Annex 4 (services), Canada’s GPA commitments exclude, among 
other areas, public utilities, R&D, certain services from the provincial police forces, and certain 
telecommunication services.  
As found in the notes to Annex 2 (sub-central entities), Canada’s GPA commitments exclude a host of 
areas. For example, they exclude programs promoting the development of distressed areas; 
procurement that is “intended to contribute to economic development within the provinces or territories 
of Manitoba, Newfoundland and Labrador, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, Yukon or 
Northwest Territories”’; any measure adopted or maintained with respect to Aboriginal peoples (in so 
far as it does not affect existing aboriginal or treaty rights of any of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada 
under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982); and procurement of goods, services of construction 
purchases for or transferred to school boards or their financial equivalents, publicly-funded academic 
institutions, social services or hospitals for all provinces in Canada except Ontario and Quebec. Note 7 of 
the exclusions also states that “Nothing in this Agreement shall be constructed to prevent any provincial 
or territorial entity from applying restrictions that promote general environmental quality in that 
province or territory, as long as such restrictions are not disguised as barriers to international trade.” 
Annex 2 itself states it does not apply to preferences on a number of highway projects. A number of 
other exclusions are made. 
In response to the first main concern of stakeholders, prohibition of exceptions/adding commitments in 
sectors including utilities (including water and electricity, among others), urban and rail transportation 
equipment (which the EU also excludes in its 1994 GPA commitments), and certain transportation 
services, among others, would go well beyond Canada’s currently binding GPA commitments and even 
beyond the written commitments in the 1994 GPA that are not currently binding due to reciprocity 
issues. This can clearly be determined by a comparative analysis using the text of Canada’s 1994 GPA.  
In response to the second main concerns of stakeholders, an absolute prohibition of offsets indeed goes 
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beyond Canada’s currently binding GPA commitments and even beyond the written commitments in the 
1994 GPA on sub-central level procurement that are not currently binding due to reciprocity issues.736 
Indeed this would disallow a broad area of regulatory discretion over GP contracts subject to CETA.  
To make another comparison, NAFTA generally prohibits offsets for procurement covered in Chapter 10. 
This said, NAFTA does allow certain exceptions to the offset restriction, for example for local content in 
turnkey construction projects in Mexico.737 For context, it should also be recalled that NAFTA does not 
apply to sub-central entities whereas Canada’s GPA does in written form although, again, not in binding 
form due to reciprocity issues.  
However, it should be noted that a number of factors would mitigate even an absolute prohibition of 
offsets in CETA. As mentioned again below, CETA would not restrict the usage of offsets in GP contracts 
below CETA thresholds. Also, as in the GPA and NAFTA, there will inferably be a variety of 
industries/areas of procurement excluded in CETA GP commitments, and thus CETA would not prohibit 
usage of offsets in these areas. Additionally, one may question if language in CETA would explicitly 
prohibit offsets for all defence procurement, as of recently both EU MS and Canada still maintain offsets 
in this area which is also traditionally a significant source of offsets.738 Further analysis on CETA 
provisions regarding offsets can be found in the “Employment” and “Innovation” indicators hereto. 
 
Additional issues 
While not as related to concerns over economic policy space as social policy space, stakeholders suggest 
Canadian policy space may be restricted as a result of GP provisions in CETA to the degree that it 
jeopardises the quality of procured goods and services. However, as outlined in later analysis, there is 
evidence to allay much of these specific concerns. Still, this is not to say that the government may still 
attempt to increase the amount of services provided by government directly or alter procedures for 
procuring them. Although raised as a concern by stakeholders, and as discussed in more detail in the 
Investment section and later in this section, while the government may encounter some difficulty in 
making private services public due to investor-state challenges, even if investor-state provisions are 
included in CETA they may not be entirely relevant to GP. 
In addition to the expressed stakeholder concerns, it appears that CETA would change a number of 
other provisions in Canada’s GPA commitments that may limit regulatory flexibility, and in turn 
somewhat limit policy space. It may exclude the set-asides for small businesses and minority peoples 
allowed in Canada’s GPA (and NAFTA739). It may exclude the provisions on agricultural products made in 
furtherance of agricultural support programs or human feeding (which the EU also excludes in its 1994 
GPA commitments, and which is also excluded in Canada’s NAFTA commitments740), and the clause 
allowing “restrictions that promote general environmental quality in that province or territory [within 
Canada]” under certain circumstances.  
 
Are there any provisions in CETA that may in fact mitigate these reductions in regulatory flexibility? 
 
It is important to note that not all of the alleged reductions in policy space should be considered as 
constituting a reduction in policy space as defined in this SIA, although they all do constitute a reduction 
in regulatory flexibility. Care must be taken in distinguishing the two effects.  
 
Also, very importantly, the aforementioned losses of regulatory flexibility, and fewer confirmed 
instances of actual economic policy space loss, from CETA would technically only apply to those 
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contracts above threshold floors agreed upon in CETA. As mentioned in the “Institutional and regulatory 
environment” indicator, consultations with the Contracting Authority indicate that thresholds in CETA 
may generally follow those in the GPA.741 Thus, CETA may be unlikely to institute thresholds for 
contracts worth lower than the lowest GPA threshold for Annex I entities of SDR 130,000 (approximately 
$202,420 in current USD). And this floor would likely apply to federal (Annex 1), sub-federal (Annex 2), 
or other entities (Annex 3) listed in CETA. This significantly decreases the abovementioned losses of 
policy space, and the losses to policy space are lessened even more when considering the fact that 90% 
of Canadian (federal) Government contracts are worth less than $100,000.742  
 
This is not to say that by gaining a foothold in the market for larger contracts opened up under CETA 
firms would not become growingly competitive in areas unopened by CETA, but Canadian governments 
would retain the current level of policy space in those areas. Without improved statistics and details of 
CETA it is not possible to calculate how much GP would be subject to CETA thresholds, and thus subject 
to some policy space loss. 
 
Additionally, one way CETA will likely at least somewhat mitigate the impacts on policy space mentioned 
will be to maintain a wide variety of requirements mentioned in the “Quality of goods and services” 
indicator later in the analysis.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In summary, CETA’s GP commitments discussed by stakeholders would indeed significantly limit 
regulatory flexibility in Canada. The conclusion regarding the limitations in regulatory flexibility is drawn 
from an analysis that Canada’s GPA commitments exclude federal-level entities; are not binding for sub-
central entities; and allow for a large amount of exceptions for sectors and goods and services, including 
certain offsets, set-asides, and other provisions – and these commitments may be reversed in CETA.  
However, and very importantly, by no means do all the reductions in regulatory flexibility discussed, 
which are often cited by some as constituting a reduction in “policy space,” constitute a reduction in 
policy space – economic, social or environmental – as defined as a sustainability indicator in this SIA. 
This said, in certain situations GP provisions could create losses in economic policy space. Herein, 
however, the assessment provided thus far does not fully explain the related economic, social and 
environmental impacts of such reductions on policy space. Rather, the conclusions are drawn from the 
in-depth analysis on such impacts that are presented not in this indicator but in other indicators hereto 
(i.e. see the “employment” indicator in this section, and the different indicators in the social and 
environmental assessments below). 
Additionally, confirmed cases of losses in economic policy space in and of themselves must be 
contextualised in terms of thresholds, with larger rather than smaller scale projects being affected. 
Generally, CETA will likely impact policy space for governments of different provinces and territories in 
Canada more significantly than the national level government. And therein, the impact on specific 
jurisdictions would depend largely upon the number of projects per sub-central level above thresholds 
agreed upon in the CETA, with areas with comparatively more contracts above thresholds experiencing 
more significant impacts on policy space. Certain provinces/territories have been more apt to open up 
their GP markets in the past than others. 
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Could CETA affect Canadian policy space in any other ways? 
It is worth noting that regulatory flexibility, and potentially some form of policy space, of the Canadian 
government as a whole may in the long term be limited indirectly as a result of CETA because of 
pressure to build a more ambitious GP agreement with the US. The US and Canada will likely preserve 
the AGP rather than abandon it.743 Further, the US and Canada may decide to extend the timing of the 
temporary provisions in the AGP. Article 8 allows the temporary provisions of the AGP (Part B), which 
are set to expire by September 2011, to be extended simply by “mutual written consent.” Additionally, 
Article 9 (1) of the AGP, which applies to the entire AGP, requires Canada and the US to enter into 
discussions to explore expansion of the AGP on a reciprocal basis within 12 months of entering into 
force of the AGP – thus the parties are bound to meet by February 16, 2011 for these discussions. 
Further, according to Article 9(2) “on any matter related to government procurement, the other Party 
shall promptly engage in such consultations, which shall commence no later than 10 days after the 
request has been made.”  
Even if Canada and the US do not expand the provisions of the AGP, they may at least agree to extend 
its provisions. Although NAFTA contained provisions allowing further negotiation of procurement rules 
after its enactment but further liberalisation did not take place,744 recent evidence shows signs that 
NAFTA Chapter 10 may be further negotiated.745 Also, temporary provisions in the AGP may be extended, 
and would be easier than expanding the AGP. Further, the AGP and subsequent permanent changes to 
both the US’ and Canada’s 1994 GPA is a clear example of continued liberalisation in GP that has 
operated outside specific NAFTA commitments in response to domestic US legislation and a changing 
economic climate. As such, it would seem reasonable to predict that the extension of otherwise 
temporary provisions or even the expansion of the AGP may be further fuelled by CETA and certain 
subsequent legislation on GP coming out of the US or Canada. 
 
EU 
GP provisions are not a new component of EU FTAs, although it should be noted that many previous EU 
FTAs have dealt with developing countries and have aimed at bringing transparency to their 
procurement practices with a relatively longer-term view to eventually increase market access. The 
CETA by contrast focuses on immediate reciprocal market access for a potential near-term GP 
competitor.  
The EU would have to make commitments in CETA beyond its 1994 GPA commitments. The EU’s 1994 
GPA exclusions on procurement of utilities like “water” and “electricity”, as well as “urban transport” 
and airports and ports by Canada (and the US) are based on reciprocal blockage by Canada (and the US), 
                                                             
743 Although Article 14 of the AGP allows either Party to the agreement to terminate the Agreement (in its entirety) by written 
notification, the reasoning for terminating the agreement early are arguably much less clear than those for expanding the 
agreement. 
744 See Article 1024: Further Negotiations. Where the Parties should have commenced further negotiations no later than 
December 31, 1998. Sub-federal entities were to be consulted, and other steps to be taken. 
745 See USTR (2010). “US-Canada Joint Statement on Government Procurement.” http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-
office/press-releases/2010/february/us-canada-joint-statement-government-procurement; and analysis at: Todgham Cherniak, 
C. (2010). “Canada and United States Tentative Agreement on Buy American Should be Reason for “Cautious Optimism.” 
http://tradelawyersblog.com/blog/archive/2010/february/article/canada-and-united-states-tentative-agreement-on-buy-
north-american-should-be-reason-for-cautious/?tx_ttnews[day]=05&cHash=53955a6f44 
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although the EU also institutes general exclusions for all GPA members regardless of the level of 
reciprocity for a number of at least generally related areas. Specifically, note 6 in the General Notes of 
the EU’s GPA commitments excludes “6. Contracts awarded by entities in Annexes 1 and 2 in connection 
with activities in the fields of drinking water, energy, transport or telecommunications, are not included.” 
Note 7 of the General Notes states “This Agreement shall not apply to contracts awarded by entities in 
Annex 3 for the purchase of water and for the supply of energy or of fuels for the production of energy.”  
Further, in 2007, utilities covered by the EU’s GPA Annex 3 commitments amounted to EUR 52 billion, 
although EUR 27 billion of utilities subject to GP were not covered in such GPA commitments.746 As such, 
the EU’s binding GPA commitments covered 65% of a EUR 80 billion EU GP market in utilities in 2007.747 
The CETA will likely remove some of these exceptions, particularly to Canadian companies’ access to 
utilities procurement in the EU. 
As a result of this potential opening of the EU GP market in CETA, EU policy space may be restricted in a 
negative direction if EU stakeholders feel it jeopardises the quality of procured goods and services, and 
limits the ability of government to regulate industries. However, consultations to date suggest the 
former concern is limited in the EU, and less of a concern than it appears to be in Canada. Regarding the 
later concern, it is unclear how the CETA may limit policy initiatives in the EU like Social Considerations 
in Public Procurement. These initiatives have been utilised by a number of institutions to foster fair 
wages among other benefits. The CETA could cause some regulatory chill limiting the flexibility of EU 
institutions to meet related policy targets, given potential obligations in CETA and/or threat of litigation 
through CETA mechanisms. These issues are further discussed in other indicators hereafter. 
 
US 
The US is unlikely to experience significant limitations in policy space as a result of CETA, although it may 
indirectly cause some reduced regulatory flexibility in the US. Specifically, the US may undergo a push to 
further liberalise GP policy with Canada which may carry with it the cost of at least some reciprocal 
limitation in US regulatory flexibility, which may translate into some reductions in economic policy space 
although the extent of these impacts are currently unclear. There is no ‘cut off’ date for finalising 
discussions on the AGP once they have been commenced, i.e. there is no de jure expiration of such 
discussions or on the binding nature of the AGP in its entirely, and discussions on expanding market 
access could continue throughout 2011 or beyond until an agreement is reached or the process is 
abandoned or postponed.  Given the EU’s goal to sign the CETA by the end of 2011, while certainly 
possible, it seems unlikely that the EU would be able to negotiate an agreement that would provide 
market access beyond the new level of reciprocal access likely to be negotiated by the US and Canada 
during the same time or not too long thereafter. Even if particular provisions were to provide the EU 
greater market access than the US, the US may, even without necessarily receiving a draft of the 
provisions, invoke Article 9(2) of the AGP at any time to immediately discuss ‘related’ or any number of 
procurement issues with Canada. If the AGP is any indication, the approach would be to provide 
comparatively less access to the US GP market than sought in the Canadian market. All of this of course 
would be an indirect result of CETA and hinges very much on the desires of the US.  
 
 
 
                                                             
746 Annex – Purchases, EU 2007 GPA statistics notification to WTO  
747 Calculations using data from Annex – Purchases, EU 2007 GPA statistics notification to WTO  
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INDICATOR: Market share 
BASELINE 
Canada 
A range of companies are funded by the Canadian GP market. The federal government of Canada buys 
approximately $14 billion worth of goods and services each year.748  Rough estimates, as outlined 
hereafter, suggest Canada’s sub-central GP is well over $CAN 17 billion. Public Works and Government 
Services Canada (PWGSC) is the largest purchasing entity in the Canadian federal government, with an 
average of 60,000 contracts totalling $10 billion per year.749 WTO statistics show the worth of Canada’s 
federal contracts in 2007 for entities listed in Annex I of the GPA and above GPA thresholds to be $CAN 
1.9 billion.750 $CAN 362.74 million of these contracts were subject to limited tendering, making $CAN 
1.54 billion of Canadian contracts bound by the GPA subject to non-limited tendering.751 
The value of GP contracts for sub-federal Canadian entities for 2007 was $CAN 17.2 billion, although this 
number excludes a wide range of different entities, including Crown Corporations and those engaged in 
MASH procurement.752 As such, the procurement market is inferably notably larger. Numbers are not 
easily accessible for the amount of sub-federal procurement that would be subject to Canada’s 1994 
Annex 2 GPA thresholds (recall that sub-federal level procurement in Canada’s Annex 2 commitments is 
not binding and so information on such contracts is not reported to the WTO as it is for Annex 1).753 
Similarly, statistics are not available on the value of contracts above the Annex 3 thresholds in Canada’s 
GPA for entities within that Annex 3 given such commitments are not currently binding.  
 
EU 
Sources suggest the EU procurement market, including central, sub-central and utilities entities, is worth 
more than EUR 1.5 trillion per year.754 According to WTO data, in 2007 the EU’s GPA commitments alone 
covered contracts collectively valued over EUR 293.48 billion. MS contribute significantly to GP 
opportunities, and significant GP opportunities also come from the European Commission and Council of 
the European Union, among governing other bodies. In 2007, procurement contracts for EU-27 MS 
entities bound to the 1994 GPA totalled EUR 293.48 billion overall – EUR 31 billion in Annex 1, EUR 150 
billion in Annex 2, and EUR 51.3 billion in Annex 3.755 In terms of individual MS, Spain and the United 
                                                             
748 CBO. Government Procurement Guide, Canada. http://www.cbo-eco.ca/en/info-guide/government_procurement_info-
guide_1121180832226.cfm 
749 Mwanzia, K. (2008). “Niagra’s Green Procurement.” St. Catharines-Thorold Chamber of Commerce.  
750 WTO (2007). Canada’s 2007 statistics notification under Article XIX:5 of WTO GPA. 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gpstat_e.htm. pg 2 
751 Author’s calculations from Ibid, pg 23 
752 Author’s calculations using MARCAN  
753 MARCAN does include certain data on contracts below thresholds established in the Sept. 1994 Agreement on Internal Trade 
(http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ait-aci.nsf/eng/il00006.html) (which are significantly lower the 1994 GPA thresholds) 
754 Beuter, Rita (2005) Pg 1 
755 WTO (2007). EU’s statistics notification under Article XIX: 5 of WTO GPA. 
http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/directdoc.asp?DDFDocuments/t/PLURI/GPA/94A4.doc 
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Kingdom have the highest ratio of openly advertised public procurement to GDP, whereas Luxembourg 
and Germany have the lowest.756  
 
US 
The US, like the EU, has a particularly large GP market in which it spends over $US 1 trillion each year.757 
The US federal government itself spends over $400 billion on procurement each year.758 In 2007, the US 
reported the following for GP contracts under Article XIX:5 of the GPA: award of 5,193 contracts in 
goods and services contracts above GPA thresholds, which were worth $US 34.38 billion; and award of 5 
contracts in construction services above GPA thresholds, which were worth a value of $US 2.1 billion. In 
the same year the US reported the following under derogations (exclusions) in the GPA: award of 6,432 
contracts for goods and services above GPA thresholds, which were worth $US146 billion; and award of 
183 contracts above the GPA thresholds, which were worth $8.78 billion. Additionally, in 2007 the US 
reported $US 539.07 billion in total procurement for the 37 states listed in Annex 2 of its GPA 
commitments, although the data does not clearly indicate this amount is for contracts above the GPA 
thresholds. The amount also excludes procurement contracts issued in 13 states, which would add 
substantially to the total level of state procurement. Lastly, in 2007 the US reported $US 13.8billion was 
procured by entities listed under its Annex 3 GPA commitments, although only for some of these entities 
does it distinguish if the amounts are for contracts above or below the GPA thresholds.759   
 
ANALYSIS 
Canada 
Economic evidence suggests that the main result of GP reform/liberalisation is increased competition in 
the domestic GP market. Sources suggest that the main effect of liberalising GP rules in developed 
economies is an increase in competition within home procurement markets rather than increased cross-
border trade.760 Evenett and Hoekman (2004) provide empirical evidence showing that the impact of 
reducing discriminatory and non-transparent GP rules is increased competition leading to increased 
                                                             
756 Eurostat. Government Finance Statistics. 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Government_finances_statistics#Further_Eurostat_informati
on 
757 Calculations based on U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Congress (2007). “More Dollars, 
Less Sense: Worsening Contracting Trends Under the Bush Administration.” 
http://oversight.house.gov/features/moredollars/moredollars.pdf. suggesting procurement spending of over $400 billion by 
federal procurement, as well as estimates in WTO Trade Policy Review Body (2008)., Report by the Secretariat: Trade Policy 
Review: United States, 68. WT/TPR/S/200 that sub-federal bodies procured $616 billion in fiscal year 2007 and $585 billion in 
fiscal year 2006. 
758 U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Congress (2007). Other sources break down this number, 
suggesting the US buys over $200 billion of goods and services a year and allots an additional $240 billion to grantees who buy 
goods and services. See: Jane Early, LLC. “Green Procurement in Trade Policy”. Report for Government of Canada. 
http://www.cec.org/Storage/50/4219_green-procurement-in-trade%20Policy_en.pdf 
759 Author’s calculations using data at: WTO (2007). US’ statistics notification under Article XIX: 5 of WTO GPA. 
http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/directdoc.asp?DDFDocuments/t/PLURI/GPA/94A1.doc 
760 See Woolcock, S. (May 2008) and Woolcock, S. (April 2008). “Government procurement provisions in CARIFORUM EPA and 
lessons for other ACP states.” London School of Economics.  
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welfare in certain cases, rather than clearly increasing market access (for example, from firms 
abroad).761  
Several EC publications suggest that EC directives and other reforms have led to a significant increase in 
“indirect” cross-border trade in GP goods and services, although it should at least be noted that these 
studies focus on cross-border within the EU as opposed to trade with countries outside the EU. 
“Indirect” herein refers to foreign subsidiaries operating in the country for which GP is being offered. 
“Direct” refers to companies bidding in a foreign country from their home country rather than through a 
subsidiary established in that country. 
Herein, it is notable that “direct” and “indirect” cross-border competition refers to two quite distinct 
sources of competition. In a 2004 EU study, data suggests 67% of EU bids were submitted by domestic 
firms in their home countries whereas only 3% of firms conducted direct cross-border procurement, i.e. 
bidding for a project in a different country without having a subsidiary in that country. However, 30% of 
firms carried out procurement through foreign subsidiaries. The study found that domestic firms and 
foreign subsidiaries have similar rates of success when bidding for contracts in the country where they 
are located (30% and 35%, respectively).762 
These findings from the EC and other sources provide strong evidence of EU GP market competition 
concentrated within the EU becoming increasingly competitive over the last decade; moreover, these 
findings taken together with WTO statistics suggest that internal regulations and policy directly 
contributed to this phenomenon. Without a separate analysis it is unclear if or how much the GPA 
contributed indirectly to this phenomenon. Overall, WTO statistics suggest that the EU awarded 
approximately EUR 12 billion in contracts to GPA members in 2007. This would mean that around 4.1% 
of all contracts in 2007 covered under the EU’s GPA commitments (EUR 293.48 billion) were awarded by 
the EU to other GPA members in 2007.763 The figure indicates that the EU awards the vast majority of its 
contracts to non-GPA countries, even over a decade after the GPA entered into force (in 1996).  
As such, it appears safe to assume that liberalising GP rules domestically, whether or not this is directly 
or indirectly a product of an international agreement, saves costs and significantly increases competition 
in home procurement markets. Also, the GP liberalisation does not necessarily lead to increased direct 
trade with companies operating overseas, although it indeed might encourage ‘indirect’ cross-border 
trade within a country like Canada or area like the EU. All of this is also contingent, of course, on the 
actual type, breadth, implementation and enforcement of the domestic reforms that are made. 
Canada, when compared to other GPA members and considering the size of its economy and population, 
has a decent foothold in the EU GP market. According to WTO statistics, out of 13 Parties to the GPA, 
Canada won the 4th highest number of EU contracts in 2007. It was the 3rd largest winner in terms of 
value of contracts, after the US and Switzerland. It beat out Japan who despite having exponentially 
more contracts/lots than Canada in terms of number was awarded collectively less in terms of value, 
although on a per capita basis Switzerland is the leader in the EU cross-border GP market among GPA 
parties in terms of value of contracts awarded.764  
                                                             
761 Evenett, S. and B. Hoekman (2004). “Government Procurement, Market Access, Transparency and Multilateral Trade Rules.” 
World Bank Policy Research Paper 3195, January 2004. The study, however, sets forth a number of nuanced situations. The 
study does not find a clear correlation between transparency in GP and market access. 
762 EC (2004). “A report on the functioning of public procurement markets in the EU: Benefits from the application of the EU 
directives and challenges for the future.” 3 February 2004. 
763 This figure inferably does not take into account the time needed for tendering, which may mean a contract was not awarded 
in the year in which it was tendered and would skew the figure more or less depending on the monetary value of such contract.  
764 Author’s calculation from data in WTO (2007), EU notification under Article XIX:5 of WTO GPA   
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However, in order for Canada to utilise CETA to increase its market share of EU GP contracts, it would 
have to become more competitive for contracts with a number of countries’ companies, likely including 
the US. This is because certain EU firms will inevitably maintain an advantage in the EU GP market and 
given the US clearly maintains an exponentially larger share of the EU procurement market subject to 
the GPA than Canada. Specifically, WTO data suggests that in 2007 the EU awarded 105 contracts/lots to 
Canadian firms, worth approximately EUR 866 million overall; however, the EU awarded the US – who 
like Canada is also only granted limited GP market access under the GP in the EU due to reciprocity 
issues – 11,691 contracts/lots, worth approximately EUR 8.68 billion overall.765 Still, for the very reason 
that Canada is already awarded a fairly low amount of EU contracts at present, it is likely that a 
liberalisation of the GP market via CETA will result in some increase in contracts awarded to Canada. 
Additionally, to the degree that the AGP, or the expansion or extension of the AGP, makes Canadian 
firms more competitive against US firms this may allow Canadian firms to gain some market share in EU 
GP contracts previously held by US entities, albeit likely a very minimal share in the short term. 
Canada could also benefit from becoming more competitive with Switzerland and Japan in the GP 
market. This is reflected in that the same 2007 WTO data for the US suggests the EU awarded 1,333 
contracts to Switzerland, worth approximately EUR 1 billion; and 1,247 contracts to Japan, worth 
approximately EUR 844 million (see Table 62). 
 
Table 62: Top 4 recipients of cross-border GP contracts awarded by the EU (2007) 
Country 
Number of GP 
contracts/lots 
Contract value (mil 
EUR) 
Population 
(mil) 
Avg. contract value/capita 
(mil EUR) 
US 
11,691 8,680 
303,824,640 
0.0000286 
Switzerland 
1,333 1,000 
7,581,520 
0.0001319 
Canada 105 866 33,212,696 0.0000261 
Japan 1,247 844 127,288,416 0.0000066 
Source: EU 2007 GPA Statistics notification to WTO, CIA World Factbook 
 
In the same vein, while GP competition may increase between EU and Canadian firms and this would not 
necessarily lead to any notable shifts in domestic to strictly ‘overseas’ trade, EU firms may gain market 
share by displacing Canadian firms, particularly if they operate through a competitive subsidiary in 
Canada. To the degree that CETA prohibits offsets, among other exceptions; opens up entire sectors (like, 
among others, the utilities); and opens up to entities which were excluded in the binding GPA, these 
areas would be forced to become more competitive under CETA.766 To add to this effect, certain 
stakeholders note that CETA may disallow splitting of contracts to stay under monetary thresholds or 
short time-frames,767 which if allowed may give an advantage to suppliers in a closer geographic 
proximity to the tender. The ensuing speed and level of competition among Canadian firms, and 
between Canadian and EU firms would depend upon the competitiveness of such firms in the newly 
opened environment. It would also depend on the thresholds in CETA. (See analysis on the EU below for 
some additional insights herein).  
                                                             
765 Author’s calculations from data in Ibid  
766 This considers that while in practice certain areas not bound under the GPA have experienced competition, and simply 
asserts that removal of de jure protection under Canada’s binding GPA commitments would increase competition to some 
degree. 
767 Sinclair (April 2010) 
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It is notable that a series of surveys conducted for DFIAT in 2007 suggest that Canadian businesses want 
access to at least certain GP markets in the EU, are willing to provide reciprocal access in return, and 
expect to see increased revenues under such an arrangement. The surveys focused on the GP markets in 
China, India, Russia, Brazil, Japan as well as the UK, France and Germany. 76% of respondents were 
interested in the GP markets in the UK, France and Germany. 72% of executives polled were not 
opposed to opening up Canada’s government procurement markets at all levels (federal, provincial and 
municipal) to foreign companies in exchange for similar access abroad, and 49% indicated clear support. 
Moreover, 63% of executives said they expected a net increase in their company revenues if such 
arrangements would be made.768 
It is important to note that many contracts would be excluded from CETA as they would not fall under 
CETA thresholds and/or they would be subject to certain exclusions which may very well be included in 
the agreement. These factors are mentioned under the “Economic policy space” indicator hereto. These 
factors both limit the potential of Canadian companies’ market share increases in the EU GP market 
while also protecting against such gains from EU companies in Canada. 
It is also important to note herein that not all EU-Canada tendering under CETA would be opening 
tendering. This allowance both somewhat limits the potential of Canadian companies’ market share 
increases in the EU GP market while also somewhat protecting against such gains from EU companies in 
Canada. Specifically, while it is noted in the 2008 Joint Study that “open tendering” is “the norm” in the 
GPA,769 it is important to note that the GPA and other EU FTAs clearly allow for selective and 
single/limited tendering. And limited and selective tendering will inevitably be allowed in CETA.  
Additionally, there are a number of other allowances likely to be included in the CETA, given they are in 
other GP agreements and EU FTAs, that provide certain buffers to competition and thus restrict the 
potential for significant market share gains in the Canadian and EU GP market. CETA will almost certainly 
allow procurement decisions to be based on considerations of both ‘lowest offer’ in terms of price 
and/or ‘the most advantageous’ offer. A ‘most advantageous offer’ option allows purchasing entities 
certain leeway to choose suppliers that offer better overall packages even if the price may not be the 
lowest. CETA will very likely also allow purchasing entities not to award a contract to any bidders in light 
of certain justifiable circumstances. A number of exceptions present in NAFTA and the GPA that would 
also likely be allowed in CETA on justifiable measures for protection of human health among other 
elements would serve as at least a limited buffer to completely open competition. Further potential 
buffers are mentioned in the “Quality of goods and services” indicator. 
Lastly, by way of comparison, given the EU’s GP market is currently among the most liberalised in the 
world and Canada’s GP market is relatively more protected, it is the opinion of this study that CETA 
would provide opportunities for comparatively greater net market share gains by EU companies in 
Canada than Canadian companies in the EU. In other words, allowing Canadian suppliers increased 
access to the EU – in terms of equal access through implementation of GPA provisions that are currently 
non-binding, or even going beyond those GPA provisions in CETA – will likely not encourage significant 
further competition in the EU GP market because of the high degree of competition already prevailing in 
the EU. The extensive reform and liberalisation of EU GP to date is mentioned in the baseline of the 
“Institutional and regulatory environment” indicator hereto. These impacts should be contextualised, 
however, with the aforementioned fact that there are many EU subsidiaries already operating 
competitively in the Canadian GP market, and that it is likely some Canadian firms would make certain 
gains in the EU GP market under CETA.  
                                                             
768 Phoenix Strategic Prospectives, Inc. (2008) 
769 2008 Joint Study, pg 75 
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In conclusion, it is unlikely that Canadians will significantly increase their market share in the EU GP 
market and may lose some of their own GP market share to EU subsidiaries in Canada as a result of CETA. 
It is the opinion of this study that any net gains Canada would make in the EU GP market would likely be 
comparatively less. Still, Canada may increase the number of GP contracts it wins from the EU, 
particularly if they become more competitive with US suppliers, and also suppliers from other nations 
like Switzerland and Japan, and depending on the size of the contracts this could provide potentially 
noteworthy benefits for the Canadian companies winning such contracts.  
 
 
EU 
Data is not easily accessible for how many GP contracts in terms of number and value Canada has 
awarded the EU. It would be reasonable to assume that Canada awards the US more contracts than it 
awards the EU. Still, the EU already has a good number of competitive subsidiaries operating in the 
Canadian GP market. As discussed in the above section, CETA would very likely provide some advantages 
to EU firms, particularly if operating a subsidiary in Canada, to compete directly with Canadian firms.  
 The EC has noted that EU companies are world leaders in transport equipment, public works and 
utilities. The EU could very well increase market share in these areas to the degree they are opened up 
in CETA.  
CETA would also likely allow the EU to compete better with US firms on Canadian contracts, and perhaps 
opportunities for EU firms to compete on contracts not afforded to US firms. As such, this would allow 
the EU to potentially gain market share by displacing both Canadian and US firms.  
Despite these opportunities, there will be some factors limiting the potential for market share gains. For 
example, the allowance of limited and open tendering under CETA will both somewhat limit the 
potential of EU companies’ market share increases in the Canadian GP market while also somewhat 
protecting against such gains from Canadian companies in the EU. And GP exclusions/derogations in 
CETA will have the same effect.     
Additionally, threshold limitations will limit the benefits provided by CETA to smaller EU companies. In 
the years since NAFTA was implemented, US companies, particularly SMEs, have done very well and 
have been awarded GP contracts in a wide range of product and service areas in Canada; and most of 
these contracts have been below US$100,000, and many are in high-tech sectors. Further, many of the 
winners have been US SMEs new to the Canadian market whose specific technology and expertise were 
what the Canadian Government was seeking.770 As mentioned, CETA may unlikely develop thresholds 
below the lowest GPA threshold of SDR 130,000 (approximately $202,420 in current USD), and thus 
would provide limited direct benefit to EU SMEs over US SMEs in competing for Canadian contracts 
operating on contracts below this threshold. This is compounded by the fact that 90% of Canadian 
(federal) Government contracts are worth less than $100,000.771  
 
Then again, while threshold requirements in CETA will restrict the benefits of CETA to EU companies, EU 
firms could still gain a new foothold in the sub-central level GP market for higher value GP contracts and 
in the mid- to longer-term these companies could use this foothold to compete more on lower value 
contracts. Depending on their resources, both larger EU enterprises as well as SMEs could increase 
market share through this approach. 
                                                             
770 US Commercial Service in Canada. “US companies in the Canadian government procurement market.”  
771 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (2010) 
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In conclusion, CETA will likely provide some opportunities for EU firms to increase market share in the 
Canadian GP market. Still, the most significant factor determining the competitiveness of EU companies 
in Canada’s GP market in the future will not be CETA provisions but how their capacity to place 
competitive bids measures up against equivalent US and Canadian companies. 
 
US 
As per the impacts on the US, data is not easily accessible for how many contracts in terms of number 
and value Canada has awarded the US. Still it would be reasonable to assume that Canada awards a 
significant amount of the GP contracts won by foreign firms to the US, a pattern that has been bolstered 
by the recent AGP.  
As mentioned above, CETA could lead to some decrease in US market share in Canadian GP if displaced 
by EU firms. In such a situation, US firms would likely either have to increase their competitiveness with 
EU firms in relevant areas or extend or expand the AGP in order to maintain market share.  
 
INDICATOR: Cost of goods and services 
BASELINE 
EU, Canada and US 
Goods and services funded through GP range widely in costs, but as discussed those contracts subject to 
GP agreements must exceed set monetary thresholds (see Table 20 for current GPA thresholds for 
Canada, the EU and US). As mentioned under the GDP indicator, GP contracts collectively make up a 
significant amount of government expenditure.  
 
ANALYSIS 
Canada 
Reciprocal GP market access granted in CETA may increase competitiveness among firms operating in 
Canada, which may result in government savings. Evenett and Hoekman (2004) suggest that the impact 
of reducing discriminatory and non-transparent GP rules is increased competition that tends to improve 
welfare.772 Further, Deltas and Evenett (1997) and Evenett (2003) explain that discriminatory GP 
practices specifically in terms of ‘price preferences’ tend to limit welfare gains as any gains are limited 
by the increased average prices paid by public entities for GP projects. These price preferences increase 
average GP prices paid by public entities, and to the extent that the government uses the “wrong rate of 
price preference” (i.e. deviates from optimal policy, which is particularly difficult to accurately predict 
given it must fully account for the expectation different bidders have about the price of each other’s 
offer prices) this further eliminates any small welfare gains from discriminatory GP practices.773 
                                                             
772 Evenett, S. and B Hoekman (2004). The study, however, sets forth a number of nuanced situations. For example, if 
government demand is higher than supply GP discrimination would lead to welfare losses in the short run; long term economic 
impacts of discriminatory GP practices depend on the barriers to entry and exit, although under free entry prices are 
determined by minimum average cost rather than existence of discrimination, and output is determined by government 
demand. As a note, the study does not find a clear correlation between transparency in GP and market access. 
773 Evenett, S. (2003). “Is there a case for new multilateral rules on transparency in government procurement.”  Chapter III of 
The Singapore Issues and The World Trading System: The Road to Cancun and Beyond. Simon Evenett and the Swiss State 
Secretariat of Economic Affairs. Pg 26; and 
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Additionally, a 2009 EC publication found that “local and cross-border competition” in the GP market 
has allowed contracting authorities to save 5-8% from what they had originally earmarked for 
projects.774 These findings suggest provisions of CETA that open up the Canadian GP market may reduce 
the costs of goods and services paid by the government.  
These reductions in costs should be contextualised in terms of the potential administrative costs of 
opening up the GP market under CETA. Opening up the GP market will increase the number of bids 
governments have to process. As such, administrative costs of governments processing the bid 
proposals may rise in the short term. This may burden smaller municipalities more than larger ones. 
However, it may be possible in the mid- to long-term for institutions to improve their tendering 
processing systems, for example through developing and/or improving upon electronic tendering 
systems, which would limit the increases in such administrative costs.  
The reductions in costs should also be contextualised in terms of the potential costs from bid challenges 
resulting from opening up the GP market under CETA. As mentioned in other indicators hereto CETA 
may increase the number of bid challenges, which have monetary costs in certain situations and may 
burden municipalities more than larger levels of government.775 However, available evidence collected 
by the study team to date does not suggest that bid challenges in Canada cost the government a 
significant amount of money as a percentage of government expenditure, and this may not change even 
if CETA contributed to increased bid challenges in Canada. Additionally, while the precise size of costs 
related to bid challenges is difficult to gauge given lack of readily accessible data, they could arguably be 
largely offset in the long-term by increased welfare gains from increased competition. This said, further 
research is warranted in this area. 
Canadian government savings from opening up the Canadian GP market may directly translate into 
lower cost public goods and services from particular projects from which they were reaped and/or may 
result in increased money that the government chooses to spend in other areas. However, the actual 
tangible benefit to society from the reduction of the costs of government-procured goods and services is 
very much determined by what the Canadian government does with the savings. To the extent that 
CETA changes the investment and competition environment within Canada through other provisions not 
directly related to GP, this would also potentially influence prices of government procured goods and 
services.   
It is important to note within all of this that the welfare discussed refers to overall welfare resulting 
from GP provisions written in CETA. Stakeholders have cited examples of where privatisation has 
resulted in poor coverage of public services and/or increased cost of such services.776 This analysis does 
not dispute all these examples; however, privatisation will not be a legal stipulation of GP provisions 
under CETA.777 Certain forms of privatisation of services that are not as competitive currently as they 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Deltas, G. and S. Evenett (1997). “Quantitative Estimates of the Effects of Preference Policies,” in B. Hoekman and P.C. 
Mavroidis (eds.), Law and Policy in Public Purchasing. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
774 EC (2008). “Internal Market Scoreboard: Members States still on target but need to focus on correct application of rules.” 
Europa Press release,16  July 2008. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1149&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=e
n 
As a note, another EC report, from 2004, suggests that the nationality of firms within the EU GP market did not have any 
significant affect on the price paid for GP contracts (Source: EC (2004) “A report on the functioning of public procurement 
markets in the EU: Benefits from the application of the EU directives and challenges for the future.” As such, it is not clear that 
lower priced bids for public goods and services will be offered by a company from a particular country as a result of the CETA. 
775 Shrybman, S. (May 2010) 
776 For example, see: The Council of Canadians, CUPE-SCFP (2010). “Public Water for Sale: How Canada Will Privatize Our Public 
Water Systems.” December 2010. pg 21 
777 Consultations with Contracting Authority at project Steering Committee Meeting in November 2010 
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would be under CETA, however, could indirectly result in the long-term. More on this issue is discussed 
in the “Quality of goods and services” indicator below. 
 
EU 
As mentioned under the GDP indicator below, while CETA may increase competition in the EU it may in 
fact not lead to significant savings for the EU. Nonetheless, the savings that do occur may directly 
translate into lower cost public goods and services from particular projects from which they were 
reaped and/or may result in increased money that the government chooses to spend in other areas. 
 
US 
No significant impact on costs of goods and services procured by the US government is predicted, 
although potential cost reductions in the longer term may be possible if Canadian firms become more 
competitive under CETA and then compete more on price in the US market. 
 
 
 
INDICATOR: GDP 
BASELINE 
Canada 
Sources estimate that Canada’s total GP market is worth 11.5% of its GDP in terms of total expenditure 
(TE) less compensation of employees.778 In terms of TE less compensation, sources estimate central level 
GP in Canada constitutes 1.7% of its GDP and local level GP is worth 8.8% of its GDP.779 Federal contracts 
falling under Canada’s binding GPA commitments totalled approximately 0.2% of nominal GDP in 2007, 
of which non-limited tendering contracts totalled roughly 0.1% of GDP.780 Given Canada’s sub-federal 
GPA commitments are not binding, WTO statistics are not available for the amount of its sub-federal GP 
subject to GPA thresholds. 
 EU 
As a whole, including governments of EU countries as well as main EU institutions involved in 
procurement, GP in the EU composes about 16% of GDP,781 although other estimates suggest it is as low 
as 9.2% of GDP.782 Depending on the MS, GP as a percentage of national GDP varies widely. 
US 
Sources suggest US GP has accounted for 19.5% of GDP annually, two-thirds of which is from state and 
local purchasing (12.6% of GDP), and one-third of which is federal (7% of GDP).783 As with the EU, this 
percentage of GP to GDP may vary depending on the source.  
                                                             
778 The value of Canadian GP in terms of TE is estimated at 25.83% of Canadian GDP. In terms of TE less compensation and 
defence related expenditures: 10.40% of GDP for all contracts, and 0.62% of GDP for central level GP. Sources: Audet, D (2002). 
“Government Procurement: A Synthesis Report.” OECD Journal on Budgeting, 2(3). OECD Publishing, Paris. OECD Report on 
Government Procurement available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/14/1845927.pdf 
779 Ibid 
780 Author’s calculations using WTO GPA notification data in market share indicator and CIA Factbook figures of $1.089trillion, 
adjusted is $CAN 1.17 in 2007 (i.e. $CAN 1,177,110,990,000) 
781 Beuter, Rita (2005), pg 1 
782 Audet (2002)/OECD statistics 
783  Ibid 
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ANALYSIS 
Canada 
A 2009 EC publication found that “local and cross-border competition” in the GP market has allowed 
contracting authorities to save 5-8% from what they had originally earmarked for projects, and 
estimated that these savings could mean increases in GDP of between 0.08-0.12% if continued over the 
next decade. As discussed in other indicators hereto, it is likely that most if not all of these savings came 
from improved facilitation and competition within the EU GP market as a result of reforms and 
liberalisation.  
As such, Canada’s commitments to GP provisions within CETA may ultimately also save money that can 
be quantified as a percentage of GDP, although the magnitude of such gains is uncertain and could be 
between relatively minor or insignificant. A variety of factors would need to be assessed to more 
precisely estimate the impact of CETA’s GP provisions on Canadian GDP, and while a useful proxy 
indicator in some senses the aforementioned 2009 EC publication may not be the best metric for such a 
prediction even when adjusting for differences in the value of the GP market in the EU vs. Canada.784 
Given Canada’s market for inter-provincial competition faces a certain level of restrictiveness at present, 
GP liberalisation combined with other provisions of the CETA, for example on investment, labour 
mobility, and free circulation of goods would likely result in increases in Canadian GDP. On the other 
hand, given CETA excludes GP contracts below thresholds, which is a significant amount of contracts (in 
number at least) this limits the impact of CETA in contributing to GDP gains. And in-line with the analysis 
in the “Costs of goods and services” indicator, the aforementioned increases in GDP may be at least 
marginally offset by increased administrative costs in the short-term and bid challenges; although on the 
other hand these costs may not be significant enough to substantially impact such gains. A range of 
other factors would also have to be considered. Unfortunately, a more in-depth analysis herein is 
beyond the scope of this SIA. 
 
EU 
To the degree that EU firms increase their market share in the Canadian GP market this may contribute 
to some minor or negligible gains in EU GDP. Given the openness of the EU GP market currently, it is 
unlikely that allowing Canadian firms increased competition in the EU GP market would significantly 
increase overall GP competition in the EU. And given the formerly mentioned studies on welfare gains 
from GP liberalisation appear to be predominately based upon savings to government gained from 
increased competition within the home market, the contribution of GP provisions in CETA to GDP 
growth in the EU will likely be minor at most.  
 
US 
US GDP will likely not be significantly affected by GP provisions in CETA. If US firms lose their GP market 
share in Canada to the EU this would negatively impact these companies and this could be compounded 
with other components of CETA, for example in terms of tariff reductions and other market access 
provisions, providing benefits to EU over US enterprises. However, losses of US GDP due directly to GP 
                                                             
784 Given available statistics suggesting Canada’s GP market makes up less of its total GDP than the EU GP market makes up of 
EU GDP, one might estimate that GP reforms in CETA in and of themselves would likely contribute to less than 0.12% gains in 
Canadian GDP over the next decade; however, this would not fully consider a number of important other variables, some of 
which are listed in the text above.  
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provisions in CETA will likely be negligible or non-existent (and potential negligible losses of GNP would 
become a non-issue altogether if the US extended or expanded an agreement like the AGP).  
 
 
 
INDICATOR: Employment 
BASELINE 
Canada, EU, US 
Considering the figures mentioned above regarding the significance of GP as a percentage of 
government expenditure and percentage of GDP, it is clear that GP is also an important source of 
employment in Canada, the EU and US. Further data on GP and related employment was not readily 
available. 
 
ANALYSIS 
Canada 
Impact on foreign vs. domestic companies 
In determining the effects CETA may have on employment in the Canadian GP market, it is first 
important to consider what type of competition such provisions would actually foster. It is clear that, 
and as stakeholders suggest, if GP money is spent to pay for products or services not produced in one’s 
home country and by workers not living in one’s home country, this detracts from the local economy 
and negatively impacts domestic workers (even though the people in the procuring country still 
maintain the utility of being able to use the procured project). However, as established in the discussion 
on market share, CETA would likely increase domestic competition in Canada rather than necessarily 
leading to awarding of contracts to companies only stationed abroad.  
As previously mentioned, there is evidence that foreign subsidiaries rather than foreign parent 
companies are most competitive in cross-border GP transactions, which in turn has implications for 
what type of workers would be hired by EU companies potentially increasingly winning Canadian GP 
contracts. Although foreign subsidiaries may hire expatriates from offices abroad, they also, and in some 
cases very significantly, hire locals who have an expertise in terms of knowledge of local language, 
culture, laws and regulations, business practices, and posses contacts among other skills, knowledge and 
experience. A 2008 report for DFIAT provides further context herein, showing that Canadian firms found 
the most significant barrier to the GP market in the UK, France and Germany to be a lack of 
communication channels and contacts.785 
Canadian subsidiaries in foreign countries also have strategies to hire locals.786 And in-line with the 
above analysis this would indicate that if Canadian companies were to increase their GP market share in 
the EU to any degree it would not necessarily lead to an equivalent increase in employment for 
Canadian workers. 
                                                             
785 Phoenix Strategic Prospectives, Inc. (January 2008) 
786 Minton-Eversole. (2008). “US, Canadian firms look past borders: hiring nationals hard, but worth it, survey says.” HR 
Magazine. April 2008.  
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Further to the above analysis, CETA’s prohibition of exemptions otherwise in the GPA would not directly 
lead to a decrease in employment of permanent residents/citizens of Canada, and if so this may at least 
in part be a product of an already ongoing trend. Pre-existing hiring practices are already promoting 
hiring of non-citizens/non-permanent residents in Canada in sectors that might be further opened up in 
the CETA. In other words, depending on the industry and sector, a Canadian company dealing in the 
Canadian GP market may indeed already be hiring those with only temporary residence or those who 
are not yet fully Canadian citizens.787 
Despite these trends, the degree to which foreign subsidiaries in particular currently hire locals may be 
changed, although not necessarily significantly, with labour mobility arrangements in CETA. To the 
degree that foreign subsidiaries are only hiring local labour due to government restrictions limiting 
labour mobility, provisions in CETA liberalising these restrictions may discourage hiring of permanent 
residents/citizens in place of temporary expatriates. Any changes in hiring practices would be focused in 
professional business services, as this is the only sector likely to be covered in labour mobility provisions 
in CETA (see the cross-cutting section on Labour Mobility for further information). 
 
General impact on companies within the internal market  
To the degree that the local market becomes more competitive it may create some unemployment or at 
least temporary unemployment among workers living domestically, particularly in less competitive 
companies at least in the short term. In-line with the theme that CETA will likely encourage domestic 
competition in the GP market, which would be magnified by any reduction in thresholds under CETA, 
CETA would create an environment of increased competition among Canadian companies, and between 
Canadian and foreign companies operating through subsidiaries. And this may create some 
unemployment among workers living domestically in less competitive companies in the short term; 
however, in the medium- to long-term, workers would at least theoretically make their ways to the most 
productive companies.788 
In some ways, some SMEs may not be as directly affected by these changes. SMEs win a significant 
portion of GP contracts. For example, the PWGSC is responsible for a significant portion of Canadian GP 
(85% of the total value spent) and since 2006-2007, on average, the PWGSC has awarded more than 
43% of the total value of contracts transacted with businesses located in Canada to SMEs.789 Overall, the 
vast majority, in fact 90%, of Canadian (federal) Government contracts are worth less than $100,000.790 
This is a sizeable market especially for SMEs. However, as mentioned, it is unlikely that CETA thresholds 
and thus its other GP provisions would extend to contracts of $100,000 or lower and therefore SMEs 
which rely on these smaller contracts would not be directly affected by CETA.  
At the same time, as mentioned under the “market share” indicator, some EU SMEs could still gain a 
new foothold in the GP market for higher value GP contracts, particularly at the sub-central level, and in 
the mid- to longer-term compete more on lower value contracts. Still, Canadian governments would 
retain policy space in tendering choices for lower value contracts. This may indicate that in certain cases 
                                                             
787 Valiani, S. (2006). “The increasing use of migrant labour in Canada.” Canadian Labour Congress. 
http://www.canadianlabour.ca/sites/default/files/pdfs/migrantLPresJune06.pdf 
788 This is not to say, however, that increased efficiency in the GP market would not lead to long term decreased government 
expenditures in certain sectors potentially creating long term unemployment therein. But this would be a product of domestic 
policymaking rather than a direct effect of CETA.  
789 Canada’s House of Commons Committee. “Government Response to the Seventh Report of the Standing Committee on 
Government Operations and Estimates.” 
http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4144312&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2   
790 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (2010)  
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some employment may move from smaller companies to larger companies. As a note, survey data 
suggests MNCs have better strategies than SMEs to address some of the aforementioned problems 
encountered in foreign GP markets,791 one of which includes hiring locals to at least some degree.  
Impact on companies by sector, and in terms of offsets and set-asides 
Generally, given the level of competitiveness of EU firms in transportation equipment, public works and 
utilities industries, they could gain in market share in Canada and thus shift employment within Canada 
in these industries. This could simply lead to shifts in employment for Canadian workers into the more 
competitive Canadian firms, more competitive EU firms, and/or result in some unemployment. However, 
how these trends would in fact play out and the significance therein is unclear and would require 
exhaustive analysis of current policies and levels of competitiveness that is beyond this scope of this SIA.  
The impact of CETA’s prohibition of offsets in relevant GP contracts warrants special attention. To recall, 
offsets allow for local content, technology licensing investment requirements, and counter-trade or 
similar requirements in an effort to contribute to “economic development.” There are three general 
types of offsets: “indirect” offsets which need not be related to base procurement, “semi-direct” offsets, 
and “direct” offsets” which must be directly related to the base procurement. Some countries, for 
example several EU MS, often call offsets “Industrial Participation.” Stakeholders have cited examples 
where a prohibition on GP offsets in CETA may have a negative influence on employment in Canada.792 
And as listed in Box 27 in the “Impact on economic policy space” indicator, Canada has included 
allowances for a number of offsets in its GPA schedule which could create employment. At first glance, 
prohibition of GP offsets in CETA would seem to intuitively have negative impacts on employment in 
Canada’s GP market.   
However, while it seems intuitive to suggest that a prohibition of offsets in CETA would create 
unemployment in Canada, or would at least limit a mechanism to create employment in Canada, this 
conclusion deserves at least some qualification. First, it is important to recognise an inability to use 
offsets is not the same as the inability to use GP contracts to contribute to local economic development. 
It simply prohibits the use of local content, technology licensing, investment requirements and counter-
trade or similar requirements to do so. This allows significant leeway for GP contracts to contribute to 
local employment. Second, one must consider what programs that use offsets would actually be above 
CETA thresholds. The prohibition of offsets under CETA would only apply to those contracts above CETA 
thresholds (as discussed, the lowest of which may perhaps be around $200,000) and subject to the other 
GP commitments (on entities, goods and services, etc.) in CETA. This would allow a significant portion of 
GP contracts to still use offsets. Then again, and importantly, it is likely that larger contracts that would 
be above CETA thresholds are those that are most effective in promoting local employment. Third, as in 
the GPA and NAFTA, there will likely be a variety of industries/areas of procurement excluded in CETA 
GP commitments, and thus CETA in itself would not prohibit usage of offsets in these areas. Additionally, 
one may question if language in CETA would explicitly prohibit offsets for all defence procurement, as of 
recently both EU MS and Canada still maintain offsets in this area which is also traditionally a significant 
source of offsets. 
Several other points deserve analysis. Fourth, one must consider how the costs saved from the 
increased competitiveness from GP provisions in CETA, as mentioned in the “Costs of goods and 
services” and “GDP” indicators hereto, would be reinvested in Canada. These could be used to create 
                                                             
791 EC/CiLT (2006). “Effects on the European Economy of Shortages of Foreign Language Skills in Enterprise.” 
http://ec.europa.eu/education/languages/pdf/doc421_en.pdf 
792 For example, a recent tender for wind energy by Hydro Quebec required contractors to create jobs and economic spinoffs in 
the Gaspé region and other areas in Quebec. For other examples see Sinclair (April 2010), pgs 7 and 11.  
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employment. Fifth, selective and limited tendering procedures may make the prohibition of offsets less 
of an issue, by allowing the government preferential decision making on who bids for contracts. Sixth, 
one would have to consider how offsets are working currently, and if in fact different policies would 
better use government efforts to stimulate employment.793 Seventh, and perhaps controversially, it 
would have to be considered if the offsets otherwise used in absence of CETA would effectively build up 
a strong industry in the long-term in terms of global competitiveness, or in fact would merely insulate an 
industry in the short-term while in the long-term when (and if) the policies are removed this could result 
in the collapse of such industry. And it would need to be considered if this could actually create more 
negative impacts on employment than if the industry was subject to competition from the start.  
In summary, while prohibition of offsets could have some negative impacts on employment in Canada, 
the full significance of these impacts is unclear without an in-depth analysis. And this additional analysis 
is outside the scope of this SIA. 
It would be difficult to argue that removing exemptions for specific group of society, i.e. Canadian GPA 
set-aside provisions for Aboriginal and minority businesses, would benefit these businesses in terms of 
employment in the near-term. Currently, contracts are awarded to this group on a preferential basis and 
elimination of such preferences would at least in the near-term subject them to increased competition, 
which may result in at least some unemployment. In addition to the economic impact, this would create 
a negative social impact. This said, most contracts won by Aboriginal businesses may in fact be below 
CETA thresholds, and thus CETA would not impact such contracts or employment resulting from such 
contracts.794 Still, it is likely that at least some contracts otherwise subject to set-asides would be 
impacted by CETA.795 It is important to note herein that Aboriginal set-asides may in fact not be altered 
in CETA as the EC has stated that set-asides with a social dimension, for example, for aboriginal business, 
are to be respected.796 An exhaustive analysis of how such group-specific GP preferences are currently 
contributing to employment in ways other programs are and could not would be required to make a 
fuller assessment herein.797 
More on the details of the Aboriginal set-aside programs in particular in Canada are discussed in Box 28 
below. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
793 There appears to be relatively limited amount of research and analysis in this area, at least in terms of GP for non-
defence/civil purposes. One study that uses transaction cost theory to provide a policy matrix for use of offsets is Taylor, T.K 
(2003) (See: Taylor, T.K. (2003). “The proper use of offsets in international procurement.”  Journal of Public Procurement, 3 (3): 
338-356. PrAcademics Press. Pg 1-19.) A number of studies do look at performance requirements for investment in the market 
at large, and many of the findings therein are likely applicable to offsets in the GP market. For one overview of these studies see: 
UNCTAD (2003). Foreign Direct Investment and Performance Requirements: New Evidence from Selected Countries. United 
Nations, New York and Geneva. http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiia20037_en.pdf.  
 
794 Consultations with EC officials in November 2010. Note: Consultation attempts to date with Aboriginal industry associations 
have not produced statistics.  
795 A review of government data suggests that Aboriginal businesses have won a number of important contracts valued above 
certain GPA thresholds and a significant portion of these particular contracts were won due to set-asides allowed in the GPA. 
(See Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (2003). “Procurement Strategy for Aboriginal Business: Performance Report for 2001.”) 
796 Consultations with experts from DG Enterprise and Industry, April 2011 
797 For example, even though it may be a policy intention or even stipulation that certain contracts are ‘set-aside’ for these 
groups to bid upon, for a variety of reasons the contracts may not in the end be awarded to these groups. 
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Box 28: Set-asides for Aboriginal businesses in Canada 
PSAB Program 
The Canadian federal government does not have set-aside provisions for small businesses at large;798 
however, it does have a Procurement Strategy for Aboriginal Business (PSAB). The term "Aboriginal" 
herein refers to a Status or Non-Status Indian, Métis or Inuit when used for contracts under the PSAB. 
There are set requirements for what constitutes and Aboriginal-owned business.799  
The PSAB helps Aboriginal firms do more contracting with the Government of Canada through 
mandatory and voluntary set-asides. Specifically, under the PSAB, mandatory set-asides apply in 
situations where "All procurements over $5,000 for which Aboriginal populations are the primary 
recipients are to be restricted exclusively to qualified Aboriginal suppliers where operational 
requirements, best value, prudence, probity and sound contracting management can be assured. There is 
no upper limit. Procurements under $5,000 may be set aside but it is not mandatory. Procurements over 
$2 million will continue to be subject to the procurement review process.”800 In addition to the 
mandatory set-asides, agencies like the PWGSC may institute voluntary set-asides for Aboriginal 
businesses. These voluntary set-asides do not appear to be limited to contracts above certain 
thresholds.801 
Comprehensive Land Claims Agreements  
In addition to the PSAB set-asides, Canada currently allows right of first refusal (set-asides) for the 
portions of GP involving delivery of goods and/or services and/or construction to settlements in 
Comprehensive Land Claims Agreements (CLCAs). CLCAs are legally binding treaties built on Aboriginal 
rights and titles to lands traditionally used and occupied by an Aboriginal group. At present, there are 
23 CLCAs.802  
                                                             
798 Government of Canada. Procurement in the US.: http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/sell2usgov-
vendreaugouvusa/procurement-marches/faq.aspx?lang=eng   
799 “To qualify for set-asides, a business - which can be a sole proprietorship, limited company, co-operative, partnership or a 
not-for-profit organization - must meet the following criteria. At least 51 percent of the firm must be owned and controlled by 
Aboriginal people; If it has six or more full-time staff, at least a third of the employees must be Aboriginal people; If the bidder is 
a joint venture or consortium, at least 51 percent of the joint venture or consortium must be owned and controlled by an 
Aboriginal business or businesses as defined above. It also has to have at least a third of the employees be Aboriginal people if 
there is more than 6 employees working for the joint venture or consortium. 
When an Aboriginal supplier or joint venture intends to sub-contract part of the requirement, the Aboriginal component in the 
work must be maintained.” See PSAB.  Module 1: Procurement Strategy for Aboriginal Business. Indian and Northern Affairs 
Canada.  http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ecd/ab/psa/bts/wbg/md1/index-eng.asp. Note: The Canadian Aboriginal and Minority 
Supplier Council (CAMSC) was established in 2004 to provide certification along these lines. 
800 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (2009). “Procurement Strategy for Aboriginal Business.” 07 August 2009. 
801 See Article 9.40.1 “Decision to Set Aside a Procurement under PSAB,” sub-article c, of the PWGSC Supply Manual. Chapter 9. 
available at URL: http://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/ga-sm/chapitre09-chapter09-eng.html#s9-1 
802 Ibid, 9.35.5 
803 Ibid, 9.35.20 
804 Ibid, 9.35.65 
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Procurement exceptions for contracts subject to CLCAs are broad. Specifically, Article 9.35.20 of the 
PWGSC’s Supply Manual states that a CLCA generally applies to any portion of a procurement in Canada 
regardless of dollar value that involves delivery of goods and/or services (both construction and non-
construction services) to locations covered by CLCAs.803 CLCA contracting may also be subject to set-
asides under the PSAB, although in certain situations a distinction must be drawn been a “CLCA 
beneficiary firm” and “aboriginal business” under the PSAB.804 
 
Conclusion and long-term impact on employment 
In summary, GP provisions in CETA will likely lead to some shifts in employment, which may mean 
employment gains for some working for Canada and EU firms, and losses for others. The full scale of 
these impacts are uncertain.  
 
EU 
GP provisions in CETA may create some positive employment impacts for EU citizens, although these 
impacts will likely be relatively limited. While, as discussed in the section on Canada, some EU 
companies will likely see some benefits from GP provisions in CETA, the extent to which these benefits 
are particularly realised in terms of employment of EU citizens largely depends on the amount of EU 
staff that EU companies operating in Canada hire.  
As the EU has much fewer exceptions in the 1994 GPA for its own GP market, and given it is overall more 
open and thus competitive than Canada’s GP market, the potentially negative effects on employment in 
this area mentioned for Canada would not clearly apply to the EU. However, to be sure, certain MS 
policies used to reduce unemployment would need to be investigated individually, using the framework 
for determining the legally binding nature of such policies under CETA as generally alluded to under the 
“…economic policy space” indicator (Meets CETA thresholds? Applies to entities committed in CETA? 
Not covered under exceptions in CETA?). Some policies to be investigated in this regard include, among 
others, Industrial Participation (offset) policies in places like Belgium, and more specifically policies of 
several municipal governments in Belgium and the Netherlands requiring contractors to recruit the 
chronically unemployed.805  
 
US 
It is envisaged that as CETA increases competition within the Canadian market for Canadian GP projects, 
this would potentially lead to some decrease in employment among US companies currently operating 
or hoping to operate in the Canadian GP market. However, these impacts may not be significant and the 
negative impacts herein would be mitigated to the degree that the AGP in its current or expanded form 
would further level the US-Canada GP market playing field.  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
805 Such policies are mentioned in UNOPS (2009). 2008 Annual Statistical Report on United Nations Procurement: Sustainable 
Procurement Supplement.  
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SOCIAL ASSESSMENT 
 
INDICATOR: Social policy space  
Canada, EU, US and Mexico 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
As mentioned in the policy space indicator in the economic section, the implications GP provisions in 
CETA might have on reducing policy space are best addressed through the other indicators hereto. GP 
provision in CETA may reduce social policy space in Canada that may have negative impacts on 
employment (as mentioned in the economic assessment). It may also reduce Canadian social policy 
space in ways that will result in some negative results on indicators of innovation, quality and decency of 
work, and cultural preservation. It may reduce EU policy space in a way that will result in some negative 
results on the indicator of quality and decency of work. Negligible impacts would be expected in the US 
and Mexico. More details on potential reductions in policy space can be found in the policy space 
indicator in the economic section, and a further discussion on the aforementioned social impacts can be 
found in the specific indicators in the social assessment below. 
 
INDICATOR: Quality of goods and services  
BASELINE 
Canada, the EU, and US all provide high quality government-procured goods and services. This is due to 
the fact that they have well developed economies and regulatory and institutional systems, including 
their GP systems. 
It is important to note that government-funded goods and services can be provided by a number of 
different entities, including private enterprises, government enterprises/state-owned companies, and 
public-private partnerships (also called “P3s”). It should also be recognised that government funds 
allotted in government budgets solely for government agencies to act as the end provider of goods and 
services are not a form of government spending potentially subject to the CETA, i.e. it is not public 
procurement. It is sufficient to say that the body of literature is full of differing opinions as to how and if 
goods and services funded by the government should be delivered under these mechanisms. Arguments 
have been well reasoned on both sides for the positives and negatives of using certain goods and 
services delivery mechanisms over others.  
The below baseline briefly discusses access currently allowed in the GP markets of Canada, the EU and 
US for particularly sensitive goods and services. It looks at certain goods, utilities and other services 
outside health and education, and separately at health and education services. This will provide 
background from which to base an assessment on how liberalisation under CETA may influence the 
quality of such particularly sensitive government-procured goods and services. 
 
Goods, utilities and other services excluding those for health and education 
Canada, EU, and US 
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As mentioned in the “institutional and regulatory environment” indicator, the EU has a relatively more 
open GP market than Canada. The US provides many opportunities for GP, although in its GPA schedule 
it also has not committed to as open as a system as the EU. By way of example, the EU has opened 
portions of utilities and sub-central level GP to international trade for years, whereas Canada in 
particular remains more closed in these areas. The treatment of certain water-related services, a 
particularly sensitive area to some stakeholders, under NAFTA is somewhat ambiguous;806 and municipal 
procurement in water services has not been included in any trade agreement to date.807 
 
Health 
Canada 
Canada provides some limited access to its health services market in trade agreements. NAFTA provides 
exclusions for national treatment and MFN status in GP of “health and social services.”808 The 2008 Joint 
Study suggests Canada’s 1994 GPA initially provided access to its health services in the GP arena, 
although these commitments are non-binding due to lack of reciprocity. 809  Even within the 
aforementioned commitments, however, it should be mentioned that a note in Canada’s Annex 2 (sub-
central entities) states that Canada’s commitments do not apply to “Emergency Health Services in Nova 
Scotia with respect to ambulance-related procurement, including telecommunications for Emergency 
Health Care purposes.” R&D is excluded in Canada’s GP commitments in NAFTA and its 1994 GPA.  
EU 
The 2008 Joint Study notes that the EU closed its “Education, health and social services”810 GP market in 
the GPA, and as a result Canada does not grant reciprocal access in these services. R&D is excluded in 
the EU’s 1994 GPA commitments.811  
US 
Unlike Canada, the US does not have exclusions for “health and social services” in its NAFTA GP 
commitments.  R&D is excluded in US’ GP commitments in NAFTA.  
 
Education 
Canada 
NAFTA provides exclusions for MFN and national treatment of “health and social services”  on GP 
contracts.812 The 2008 Joint Study suggests Canada’s 1994 GPA initially provided access to its education 
services in the GP arena, although these commitments are non-binding due to reciprocity issues.813 Even 
within the aforementioned initial commitments, however, it should be noted that Canada in their GPA 
                                                             
806 Gleick, Peter H. et al. (2002). “The New Economy of Water: The Risks and Benefits of Globalization and Privatization of Fresh 
Water.”  Pacific Institute. February 2002. 
http://www.pacinst.org/reports/new_economy_of_water/new_economy_of_water.pdf 
807 The Council of Canadians, CUPE-SCFP (2010), pg 3 
808 NAFTA “Chapter 10 (government procurement), Section B - Excluded Coverage Schedule of Canada Services Exclusions by 
Major Service Category – G. Health and Social Services” 
809 2008 Joint Study, Box 2.3, pg 77 
810 Ibid 
811 Ibid 
812 NAFTA, Chapter 10 (GP), Section B - Excluded Coverage Schedule of Canada Services Exclusions by Major Service Category – 
G. Health and Social Services 
813 2008 Joint Study, Box 2.3, pg 77 
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Annex 2 (sub-Central government entities) makes the following note “6. Except for Ontario and Quebec, 
this Agreement does not apply to the procurement of goods, services or construction purchased for the 
benefit of, or which is to be transferred to the authority of, school boards or their financial equivalents, 
publicly-funded academic institutions, social services entities or hospitals.” 
EU 
The 2008 Joint Study notes that the EU closed its “Education, health and social services”814 GP market in 
the GPA, and as a result Canada does not grant reciprocal access in these services.  
US 
Unlike Canada, the US does not make exclusions for “health and social services” in its NAFTA GP 
commitments. 
 
ANALYSIS 
Canada and EU 
An in-depth analysis on the benefits of delivery of goods and services through the different mechanisms 
mentioned in the baseline and how these mechanisms would be individually affected by CETA is far 
beyond the scope of this analysis and would not focus on GP issues alone. However, a basic analysis on 
GP provisions in CETA should provide some useful insights on how CETA may impact the quality of 
government-procured of goods and services in Canada and the EU.  
Theoretically, CETA would encourage more firms to participate in the GP process, allowing wider choice 
for government in which companies are contracted to deliver goods and services, which should 
reinforce the trend that companies that provide quality goods and services win contracts. However, this 
finding is, again, theoretical and deserves further analysis. And further analysis is made difficult given 
Canada and the EU already provide high quality government-procured goods and services, and this is 
due to the fact that they have well developed economies and regulatory and institutional systems, 
including their GP systems. Nonetheless, some analysis can be made. 
As mentioned, generally, firms currently providing public services in Canada and the EU either provide 
high enough quality services to meet demand or are replaced by other firms or government programs. 
This is not to say that in some cases, as certain stakeholders’ have pointed out, this is not done without 
difficulty.815 In fact, stakeholders suggest it can result in two main forms of legally sanctioned backlash: 
bid challenges and/or investor-state challenges. Box 29 below outlines these mechanisms. 
 
Box 29: Mechanisms in CETA related to contesting GP bids and projects 
 
Bid challenges 
As discussed in the “Policy space” indicator hereto, bid challenges are standard to GP agreements. 
Stakeholders fear that bid challenging creates a risk for litigation for public authorities, and thus 
monetary compensation to firms. They also note that bid challenges allow for an unsuccessful bidder to 
stall the GP process for several months by making claims.816 Taken together, some suggest these 
                                                             
814 Ibid 
815 See examples in: Sinclair, S. (April 2010) 
816Shrybman, S. (May 2010) 
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allowances will have a negative impact on the government’s ability to function in the best interest of the 
public. 
While, as with any number of agreements on GP, CETA will allow for bid challenges, the extent and 
significance of these bid challenges warrants further consideration. Direct costs of bid challenges include 
costs to the government to maintain the bid challenge system, costs to the complainant in bringing the 
case, and the compensation paid by the government if they lose a bid challenge. While detailed statistics 
do not appear to be easily available on these costs,817 a number of points should be made to 
contextualise the potential costs, monetarily and otherwise, of bid challenges under CETA. To the 
degree that CETA does not dramatically change the Canadian International Trade Tribunal Procurement 
Inquiry Regulations, these points should be relevant. 
First, and very importantly, parties are encouraged to discuss concerns tantamount to a bid challenge 
with contracting authorities before resorting to legal proceedings. This is a useful mechanism to limit 
costs and impacts from bid challenges on the quality of government-procured goods and services from 
formal litigation.  
Second, it is critical to note that parties in trade agreements cannot challenge their loss of any bid, but 
can only challenge bids that are above thresholds agreed to in relevant trade agreements. This 
understanding has even been explicitly confirmed in Canada given the January 2010 CITT decision on A-1 
Cleaners vs.  Department of National Defence (File No. PR-2009-068).818  
Third, while there were 154 cases brought to the CITT from fiscal year 2009-2010, it is critical to note 
that these were not resultant from allowances from one trade agreement. Bid challenges currently 
heard by CITT may come from NAFTA, the AIT, the AGP, the Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement (CCFTA) 
or the Canada-Peru Free Trade Agreement (CPFTA).819 Even taken as a whole, there is not a readily 
available metric to suggest these cases act as a significant burden on government’s ability to act in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
817 Although some costs are clear. Specifically, under Canadian law, the government is obliged to reimburse costs of hearing a 
complaint along a pre-determined all-inclusive flat rate (including expenses, representation services, and disbursements). The 
awarded costs depend on the level of complexity of a case, with the rate for a level one case at $1,000, level 2 at $2,400, and 
level 3 at $4,100. See: CIIT. Canadian International Trade Tribunal Guideline for Fixing Costs in Procurement Complaint 
Proceedings. 
818  CITT -1 Cleaners vs.  Department of National Defence (File No. PR-2009-068). January 2010 decision. 
http://www.citt.gc.ca/procure/determin/pr2j068_e.asp 
819 Note: The Canada-Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement, Canada- Israel Free Trade Agreement, and the Canada-EFTA Free Trade 
Agreement do not contain government procurement chapters. 
820  Close, P. M. (2003). “An Unintended Consequence: The Canadian Domestic Spin-off of Government Procurement Trade 
Agreements.” Canadian Foreign Policy, 10 (3): 117-140. Note: more recent statistics were not readily available. 
821 Canadian International Trade Tribunal (2010). Annual Report for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31, 2010. ‘Chapter IV’. URL: 
http://www.citt.gc.ca/publicat/ar2k_e.asp 
822 Close, P. M. (2003). Note: more recent statistics were not readily available. 
823 Ibid 
824 Bid Challenge Lawyer Online at http://www.bidchallengelawyer.com/ 
825 Note: According to Canadian International Trade Tribunal -- Practice Notice, Complaints by Potential Suppliers – TT Inquiries, 
bid challenges generally should be decided within 90 days, and while under certain circumstances the deadline for issuing a 
ruling and recommendations may exceed 90 days, under no circumstances can it exceed 135 days.  
826Sinclair (April 2010) 
827 See NAFTA Decision: ADF Group, Inc. v. United States of America. Case No. ARB (AF) 00/1. Ruling issued to parties on 9 
January 2003. For one analysis see: Epting, R. (2005). “An analysis of ‘Buy America’ Provisions in ADF Group Inc. vs. United 
States under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA.” IELP Law Clerk. August 25, 2005. 
http://legacy.lclark.edu/org/ielp/objects/adf_buy_america.pdf 
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best interest of the public. 
Fourth, sources indicate that after NAFTA entered into force domestic suppliers rather than foreign 
suppliers brought most of the cases to the CITT.820 While of course this does not alter the fact that bid 
challenges add to the administrative burden on government, it does at least undermine an argument 
that the bid challenge mechanism (for example, under Canada’s biggest trade agreement to date) has 
resulted in mostly foreign companies challenging Canada’s bid tendering process/awards.  
Fifth, while the costs to the state of actually hearing bid challenges in Canada are unclear without 
further fact finding, there is indication that bid challenges have not affected a particularly significant 
portion of overall GP contracts. Specifically, 154 cases brought in fiscal year 2009-2010 involving 147 
different contracts represented only about 0.8 percent of the total number of contracts issued by 
PWGSC in 2009-2010.821 
Sixth, there is at least some evidence that the value of GP contracts subject to bid challenges is relatively 
minor/limited when compared with the size of the Canadian GP market. For example, in 2001, the CITT 
reviewed around 77 complaints, which involved less than 5% of the total value of Canadian government 
contracts awarded that year.822  
Seventh, there are fewer bid challenges that end favourably for complainants than there are cases that 
are filed. For example, of the 154 cases in fiscal year 2009-2010, 61 of these inquires were not initiated 
(given the following justifications: “lack of jurisdiction/not a potential supplier,” “late filing,” or “not a 
designated contract/no reasonable indication of a breach/premature”) and 7 were abandoned while 
filing and withdrawn.823  
Eighth, even successful bid challenges do not necessarily result in monetary damages or decisions that 
could in any way affect the quality of government procured goods and services. Based on the 
circumstances, the CITT may award successful complainants (1) bid preparation costs, (2) bid challenge 
costs, (3) damages, and/or (4) money for lost opportunity. Also, the CITT may (1) enact a "stop award" 
order to maintain the status quo, (2) recommend the contract be awarded to the appropriate party, (3) 
require the Canadian Government to clarify technical or evaluation criteria, etc.824  
Ninth, and importantly, based upon a review of the literature, there does not appear to be conclusive 
evidence linking the majority of bid challenges with net positive or negative impacts on public services in 
the EU, Canada or US. This includes, of course, the impacts bid challenges have in terms of delaying 
tenders.825  
In summary, one cannot with certainty find that the bid challenge mechanism in CETA would have 
significant negative impacts on government ability to function in the best interest of the public. This 
assessment is based upon the lack of evidence showing bid challenges directly have had a net positive or 
negative effect on the quality of government procured goods or services in Canada or the EU. It also 
considers the utility in being able to use a bid challenge as a tool to ensure fairness and transparency in 
the bid awarding procedure. As such, it would seem much more reasonable to suggest that bid 
challenges in the EU, Canada and US have produced some negative (for example, in paid out damages by 
the government and the administrative burden to participate in the challenge – which would likely 
impact smaller governments, i.e. municipalities more so than other levels of government) and positive 
impacts (for example, by ensuring fairness and transparency in the bid award system) and this trend 
would continue under CETA. 
 
Investor-state challenges 
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As discussed in the Investment section, investor-state provisions, which allow investors to challenge the 
state if they believe the state has taken an action that discriminates against certain allowances for 
investment legally afforded to the investors, are standard to investment agreements. Stakeholders have 
voiced concern over investor-state challenges as they relate to the GP market. Some appear to infer that 
GP provisions in CETA could increasingly facilitate investor-state challenges if the government attempts 
to nationalise a service formerly delivered for profit, thus making it harder to reverse failed 
privatisations.826 
The aforementioned concern may be largely moot when considering likely limitations on the usage of 
investor-state provisions. If CETA were to include investor-state provisions modelled off of the structure 
of NAFTA there is precedent to suggest that in many if not all circumstances the provisions in fact would 
not be allowed to apply to GP. Specifically, in the ADF Group Inc. vs. United States case filed on July 19, 
2000, which was the only investor-state case in the decade after implementation of NAFTA that directly 
involved GP, the NAFTA tribunal found the Canadian company’s claim over Buy American provisions 
constituted government procurement and therefore fell under Chapter 10 of NAFTA not Chapter 11. 
Article 1108’s exemption of government procurement, among other issues, played into this decision.827 
Unless the relationship between the GP chapter and the Investment Chapter in CETA was substantially 
different from that in NAFTA, it would appear such limitations on application of investor-state provisions 
to GP would exist under CETA. 
Nonetheless, for the sake of context, it is worthwhile to consider the impacts investor-state claims 
against Canada under NAFTA have actually had on government and public services, regardless if they 
relate to GP. Given available evidence, albeit which as mentioned in the Investment section is limited, 
Chapter 11 cases do not appear to have significantly undermined government ability to deliver 
health/safety, education, and other key public services or environmental protection; however, investor-
state arbitration does pose a risk to reducing policy space. It seems unlikely that investor-state 
arbitration would cause a significant reduction in the quality of public services even if applicable to GP in 
CETA, although they could pose some less significant indirect risk therein.  
In summary, there is strong precedent to limit fears that investor-state provisions linked to GP 
provisions in CETA which are modelled off NAFTA will necessarily lead to a significant negative impact on 
the quality of government-procured goods and services. However, this does not mean that investor-
state cases will absolutely not impact public services somewhat negatively in certain circumstances. As 
such, while available evidence suggests such impacts will likely not be significantly negative, inclusion of 
investor-state allowances in CETA deserves close consideration as it would pose some risk to social and 
environmental sustainability in particular. These and other related issues are discussed further under 
the “health” and “education” boxes below and under the “policy space” indicators in the economic, 
social and environmental assessments in the Investment section. 
 
If CETA does remove previously held exclusions for specific industries like telecom, urban and rail 
transportation equipment, and utilities (e.g. distribution and purification of drinking water, 
water/sewage treatment), there is not sufficient evidence to suggest this would per se substantially 
affect the quality of such services. This is not, however, to take a stance in the debate on what goods 
and services should be fully public vs. private or quasi-public or to detract from the important concept 
that government is an indispensable figure in delivery of certain public services.  
It is worth noting that some stakeholders are particularly concerned about CETA’s effect on some of the 
aforementioned industries. Specifically, certain Canadian stakeholders have expressed significant 
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concern over water delivery and water management.828 Concern among EU stakeholders herein appears 
to be less given areas otherwise sensitive to Canadian stakeholders, like portions of utilities, have 
already been open to international trade for years.  
 
 
Box 30: CETA’s potential impact on government-procured  
Healthcare services 
 
Note: Also see the analysis following this box for further discussion on relevant issues impacting 
government-procured services including healthcare 
Canada 
Healthcare is a longstanding sensitive issue in trade agreements for Canadians. Stakeholders have 
expressed concern that provisions in CETA specifically will open up the Canadian healthcare services at 
all levels, including the municipal level, to foreign competition particularly from MNCs. They also suggest 
if CETA were to include provisions allowing investors to sue the state, as provided in NAFTA, this would 
hurt healthcare. Although not all these concerns are in fact limited to the GP market in particular, they 
will be generally assessed.  
Firstly, CETA would almost certainly not preclude enactment of fundamental measures to protect public 
health in GP, as they are a fundamental part of NAFTA and other trade agreements, including the GPA. 
Such provisions are mentioned under different indicators hereto. 
Secondly, investor-state provisions in CETA will likely not apply to government-procured health services 
in the way certain stakeholders have envisaged. As discussed in the above box on investor-state 
provisions, if CETA were to include investor-state provisions modelled off of the structure of NAFTA 
there is precedent to suggest that in many circumstances at least they in fact would not be allowed to 
apply to GP.   
Nonetheless, for the sake of context, it is worthwhile to consider the impacts investor-state claims 
against Canada under NAFTA have had on healthcare services, regardless if they relate to GP. Evidence 
from NAFTA, albeit which as discussed in the Investment section is limited, does not suggest similar 
investor-state provisions in CETA would particularly significantly affect public health. No successful 
private investment case was brought against Canada in the non-GP market for healthcare since NAFTA 
was enacted.829 There have been a number of environmental cases brought under Chapter 11, which 
some could argue could affect public health, may create regulatory chill, and may cost government 
money, but they do not appear to have significantly hurt health and safety. If provisions from NAFTA 
were borrowed in CETA, they might provide some basic protection for companies operating healthcare 
services against being sued.830 As such, it seems unlikely that investor-state arbitration would cause a 
                                                             
828 For example, see The Council of Canadians, CUPE-SCFP (2010). 
829 Review of cases as listed in: Sinclair, S. (October 2010). “NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-State Disputes.” Canadian Centre for 
Policy Alternatives.  
Notes:  One case, Signa SA vs. Government of Canada was brought in 1996 but was not successful. The most recent case on 
healthcare, Centurion Health Corporation v. Government of Canada, was dismissed on procedural grounds. 
830 NAFTA Chapter 11, Article 1101, sub-article 4. “Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from providing a 
service or performing a function such as law enforcement, correctional services, income security or insurance, social security or 
insurance, social welfare, public education, public training, health, and child care, in a manner that is not inconsistent with this 
Chapter.”(emphasis added) 
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significant reduction in the quality of public services even if applicable to GP in CETA, although they 
could pose some less significant indirect risk therein. However, this does not mean that investor-state 
cases will absolutely not impact public services like healthcare in certain circumstances if the sector in 
Canada is further opened (although this study views this as unlikely) under CETA. As such, inclusion of 
investor-state allowances in CETA deserves close consideration (see the social assessment in the 
Investment section for further details herein). 
(For more analysis on these are other related issues see the “policy space…” indicator in the social 
assessment in the Investment section.) 
Third, it is difficult to gauge what would happen even if CETA explicitly opened up the GP market for 
healthcare in Canada. The healthcare market in Canada has not been open under key binding 
international GP agreements. The October 2010 decision in Bayshore Health Ltd. shows that the 
Canadian government did not open healthcare GP under the GPA, Chapter 10 of NAFTA or even the 
AIT.831 (As a note, even though not open to the EU due to reciprocal access issues, Canada initially 
committed to a comparatively more open “Education, health and social services” sector within its GPA 
compared to the EU.)  
If CETA did break from this trend and explicitly opened up the health sector in Canada, it is difficult to 
determine if CETA would result in significant GP market share losses in the overall Canadian healthcare 
sector to EU companies operating in Canada through subsidiaries or otherwise (see “Market share” 
indicator and below section on the EU for more on the competitiveness of EU firms). Among other 
issues, the percentage of healthcare contracts meeting CETA thresholds would have to be considered. 
On a very macro level, and in the long term, competition as a result of CETA may result in reduction of 
prices of certain medical services, although this is not necessarily the case as it depends on a number of 
factors. A more detailed analysis which is beyond the scope of this SIA would be required to assess 
competitiveness in specific areas within the entire healthcare industry, services and otherwise, and 
which of them if any would be specifically affected under CETA GP provisions. 
It should lastly be considered that CETA could change how Canadian officials procure health services in 
Canada. After implementation of CETA, in order to ameliorate stakeholders concerns about privatising 
services like healthcare, Canadian officials may at least consider further utilising selective tendering (and 
perhaps single/limited tendering) provisions.  
 
EU 
If CETA opened the EU sector for health and social services, there is mixed evidence as to the potential 
impact on market share of EU companies operating in such sector. This assessment would follow the 
analysis under the “Market share” indicator. Without further details of CETA the level of access the EU is 
even offering in certain sectors is unclear. CETA may provide some advantage to EU firms, particularly if 
operating a subsidiary, to compete directly with Canadian firms.  
At the same time, it is worth noting that the EU closed its “Education, health and social services” sectors 
within its 1994 GPA. As such, depending on their level of competitiveness, EU companies currently 
operating in these sectors are likely to experience increased competition.  
As in the Canadian case, it seems unlikely that investor-state arbitration would cause a significant 
reduction in the quality of public health services even if applicable to GP in CETA, although they could 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
831 Canada International Trade Tribunal. Bayshore Health Ltd. Procurement: Decisions and Reasons. File No. PR-2010-06, issued 
October 13, 2010. URL : ftp://ftp.citt-tcce.gc.ca/doc/english/procurement/determinations/pr2k065_e.pdf 
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pose some less significant indirect risk therein. However, this does not mean that investor-state cases 
will absolutely not impact public services like healthcare in certain circumstances if the sector in the EU 
is further opened under CETA (which is unclear at present) when compared to the EU’s GPA 
commitments. As such, inclusion of investor-state allowances in CETA deserves close consideration (see 
the social assessment in the Investment section for further details herein). 
On a very macro level, and only in the long term, competition as a result of CETA may result in reduction 
of prices of certain medical services, although this is not necessarily the case and prices may potentially 
rise. Among other issues, the percentage of healthcare contracts meeting CETA thresholds would have 
to be considered. A specific assessment herein depends on a number of factors and is beyond the scope 
of this analysis. 
 
 
Box 31: CETA’s potential impact on government-procured  
education services 
 
Note: Also see the analysis following this box for further discussion on relevant issues impacting 
government-procured services including education 
Canada 
The impacts described for Canada in the education sector would roughly be the same as those described 
for the healthcare sector in the previous box.  
 
EU 
The impacts described for Canada in the education sector would roughly be the same as those described 
for the healthcare sector in the previous box. To the degree that this opening might make the Canadian 
educational system more competitive in the long term, and particularly if combined with relevant labour 
mobility provisions, EU students, particularly those seeking to enrol in college (as opposed to lower-
levels of education, in which labour mobility is limited by a number of factors) may benefit. 
 
 
By way of further support for the above findings, it would seem that no agreeable CETA would remove 
contracting authorities’ ability to award contracts based upon a number of key provisions to ensure the 
quality of goods and services. Prevalence of such provisions would allow Canadian officials to award 
many contracts to contractors that provide both the best price and quality. These provisions, 
fundamental in modern GP agreements, include allowance of contract granting for the “most 
advantageous offer,” denial of contracts if there are no suitable offers, and the option not to award a 
contract if not in the “public interest.”  
Also, no agreeable CETA would outright preclude a Party from instituting or enforcing measures to 
protect several fundamental societal interests. It would seem necessary to provide the NAFTA and GPA 
exception that the agreement should not preclude a Party from instituting or enforcing certain 
justifiable measures that are necessary to protect public morals, order or safety; human, animal or plant 
life or health; intellectual property; or those relating to goods or services of persons with disabilities, 
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philanthropic institutions or prison labour. Herein, requiring such measures are “justifiable” means that 
the aforementioned exceptions can only be invoked to defend measures in specific circumstances.832 
Canada and the EU would be obliged to follow international agreements on health and safety to which 
they are signatories, for example the WTO agreements on TBT and SPS.833 The EC-Canada Mutual 
Recognition Agreement (MRA) on product conformity assessments and the EU-Canada Veterinary 
Agreement to protect public and animal health would still be in place.  
Moreover, Canada and the EU as a whole have well developed system for procurement selection which 
includes laws, regulations and guidelines that must be met to ensure the safety and welfare of both 
people working in companies awarded the contracts as well as for ultimate delivery of the goods and 
services. As an example, established technical specifications require characteristics of a product or 
service in terms of quality, safety, labelling, environmental performance, and so on, and are a 
fundamental part of all GP tenders which would also inevitably be in the CETA. Parties to CETA would be 
bound by current domestic laws on health and safety.  
Governments would retain the ability to use selective and limited tenders in the CETA. This mechanism 
is one method of allowing high-quality and trusted providers to get easy access to GP opportunities. 
Governments would not be restricted from awarding contracts to any one type of entity just because 
such contracts are subject to CETA competition. And while CETA may remove the previously provided 
protection of certain entities, sectors and types of contracts within the tendering process, it does not 
necessarily per se preclude awarding contracts to any specific type of legal entity. 
In addition, there would be no de jure requirement in CETA explicitly requiring privatisation.834 
Nonetheless, the issue of privatisation warrants further analysis (see box below). Herein, it is important 
to note that one can make distinctions in the different forms of what is often referred to under the 
blanket term “privatisation.” There is ‘full’ privatisation (government transfers full ownership of a 
service provider to the private sector) vs. ‘partial’ privatisation (public ownership over a service provider 
is maintained, but some of the operational responsibilities are transferred to the private sector), as well 
as  ‘further’ privatisation (assets and/or operational responsibilities of an otherwise fully or partially 
nationalised service provider are transferred to the private sector via full or partial privatisation) vs. 
‘new’ privatisation (a currently fully nationalised service provider is partially or fully privatised). One 
could describe privatisations using combinations of the aforementioned terms, for example ‘further-
                                                             
832 Justification herein requires that such measures meet a necessity test and are the least restrictive measures possible.  
833 Note 1: Generally (not just in relation to the GP Chapter), NAFTA may not be the most appropriate proxy on application of 
SPS and TBT measures under CETA. NAFTA’s SPS requirements, which were drafted at the same time as WTO SPS measures, are 
less restrictive than those in GATT in that NAFTA Article 710 stipulates that NAFTA Chapter 7B on SPS measures apply instead of 
those in GATT Article XX(b) (Hufbauer, C.G. and J.J. Schott. (2005). NAFTA Revisited: Achievement and Challenges. Institute for 
International Economics. Washington, DC., pg 156). NAFTA TBT regulations are more extensive than WTO TBT regulations (Irish, 
M. (2009). “Regulatory Convergence, Security and Global Administrative Law in Canada-United States Trade.” Journal of 
International Economic Law. 12(2)).  
Note 2: It is worth at least noting that there have been debates although unrelated to GP about where certain disputes 
regarding if measures for the protection of “human, animal or plant health” as stipulated both in NAFTA and in GATT XX(b) 
should fall under the purview of NAFTA dispute settlement or the WTO DSM. NAFTA’s Article 2005(4) requires that in certain 
types of disputes defending parties can request, and complainants are to oblige, to use NAFTA mechanisms as the sole venue of 
dispute settlement. As recently as 2010, despite the related 1991 WTO ruling, the US requested consideration of the Tuna-
Dolphin case under NAFTA (See American Shipper Florida Connection. “US seeks NAFTA panel for Mexico dispute.” 27 
September 2010.). (Herein, GATT XX(b) should also be contextualised in terms of its applicability in the WTO; for example, the 
WTO dispute settlement panels in the 1991 Tuna-Dolphin case and 1998 Shrimp-Turtle case did not find environmental 
protection legislation as a legitimate basis for imposing trade restrictions.) 
834 Consultations with Contracting Authority at Steering Committee Meeting in November 2010 
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partial’ privatisations. Note: one could generally define forms of nationalisation (the opposite of 
privatisation) using the same definitions herein applied in reverse.835 
 
Box 32: Will a GP Chapter in CETA Encourage Privatisation? 
 
If certain privatisation takes place after CETA, even at the closest level of a causal relationship possible, 
it would be a long-term and indirect result of increased competition in certain services that are not as 
competitive currently as they would be under CETA. The details of this scenario and its potential impact 
are discussed below. 
 
Generally, any privatisation pressures subsequent to CETA’s enactment (which would be indirect) might 
develop in the long-term through a few means. While EU firms would only gain access in above 
threshold contracts and/or government-procured services and goods in Canada explicitly allowed by 
CETA, they could still use this foothold in these areas to expand in the mid- to longer-term to below 
threshold contracts and related (not explicitly liberalised) goods and services (this possibility is also 
mentioned in the “Market access” indicator). Also, as suggested by stakeholders concerned about 
privatisation of water services in particular, “there is good chance a procurement dispute panel [bid 
challenge panel] would decide that on market determinations alone, a private firm should have won out 
over the public option after going through this procurement process.”836 Non-GP provisions in CETA in 
terms of services and investment (see “Investment” section) may also compound this trend.  
 
However, and again, there would be no legal requirement in CETA explicitly requiring privatisation, and 
in this sense such action would be a conscious decision of government outside CETA per se. Also, the 
tendency of certain type(s) of privatisation over others herein would need to be considered in assessing 
the tangible impact of a privatisation; for example, given the current details of CETA it seems unlikely 
that the agreement could even lead to a ‘new’ (full or partial) privatisation as defined above, and rather 
more likely could lead to ‘further’ privatisation, if any privatisation. This would likely further mitigate the 
impact of a privatisation if it were to indeed happen.  
 
Still, while indirect and in the long-term, the possibilities of privatisations, however indirect, are real, are 
very important, and most certainly warrant close and further consideration. Privatisation of water 
services in particular has been noted to have both dangers and benefits depending on the 
circumstances.837 Further analysis on this point is beyond the scope of this SIA, although the issue is also 
mentioned in the “Investment” section. 
 
 
More generally, Canada and the governing bodies of the EU and EU MS have political leaders that 
represent vocal populations with access to information and that are actively involved in the democratic 
process, which strongly helps ensure quality in procured goods and services.  
                                                             
835 The terms in single quotations herein are created by the author and are not necessarily indicative of common terminology 
used to describe forms of privatisation 
836 The Council of Canadians, CUPE-SCFP (2010), Pg 19.  
837 Among others see: Gleick, Peter H. et al. (2002). 
EU-Canada SIA Final Report 
304 
Lastly, and a point already alluded to, CETA will likely not significantly impact the quality of government-
procured goods and services in Canada and the EU given they all already provide high quality 
government-procured goods and services. This is due to the fact that they have well developed 
economies and regulatory and institutional systems, including their GP systems. 
In summary, there does not appear to be strong evidence to suggest CETA will have a significant positive 
or negative impact on goods and services delivered in Canada or the EU. In combination with the 
aforementioned safeguards of the GP process, and given Canada and the EU already provide high quality 
government-procured goods and services, the main difference in the quality of goods and services 
offered by companies under CETA would likely not significantly change from the present. Instead, 
factors of determining competitiveness within such markets currently, including management structures, 
labour and technological productivity and the related metric of value added, among others, would likely 
determine the quality of goods and services.  
Still, for a more nuanced perspective, there may be some lesser than significant negative or positive 
impacts of CETA on GP in Canada and the EU. There will be challenges to bids and projects under CETA 
that will cost certain amounts of time and money, although these likely will not be as significant as some 
observers have suggested. There may be some intrinsic value in contracting to certain companies, or 
strata of employees covered under current GPA exceptions that would be undermined by CETA (more 
on this is discussed in the cultural indicator section below). Lastly, as certain government-procured 
goods and services are subject to new competition under CETA there may be some net positive benefit 
(but likely less than significant, and beyond this metric difficult to quantify) to the quality of certain 
goods and services that are newly opened up under CETA.  
 
US 
CETA is unlikely to have any significant direct impacts on the quality of government-procured goods and 
services in the US. However, it may have some lesser and relatively indirect positive impacts on the 
quality of services enjoyed by Americans.  
The impact of CETA on the quality of US healthcare services, and in terms of who delivers the services 
would likely not be significant for reasons implied in the healthcare analysis for the EU and Canada, 
although those US citizens currently seeking medications and medical treatment in Canada may enjoy 
slightly lower prices, albeit marginally so, due to potentially increased EU-Canada competition. Then 
again, while unclear at this point, these welfare gains may be somewhat offset by IPR provisions in CETA. 
The impacts described for the US in the education sector would roughly be the same as those described 
for the healthcare sector. To the degree that an opening of this sector in CETA might make the Canadian 
educational system more competitive in the long term, American students, particularly those seeking to 
enrol in college (as opposed to lower-levels of education, in which labour mobility is limited by a number 
of factors) may benefit. 
 
 
 
 
INDICATOR: Innovation 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
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Canada 
The precise impact on innovation of prohibiting GP offsets in CETA is debatable. While not restricting 
Canadians from enjoying innovative products per se, it may in some ways limit policies otherwise used 
by the government to encourage Canadian companies to add to such innovation themselves. The role of 
GP in spurring innovation is well documented in the body of literature. Many argue over the exact 
model to best promote innovation, and the balancing of government vs. private sector incentives 
herein.838 While an exhaustive assessment herein is beyond the scope of this SIA, it is worthwhile to 
mention two points.  
First, one must consider what programs that use offsets would actually be above CETA thresholds. 90% 
of (federal) Government of Canada contracts are worth less than $100,000. Also, most of the contracts 
won by many foreign companies, particularly US companies, in Canada have been below US$100,000, 
and many are in high-tech sectors. This would suggest that many contracts given to companies which 
are innovating in Canada, even those for foreign companies, would not be impacted by the prohibition 
of offsets in CETA because they would not be above CETA thresholds (the lowest of which, using Annex 1 
thresholds of the GPA as a floor, may be around $200,000). Given a lack of statistics, this does not fully 
consider sub-central level procurement; however, while perhaps an administrative burden, it would be 
difficult to argue that sub-central governments could not meet at least some of their innovation policy 
objectives argued to require offsets by using offsets in a host of contracts valued below $200,000. 
Moreover, thresholds for sub-central level contracts in CETA could very well be above $200,000 
(although if and how far above is unclear at this point), allowing even further discretion of offset usage. 
Second, to the degree that Canadian governments and stakeholders desire ambitious new GP policies 
using high value contracts that also include mechanisms like offsets to fuel innovation the proposed 
CETA would clearly limit such a liberal scope of policy space. This would include limitations on policies 
like the Ontario Green Energy Act which requires local content (an offset) as a precondition for GP 
(although it should be noted that the Ontario Green Energy Act does not only focus on GP projects).839 
Still, as alluded to under the “Employment” indicator, the impact of a prohibition of offsets on 
innovation even in this instance would depend on a number of factors. For example, some would argue 
that while a prohibition of offsets would remove an extra impetus for indigenous innovation in the 
short-term. And some may argue that contracts above CETA thresholds may be more effective in 
promoting certain policy objectives of offsets. However, others could argue, perhaps controversially, it 
could have positive impacts because while domestic companies may not innovate at the same level they 
would in the presence of offsets, the market would still theoretically supply innovation from either 
domestic or foreign enterprises, for example EU, US, Japanese, or Chinese firms.  
 
 
 
 
EU  
                                                             
838 For example, see Aschhoff, B. and W. Sofka (2007). “Innovation on Demand—Can Public Procurement Drive Market Success 
of Innovations?” Center for European Economic Research Discussion Paper. 08-052. 
839 In fact, it also includes projects outside GP. This has recently raised questions over the WTO compliance of the Act, whereas 
TRIMS and SCM violations among others have been cited by certain WTO members. (See DS412 brought on 13 September 2010 
by Japan at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds412_e.htm) 
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If CETA prohibits offsets in GP it will likely not have a significant negative impact on innovation in the EU. 
While the EU prominently used GP offsets in the 1980s and 1990s to foster innovation, for example in 
building the wind industry in Denmark, it has since relied far less on those offsets. A wide usage of GP 
offsets are now prohibited by the EU’s legal obligations under its binding GPA commitments, which are 
more stringent on offsets than Canada’s binding GPA commitments. (Certain EU and Canadian offsets 
are more generally prohibited outside GP in TRIMS obligations.)  
On the other hand, a prohibition of GP offsets in Canada may allow the EU some opportunities to 
develop innovative products through subsidiaries in the Canadian market. At this point it is unclear, 
however, how much such a prohibition would lead to increased opportunities, i.e. opportunities that 
would not exist without CETA. 
 
US 
It is unlikely that innovation in the US would be significantly affected by GP provisions in CETA.  
 
INDICATOR: Quality and decency of work: equity, quality of work environment, collective bargaining, 
wages 
BASELINE 
Canada, EU, and US 
In the absence of detailed and comprehensive data on indicators in the quality of work environments in 
terms of hours and job satisfaction, equity in wages, unionisation rates, and health and safety within the 
workplace specifically for workers in the GP market vs. non-GP market, the following baseline is limited.  
In terms of 2009 statistics, four EU members had higher average PPP-adjusted wages than Canada, but 
23 countries had lower average wages. Additionally, Romania, Latvia, Bulgaria, Poland and Lithuania had 
average lower wages (measured in GDP/capita) than Mexico, a member of NAFTA.840 And all of these 
countries, Mexico included, are listed by the IMF in 2010 to be “emerging and developing countries.”841 
In 2009, Romania, which has the lowest average wage of any EU country, had average wages ($ 11,500) 
that were 70.5% less than Canadian wages ($38,400).   
 
ANALYSIS 
Canada and EU 
Certain stakeholders have suggested that opening up Canada and the EU’s GP market would mean 
taxpayers’ dollars diverted to countries where unionisation rates are low, wages are low and where legal 
rights are ineffective.842 In the absence of specific data, it is difficult to specifically assess how quality 
and decency of work would specifically change under GP provisions in CETA; however, analysis of the 
overall trends among and within trading nations with different wages and other characteristics should 
be a useful proxy for assessment. 
                                                             
840 World Bank 2009 statistics 
841 IMF (2010). World Economic Outlook Report, April 2010. 
842 See in particular: EPSU, CUPE, NUPGE, and PSAC (2010). “A Critical Assessment of the Proposed Comprehensive Economic 
and Trade Agreement between the European Union and Canada.” Position Paper, January 2010. 
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General impacts on international decency and quality of work 
Empirical studies suggest that, in general, production costs, wages inclusive, in fact do not correlate to 
winning of GP projects. Evenett (2003)843 suggests that overall, differences in production costs among 
firms (even between foreign firms vs. domestic firms, and even if there are only a small number of 
potential suppliers competing) do no result in welfare gains for contracting authorities. The welfare 
gains mentioned are inferably savings gleaned from lower bid prices. As such, this suggests that the 
differences in production costs between foreign and domestic firms are not significant determinants of 
bid prices and ultimately who will win bids. This could mean that the differences in such costs between 
companies are not great and/or that even if there are differences these do not generally result in lower 
priced offers. Either way, this suggests that a reduction of discriminatory provisions in CETA will not per 
se lead to companies with lower wages in the EU winning contracts from Canadian companies with 
comparatively higher wages or vice versa.  
To be sure, while the aforementioned stakeholder concerns would in fact likely apply if signing a GP 
agreement with a country with characteristics directly related to such concerns, e.g. China, they should 
not be such a significant issue in a CETA with the EU-27.844 A 2004 EC report suggests that the nationality 
of firms within the EU GP market did not have any significant affect on the price paid for GP contracts.845 
These findings would imply that there was no clear trend of countries with comparatively lower wages, 
unionisation rates and/or poor working environments within the EU winning comparatively more GP 
contracts. As a note, the biggest average wage gap between two EU member states in 2002 was 75.9% 
($50,986 in Luxembourg and $12,289 in Greece).846 
Additional evidence specifically suggests Canadian GP contracts would not by any means necessarily go 
to countries or specific intra-country jurisdictions in the EU with lower wages, or vice versa, but rather 
would be determined upon other factors of competitiveness. Specifically, evidence from NAFTA suggests 
that such a trend, even when signing a free trade agreement with a much less developed country and 
one with significantly lower wages, is in fact not inevitable. As of NAFTA’s entry into force on 1 January 
1994, Mexico’s overall average annual wage was $4,709, making it 82.3% lower than the US wage of 
$26,669 and 75.3% of the $19,093 average wage earned in Canada during the same time.847 This makes 
the wage gap between Romania (lowest average wages in the EU) and Canada in 2010 roughly 5% less 
than the gap Canada had with Mexico upon signing NAFTA.848  
Studies suggest that after NAFTA’s enactment Mexican companies did not win a notably increased 
amount of Canadian GP contracts, despite comparatively much lower wage rates and less effective 
working and legal rights in Mexico. For example, evidence collected from years post NAFTA’s inception 
indicate the US was awarded new Canadian GP contracts at a higher rate than Mexico. Prior to NAFTA, 
US companies were awarded 4% of all Canadian GP contracts, and not long after NAFTA was signed this 
number grew to 7%. Mexico’s claims to Canadian GP projects remained static during this same period 
                                                             
843 Evenett, S. (2003). 
844 As an apparently rather unique exception to Evenett (2003). in recent years there has been increasing weariness in some 
countries over some Chinese firms’ ability to offer substantially lower bids on their GP projects than domestic firms. This is 
likely due to the incredible economies of scale, and other factors (e.g. government support), not just wage rates, Chinese firms 
rather uniquely enjoy.  
845 EC (2004). “A report…”  
846 Author’s calculations using data from nationmaster.com, which uses CIA Factbook and World Development Indicators data. 
Data from 2002 was used as it appears Ibid (EC (2004)) uses data from 2 years back in places. Note: data is unfortunately not 
readily available for wages in the GP market specifically. 
847 Author’s calculations from nationmaster.com (using World Development Indicators and CIA Factbook) 
848 Author’s calculations using CIA Factbook 2009 statistics 
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with approximately 3% of all contracts being awarded to Mexican companies both before and after 
NAFTA was implemented.849  
Moreover, even if GP contracts were awarded to EU subsidiaries with comparatively lower wages than 
Canadian enterprises working on equivalent projects – although there is no strong evidence to suggest 
this would take place – the regulatory system in Canada would prevent a significant undermining of the 
local work environment. And the same applies to Canadian firms operating in the EU. (See the intra-
country analysis below for further discussion on this point). 
 
 
General impacts on intra-county decency and quality of work 
Further analysis would be needed and is beyond the scope of this assessment to assess how the findings 
mentioned in the above section would apply among companies within specific Canadian or EU 
jurisdictions. This is not to say that Canadian or EU companies with comparatively lower wages may in 
some cases be particularly competitive in the GP market, however, the study team has not found 
sufficient evidence readily available to correlate the disparity in wages with a competitiveness that will 
allow such companies with lower wages to win GP contracts.  
A global analysis herein would need to consider, among other issues, the impact of prohibiting offsets. 
There would be a number of uncertainties to address in an analysis on the prohibition of offsets in CETA. 
In particular, one could argue that if CETA removed Canadian offsets as tools to develop the local market 
Canadian workers may lose out to other nations with lower decency and quality of work that are 
utilising their own offsets. For example, like workers in China. As mentioned in the “Employment” and 
“Innovation” indicators, these impacts could have negative and positive dimensions, and the extent of 
these impacts is not clear-cut. 
However, to consider the more direct impacts of CETA, even if it could be empirically proven that 
Canadian companies with lower average wages win comparatively more Canadian GP contracts within 
certain jurisdictions, Canada’s core domestic labour laws and laws on safety and health in the GP market 
working environment as a whole, and support of ILO standards (albeit it has yet to sign ILO. Conv. 94, in 
particular), would arguably prevent a significant undermining of the work environment in Canada’s GP 
market. More generally, it is extremely unlikely that any localities’ democratic system, or the governing 
institutions of Canada, would allow it to significantly reduce its domestic labour standards as a result of 
CETA. This said, provincial level governments in Canada currently impose certain restrictions on trade 
union rights, and breaches of labour standards have often been reported by the Canadian Labour 
Congress to the ILO. 
Likewise, all EU countries are required by domestic laws to meet requirements in terms of treatment of 
workers which would suggest that CETA would not result in GP projects being operated by workers with 
notably unfair wages and unsavoury working environments. The EU has established a strong 
commitment to the ILO’s Decent Work Agenda, in part through the Lisbon Strategy to create more and 
better jobs. Moreover, a number of EU states have ratified ILO Convention No 94, which establishes a 
standard on labour clauses in public contracts and aims to avoid companies underbidding by cutting 
labour costs. Additionally, a 2005 ILO study found notably positive trends specifically for new EU 
member states in bringing comprehensive decent and quality work standards (in terms of working time, 
                                                             
849 Wise, C. (1998). “The post-NAFTA political economy:  Mexico and the Western Hemisphere.” (Note: this data is limited in 
that it reflects a period of only a few years, and should not be taken to necessarily say that the US increase in Canadian GP 
contracts was due to NAFTA). 
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employment contracts, wages, stress at work, reconciliation of work and family, occupational health and 
safety, social dialogue and industrial relation), albeit did note there is room to improve.850 Additionally, 
it is extremely unlikely that any EU country’s democratic system, or the governing institutions of the EU, 
would allow it to significantly reduce its domestic labour standards as a result of CETA. 
 
While it must be noted that there is a need for marked improvement in the quality of decency of work in 
certain jurisdictions in Canada and the EU, still – with perhaps the exception of jurisdictions with 
comparatively significant amounts of Aboriginal-owned businesses, for example in CLCAs (see the 
‘Employment’ indicator) – there is limited evidence to suggest this would necessarily be significantly 
exacerbated by GP provisions in CETA. A “race to the bottom” in terms of labour standards is a problem 
more acute in developing countries.  
 
Impacts on wage-specific policies in GP 
Without a more in-depth analysis, it is unclear how CETA may limit initiatives in the EU towards Social 
Considerations in Public Procurement. These initiatives have been utilised by a number of nations to 
foster “fair wages” among other benefits, and some evidence suggests that including social clauses in GP 
contracts results in slightly higher costs paid by contracting authorities.851 It is not obvious that these 
policies would be an “unnecessary obstacle” to trade under CETA, but, again, this is unclear at this point 
without further details of CETA. Also, it is not clear how CETA would impact policies to use “fair trade” 
specifications, for example those used by several governments in Italy in procuring food for public 
school cafeterias. If CETA disallows these initiatives it would have a significant negative impact on 
quality in decency of work in certain areas; although, by way of assurance, consultations with the EC 
suggest that the strong commitment of the EU to maintain these policies would likely mean they are 
unaffected by CETA.852 
As in the EU, it is not clear how CETA would impact Canadian provisions to encourage “fair wages” in GP 
as defined specifically by “fair wage” initiatives. Specifically, if CETA disallows these initiatives it would 
have a significant negative impact on quality and decency of work in certain areas; although, by way of 
assurance, consultations with the Contracting Authority suggest that the strong commitment of Canada 
to maintain these policies would likely mean they are unaffected by CETA.853 
 
Other impacts 
While CETA may not necessarily result in GP contracts being awarded more consistently to companies 
with comparatively lower wages, the competition it fosters may increase wages in certain firms while 
wages in other firms may remain static (in the GP market or in different areas), which creates wage 
inequality. The extent of this wage inequality is uncertain and may be insignificant.  
To the degree that CETA fosters competition that leads to certain larger EU and Canadian firms 
becoming more competitive in the market at least some employment will likely shift from smaller 
enterprises to these larger enterprises. This may have some positive consequences on decency and 
                                                             
850 Vaughan-Whitehead, D. et al.  (2005). “Working and Employment Conditions in New EU Member States: Convergence or 
Diversity?” ILO. April 2005.  URL: http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/2005/105B09_92_engl.pdf 
851 EC (2004). “A report…”  
852 Consultations with experts from DG Enterprise and Industry, April 2011  
853 Ibid  
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quality of work indicators if the larger firms offer better benefits than smaller companies. The extent of 
these impacts is uncertain and likely to be insignificant.  
As a final note related to quality and decency of work, although also more broadly to the concept of 
“social justice,” sources suggest that procurement policies can be used to effectively promote gender, 
racial and ethnic equality as well as provide employment opportunities for disabled persons. For 
example, the 2001 Ontarians with Disabilities Act has provisions for government agency purchasing of 
accessible information and communication technology. In past decades, the EU and Canada have 
instituted laws preventing racial and ethnic discrimination in procurement.854 These policies, which are 
ingrained not only in procurement law but also in the standard operation of the EU and Canadian 
systems, would not appear to be particularly affected by CETA. 
 
US 
In the absence of specific data it is difficult to assess how quality of decency of work would change 
under GP provisions in the CETA; however, given the strength of the regulatory system in the US it is 
unlikely that CETA would have a significant effect on equity in terms of wages of the quality of working 
environments. To the degree that the US loses market share to EU firms this may result in some increase 
in inequality of wages, although this is likely to be recouped through an extension of the AGP or a future 
GP agreement. 
 
INDICATOR: cultural preservation – identity, preservation of cultural lands and sites 
BASELINE 
Canada, EU and US 
Goods and services in the GP markets of Canada, the EU and US have cultural significance depending on 
the type of project and who is implementing the project.  
 
ANALYSIS 
Canada 
It is envisaged that the cultural concerns that are described within this SIA per each sector in Canada 
could apply to companies working on GP contracts in such sectors. To the degree that GP contracts are 
concentrated in a particularly sensitive sector, or the types of contracts deal with particularly culturally 
sensitive issues, the impact of foreign competition brought about through the CETA would increase. It is 
beyond the scope of this analysis to suggest if this would have overall positive or negative consequences. 
On an additional point, if CETA were to remove set-asides and certain other exclusions for a specific 
stratum of society, this may result in the loss of cultural identity to the degree that former 
workplaces/workers protected under such provisions and the projects awarded to such workplaces’ 
workers formed or reinforced cultural identities. For example, if an EU company – to complete the 
example, one not hiring a notable amount of Aboriginals within Canada – were contracted to provide 
services relating to Aboriginal culture in Canada over a company majority-owned and/or employing 
Aboriginals, even if this were because the EU company offered a better price for the services, this would 
have a negative impact on cultural identity. While not necessarily jeopardising the preservation status of 
                                                             
854 For example, see McCrudden, C (2007). Buying Social Justice: Equality, Government Procurement, and Legal Change. Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press.  
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cultural lands and sites, one may argue that this would also detract somewhat from the purpose of such 
preservation. As a caveat, this scenario may not be plausible as it would require set-asides for Aboriginal 
businesses to be removed in CETA, which, as mentioned in the “Employment” indictor, the EC may not 
even request in negotiations. Even if such set-asides are removed, the possibility of the aforementioned 
scenario would depend entirely on if such contracts met CETA thresholds, which such contracts in fact 
may not meet. 
More generally, to the degree that CETA fosters competition which leads to certain larger EU and 
Canadian firms becoming more competitive in the market some employment will likely shift from 
smaller enterprises to these larger enterprises. This may result in some loss of company culture 
preserved by smaller companies, but may be a non-issue if company culture in larger firms is preferred 
by employees. Also, the extent of this trend may be minor.  
 
EU and US 
It is unlikely that CETA would have any significant overall effect on cultural identity or preservation of 
cultural lands and sites in the EU or US.  
 
 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 
 
BASELINE  
Canada and EU 
A wide variety of projects with notable environmental impacts are funded by GP. For example, 
construction of roads and other infrastructure, which is often the biggest portion of GP expenditures, 
has wide implications for land usage among many other environment impacts. Given data limitations, it 
is unfortunately not plausible to compile a detailed statistical breakdown of what types of projects are 
funded by what governments with a view to gauging the environmental impacts of such projects.  
Because government is a major purchaser in the Canada and EU, the implementation of environmental 
considerations, also called ‘green procurement,’ in its procurement process can have notable 
environmental effects. These include effects on GHG emissions, air contaminants, waste, hazardous 
waste and toxic chemicals and energy and water efficiency.855 
Canada allows for environmental considerations in GP. The government’s Policy on Green Procurement 
came into effect in April 2006. Under the guidelines for greening services, considerations that need to 
be taken into account include assessing environmental impacts, as well as general environmental 
considerations, such as the presence of eco-labels or third party environmental certification like ISO 
14001. The mostly widely recognised eco-label in Canada is the Environmental Choice Program.856 
Approximately three quarters of Canadian government agencies or departments had green purchasing 
policies as of 2007.857 A number of Canadian provinces and localities have included environmental 
considerations in GP, including the currently debated and controversial Ontario Green Energy Act.  
                                                             
855  PWGC. Policy on Green Procurement.  
856 PWGSC Supply Manual. Chapter 9.  
857 UNOPS (2009)  
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Recent GP reforms in the EU also allow for environmental considerations in GP. These include technical 
specifications involving environmental performance. They develop new procurement procedures for 
entities in many sectors that are particularly environmentally sensitive, include water and energy, 
among others. In 2004 the EC produced a Handbook on Green Public Procurement to introduce 
environmental considerations in the different stages of a procurement procedure.858 As of 2007, 9 of 26 
EU MS adopted sustainable or, specifically, green procurement action plans, five drafted a plan but it 
had yet to be adopted, and two were in the process of preparing a plan. In seven MS – Austria, Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden and the UK – 40-70% of all tenders published on Tenders 
Electronic Daily incorporated some environmental criteria, although in the other EU MS the number was 
below 30%. 859  The Treaty of Lisbon generally encourages environmental sustainability in areas 
applicable to GP. 
The EU and Canada have made some exceptions in international agreements to allow for environmental 
considerations in GP. For example, Note 7 of Canada’s GPA Annex 2 (sub-central entities) finds that 
“Nothing in this Agreement shall be constructed to prevent any provincial or territorial entity from 
applying restrictions that promote general environmental quality in that province or territory, as long as 
such restrictions are not disguised as barriers to international trade.” NAFTA states that it should not 
prevent any NAFTA party from implementing of measures to protect “….animal or plant life or health.” 
Article XXIII sub-article 2 of the GPA provides similar stipulations.860 In the EU’s 1994 GPA commitments, 
General notes, note 7 states that “This Agreement shall not apply to contracts awarded by entities in 
Annex 3: for the purchase of water and for the supply of energy or of fuels for the production of energy”; 
however, as noted, in more recently revised GPA offers as well as FTAs with other countries and blocs 
the EU has notably opened up its sectors, goods and services, including in utilities and other 
environmental services.  
US 
As in Canada and the EU, there have been recent policy initiatives in the US to support green 
procurement. 
 
ANALYSIS 
INDICATOR: Policy space, institutional and regulatory environment 
Canada 
Generally, the same analysis in policy space indicator in Economic section above applies herein, 
although, the issue of “green” procurement in international trade agreements and how it may be 
affected in CETA warrants specific consideration.  
A study for the government of Canada on how international trade agreements like NAFTA and the GPA 
would affect green procurement in Canada found the provisions in the agreements constitute “no 
serious barriers to ‘green’ procurement.” The study found, however, that green standards themselves 
may be challenged and this trend may increase in the future as eco-labels and green buying programs 
                                                             
858 EC (2004). Handbook on Green Public Procurement. Brussels 
859 UNOPS (2009) 
860 Also, although not specifically applying to GP it is worthwhile to note that the EU and Canada are bound by Article XX(b) of 
GATT, which provides similar stipulations, and are also bound by Article XX(g) of GATT, which allows justifiable measures 
“relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with 
restrictions on domestic production or consumption” although there is limited jurisprudence on this provision to date.   
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becoming more common. However, the study finds such challenges would not be restricted to GP 
transactions per se, but could result out of any dispute over market access within the GP market or 
otherwise. The report suggested that standards relating to controversial products, such as transgenic 
maize in Canada might be subject to particular scrutiny.861  
To the degree that CETA removes flexibility in green procurement enjoyed under the current trading 
regime, the CETA would reduce environmental policy space and regulatory flexibility. To the degree that 
CETA disallows usage of certain initiatives for green procurement – which again is unclear at this point 
without further details of the agreement – this would undermine the positive aspects of such 
procurement, i.e. the cost effectiveness of some greener products; direct environment benefit from the 
government sourcing environmentally-friendly products; government ability to use its market power to 
influence producers to more quickly move to cleaner technologies; and raising consumer awareness 
about the environmental implications of certain purchases.862  
Further, the logic behind full-out disallowance of environmental clauses in CETA would be unclear as it 
would not necessarily render any significant financial benefits for contracting authorities. For example, a 
2004 EC study found that the introduction of environmental clauses in EU contracts does not increase 
the prices actually paid for the supplies, services or works.863 This trend is generally confirmed by other 
sources, which find that some greener products and services cost less in terms of usage, maintenance 
and disposal despite higher initial investment costs.864  
If CETA changes provisions in Canada’s current international GP agreements to open Canada’s GP 
market further, this does not necessarily imply that the usage of environmental clauses in particular will 
be phased out under the CETA. It is unclear if CETA will exclude environmental protection provisions like 
that in Note 7 of Canada’s GPA Annex 2.  
Generally, given the high level of support for green procurement policies currently, such policies could 
very well still remain in place under CETA.865 This should allay concerns over the broad environmental 
impact of a GP chapter in CETA, although this does not fully address specific concerns over CETA’s 
disallowance of offsets. 
CETA’s potential prohibition of offsets warrants analysis in terms of environmental impacts, as this could 
have mixed effects. While certain offsets are allowed under exceptions in Canada’s GPA commitments, it 
should be recalled that offsets are prohibited in NAFTA with limited exceptions (for example, for 
Mexico). The extent of removing offsets would need to be assessed in detail along the lines of the 
considerations mentioned in the “Quality of goods and services” and “Innovation” indicators. It is 
beyond the scope of this SIA to provide this assessment. 
A further assessment herein is beyond the scope of this SIA, although some additional analysis on 
related issues is made under the indicators below.  
 
EU 
No significant environmental effect is expected for the EU outside those similar impacts described under 
the above section on Canada. The body of literature supports the idea that environmental 
                                                             
861 Jane Early, LLC., pg iii  
862 Kjollerstrom, M. (2009). “Public procurement: a tool for promoting more sustainable consumption and production patterns.” 
Sustainable Development Innovation Brief, UNDESA in UNOPS (2009) 
863 EC (2004) “A report…” 
864 Kjollerstrom, M. (2009) in UNOPS (2009) 
865 Consultations with experts from DG Enterprise and Industry, April 2011 
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considerations in procurement generally have positive impacts on the environment. Thus, if CETA 
specifically disallows initiatives on green procurement, it would certainly have a significant negative 
impact on the environment in the EU. Specifically, this could undermine the positive aspects of such 
procurement in terms of the cost effectiveness of some greener products; direct environment benefit 
from the government sourcing environmentally-friendly products; government ability to use its market 
power to influence producers to more quickly move to cleaner technologies; and raising consumer 
awareness about the environmental implications of certain purchases.866 However, given the high level 
of support for green procurement policies currently, such policies could very well still remain in place 
under CETA.867 
 
US 
No significant environmental effect is expected outside any effects applicable to GP that are mentioned 
in the environmental impact sections for specific sectors. 
 
INDICATOR: Water usage and pollution 
Canada 
On paper, the CETA may have certain implications for regulation of water usage and pollution in Canada, 
although it is unlikely that it would significantly affect the sector. If drinking water and other water-
related utilities are included in the CETA, this would step beyond Canada’s past international GP 
commitments. However, the main issue being discussed in CETA is EU access to services dealing with the 
distribution and purification of water, as well as water treatment (sewage, etc.); and is not so much an 
issue of the EU seeking to exploit Canada’s domestic water supply. Either way, Canadian domestic laws 
that regulate water usage and water pollution would provide a strong framework against unsustainable 
practices in government procured water contracts.  
 
EU and US 
No significant environmental effect expected.  
 
INDICATOR: Natural resource stocks – Fish usage, biodiversity change, others 
In absence of specific data for the GP market, refer to the analysis for according environmental 
indicators for the sectoral assessments in the SIA.  
 
 
7.1.2. MEXICO   
 
BASELINE 
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Mexico is party to Chapter 10 of NAFTA on GP. Mexico’s schedule sets forth a number of exceptions to 
GP commitments, i.e. in the area of land transportation; water transportation; air transportation; 
supporting and auxiliary transport; post and telecom; repair services of other transport equipment on a 
fee or contract basis; public utilities services, including telecom, transmission, water or energy services; 
management and operation contracts awarded to federally-funded research and development centres 
or related to carrying out government sponsored research programs; financial services; and research 
and development services.868  
 
The EU signed an FTA with Mexico in March 2000, which includes an ambitious GP section. Mexico is 
required to open up procurement from government enterprises in telecoms, energy (gas and petrol), 
and railways. The EU covers procurement by public authorities and undertakings in drinking water, 
electricity, urban transport, airports, and maritime or inland ports. The agreement allows for possibly 
expanding coverage.  
Mexico is not a party to the GPA.  
 
ANALYSIS 
There is little evidence to suggest that CETA would significantly impact the GP market of Mexico. This is 
in part given that the EU already has an ambitious GP agreement with Mexico through the EU-Mexico 
FTA. 
However, CETA may indirectly impact Mexico. To the degree that CETA pushes the US to sign a more 
comprehensive GP agreement, for example extending or expanding the AGP, Mexico would be further 
pushed out of the US, and potentially, the Canadian GP market. Mexico seems to be undercut by Buy 
American provisions in recent US legislation. For example, the only explicit exemption for Buy American 
provisions on iron and steel in the US Recovery Act is given to Canada in the AGP. Although under the 
AGP’s modification of US GPA Annex 3, note 4 allows for other parties to the GPA to reach mutually 
agreeable solution, inferably meaning similar treatment as afforded to Canada, Mexico is not a party to 
the GPA. As such, the AGP currently seems to undermine the level of liberalisation afforded to Mexico in 
NAFTA. To the extent that CETA would encourage extension of the temporary provisions of the AGP or 
exemption of Canada from future US legislation in a way that discriminates against Mexico, this would 
undermine Mexico’s involvement in the NAFTA GP market, albeit in certain situations it would seemingly 
have legal recourse. 
 
7.1.3. OTHER THIRD COUNTRIES   
 
The EU currently includes GP in all its bilateral trade agreements. It has currently in force bilateral 
agreements with Mexico, Chile, CARIFORUM and Switzerland that include GP provisions. EU 
procurement rules apply to the European Economic Area. To the degree that CETA allows for Canadian 
firms to become more competitive in the EU, this could theoretically allow Canadian firms to take some 
the EU GP market share previously divided among third countries; however, as discussed in the above 
section on Canada, the EU and US, it is unlikely that the Canadian firms would gain a noteworthy share 
of the EU GP market, in part given the significant degree of competition there already. This in turn 
would limit the overall economic, social and environmental impacts of GP provisions in the CETA on 
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third countries, as the EU is a much more significant GP market for third countries (again, this category 
excludes the US and Mexico) than Canada.  
Canada’s and the EU’s commitments to other nations with which they do not have bilateral agreements 
would remain the same under their current mechanisms, and would not be effected by CETA. Their 
commitments to other members of the GPA would remain the same. 
EU-Canada SIA Interim Report 
 
317 
7.2. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (IPR) 
 
Summary: Canada offers a standard level of IPR protection when assessed at a world-wide level but it is 
lower than that of the EU on several accounts.869 Canada does not accept the patentability of higher life-
forms, does not offer patent term extension, does not protect copyrights for 70 years after death, does 
not protect technological protection measures, does not offer resale rights to artists, does not have 
statutory provisions on internet service providers liability, has not ratified and implemented WIPO 
internet treaties nor UPOV 1991, has no sui generis protection for geographical indications on food 
products, does not offer a 10 years exclusivity for data protection, and the Canada Border Services 
Agency does not have the legal authority to detain on its own initiative goods suspected of infringement. 
It is thus assumed that CETA will lead to an upward harmonisation and call primarily for change in 
Canadian laws.  
Assessing the specific impact of CETA IPR provisions is challenging for three reasons. First, the final 
provisions of CETA are not yet available. This section is thus based mostly on speculations. Second, both 
Canada and the EU are currently considering major changes in their IPR system independently from 
CETA. If implemented before CETA, these initiatives could substantially forestall impacts identified in this 
report. Third, the economics of IPR are characterised by a high level of scientific uncertainty. Rhetorical 
claims are far more frequent than empirical evidence due to the high number of variables and 
methodological difficulties in providing reliable data.  
Nevertheless, it is safe to assume that IPR-related provisions in CETA will likely benefit specific sectors, 
such as the Canadian publishing industry and the innovative pharmaceutical industry. R&D spending and 
FDI inflows could increase as a result. As a net importer of IPR-related assets, however, Canada has an 
interest in maintaining some exceptions and limitations. CETA could otherwise have significant adverse 
impacts on consumers of educational and pharmaceutical products as well as on the balance of 
payments for royalties and licensing fees. The overall impact will depend on CETA’s specific provisions 
and on Canada’s implementing legislation.  
Strengthening IPR protection in Canada will very likely have a positive impact on the economy of the 
European Union, derived mostly from reduced counterfeiting and piracy level in Canada, enhanced 
export opportunities, and additional revenues from royalties and license fees. Depending on CETA 
provisions, the creative industry, the pharmaceutical industry and the agro-food industry, or at least 
companies active in the Canadian market or facing Canadian competition, would benefit from enhanced 
IPR protection. Only minor impacts are anticipated for each indicator, but the cumulative impact could 
have a moderate significance and spill-over impacts on third countries could be significant as well.  
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7.2.1. CANADA 
 
ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT 
 
INDICATOR: Strength of enforcement mechanisms  
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
 
Counterfeiting and piracy levels in Canada are especially disturbing. Stakeholders almost unanimously 
acknowledge that enforcement of IPR in Canada must be improved. According to the Canadian 
Intellectual Property Council, “counterfeiting and piracy cost the Canadian economy $22 billion annually 
in lost tax revenue, investment and innovation.”870 More specifically, the Canadian Motion Picture 
Distributors Association calculated the annual GDP loss due to film piracy at $965 million871 and the 
Business Software Alliance estimated that reducing software piracy by 10% in two years could increase 
GDP by more than $4 billion872. 
This gloomy picture should be put in its global context. The OECD’s trade-related index of physical 
counterfeiting and piracy indicates that Canada has a higher rate (0.057086) than Germany (0.039872)  
but a lower rate than most EU countries, including France (0.086579), the Netherlands (0,063505), Italy 
(0.384653), Spain (0.212384) and the United Kingdom (0.127595).873 This relatively good performance is 
also reflected in a study conducted by the Business Software Alliance estimating that the “software 
piracy rate” in Canada (29%) is lower than the average of Western Europe (34%) and Central/Eastern 
Europe (63%).874 That being said, these statistics are estimates based on seized infringing physical goods 
and must be used with great caution.875 They could be misleading because enforcement and hence 
seizures are often seen as the Achilles' heel of the Canadian IPR system. The Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police acknowledge that, although it has investigated nearly 1,500 cases of IPR crime between 2005 and 
2008, these “numbers are believed to be a fraction of the true IPR crime situation in Canada.”876 
The Canadian government has repeatedly expressed its determination to address the issue of IPR 
enforcement. Some stakeholders, however, consider that these intentions have led to few concrete 
measures. On the copyright front, for example, several bills were tabled in the Canadian Parliament (Bill 
C-60 in 2005, C-61 in 2008 and Bill C-32 in 2010) but so far none were enacted. Policy options suggested 
by stakeholders include 1) providing more resources to police authorities and prosecutors for the 
enforcement of IPR laws; 2) introducing statutory damages for trademark infringement and increasing 
                                                             
870 Canadian Intellectual Property Council, A Time for Change: Toward a New Era for Intellectual Property Rights in Canada, 
Ottawa, The Canadian Chamber of Commerce, 2009, p.13. 
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damages and penalties for copyright infringement; 3) adopting criminal prohibitions on the manufacture 
and distribution of circumvention devices; 4) authorising the Canada Border Services Agency to detain 
on its own initiative goods suspected of infringement; 5) creating appropriate incentives for ISPs to 
cooperate with right-holders in curbing online piracy; and 6) providing clear rules on secondary liability 
for IPR infringements.877  
All of these measures could significantly strengthen enforcement of IPR law in Canada. Border measures 
are expected to be especially efficient with respect to physical goods since most counterfeit and pirated 
goods in Canada are imported.878 As noted by the Canadian Anti-Counterfeiting Network, “it is virtually 
impossible to effectively deal with imported counterfeit and pirated products once they have been 
disbursed into the marketplace.”879Although most infringing goods in Canada are imported from Asia, 
additional enforcement measures in Europe resulting from CETA could also help Canada in enforcing its 
own legislation.880  
Further, the European pharmaceutical industry believes that the CETA provides opportunity to ‘address 
Canadian measures that are problematic for innovative pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical 
products’. 881  In this regard, they claim that the CETA could specifically help to address ‘unfair, 
discriminatory judicial processes and weaker patent and regulatory data protection’ that is argued to 
exist in Canada.882  
 
 
INDICATOR: GDP/capita (PPP adjusted) 
 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
IPR-based industries represent a significant share of Canadian GDP. In 2008-2009, Canada’s arts and 
cultural sector alone contributed $46 billion, or 3.8% of Canada's GDP.883 Moreover, IPR industries have 
high annual growth rates. Copyright industries, for example, have a growth rate twice higher than the 
Canadian economy.  
Canada, however, does not fully take advantage of its potential as a knowledge economy. Venture 
capital and business expenditure on R&D as percentage of GDP are significantly lower than the OECD 
average.884 Many explain this poor performance by the limited IPR protection available in Canada. As 
opposed to several OECD countries, Canada does not accept the patentability of higher life-forms, does 
not offer patent term extension, does not protect copyrights for 70 years after death, does not protect 
technological protection measures, does not offer resale rights to artists, does not have statutory 
provisions on internet service providers liability, has not ratified and implemented WIPO internet 
treaties nor UPOV 1991, has no sui generis protection for geographical indications on food products, 
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does not offer a 10 years exclusivity for data protection, and the Canada Border Services Agency does 
not have the legal authority to detain on its own initiative goods suspected of infringement.  
Most stakeholders assume a causal relation between weaker IPR protection and lower R&D investments. 
They consider that Canada’s IPR regime “undermines the country’s innovation capacity and economic 
prosperity.” 885  Among them, Canada’s Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies notes that, 
historically, amendments strengthening patent protection have been followed by periods of increased 
R&D investment in the pharmaceutical sector.886  It is thus assumed that bringing Canadian IPR 
protection to European levels would help Canada in catching up to the OECD R&D average. Under this 
perspective, CETA could potentially have a positive impact on Canada’s GDP.  
Nevertheless, the impact of strengthening IPR protection on GDP remains subject to controversies.887 
Some scientific studies contradict the industry’s viewpoint and “fail to find evidence of a strong positive 
response by domestic innovators that could be reasonably ascribed to the effect of stronger IPR.”888 To 
clarify, it is undisputable that R&D spending is associated with higher GDP growth and, given current 
business models, a certain level of IPR protection is essential for investment in innovation and 
creativity.889 Incremental IPR reforms in OECD countries, however, do not seem to increase domestic 
spending in R&D.890  
Some are even more pessimistic. A study commissioned by the Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical 
Association concluded that every additional dollar invested in R&D as a result of CETA would cost an 
additional 8 dollars to Canadian consumers (though these figures have been contested by Canada’s 
Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies on the basis that it is faulty to assume that healthcare costs 
can only be controlled ‘by maintaining weak and ineffective IP protection’).891 Other stakeholders 
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interviewed for this study consider that excessive IPR could actually harm R&D if their holders can block 
follow-on research.892 They argue that other policies, such as advance market commitments, targeted 
subsidies, fiscal incentives, or product development partnerships, provide more direct incentive for 
private R&D investment than enhanced IPR protection.  
Whether Canada has reached the optimal balance between minimal and excessive IPR protection is an 
open question for some, although evidence suggests the need for improvement in at least a number of 
IPR-related areas. IPR-related provisions of CETA could have, at best, a minor positive impact on 
Canadian growth. Depending on their specific content, they could even have an adverse impact on the 
Canadian economy.   
 
INDICATOR: Employment rate by sector/industry 
 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
IPR-based industries represent a substantial share of the Canadian workforce. More than 633,000 
Canadians work in the culture sector and more than 200,000 are engaged in R&D activities.893 
Employment growth in these sectors is especially dynamic. Employment in copyright-based industries 
has grown at 5.3% between 1991 and 2002 and research personnel have grown at over 4% yearly from 
1995 to 2004.894 
The impact of stronger IPR protection on Canadian employment will vary among industrial sectors. The 
Business Software Alliance calculated that reducing software piracy by 10% in two years could create 
more than 64,000 new jobs in Canada. 895  Likewise, according to the Canadian Motion Picture 
Distributors Association, film piracy costs the equivalent of 12,600 full-time jobs in Canada.896 While the 
methodology supporting these estimates is open to debate, it is realistic to assume that employment in 
IPR-based industries could benefit from strengthened IPR protection. It is, however, equally realistic to 
assume that employment could be adversely impacted in other sectors, such as the generic 
pharmaceutical industry and agri-food industries that employ geographical indications in their branding. 
The impact of IPR provisions in CETA on overall employment is likely to be minor.  
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INDICATOR: Rate/volume of FDI inflows 
 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
According to Statistics Canada, “foreign organizations supported R&D in Canada in the amount of $2.6 
billion” in 2008.897 Strengthening IPR protection could positively increase this inflow. Reports from non-
Canadian industry associations frequently stress that Canada “is fast gaining a reputation as a haven 
where technologically sophisticated international piracy organizations can operate with virtual 
impunity.”898  According to the Canadian Intellectual Property Council, this regrettable reputation 
“directly affects the willingness of foreign firms to invest domestically.”899 Further, the European 
pharmaceutical industry stresses that improved IPR protection could act as a clear signal to investors, 
helping to provide greater predictability and, hence, inflows of EU FDI into Canada.900 
This causality between IPR protection and FDI inflow is supported by empirical evidence. Surveys of 
executive managers suggest that investments and technology transfer decisions are strongly sensitive to 
the perceived strength of IPR protection.901 These findings are confirmed by most empirical and 
statistical studies.902 There is no consensus, however, on the necessary conditions required. Some 
consider that the capacity of IPR reforms to attract additional FDI is valid among developed countries 
where other factors affecting investment are similar.903 Others believe that strengthening IPR can attract 
FDI only in developing countries where foreign corporations typically prefer to invest directly rather 
than granting a license to a local manufacturer.904  
In the age of globalisation, however, it is very likely that transnational corporations in IP intensive 
sectors disconnect their investment decisions from their marketing strategies.905 In other words, they 
invest where conditions are ideal for investment, not where conditions are ideal for marketing. The 
availability of skilled resources, for example, is more important than the IPR level to attract FDI to 
Canada.     
                                                             
897 Statistics Canada, “The Ongoing Importance of Gross Domestic Expenditures on Research and Development”, Innovation 
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899 Canadian Intellectual Property Council, A Time for Change: Toward a New Era for Intellectual Property Rights in Canada, 
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Analysis of the CGP’s Economic Impact Assessment of Proposed Pharmaceutical IP Provisions, 2011, available at 
www.canadapharma.org. 
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Interestingly, a survey conducted by the International Chamber of Commerce has found that foreign 
investors are more concerned about enforcement practices than standards provided in legislation.906 
Therefore, raising IPR standards might not significantly increase FDI inflows, but improving enforcement 
as a result of the CETA could have a positive impact.  
 
INDICATOR: Rate/volume of FDI outflows 
 
CETA’s IPR provisions are not likely to affect Canadian FDI outflows to Europe. 
 
 
INDICATOR: Economic policy space 
 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Policy coherence between IPRs and other economic policy-areas is frequently sought through limitations 
and exceptions. For example, the fair dealing exception facilitates documentary filmmakers’ ability to 
use copyrighted material. Similarly, the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act authorises farmers to save and plant 
their own seed of protected varieties. The Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic argues that 
these “exceptions and limitations to intellectual property have enormous economic value.”907 
It is unclear to what extent CETA could restrict the Canadian ability to maintain its exceptions and 
limitations. Trade agreements do not typically list specific IPR exceptions authorised. Most agreements 
provide only general exceptions with considerable room for interpretation (such as TRIPs art. 13, 17, and 
30). In this context, Canada’s ability to have a flexible economic policy would depend on CETA’s formal 
objectives and guiding principles (see for example Article 7 and 8 of the TRIPs agreement), and on 
implementing legislation.  
 
INDICATOR: Trade balance 
 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Canada is a net importer of IP-based goods. In 2008, Canada imported $4.0 billion of cultural goods and 
exported $1.7 billion.908 According to the Canadian Manufacturers & Exporters, counterfeit goods 
represent 2% to 3% of Canada’s trade.909  
IPR reforms could have a significant impact on trade. A number of studies suggest that exports from 
high-income countries to developing countries tend to increase when the latter raise their standards for 
IPR protection.910 However, for countries where threat of imitation is weak, strengthening IPR protection 
                                                             
906 International Chamber of Commerce, Global Survey on Counterfeiting & Piracy, 2007, Paris, ICC, p. 5. 
907 Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic, Letter to Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, April 30 2008, p. 
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June 2006. 
910 Keith Maskus, “Normative Concerns in the International Protection of Intellectual Property Rights”, The World Economy, vol. 
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tends to have minor impact on exportations.911 It is thus likely that European exports to Canada will not 
be significantly affected, as it currently does not imitate a noteworthy amount of IPR-protected products. 
Exports of products protected by geographical indications will likely increase, but in some other 
industries European businesses might prefer to invest directly in Canada.   
The Canadian trade balance would not necessarily benefit from IP provisions in CETA. Trade in specific 
goods, that are currently freely marketed and exported from Canada, could be adversely affected. For 
example, several Canadian companies brand and export their products with labels that could be 
considered as European geographical indications. These companies could lose market shares in 
domestic and foreign markets if they are forced to abandon their commercially significant labels. In sum, 
both Canadian exports and imports might be slightly and negatively impacted, but only in specific 
sectors.  
 
INDICATOR: Balance of payments 
 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Canada has a negative balance of royalties and license fees paid for the authorised use of IPR. In 2008, 
receipts were US$ 3.4 billion while payments were US$ 8.8 billon.912  
If Canada raises its level of protection and enforcement, it will likely increase payments made by 
Canadians to European holders of IPR. If CETA does not require major changes in European IPR regimes, 
as is anticipated, Canadian holders of IPR in Europe would not increase their receipts from European 
markets. One of the only cases that could benefit Canadian copyright works is an extended duration of 
IPR protection resulting from a new reciprocity. Therefore, it is very likely that the CETA will worsen the 
Canadian deficit in its balance of royalties and license fees.  
 
 
INDICATOR: Consumer price 
 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Despite their social and economical benefits, IPRs are linked to increased consumer prices for certain 
products. Patents, copyrights, trademarks, geographical indications, plant breeder’s rights, and other IPR 
conferred exclusive rights, restrict competition, and authorise holders to maintain higher prices. Several 
mechanisms, such as compulsory license schemes or the Patented Medicines Prices Review Board 
(PMPRB), are intended to maintain prices of IP protected goods at reasonable levels.  
Certain CETA provisions could lead to some higher consumer prices in Canada. For example, if artistic 
works and data protection are protected for longer periods, the effective use of fair dealing exception is 
limited, protection for geographical indications and industrial designs are enhanced, and term 
extensions are made available for patents, it is very likely that CETA will create an inflationary pressure 
on consumer prices for certain IP products.913 Mechanisms external to the IP systems could be 
established to offset this increased pressure.  
                                                             
911 Rafiquzzaman, Mohammed, “The Impact of Patent Rights on International Trade: Evidence from Canada”, The Canadian 
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INDICATOR: Public finances 
 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
IPRs have four impacts on public finances. First, they foster several industries and create employment, 
generating tax revenues. Second, the examination, registration, and maintenance of some IPR require 
the payments of fees. Third, the enforcement of IPR necessitates public spending. Fourth, governments 
are consumers of IPR protected goods.  
CETA impacts on public finance will be mixed. The Canadian Chamber of Commerce has calculated that 
film piracy resulted in tax losses of $42 million.914 The Business Software Alliances goes as far as 
estimating that reducing software piracy by 10% in 2 years could generate 2 billion dollars in extra 
taxes.915 However, several NGOs consider that the government “should not be required to devote 
excessive resources to the overzealous enforcement of possible intellectual property violations.”916 They 
are especially concerned over CETA’s border measures that could “shift the burden of private rights 
enforcement to the public”917 at the expense of taxpayers.  
Moreover, the public sector, as a consumer of IPR-protected goods, might face additional spending, 
notably for educational books (educational institutions accounted for 23.4% of book sales revenues in 
Canada) and pharmaceutical products (the public sector finances 45% of prescribed drug expenditure). 
This is likely for pharmaceuticals because, as mentioned under the “Access to pharmaceuticals” 
indicator hereto, a number of measures, including adoption of patent term extensions and the 
extension of data protection term could delay the entry of genetic products into the market. A study 
commissioned by the Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association concludes that these measures 
would represent additional public expenditure of $1.3 billion yearly, including $551 million from the 
Government of Ontario and $412 million from the Government of Quebec.918 Public expenditures could 
also increase for education books if the duration of copyright protection is extended, fair dealing 
exceptions are restricted and digital locks are protected. 
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SOCIAL ASSESSMENT  
 
INDICATOR: % of population living under country-specific poverty line 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
It is not anticipated that CETA will have an impact on this indicator.  
 
INDICATOR: Equity in wages 
 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
The impact of IPR on equity in wages is uneven and varies depending on the economic sectors involved.  
Most IPR intensive industries offer relatively high wages. However, several artists and creators, holders 
of copyright, have modest revenues.   
Strengthening IPR could favour industries paying higher wages. Artists could also benefit from resale 
rights and enhanced cooperation of collecting societies. One study, however, suggests that increasing 
IPR protection decreases bonuses paid by IPR-based companies to retain knowledge and avoid 
divulgation of trade secrets to competitors.919 
 
 
INDICATOR: Product innovation 
 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Exclusive rights conferred by IPR provide economic benefits to their holders, but this is not their end 
goal.  IPR are policy instruments for the social goal of providing new products to society.  
 
The CETA could slightly increase the number of new-to-market products in Canada. In a globalised world, 
however, IPR standards in larger markets are often more important to Canadian firms. This partly 
explains why, although Canada has weaker IPR protection than several other OECD countries, it ranks 
higher than OECD average in percentage of firms with new-to-market product innovation.920  
 
 
INDICATOR: Number of in-country produced TV shows (culture) 
 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
In 2008, the Canadian television production industry earned $2.2 billion in operating revenues.921 IPR 
represents a significant source of revenue for this industry. Strengthening IPR could increase revenue of 
the television production industry. One can assume that this revenue could be reinvested to increase 
                                                             
919 Amy Glass and Kamal Saggi, “Intellectual Property Rights and Foreign Direct Investment,” Journal of International Economics, 
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the number of in-country produced TV shows. This could be the case in the francophone market which, 
as opposed to the Anglophone market, consumes more Canadian than foreign programs.922 
 
INDICATOR: Number of in-country produced movies (culture) 
 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
The Canadian film production industry earned $389 million in operating revenues in 2008.923 Several 
stakeholders expressed major concerns regarding film piracy. Canada is said to be “a haven for the 
illegal recording of movies in theatres”924 and host 4 of the top 10 illicit BitTorrent sites in the world.”925 
According to industry, film piracy resulted in consumer spending losses of approximately $1.8 billion in 
2010.926  
Strengthening enforcement and improving enforcement through CETA could significantly reduce the 
rate of film piracy. The detrimental economic effects of online and offline piracy affect the Canadian film 
production and distribution chain, including theatrical distributors, video publishers and television 
broadcasters who see their capacity to pre-finance local productions reduced. However, since most films 
pirated and distributed in Canada are not Canadian productions, CETA enforcement measures will likely 
have a minor positive impact on the indicator “number of in-country produced movies.”   
 
 
INDICATOR: Number of in-country produced and/or IP-protected music (culture and employment) 
 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
The Canadian sound recording industry’s revenue totalled at $887 million in 2008.927 This industry is 
especially harmed by digital music downloads and file sharing.928 According to the Canadian Recording 
Industry Association, piracy caused “a 48% ($637 million) drop in retail sales from 1999 to 2006.”929 The 
International Intellectual Property Alliance considers that this drop, experienced all over the world, is 
more pronounced in Canada: “Internet music piracy remains prevalent in Canada, aided by weak and 
outdated copyright laws. […] The fact is that Canada lacks the marketplace integrity required for 
innovative digital business models to flourish as they do in other countries.”930 
CETA will very likely contribute to reducing piracy rates and indirectly increase the amount of produced 
music. However, as with the film production industry, most sound recordings legally sold or pirated are 
not Canadian. Foreign firms control the sound recording industry in Canada and earn more than 70% of 
its revenues.931 In this context, it is important to distinguish the interests of Canadian performers from 
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those of sound recording makers.932 If non-Canadian sound recording makers are able to increase their 
revenues from enhanced protection in Canada, they might not necessarily reinvest these revenues in 
scouting and developing new talent specifically in Canada. It is also unlikely that an extended copyright 
protection will provide a sufficient incentive for performers to record more music. Some argue that 
overly strong copyright protection could even harm creativity.933 While CETA could increase revenues for 
sound recording makers, “these revenues are likely to accrue mainly to non-Canadians.”934 
 
INDICATOR: Number of in-country produced and/or IP-protected literature (culture, education) 
 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
In 2008, operating revenues for the book publishing industry in Canada totalled $ 2.1 billion.935 More 
than 42% of sales made were for educational books.936 Book publishers frequently report “continuing 
piracy problems in Canada with regard to infringements such as high-volume photocopying, and 
unauthorised uploading and downloading.”937  
Increased IPR protection will likely generate additional revenue for book publishers. Since the majority 
(58%) of operating revenue of the industry is made by Canadian-controlled book publishers, it is more 
likely than in some other copyright-based industries that a share of this additional revenue will be 
reinvested to publish Canadian books.938  
 
INDICATOR: Employment rates of university graduates 
 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
CETA is not likely to impact this indicator in any other ways than what is mentioned under the indicator 
“employment rate.” 
 
INDICATOR: Access to pharmaceuticals 
 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Patents have a direct impact on pharmaceutical products' prices. In Canada, the Patented Medicines 
Price Review Board (PMPRB), a quasi-judicial body, must approve prices of patented drugs. An OECD 
study concludes that this mechanism “has very likely been responsible for bringing Canada’s prices for 
patented medicines roughly in line with European comparators.”939 
A number of measures, including adoption of patent term extensions, the removal of the regulatory 
approval exception, and the extension of data protection term, could delay the entry of generic 
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products into the market. This will not affect the average prices of patented medicines, but could 
increase the percentage of GDP spent on healthcare. According to a 2011 study commissioned by the 
Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association, the annual increase in cost would be in the range of $2.8 
billion per year. 940 
 
INDICATOR: Social policy space 
 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Several exceptions to IPR serve social objectives, such as education, research, maintenance of archives, 
distance learning, and access to artistic works by persons with disabilities.941  
The CETA could, potentially, restrain the use of the exceptions, notably if technological protection 
measures are legally protected.  
 
INDICATOR: Product Safety   
 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Some counterfeiting products are substandard and pose “serious consumer health and safety risks.”942 
Substandard products have been reported in a large range of goods, including batteries, brake pads, 
cosmetics, children’s toys, electrical products, and pharmaceutical products.943 Furthermore, pirated 
content online also presents risks as it can also contain dangerous hidden additions, including viruses, 
malware and Trojans, which would enable criminal elements to damage a user or steal information or 
their online identities.944 
The problem of substandard products is real, but it is far from being as widespread as in developing 
countries. The consumption level of substandard products in Canada remains low. New enforcement 
measures, especially targeting imported goods, could reduce even further the circulation of substandard 
products in Canada.  
However, it should at least be mentioned that several NGOs have recalled that not all IPR infringing 
products are counterfeits, that not all mislabelled products are substandard, and that several IPR 
compliant products are also substandard. Accordingly, approaching the problem of substandardness 
through the lens of IPR, “not only fails to address the very real public health threat, [but also] draws 
public resources away from that urgent task.”945 
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ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 
 
INDICATOR: Air pollution/GHG emissions 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
CETA IPR provisions are not likely to impact this indicator. 
 
INDICATOR: Other environmental indicators 
 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
CETA IPR provisions are not likely to impact any other environmental indicators. 
 
 
 
7.2.2. EU 
 
ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT 
 
INDICATOR: Strength of enforcement mechanisms 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
For reasons detailed under the indicator “GDP/capita”, it is anticipated that a CETA IPR chapter will have 
a positive but minor impact on this indicator. Industry groups such as the European pharmaceutical 
industry strongly support greater IPR protections under the CETA, particularly under the viewpoint that 
doing so could send a strong signal to the international community and help foster greater IPR 
protections globally over the long-term.946 
 
 
INDICATOR: GDP/capita (PPP adjusted) 
 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
IPRs are critically important for the EU economy and contribute to a significant share of its GDP. Creative 
industries alone are said to generate approximately €860 billion of value added, corresponding to a 6.9% 
of European GDP.947 In a recent document, the Commission considered that “counterfeiting and piracy 
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have a dramatic and damaging effect on business and they have the potential to become even more 
problematical.”948 
The 2009 IPR Enforcement Report of the European Commission targeted Canada among the list of 
“priority countries” for its relatively weak protection. Shortcomings identified in the report are related 
to “the lack of ratification by Canada of major IPR treaties relating to trademarks and copyright (WIPO's 
"Internet Treaties"), deficiencies in the protection of pharmaceuticals and of geographical indications, 
ineffective enforcement mechanisms (in particular regarding customs seizures), and limited sharing of 
information between Canadian authorities and rights holders.”949  
CETA’s IPR chapter will very likely have positive impacts on Europe. These impacts will, however, be 
relatively minor for two reasons. Firstly, the Canadian market for European IPR-protected products is 
relatively small. Canada represents only 2% of world sales of sound recordings 950 and around 3% of 
European exports in newspapers, journals and periodicals.951 Canada represents a more significant 
market for specific products, like adult computer games, that are designed for Westerners. For those 
products, however, the American market is perceived by some European stakeholders as a more 
worrying “source of IP threats”. Although the United States offers stronger IPR protection than Canada, 
the potential value of the American market is also much more significant.952  
Secondly, Canada is not a major source of physical counterfeit and pirated goods. Asian and Middle East 
countries are the main sources of physical counterfeit products imported in Europe.953 China alone is the 
origin of 54% of all suspect goods detained at EU borders.954 That being said, Canada serves as a 
transhipping point for some counterfeit and pirated goods from Asia. Moreover, Canada hosts a number 
of torrent sites used to pirate European copyrighted works and are accessible from within the EU. As 
such, increasing enforcement in Canada could have a positive impact herein. 
Although it may not have a significant effect on overall GDP, a CETA IPR chapter will likely have a 
positive effect on European economy. It could have a significant impact in specific industries such as 
agri-food companies using geographical indications. If CETA raises the bar for future negotiations with 
third countries, including WTO talks on geographical indications, spill-over may be more important than 
direct and immediate impacts.  
 
INDICATOR: Employment rate by sector/industry, FDI flows, trade balance, balance of payments 
 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
For reasons detailed under the indicator “GDP/capita”, it is anticipated that a CETA IPR chapter will have 
a positive but minor impact on these indicators.  
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954 Commission Staff Working Document, IPR Enforcement Report 2009, Brussels, EC, p. 4. 
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SOCIAL ASSESSMENT 
 
It is not anticipated that CETA IPR chapter will have a noteworthy social impact on the European Union, 
which includes an assessment on the indicator of access to pharmaceuticals among other indicators.  
 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS 
 
CETA IPR provisions are not likely to impact the environmental indicators employed in this SIA. 
 
 
7.2.3. USA 
 
ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT 
 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Over the last few years, the US government and several US industry associations have repeatedly 
pressed Canada to adopt measures like the type that could be adopted in CETA.955  
If Canada strengthens its IPR protection, the US might very likely increase its exports, investments and 
revenues from royalties and license fees. Given the size of the US economy, minor impacts are 
anticipated for each economic indicator, but the cumulative impact could have a moderate significance. 
In fact, since the US exports and invests significantly more to/in Canada than the EU, it is very likely that, 
thanks to TRIPs most-favoured nation treatment, the US will be the first beneficiary of CETA IPR 
provisions.956 
 On products protected by geographical indications, however, US exports to Canada could be negatively 
affected.  For example, cheeses produced in the US but protected in Europe by geographical indications 
might have to be rebranded under another name to be legally exported to Canada. Under these 
conditions, some American producers might simply prefer to withdraw from the Canadian market.  
 
 
SOCIAL ASSESSMENT 
 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
It is not anticipated that CETA IPR chapter will have social impact on the US, unless it directly addresses 
the online selling of pharmaceutical products, which is unlikely. 
 
                                                             
955 Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2010 Special 301 Report, 2010, p. 25. 
956 For example, in 2008, US exports of cultural goods to Canada reached more than $ 3 billon and US revenues from cultural 
service reached more than $ 2 billion. Statistics Canada.  
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ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 
 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
It is not anticipated that CETA IPR chapter will have environmental impact on the US.  
 
 
7.2.4. OTHER THIRD COUNTRIES 
 
ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT 
 
It is not anticipated that a CETA IPR chapter will have direct economic impact on these countries, unless 
CETA has a spill-over effect on parallel and future negotiations involving these countries (including WTO 
negotiation on geographical indications and other bilateral free trade agreements).  
 
 
SOCIAL ASSESSMENT 
 
INDICATOR: Access to pharmaceuticals  
 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Some NGOs have expressed concern on CETA’s impacts on access to medicines in developing countries. 
Border measures could restrict, chill, or slow down the export of drugs to those countries when in 
transit to Canada. According to a stakeholder, “customs authorities in Europe have wrongly detained 
generic medicines in transit to developing countries [and] their detention did disrupt drug procurement 
in destination countries where, in at least some cases, the medicines were not even on patent.”957If 
Canada replicates EU border measures, a similar scenario could happen when pharmaceutical products 
are in transit in Canada on their way to a developing country.  
 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 
 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Several developing countries are providers of genetic resources and have expressed in multiple 
multilateral forums that a mandatory disclosure of the origin of genetic resources in patent application 
could strengthen the enforcement of their access and benefit sharing (ABS) laws. Currently, Canada does 
not formally require such disclosure but a number of European countries have introduced this 
                                                             
957 Essential Action, Letter to the Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, July 2 2009, p. 2; Oxfam Canada and Oxfam 
Québec, Submission regarding the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, July 15, 2009, p. 2. 
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requirement.958 Moreover, references to the Convention on Biological Diversity and its principle of ABS 
and traditional knowledge protection are increasingly being included in recent free trade agreements.959  
The inclusion of a disclosure requirement in CETA could improve the quality of patent examination, 
provide an additional incentive for users of genetic resources to comply with ABS requirements and 
allows stakeholders to better monitor their enforcement. It could also set new standards for current 
multilateral negotiations at the World Intellectual Property Organization and under the Convention of 
Biological Diversity.  
                                                             
958 Jean-Frédéric Morin, « La divulgation de l’origine des ressources génétiques : Une contribution du droit des brevets au 
développement durable », Les Cahiers de la propriété intellectuelle, vol 17, no 1, 2005, p. 131-147 
959 David Vivas-Engui and Maria Julia Oliva, Biodiversity and Intellectual Property in North-South Free Trade Agreements, Geneva, 
CTSD, 2010. 
EU-Canada SIA Interim Report 
 
335 
 
7.3. INVESTMENT960 
Overall Summary:   
Regulatory and institutional reforms encouraged by CETA may remove certain barriers in Canada to EU 
investment; however, as the negotiations remain ongoing, this assessment is based on a set of 
assumptions. Removal of barriers could create certain net economic benefits. It would likely create some 
positive, and potentially negative, social impacts. It would likely have mixed environmental impacts. 
Regarding investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) specifically, the conflicting costs and benefits of such 
a mechanism make it doubtful that its inclusion in CETA would create a net/overall (economic, social and 
environmental) sustainability benefit for the EU and/or Canada. There is no solid evidence to suggest 
that ISDS will maximise economic benefits in CETA beyond simply serving as one form of an enforcement 
mechanism, just as state-state dispute settlement is also an enforcement mechanism. And the policy 
space reductions caused by ISDS allowances in CETA, while less significant than foreseen by some parties, 
would be enough to cast doubt on its contribution to net sustainability benefits. As such, the study’s 
assessment suggests that a well-crafted state-state dispute settlement mechanism might be a more 
appropriate enforcement mechanism in CETA than ISDS. 
Economic assessment summary:  
The impact of CETA as a whole specifically on investment, as well as the impact of the Investment 
Chapter specifically on trade and intangible business linkages, could contribute to some increase in GDP 
growth in Canada and the EU.  
More specifically, the impact of CETA as a whole on investment in Canada and the EU will likely be 
positive, and could be ‘notable,’ although in the opinion of the study would likely be less than 
‘significant.’ For Canada, investment liberalisation in CETA is expected to reinforce existing trends in 
bilateral investment, with the majority of flows directed towards the financial, energy and mining sectors. 
More specifically, if included in the negotiations, removal of restrictions in such sub-sectors as telecom; 
transportation services, including water and transportation services; fisheries; finance; and 
mining/uranium may positively impact the level of bilateral investment in such areas. Investment in the 
EU would likely follow the positive trend predicted for Canada, but on a smaller scale. This is due to the 
relatively larger size of the EU economy compared to Canada and given Canada is currently more 
restricted to FDI than the EU at large.  
The Investment Chapter in CETA could encourage economic benefits in Canada in terms of trade-related 
effects and intangible linkages, although the significance of these will likely be minor to notable at most. 
The Investment Chapter in CETA would provide benefits to multinational companies in particular in terms 
                                                             
960  
Introductory notes: “Investment” herein follows the definition used in NAFTA – specifically, all types of financial investments, 
shareholding, secured debts and typical forms of FDI. The below assessment delineates between portfolio investments and FDI 
where appropriate. Unlike the other cross-cutting issue sections herein, this section considers both the US and Mexico 
alongside the assessment for the EU and Canada, in recognition of the linkages between CETA and NAFTA, and the EU-Mexico 
FTA and CETA. Although the analysis focuses on investment arising out of an “Investment” chapter in CETA, particularly in 
reference to investor-state provisions, it also considers investment effects from CETA as a whole. This investment section, (as 
well as the analysis of investment-related indicators within the individual sectoral analyses), is partially informed by the FDI 
gravity modelling results found in Annex 3.  
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of fostering intangible business relationships, which may have economic benefits, and stimulating the 
flows of capital and differentiated goods.  
However, the role of ISDS, which may be included in the Investment Chapter in CETA, as a contributor to 
the aforementioned economic benefits is unclear as there does not appear to be readily available 
empirical evidence on the matter. On one hand, simply to the extent that it serves as an enforcement 
mechanism, the inclusion of ISDS in CETA may contribute to some economic benefits, and the economic 
risks it brings are unlikely to be as significant as some stakeholders suggest. On the other hand, it is 
uncertain that the aforementioned economic benefits from ISDS would be maximised in a sustainable 
way, and the fact remains that ISDS does usually create at least some minimal economic costs to 
government.  
The Investment Chapter in CETA will create requirements that on one hand will likely have positive 
economic effects, while on the other hand may also create effects that constitute a reduction in 
economic policy space. 
Social assessment summary 
There will likely be some positive, and potentially some negative, social impacts from investment 
encouraged under CETA as whole. Increased investment under CETA might be channelled into creating 
jobs in Canada and the EU that score higher on quality and decency of work indicators, although it may 
also create some degree of worker displacement and wage inequality. Either way, these impacts would 
likely be relatively limited. The impacts related to CETA-encouraged investment flows would not be 
attributable solely to the Investment Chapter but to the combined impacts of a number of provisions in 
CETA, for example those relating to other cross-cutting issues described herein, those liberalising 
restrictions in services (inclusive of those not related directly to investment), and those creating tariff 
reductions. 
The policy space reductions caused by ISDS allowances in CETA would likely be less significant than 
foreseen by some, but still enough to cast doubt as to if they would contribute to net/overall social 
sustainability in Canada and the EU. (This said, it should be kept in mind that the state legally maintains 
the right to regulate in the face of an ISDS mechanism, although it may have to pay compensation in 
ISDS cases and feel dissuaded from regulating for fear of ISDS cases; and it is important to stress that a 
reduction in “policy space” as used in this assessment exclusively refers to the ability of governments to 
make policies that have clear social [as well as economic and environmental] benefits.) This assessment 
is based upon consideration of several arguments: the questionable utility of using ISDS as currently 
operating rather than domestic courts in Canada and the EU; precedent of ISDS creating some regulatory 
chill; risk of unrecorded regulatory chill from ISDS; lack of information on ISDS case rulings; and risk 
created by a ‘third country incorporation’ provision in ISDS in CETA. This brings into question the efficacy 
of ISDS in contributing to protection of investors’ rights premised on objectives of preventing capital 
flight and enhancing investment with the end goal of contributing to the “the well-being of society.” 
Likewise, it is doubtful that including ISDS in CETA would create a net/overall social sustainability benefit 
for the EU and/or Canada. 
Environmental assessment summary 
As mentioned in the Industrial Products section, increased FDI in the oil sands and mining sectors could 
lead to increased environmental impacts since these sectors are environmentally intensive. Given the 
relative concentration of FDI inflows in these sectors in Canada, a marginal increase in investment 
inflows driven by CETA and higher oil and mineral prices could lead to an increase in production capacity 
that would in turn lead to impacts on capital stocks, use of bio-diverse areas, water use and 
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contamination, toxic contaminants and effluents, and air pollution and GHG emissions. This said, 
although the gravity modelling for this report provides some indication that investment could increase, it 
is unclear how much CETA would increase investment in the oil sands and mining sectors, and if 
investment does not particularly increase then the directly related environmental impacts therein would 
clearly be lessened. 
On the other hand, increased investment under CETA might have some positive environmental impacts. 
In particular, some investment might gravitate towards green technology, producing positive impacts in 
Canada and the EU.  
This analysis errs on the side of caution by assuming that, while not meeting the threshold of 
‘significant,’ ISDS in NAFTA, as well as some EU BITs, may very well have created some magnitude of 
reductions in environmental policy space relevant to this SIA, and thus ISDS in CETA may have some 
negative environmental impacts on the EU and Canada. It is therefore doubtful that including ISDS in 
CETA would create a net/overall environmental sustainability benefit for the EU and/or Canada.  
 
7.3.1. EU, Canada, USA and Mexico 
BASELINE  
FDI and portfolio flows 
Canada 
Canadian direct investment abroad has rapidly expanded in the past 30 years, and Canadian firms now 
own more foreign operations in terms of dollar value than foreign companies own in Canada.961 
Outward stocks of FDI stood at $522,069 million in 2009, representing an increase of 66% since 2000.962 
Of this stock, the EU was the second largest destination for Canadian outward investment with 25.1% of 
the total, representing an increase of 4.1 percentage points from 2000 figures. In 2009, the total stocks 
of investment in Canada amounted to $483,472 million.  
In terms of sectoral investment, the largest recipients of outward Canadian FDI are the finance and 
insurance industry (50.3% of all outward FDI stocks) and the energy and metallic minerals industry 
(23.3%). The average annual FDI inflow from 1994-2009 from the Canada to the EU was $CAD 8,189.963 
The average annual FDI inflow from 1994-2009 from the US to Canada was $CAD 12,337, and the 
average annual FDI inflow during the same period from the EU to Canada was $CAD 8,813.964 The EU 
serves as the second largest source of inward FDI in Canada, contributing 29.8% of the total stocks in 
2009. Herein, the UK is the single largest contributor, holding 11.6% of the total stock of foreign 
investment in Canada, followed by the Netherlands (8.5%), France (3.3%), Germany (2.5%) and 
Luxembourg (1.8%). Overall, these countries respectively represent the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 7th and 9th largest 
sources of investment into Canada in 2009. In terms of sectoral investment, inward FDI is primarily 
directed towards Canada’s energy and metallic minerals industry (36.2%) and finance and insurance 
industry (19.8%). Within the former, the EU, led by the UK, holds 35.2% of all inward FDI in the sector, 
while in the latter the EU holds 34.8% of all inward FDI.965 
                                                             
961 Institute for Research on Public Policy. “Dispelling Myths about Canadian Foreign Direct Investment.”  Canada. 
962 Statistics Canada 
963 Constructed average from Statistics Canada data 
964 Ibid 
965 Statistics Canada 
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At the end of 2007, the market value of Canadian portfolio investment abroad totalled $714,734.7 
million consisting of $564,138.4 million in stocks and $150,596.4 million in debt instruments. Herein, the 
EU served as the second largest destination of Canadian portfolio investment with holdings of 
$201,318.6 million. Within the EU, the largest destinations were the UK (33.4% of all EU holdings), 
France (14.8%), Germany (15.1%) and the Netherlands (7.4%).966  
 
EU 
In 2009, outward investment from the EU totalled $366,727 million, with the main outflows originating 
from Luxembourg,967 the UK and France. The largest destinations for outward FDI in 2006 were the US, 
Canada and Switzerland. Inward investment totalled $309,557 million, with the aforementioned 
countries also serving as the main sources of investment.  
In terms of portfolio investment, Euro area holdings of foreign securities totalled EUR 3.8 trillion at the 
end of 2008, with holdings of US securities at 33% of the total and offshore financial centres 12%.968 
 
US and Mexico 
The US is the world’s largest recipient of FDI. More than $325.3 billion in FDI flowed into the US in 2008, 
which is a 37 percent increase from 2007.969 The $2.3 trillion stock of FDI in the US at the end of 2008 is 
the equivalent of approximately 16 percent of US GDP.970 Canada is the largest source of inward 
investment with inflows of $25, 813 million in 2009 followed by France with $24,046 million and 
Germany with $16,210 million. In total, financial inflows from the EU were $83,725 million. The US also 
has the world’s largest outward investments. Outward flows totalled more than $3.2 trillion in 2009.971  
In 2009, the largest recipients of US FDI were the Netherlands ($471,567 million), the UK ($471,384 
million) and Canada ($259,792 million). In total, outflows to the EU were more than $1,976 billion.972 
FDI in Mexico for 2009 was $11.6 billion, down 51% from the previous year. The US was the largest 
foreign investor in Mexico, accounting for 49.8% ($5.8 billion FDI from the US) of reported FDI. The 
economic slowdown in the US in 2008 and 2009 has caused a significant decline in this figure. The 
Mexican Government estimate of FDI for 2010 is $15 billion to $20 billion.973 
 
Regulatory and institutional framework 
Canada and EU  
International investment agreements (“IIAs”) serve as the legal basis for international investment 
cooperation. There are several types of IIAs. These include Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs)/Foreign 
Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (FIPAs); double taxation treaties (DTTs); hybrid 
bilateral trade and investment agreements like CETA, often called preferential free trade and investment 
agreements (PTIAs); regional trade and investment agreements, some of which may be  PTIAs, like 
                                                             
966 Statistics Canada 
967 The role of Luxembourg in investment is primarily explained by its role in financial intermediation 
968 European Central Bank 
969 US Dept. Of Commerce – Bureau of Economic Analysis 
970 CIA World Factbook 
971 CIA World Factbook 
972 US Dept. Of Commerce – Bureau of Economic Analysis 
973 US Department of State 
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NAFTA; regional economic integration agreements; and other multilateral agreements involving foreign 
investment, for example, sectoral investment agreements like the Energy Charter Treaty. According to 
UNCTAD, as of 2005 there were over 2,400 BITs, 2,600 DDTs, and many PTIAs, regional economic 
integration agreements, and other multilateral agreements involving foreign investment worldwide.974 
The investment environment in Canada and the EU (including EU MS) is governed by a variety of 
domestic and international rules. Certain EU MS have particularly well developed domestic regulatory 
and institutional environments for FDI and portfolio flows. Both Canada and the EU, as members of the 
WTO, are bound by WTO agreements including GATS and the Agreement on Trade Related Investment 
Matters (TRIMS).  
Canada and the EU have a number of trade and economic agreements with foreign countries, many of 
which include provisions on investment. A listing of these agreements for can be found in the Tables 72 
and 73 in the “Third Countries” section below.   
Additionally, Canada and the EU each have a range of investment-specific agreements with other 
nations. Canada’s FIPAs with third countries are listed in a Table 74 in the “Third Countries” analysis 
below.975 EU MS have concluded 1,200 BITs with other countries.976 BITs typically include provisions 
defining standards of treatment, protection from expropriation, the right to freely transfer capital, 
prohibitions on certain performance requirements, and investor-state dispute settlement.977 Under 
Article 207(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the new name of the EU 
Treaty as written under the Treaty of Lisbon, FDI now falls within the scope of EU commercial policy. The 
EU now has the exclusive competence to abolish barriers to foreign direct investment, whereas 
previously Member State BITs protected EU investors (market access was already an EU competence). 
Canada and EU MS have undertaken a number of measures to facilitate investment among one another 
specifically. Canada has FIPAs with 6 EU MS: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Romania, and 
Slovakia. Canada and EU MS have made commitments through the OECD to one another to mutually 
facilitate investment, including via the OECD Code for Liberalisation of Capital Markets and Code for the 
Liberalisation of Invisible Operations and the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. These 
commitments do not include investment protection provisions, such as expropriation and investor-to-
state dispute settlement. The OECD National Treatment Instrument is a non-binding agreement. The 
2008 Joint Study suggests that no Canadian provinces and territories have arrangements with EU MS on 
Canadian Direct Investment Abroad (CDIA) outside of the informal mechanisms set up by Ontario. 
Regional businesses and commerce groups importantly facilitate commerce and trade between the EU 
and Canada.978  
 
                                                             
974 UNCTAD (2005). “Investor-State Disputes Arising From Investment Treaties: A Review.” UNCTAD Series on International 
Investment Policies for Development. New York and Geneva. http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit20054_en.pdf 
975 Canadian FIPAs contain the following major components: 1. Definitions; 2. Treatment of Investments - General and Specific 
Obligations; 3. Protection of investments - Expropriation, Compensation, and Transfers; 4. Subrogation (this is an insurance 
term, used for situations where the insurer has the rights of its insured after it makes an insurance payment) 5. Dispute 
Settlement Mechanisms; 6. Entry Into Force; 7. Exceptions and Special Provisions. More on the structure of FIPAs can be found 
at URL: http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?article497 
976 EC (2010). “Memorandum 10/303: Q&A: Commission launches comprehensive European international investment policy.” 7 
July 2010. 
977 Gallagher, Kevin P (2010), “Policy Space to Prevent and Mitigate Financial Crises in Trade and Investment Agreements.” G-24 
Discussion Paper Series, UNCTAD. 
978 2008 Joint Study 
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Canada, EU, US and Mexico 
The US has a particularly well developed investment environment, and Mexico has an investment 
environment that has seen marked improvement and transformation over the last few decades. The US 
has one of the most developed systems for FDI and portfolio flows in the world. Mexico has a well-
established environment for investment with the US and Canada under NAFTA, and with the EU under 
the EU-Mexico FTA which entered into force in 2000. More than 18,000 companies with US investment 
have operations in Mexico, and the US accounts for more than 40% of all FDI there.979 However, Mexico 
opted out of making commitments for investment in its energy sector under NAFTA, which has 
ultimately hurt Mexico.980 
As mentioned, the important investment relationship between Canada, the US and Mexico is governed 
by NAFTA. Box 33 below summarises certain key provisions in Chapter 11 of NAFTA, which deals 
specifically with investment. 
 
 
Box 33: Select provisions in Chapter 11 of NAFTA 
 Article 1102 of NAFTA requires national treatment in investments between NAFTA countries. 
Sub-article 2 (Article 1102:2) applies to investors and investments in “like circumstances,” which 
may allow for difference in interpretation when considering the applicability of different sized 
companies and/or investments in different sectors. (Note: As stipulated by Article 1108, Article 
1102 does not apply to government procurement; subsidies or grants; nor does it apply to 
measures that relate to aboriginal affairs, minority affairs or social services such as health, child 
care and social welfare.) 
 Article 1103 of NAFTA requires all concessions in investment be extended to investors from the 
US and Mexico in what is known as a most favoured nation (MFN) clause. Sub-article 2 (Article 
1103:2), like Article 1102:2, applies to investors and investments in “like circumstances,” which 
may allow for difference in interpretation when considering the applicability of different sized 
companies and/or investments in different sectors. (Note: As stipulated by Article 1108, Article 
1103 does not apply to government procurement, subsidies or grants.) 
 Article 1105 of NAFTA requires members to observe minimum standards within “international 
law.” 
 Article 1106 on NAFTA prohibits performance requirements in terms of export quantity 
requirements, domestic content, and technology transfer, among other requirements. 
 Article 1110 of NAFTA states that “No Party may…take a measure tantamount to nationalization 
or expropriation of such an investment…” except under certain circumstances.981  
Certain provisions herein have been used as the basis for private investors to sue the state over claims 
that the government limited their investment opportunities/their rights have been violated under the 
                                                             
979 US Department of State http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35749.htm 
980 Hufbauer, G.C. and J.J. Schott. (2005) 
981 Article 1110 of NAFTA states: “No Party shall directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of an investor of 
another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an investment 
(“expropriation”), except: (a) for a public purpose; (b) on a non-discriminatory basis; (c) in accordance with due process of law 
and the general principles of treatment provided in Article 1105; and (d) upon payment of compensation in accordance with 
paragraphs 2 to 6.” 
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agreement. These are so called “investor-state” provisions, which form the basis for what is called 
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). Article 1102, 1105 and 1110 have been frequently used in this 
regard. 
The application of Chapter 11 is limited by sectoral, reciprocal and investment review reservations listed 
in Annexes 1, 2 and 3 of NAFTA.982 
NAFTA allows companies of any nationality incorporated in a NAFTA country to bring a Chapter 11 
case.983  
 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT 
 
INDICATOR: Impact on institutional and regulatory environment for investment (focus on FDI) 
Canada and EU 
FDI restrictions and liberalisation 
The OECD has compiled an FDI Restrictiveness Index which is useful at a basic level to assess the 
investment climate in Canada and the EU (and the US and Mexico). The index uses 4 categories of 
restrictions against investment, i.e. equity restrictions, screening and prior approval requirements, 
restrictions on key foreign personnel/directors, and an “other restrictions” category.984 It calculates 
scores for several sectors and weights the sector scores (using FDI/trade weights)985 to create an overall 
country score. The index is not without its flaws, including that it does not take into account important 
determinates of investment including barriers posed by state-owned enterprises and semi-private 
government enterprises or special government rights,986 or stringency of enforcement and application of 
rules. Still, the 2010 Index has made some revisions to past methodologies,987 and is useful in providing a 
basic understanding of the dynamics of the institutional and regulatory investment environments in 
Canada and the EU (and the US and Mexico).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
982 For example, Canada carried over 48 sectoral reservations from CUFSTA under Chapter 11 of NAFTA (Hufbauer, G.C. and J.J. 
Schott (2005), pg 202) 
983 See Dumberry, P. (2001). “The NAFTA Investment Dispute Settlement Mechanism: A Review of the Latest Case Law: Journal 
of World Investments.” 151-95; and Hufbauer, G.C. and J.J Schott (2005), pg 206 footnote 22 
984 The OECD defines the 2010 index components as follows: (1) foreign equity limits (no foreign equity allowed, foreign equity 
allowed to be less than 50% of total equity, foreign equity is allowed to be greater than 50% but less than 100% of total equity); 
(2) screening and prior approval (approval required for new FDI/acquisitions of less than USD 100million or if corresponding to 
less than a 50% of total equity, approval required for new FDI/acquisitions above USD 100 million or if corresponding to over a 
50% of total equity, notification with discretionary element); (3) restrictions on key foreign personnel/directors (foreign key 
personnel not permitted, economic needs test for employment of foreign key personnel, time bound limit on employment of 
foreign key personnel, nationality/residence requirements for board of directors – majority must be nationals, at least one 
must be a national); (4) “other restrictions” (establishment of branches not allowed/local incorporation required; reciprocity 
requirement; restrictions on profit/capital repatriation; access to local finance;  acquisition of land for business purposes; land 
ownership not permitted but leases possible) 
985 See Golub (2003) for explanation of weighting methodology 
986 Mandel-Campbell. A. (2008)  
987 For example, the 2010 methodology expands upon previous coverage for sectors and re-weights certain components. 
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Table 63: OECD 2010 FDI restrictive index for EU(24)* (0 = most open, 1 = most closed) 
Country Equity 
restrictions 
Screening 
and prior 
approval 
requirements 
Restrictions on key 
foreign 
personnel/directors 
Other 
restrictions 
Total FDI 
index 
 Austria   0.058 0.009 0 0.009 0.076 
 Belgium   0.014 0 0 0.002 0.016 
 Czech Rep.   0.049 0 0 0.006 0.055 
 Denmark   0.063 0 0 0.001 0.063 
 Estonia   0.052 0 0 0.046 0.098 
 Finland   0.019 0 0 0.021 0.04 
 France   0.038 0 0.001 0.014 0.053 
 Germany   0.02 0 0 0.004 0.025 
 Greece   0.032 0.002 0.002 0.024 0.059 
 Ireland   0.035 0 0 0.024 0.059 
 Italy   0.069 0 0 0.004 0.073 
 Hungary   0.065 0 0 0.001 0.066 
Latvia 0.051 0 0 0.034 0.085 
 Lithuania   0.036 0 0 0.014 0.05 
 Luxembourg   0.003 0 0 0 0.004 
 Netherlands   0.003 0 0 0.001 0.004 
 Poland   0.058 0 0 0.053 0.111 
 Portugal   0.003 0 0 0.003 0.006 
 Romania   0.008 0 0 0 0.008 
 Slovak Rep.   0.049 0 0 0 0.049 
 Slovenia   0.011 0 0 0 0.012 
 Spain   0.019 0 0 0 0.019 
 Sweden   0.028 0.027 0 0.001 0.057 
 UK   0.036 0 0 0.022 0.059 
EU (24) 
Average 
0.034 0.002 0.000 0.012 0.048 
 
*OECD 2010 FDI Restrictiveness Index does not provide data for Malta, Cypress, and Bulgaria 
Source: Data compiled from: Kalinova, B., A. Palerm and S. Thomsen (2010) 
 
As can be seen in the above table (although not accounting for Malta, Bulgaria or Cypress given lack of 
data), the EU overall has a relatively low FDI restrictiveness index of 0.048 out of 1. Members with the 
highest investment restrictiveness include Poland and Estonia. Members with the least restrictive index 
include the Netherlands and Luxembourg. 
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Table 64: OECD 2010 FDI restrictive index for Canada, EU (24)*, US and Mexico (0 = most open, 1 = 
most closed) 
Country Equity 
restrictions 
Screening Key 
Personnel 
Operational 
Restrictions 
Total FDI 
Index 
Canada 0.067 0.082 0.000 0.005 0.153 
EU (24)* 0.034 0.002 0.000 0.012 0.048 
US 0.100 0.000 0.008 0.008 0.116 
Mexico 0.131 0.095 0.000 0.037 0.264 
*OECD 2010 FDI Restrictiveness Index does not provide data for Malta, Cypress, and Bulgaria 
Source: Data compiled from: Kalinova, B., A. Palerm and S. Thomsen (2010) 
 
As can be seen in the above Table 64, Canada has a more restrictive investment environment than the 
US or EU24, although less restrictive than Mexico. As is evidenced in Table 64, Canada’s most significant 
restrictions to FDI are in the media and fishing sectors. It is least restrictive in the agricultural and 
forestry as well as real estate sector. Still, the full impact of this restrictiveness on the grand scheme of 
investment flows should be contextualised, as the Canadian Competition Panel among others have 
noted Canada does attract noteworthy amounts of FDI. Indeed, as a proportion of GDP its stock of 
inbound FDI is relatively high among developed countries.988 Canada experienced a significant change in 
its OECD FDI restrictiveness in the last 4 years, as in 2006 its FDI restrictiveness index score was about 
0.359989 making its 2010 score of 0.153 roughly 53% lower, although it is unclear how much of this is due 
to a reduction in restrictiveness or a result of changes to the OECD restrictiveness index methodology 
between 2006 and 2010.990   
 
 
Table 65: Canada’s 2010 OECD FDI Restrictiveness Index by sector991 (0= most open, 1 = most closed) 
Sector Canada’s FDI restrictiveness  index 
Agri. & For.  0 
Fishing  0.6 
Mining  0.15 
Manuf.  0.1 
Electricity  0.1 
Construction  0.1 
                                                             
988 Competition Review Panel. Compete to Win. Ottawa: Government of Canada. 2008.  
989 Data from: Blanka Kalinova, Angel Palerm and Stephen Thomsen (2010), “OECD’s FDI Restrictiveness Index: 2010 Update”, 
OECD Working Papers on International Investment, No. 2010/3, OECD Investment Division, www.oecd.org/daf/investment 
990 See Ibid at pg 7 which makes a note on comparing 2006 vs. 2010 FDI restrictiveness indexes 
991 The OECD offers the following further description of what some of the sectors herein include: Business services (legal 
services, accounting and audit, architectural services, and  engineering services); other finance (including securities and 
commodities brokerage, fund management, custodial services, etc.); telecommunications (fixed telecoms, mobile telecoms); 
media (radio and TV broadcasting, other [newspapers, etc.]); transport (land, maritime, air); electricity (general distribution); 
food and other manufacturing (including textiles, wood, paper and publishing, other manufacturing); mining and quarrying 
(including oil exploration and drilling)   
Notes: (1) The score for Financial Services has been calculated on the basis of a National Treatment instrument. Canada’s 
position under the Codes of Liberalisation in the area of financial services is discussed in the July 2009 Report by the Investment 
Committee to the OECD Council (www.oecd.org/daf/investment/instruments).  
(2) The scores for Fishing, Maritime Transport, Media and Telecoms have been calculated on the basis of Canada's list of 
exceptions under the National Treatment instrument. The corresponding sectoral reservations under the Capital Movements 
Code are under review by Canada. 
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Distribution  0.1 
Hotels & res.  0.1 
Transport  0.267 
Media  0.7 
Telecom  0.35 
Financial Serv. 0.067 
Business Serv.  0.1 
Real Estate  0 
Total FDI Index                                      0.153 
Source: Kalinova, B., A. Palerm and S. Thomsen (2010) 
 
 
Table 66: Canada’s 2006 OECD FDI Restrictiveness Index by sector (0= most open, 1 = most closed) 
Sector Canada’s FDI restrictiveness  index 
Business service (total) 0.175 
Legal  0.200 
Accounting  0.200 
Architecture  0.150 
Engineering  0.150 
Telecoms (total)  0.525 
Fixed  0.525 
Mobile  0.525 
Construction 0.150 
Distribution 0.150 
Finance (total) 0.219 
Insurance 0.200 
Banking 0.225 
Hotels & Restaurants 0.150 
Transport 0.413 
Air 0.675 
Maritime 0.300 
Road 0.250 
Electricity 0.350 
Manufacturing 0.150 
Total FDI Index                                      0.228 
Source: Koyama, T. and S. Golub (2006) 
 
CETA may not reduce any current investment barriers in the EU to a significant degree given the EU’s 
already comparatively low level of investment restrictiveness. The impact of this reality on FDI flows is 
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discussed under the “FDI and portfolio flows…” indicator(s) below. This is not to deny that CETA may 
encourage some reductions on investment barriers in EU MS with higher investment restrictiveness.992  
 Regulatory and institutional reforms encouraged by CETA may remove certain barriers in Canada to EU 
investment; however, without further details of the agreement it is difficult to tell exactly what barriers 
may be removed. Also, without further details, it is difficult to tell if these barriers will be removed 
specifically because of the CETA negotiation process or were in the process of being liberalised anyway.   
It is also worth noting that CETA may affect restrictions in the inter-provincial investment in Canada. 
Requirements on administrative processing of paperwork that must be completed and submitted to 
agencies at different levels of government acts as an impediment to investment. Lack of harmonisation 
can also lead to delays in zoning, licensing and permit requirements. CETA may prioritise reduction of at 
least some of these internal barriers to investment in Canada, which are of concern to EU companies 
operating in Canada as well as to domestic Canadian companies. 
Enforcement provisions in investment and trade & investment agreements 
Logic behind using investor-state provisions in investment and trade & investment agreements 
Investor-state provisions are included in investment (e.g. BITs) and trade & investment agreements (like 
NAFTA) as the basis for ISDS, i.e. for private investors to sue the state in international arbitration over 
claims that the government limited their investment opportunities/their rights have been violated under 
the agreement. They deal with disputes over property rights and other treatment of investments. A brief 
overview of commonly invoked investor-state clauses from NAFTA, found in Chapter 11 of that 
agreement, can be found in Box 33 of the baseline section. The remainder of this analysis considers 
investor-state provisions in CETA that would likely be worded in a broadly similar manner to those in 
NAFTA Chapter 11. 
It is important to note that investor-state provisions are not unique to NAFTA or (if included) to CETA; 
however, while EU MS have many BITs with investor-state provisions the EC has not included investor-
state provisions in an EU-wide trade & investment agreement with third countries. CETA would be a first 
in this regard.993 Such provisions are very common in IIAs signed all over the world over the past decade 
or so, and it is now more unusual to have such an agreement without their inclusion.994 Cases are often 
heard by the World Bank’s ICSID; the Permanent Court of Arbitration, according to UNCITRAL rules; or 
the International Court of Arbitration in Paris, an arm of the International Chamber of Commerce. As 
noted by UNCTAD, the UN agency dealing specifically with trade, the increase in investor-state disputes 
usually arises as increased international investment flows lead to more occasions for such disputes, and 
more occasions for disputes taken together with more IIAs are likely to lead to more cases. Also, with 
increased numbers of investment agreements in place, more investor-state disputes are likely to be 
within the realm of ISDS. Another reason for the increase may be the increased complexity of recent IIAs 
and other regulatory hurdles in their actual implementation. Additionally, as investors hear about 
successful claims, more investors may be encouraged to use the mechanism.995 
Advocates of ISDS, and BITs at large, argue that these provide added security to investors, which 
ultimately creates economic benefits for society. Specifically, as ISDS is undisputedly intended as a core 
                                                             
992 Note that although Poland has a more restrictive FDI environment than Estonia according to the OECD index, Poland has 
signed an FIPA with Canada, implying that its FDI restrictiveness with Canada would be comparatively lower than it is with the 
RoW under the OECD index. 
993 Sinclair, S. (April 2010), pg 15 
994 A database of BITs can be found at UNCTAD’s website here: http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch____779.aspx 
995 UNCTAD (2005)   
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mechanism for protecting investors’ rights, it intuitively should also contribute to the wider stated 
objectives of its advocates in protecting such rights, i.e. preventing capital flight and maintaining 
investment, “enhancing”/increasing investment, and through these actions contributing to the “the 
well-being of society.”996 For example, advocates say investor-state dispute settlement prevents capital 
flight in the event of a problem with investment. Also, there is a related rationale for including investor-
state provisions in an agreement like CETA because “Investor-state is such an established feature of 
investment agreements that its absence would in fact discourage investors and make a host economy 
less attractive than others.”997  
The implications of these objectives for CETA are discussed further in the “FDI and portfolio flows…” 
indicator section, below.  
Investor-state allowances vs. domestic law and domestic adjudication 
As with any binding commitment, investor-state provisions require enforcement mechanisms since 
without a mechanism of enforcement investment commitments have relatively little meaning. However, 
some suggest that tribunals, at least as currently operating, are not necessarily the most appropriate 
institutional settings in which to hear investment-specific cases. Gus Van Harten of Osgoode Hall Law 
School suggests tribunals are “fragmented and non-hierarchical adjudicative structure of investor-state 
arbitration.” He suggests that investor-state tribunals have in the past “been more likely to base 
damages awards on violations of the standard of fair and equitable treatment, in particular, than 
expropriation provisions in investment treaties.” Further, he says “…governments are not acting 
responsibly to the public purse if they assume, when passing a measure, that future tribunals will favour 
a state-friendly as opposed to an investor-state interpretation.” 998 Also, some draw attention to the 
apparent inability to challenge cases heard under ICSID rules.999 These concerns extend to ISDS under 
CETA, as it appears to be on track to use the same method of tribunal arbitration. Others may disagree 
with the aforementioned assessment, finding that international tribunals provide an environment to 
hear cases that is in fact less bias than domestic courts in certain countries. And some sources emphasis 
                                                             
996 Trade negotiators from the European Commission, February 2011 suggest investor state provisions may increase investment 
(consultations with EC trade negotiations, February 2011). The EC finds in EC (2010c) “Memorandum...” page 1 that “Investors 
are not the only beneficiaries of investment agreements. Investment, being an important driver for economic and social 
development, equally benefits all stakeholders. Thus, protection of investors' rights is not an aim in itself, but serves a wider 
objective: to enhance investment and contribute to the well-being of society.”  In another publication the EC finds that 
“Investor-state dispute settlement, which forms a key part of the inheritance that the Union receives from Member State BITs, is 
important as an investment involves the establishment of a long-term relationship with the host state which cannot be easily 
diverted to another market in the event of a problem with the investment.” (EC (2010d). “Communication from the Commission 
to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 
Towards a comprehensive European international investment policy.” COM 343 final. 7.7. 2010, pgs 9-10) 
997 Ibid, confirmed by consultations with DG Trade investment and service negotiators, March 2011. Also, aforementioned 
consultations specifically suggest that EU and/or Canadian investment might be diverted to a country like China if not protected 
by ISDS in CETA. And it was inferred that this investment loss could be compounded if China were to sign an agreement with 
ISDS with Canada, for example, if CETA did not include ISDS. In response, it must first be recognised a wide variety of pull 
factors unrelated to any push factors in CETA exist in China which make it a highly attractive market to EU and Canadian 
investment. (And Canada’s resource endowements in particular, not the prospect of ISDS, make Canada attractive to Chinese 
investors.) Second, while China has more recently included certain ISDS provisions in investment agreements, for example in its 
latest BIT with Germany, no recorded ISDS case has ever been brought against China to date. It is likely that this trend is 
explained in that foreign businesses might feel they would jeopardise their operations in China if bringing an ISDS case, and in 
fact one reason for ISDS being allowed in recent Chinese investment agreements is likely the flexibility in the scope of what is 
committed and the fact that such allowances could practically be more so to protect Chinese interests abroad than vice versa 
(see Prud’homme, Dan (2011) “Recent ISDS trends in investment agreements with China.” Working Paper.) 
998 Consultations with Gus Van Harten, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, February 2011 
999  Allen & Overy LLP (2010). “Investment Treaty Arbitration: Protecting and Promoting Foreign Investments.” 
http://www.allenovery.com/AOWeb/binaries/51290.pdf 
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that the ICSID Convention, for example, does not override domestic laws relating to sovereign immunity 
from the awards process, and arbitration decisions can be annulled or revised on review.1000  
 
More specifically, the utility of ISDS between developed countries in particular can be questioned, for 
example between the EU and Canada under CETA, given the strength of their existing institutional 
environments. Herein, a commonly held viewpoint from some opponents of investor-state provisions in 
agreements between countries like the US and Canada, i.e. those developed countries in NAFTA, is that 
investors from countries with well developed legal systems for hearing disputes will “abuse” such 
provisions in an effort to challenge government regulation.1001 As a note, when involving developing 
countries, investor-state arbitration is also not without its flaws, and in fact may be sometimes 
disproportionately burdensome on these countries,1002 although, at least theoretically, on the other 
hand these countries might benefit more from ISDS if they in fact bring investor security that exists 
comparatively more in developed countries. 
 
Box 34: treatment of firms from third countries under certain ISDS provisions 
 
NAFTA allows companies of any nationality incorporated in a NAFTA country to bring a Chapter 11 case 
(hereafter sometimes referred to as the ‘third country incorporation provision’).  
 
As a note, the application of this provision may be somewhat limited by provisions included in NAFTA to 
protect against “treaty shopping,” a situation where investors search for home countries that have 
treaties with host countries where investments will be made. The potential for such treaty shopping was 
recognised in the drafting of Chapter 11 of NAFTA, which includes a provision allowing a party to deny 
the benefits of the agreement to investors that have no “substantial business activities” in their putative 
home country.1003  
 
Without further details of CETA it is unclear how the agreement might address the aforementioned 
                                                             
1000 EIU (2010). “Evaluating a potential US-China bilateral investment treaty.” EIU report for the US-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission. EIU, London. http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2010/EIU_Report_on_US-China_BIT--
FINAL_14_April_2010.pdf 
1001 See Public Citizen. http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=2309 
1002 On one hand, the relationship between developed and developing countries in particular might best be protected by such 
arbitration given the often underdeveloped nature the dispute settlement institutions within developing countries. For example, 
a number of studies discuss the utility of ISDS where investors are concerned about the strength of domestic reforms 
implemented in countries with higher perceived risk and/or corruption, i.e. usually certain developing countries (for example, 
see Vandevelde, K. (1998). “Investment Liberalization and Economic Development: The Role of Bilateral Investment Treaties”. 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law). On the other hand, it is interesting to note that the NAFTA experience suggests that 
there is no clear evidence of more ISDS being initiated against developing countries than developed countries, as 28 cases were 
brought against Canada whereas only 17 cases were brought against Mexico (a developing and emerging country as defined by 
the IMF, although a member of the OECD). This said, trends in NAFTA alone cannot be extrapolated to assessing the ISDS 
relationship between all developed countries and developing countries, and further analysis is warranted in this area.  
Monetary payouts, combined with the clear concerns raised by UN panels over the impacts of investor-state provisions on 
developing countries in particular -- among others see UNCTAD (2007) and other groups, for example, Osogoode Law School 
(2010) – suggest a need for improved arbitration of investor-state cases or dramatic changes in the system, for example moving 
towards contract-based approaches to ensure investment rather than IIAs. To take an example from NAFTA even, Mexico has 
been compelled to pay over $187 million in damages under NAFTA (data from Sinclair (October 2010)). This is the highest 
amount of damages paid by any NAFTA country, and clearly has higher monetary burden on the Mexican government than it 
would on the US or Canada given its comparatively smaller budget.  
1003 Article 1113.2. For further discussion on this issue see UNCTAD (2005)   
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issues. The implications of including the third country incorporation provision in CETA are discussed 
further in the “Cost of ISDS…” and “Policy space” indicators sections, below. 
 
 
Certain government officials consulted have pointed out that NAFTA Chapter 11 cases brought under 
NAFTA tribunals could instead be brought to domestic courts under domestic law (regardless of the 
existence of NAFTA), and this would also apply to CETA.1004 This point is further analysed below. 
NAFTA allows a wider breadth of recourse than in domestic law in allowing a private foreign individual 
to challenge a foreign government, for example in certain circumstances depending on the related 
commitments in terms of MFN, national treatment, minimum standards of treatment, monopolies and 
state enterprises, performance requirements, requirements on senior management and board of 
directors, among others. These provisions deal with treatment of companies along a relatively specific 
set of commitments.    
Moreover, NAFTA provisions related to “expropriation” go beyond domestic law on the same subject 
(also called “takings law”). Domestic law in NAFTA countries requires compensation for direct 
expropriation, which under a simplified definition is when the government takes over property rights. In 
NAFTA, for example, provisions allowing protection of expropriation are worded in a rather unique way: 
allowing protection against acts “tantamount to expropriation” and wider indirect expropriation. These 
provisions have been applied more liberally than US domestic takings law in terms of “diminution of 
value,” “conceptual severance,” “police power” and the “ripeness rule.” 1005 The US takings law is known 
to be more complex than Canadian takings law. As such, a CETA with investor-state provisions for 
expropriation similarly worded to NAFTA would inferably open the door to more ambitious 
interpretations and usages than allowed under domestic takings laws in Canada.  
Other investment enforcement mechanisms outside ISDS 
The standard enforcement mechanism outside ISDS to protect investors’ rights in a trade/trade & 
investment agreement, and also intended to meet the same end objectives of ISDS as previously listed, 
is state-state dispute settlement. In state-state dispute settlement, disputes go through state 
representatives and tariffs are allowed to be raised or agreement concessions or obligations suspended 
as punitive measures.  
                                                             
1004 Consultations with trade negotiators from the European Commission, February 2011 
1005 Herein “diminution of value” refers to the level of loss required to constitute expropriation; whereas the Metalclad Corp v. 
United Mexican States case (hereafter “Metalclad”) shows that NAFTA required “significant” impairment of the investment 
value, not the stricter destruction of nearly the entire value as required in US takings law. “Conceptual severance” refers to 
splitting the value of takings into components of space, time and function to determine the value of takings; while this concept 
is not typically allowed in domestic US law when determining the value of a land taking, rulings from Metalclad, Pope & Talbot 
vs. Canada (hereafter “Pope & Talbot”), and S.D. Myers Inc. vs. Canada (hereafter “S.D. Myers”) by NAFTA tribunals applied this 
concept. “Police power” refers to the unintentional loss of property or other economic disadvantage from ordinary, non-
discriminatory state actions like regulation and taxation; whereas some suggest Metalclad makes a comparatively limiting 
judgment on the breadth of police power allowed under Chapter 11 when compared to domestic US law. The “ripeness rule” 
under US law finds that one must exhaust state procedures for remedy before filing a case with federal court; however, sources 
suggest that in Metalclad the ripeness rule was not required (although as a note, consultations are required before formal 
litigation in the NAFTA tribunal). Sources: Text of NAFTA Chapter 11, US eminent domain law, and related jurisprudence – for 
example, e.g. Metalclad, Pope & Talbot, and S.D. Myers decisions at www.naftalaw.org. Also, among secondary sources see: 
Shenkman, E. (2002) “Could principles of Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence be helpful in analyzing regulatory 
expropriation claims under international law?” New York University Environmental Law Journal 11(1): 174-197; Porterfield, M. C. 
(2004) “International expropriations rules and federalism.” Stanford Environmental Law Journal 23(3): 4-90; and Been, V. and J. 
C. Beauvais. (2003). “The global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s investment protections and the misguided quest for an 
international ‘regulatory takings’ doctrine.” New York University Law Review 78 (1): 30-143.) 
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Drawing on other conclusions in this assessment, it is the opinion of this study that a well-crafted state-
state dispute settlement mechanism might be a more appropriate enforcement mechanism than ISDS in 
CETA. First, given state-state dispute settlement does not bring with it the same sustainability concerns 
as ISDS (as described in the economic, social and environmental assessments hereto), it would have 
fewer negative impacts if included instead of ISDS in CETA. Second, (as described in the economic, social 
and environmental assessments hereto), while advocated by a variety of business groups, there is no 
strong evidence to suggest ISDS brings with it more/maximises net benefits (economic, social or 
environmental) than state-state dispute settlement. Herein, it should be noted, however, that it would 
seem that there is at least some risk that if not carefully awarded, remedies (raised tariffs or suspension 
of agreement concessions or obligations) in state-state dispute settlement might have some negative 
impacts, including impacts on industries indirectly related to the investment disputes at hand. Also, 
there would inevitably be concerns among businesses over the effectiveness and efficiency of such a 
mechanism when compared to ISDS. As such, both caution and tact need to be exercised in using state-
state dispute settlement.    
By way of context, while there has been a trend in new generation trade agreements to include ISDS, 
there are prominent recent examples of trade & investment agreements between developed countries 
which exclude ISDS.1006 For example, the US-Australia FTA, signed in 2004 and entered into force on 1 
January 2005, does not include ISDS given opposition to including such a mechanism in a trade 
agreement with developed countries with robust institutions. That agreement, however, includes a 
provision to allow reconsideration of the FTA’s enforcement mechanism if warranted. Given this 
precedent and recent policy statements, it would not be surprising if the Australian government seeks to 
keep ISDS out of the Australia-Japan FTA, negotiations on which started in 2007.1007 The recent EU-Korea 
FTA (like other EU-wide FTAs to date), signed in 2009 does not include ISDS.  
 
US and Mexico 
If CETA removes certain barriers in Canada to EU investment – directly or indirectly – it could directly or 
indirectly remove barriers to US and Mexican FDI into Canada. This is due to the Chapter 11 MFN and 
national treatment provisions under NAFTA that would extend to investors in “like” circumstances under 
CETA.  
There is also an automatic extension of liberalisation afforded under NAFTA in what is known as the 
“ratchet” mechanism. The mechanism is invoked in instances of “autonomous” liberalisation, i.e. 
                                                             
1006 “Developed” herein used in-line with the IMF categorisation 
1007 One update from the Australian authorities finds “We will continue consultations with Australian stakeholders on the 
merits of including investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) in an FTA with another developed country.” (Australia-Japan Free 
Trade Agreement: Newsletter Update 2. http://dfat.gov.au/fta/ajfta/newsletter_update/update_2.html); whereas recent policy 
statements clearly indicate the Gillard government does not intend to use ISDS in trade agreements, at least those with 
developing countries: “In the past, Australian Governments have sought the inclusion of investor-state dispute resolution 
procedures in trade agreements with developing countries at the behest of Australian businesses. The Gillard Government will 
discontinue this practice. If Australian businesses are concerned about sovereign risk in Australian trading partner countries, 
they will need to make their own assessments about whether they want to commit to investing in those countries.” (Australian 
Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2011). “Gillard Government Trade Policy Statement: Trading our way to 
more jobs and prosperity.” http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/trade/trading-our-way-to-more-jobs-and-
prosperity.html#investor-state) 
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liberalisation that is considered unilateral, and applies to areas listed in Annex I of NAFTA although it 
does not apply to areas listed in Annex II (exclusions) of NAFTA.1008    
There remain some questions about the applicability of the NAFTA ratchet mechanism in relation to 
CETA. Consultations with trade negotiators suggest that CETA in unlikely per se to trigger the ratchet 
mechanism given Canada “generally liberalises on an autonomous basis.” 1009 While there could be a 
chance that CETA would encourage the use of Chapter 11 by the US and Mexico in situations where it 
otherwise would not have been used, i.e. if CETA were not implemented, these chances appear to be 
relatively limited. 
Specifically, there is evidence that negotiations in CETA in particular could liberalise a number of services 
listed in NAFTA Annex II, Schedule of Canada, and while not fully clear what regulatory implications this 
would have for the US and Mexico they appear to be limited. CETA may liberalise sectors also listed in 
some form in NAFTA Annex II, Schedule of Canada, such as certain air transportation services, water 
transportation services, government finance, and telecom services. For example, within Annex II of 
NAFTA, CPC 752 Telecom Services, CPC 7549 – “Other Telecommunications Services Not Elsewhere 
Classified (limited to telecommunications transport networks and services)” is listed as having 
reservations in terms of national treatment, MFN, and senior management and boards of directors. 
Notably, NAFTA Annex IV, Schedule of Canada also sets reservations for “telecommunications transport 
networks and telecommunications transport services.”1010 In addition, the aforementioned liberalisation 
does not seem to constitute “autonomous” liberalisation, since available evidence suggests it would 
result at least partly as a result of CETA negotiations. This suggests that if CETA were to liberalise CPC 
7549, such liberalisation would not automatically extend to the US and Mexico under the NAFTA ratchet. 
However, further details of CETA would be required to specifically analyse all types of telecom services 
and government finance and the related reservations in NAFTA Annex II, compared to what is being 
asked for in CETA in order to determine the application of the NAFTA ratchet and/or if the US and 
Mexico would have recourse under investor-state provisions if not extended similar treatment. A similar 
assessment could be performed for air transportation services and water transportation services, 
although these sectors would not seem to extend to the US and Mexico even if liberalised for the EU 
under CETA, given stipulations in Annex IV of NAFTA.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1008 Consultations with trade negotiators from the European Commission, February 2011 
1009 Consultations with DG Trade services trade and investment negotiator in February 2011 
1010 NAFTA Annex IV, Schedule of Canada reads: “Canada takes an exception to Article 1103 for treatment accorded under all 
bilateral or multilateral international agreements in force or signed prior to the date of entry into force of this Agreement. For 
international agreements in force or signed after the date of entry into force of this Agreement, Canada takes an exception to 
Article 1103 for treatment accorded under those agreements involving: (a) aviation; (b) fisheries; (c) maritime matters, including 
salvage; or (d) telecommunications transport networks and telecommunications transport services (this exception does not 
apply to measures covered by Chapter Thirteen (Telecommunications)).” It is notable that the aforementioned reservation (d) 
does not appear to include all telecommunication services that might be liberalised under CETA.  
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INDICATOR: FDI and portfolio flows (from CETA as a whole), FDI and portfolio flows (from Investment 
Chapter in CETA alone, trade flows (from Investment Chapter in CETA alone), FDI and portfolio flows 
(from ISDS alone), trade flows (from ISDS alone) 
Canada 
The following section will analyse the potential economic impacts of (1) CETA as a whole on investment, 
(2) an Investment Chapter in CETA, and (3) the role of ISDS, within the Investment Chapter, as a 
contributor to the aforementioned impacts. The analysis will draw heavily upon trends in investment 
and trade patterns resulting from BITs/FIPAs and hybrid trade and investment agreements like NAFTA.  
FDI flows caused by relevant trade agreements and implications for CETA as a whole 
 
It is generally recognised that investment liberalisation when combined with certain other policies 
encourages investment and growth.1011 For example, there is a general consensus that NAFTA clearly 
increased FDI in Mexico. 1012 These analyses, however, may not be as relevant to CETA, as they typically 
involve developed countries’ interactions with developing countries.  
Generally, to the extent that a trade and investment agreement like CETA removes barriers to FDI it may 
increase FDI flows. Specifically, gravity modelling performed in this study generally supports the 
argument that removal of restrictions may positively impact the level of bilateral investment in such 
areas. See Annex 3 for further details of these results. 
The impacts of NAFTA on US-Canada investments provide a useful indicator of the possible impacts of 
CETA on EU-Canada investment. There is evidence that NAFTA as a whole contributed to some increased 
investment between the two countries in certain sectors, for example in the automotive sector;1013 
however, it is unclear as to how much the specific impact of the Investment Chapter of NAFTA 
contributed to the aforementioned investment flows. Moreover, Hufbauer and Schott (2005) suggest 
that overall (i.e. inclusive of all provisions in the agreements) “the CUSFTA and NAFTA did little to 
enhance the already mature direct investment relationship between Canada and the United States.”1014 
As such, while NAFTA in its entirety has encouraged certain investment between Canada and the US, 
evidence suggests its contribution to overall investment increases between the two countries has not 
been particularly significant.  
The impact of CETA on investment in Canada will likely be larger than the relatively insignificant impacts 
from CUSFTA and NAFTA. The impacts will be more significant than those between Canada and the US 
under NAFTA because the EU is not as integrated with Canada as the US was pre-CUSFTA and pre-NAFTA.  
On the other end of the spectrum, CETA will likely have a less significant impact on investment than 
those predicted for trade agreements between developed and developing countries. This is because 
there is not the same potential for investment growth present in the CETA relationship as there would 
be between Canada, or the EU, and certain developing nations. In a related vein, the impact of CETA will 
be more limited than would be found in an agreement involving developing nations given the advanced 
                                                             
1011 For example, among others see: Kirkpatrick, C., C. George and S. S. Scrieciu (2004). “Implications of Trade and Investment 
Liberalisation for Sustainable Development: Review of Literature.” Impact Assessment Research Centre at Institution of 
Development Policy and Management, University of Manchester. 19 May 2004.  
1012 Among others see Hornbeck, J.F. “NAFTA at Ten: Lessons from Recent Studies.” CRS Report for Congress. 13 February 2004; 
and Dee, P. and J. Gali (2003) “The Trade and Investment Effects of Preferential Trading Arrangements”, NBER working paper 
10160. 
1013 Hufbauer, G.C. and J.J. Schott. (2005), Chapter 6, discusses the growth of the automotive industry (including via investment 
and other means) as a result of NAFTA. 
1014 Ibid, pg 36 
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nature of the institutions and high incomes in the EU and Canada, whereas higher income countries in 
many cases attract less capital flows than those with lower incomes (refer to the gravity modelling in 
Annex 3 for related statistical correlations herein). As such, quantitative estimates in studies of 
agreements between developed and developing countries, for example in the EU-Andean SIA on the EU-
Andean FTA,1015 or among developing countries,1016 do not provide particularly relevant estimates that 
can be extended to the EU-Canada CETA context. 
 
Some studies might be used to gauge the specific impact of CETA on encouraging investment, an 
exercise requested by the Contracting Authority, although the studies producing quantitative results 
should be extending to the CETA context with great caution. For example, IBM (2008), predicts an 
increase of investment resulting from the EU-Korea FTA given that the FTA is a “deep FTA” and that 
cross-border investment between the EU and Korea would increase and third countries will also invest 
in Korea to benefit from improved market access. Based on these basic assumptions, the study then 
assumes a lower bound rise in FDI equivalent to 30% of the EU investment in Korea (slightly below $1 
billion/year) and an upper bound 60% rise in FDI (equivalent to an annual increase of FDI slightly below 
$2 billion), for the purpose of inputting these assumptions into econometrics predicting according rises 
in GDP from the FTA over a eight year period. 1017 It is beyond the scope of this SIA to assess in detail 
how these specific estimates might apply to CETA; however, it is quite clear that the aforementioned 
assumptions are just that, and while perhaps a general metric there is little reason to believe they can 
be used as a reliable proxy for investment increases under CETA.   
By way of another comparison, a variety of studies that reach qualitative conclusions on investment 
encouraged by the trade agreement between the US and Australia should provide useful to generally 
gauging the amount of investment CETA may stimulate. This FTA is likely the best comparison to CETA 
available considering general similarities of the US with the EU, and Australia with Canada. Monash 
(2001) predicts that the FTA would not only encourage US investors to invest in Australia but also may 
additional encourage them to use Australia as a base for operations in the Asia-Pacific region, and 
generally emphasises the ‘head-turning’ impact of generating increased interest in investing in 
Australia.1018  USITC (2004) finds that “The markets in both the United States and Australia are 
substantially open to foreign direct investment under current policies. Therefore, according to several U.S. 
industry representatives, the U.S.-Australia FTA is not expected to have a significant impact on the level 
of U.S. direct investment in Australia, or the level of Australian direct investment in the United States.” 
(emphasis added) 1019 It is notable that Stoler (2009) finds that in fact several years after the FTA was in 
force, US investment in Australia dropped for a number of years, and Australian investment in the US 
surprisingly grew to exceed American investment in Australia, although also notes that a longer period 
of time would need to be considered before tying such trends to the US-Australia FTA.1020  
                                                             
1015 See DEVELOPMENT Solutions et. al. (2009).  
1016 Among other quantitative projections on increased investment resulting from FTAs with developing countries see Jaumotte, 
Florence (2004). “Foreign Direct Investment and Regional Trade Agreements: The Market Size.” IMF Working Paper: WP/04/206. 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp04206.pdf 
1017 IBM Belgium et al. (2008). “Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment of the EU-Korea FTA: Final Report – (Phase 3)” 
http://www.eu-korea-
sia.org/uploads/filedir/Docs/Front%20Page%20T/EU%20Korea%20FTA%20SIA%20Phase%203%20Final%20Report.pdf 
1018 Monash (2001). “An Australia-USA Free Trade Agreement: Issues and Implications.” Report for DFAT, APEC Study Centre, 
Monash University. http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/aus_us_fta_mon/aus_us_fta_mon.pdf 
1019 USITC (2004). US-Australia Free Trade Agreement: Potential Economywide and Selected Sectoral Effects.” USITC Publication 
3697. Pg 104. http://www.usitc.gov/publications/docs/pubs/2104f/pub3697.pdf 
1020 Stoler, Andrew (2009). “Economic Impact of the AUSFTA.” Institute for International Trade. Paper for Fulbright Symposium, 
Canberra, Australia. 
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Given the aforementioned findings, it seems reasonable to assume that CETA, like the US-Australia FTA, 
might encourage investment in Canada and the EU to the extent envisaged by the aforementioned 
studies. In other words, it could encourage investment, but not significantly increase investment. This 
also at least leaves open the possibility that such an increase could be closer to a ‘minor’ rather than 
‘significant’ magnitude. 
While the US-Australia FTA is the best proxy available to evaluate investment under CETA, by way of 
additional analysis, there is reason to believe that investment realised under CETA could be at least 
slightly more significant than that under that agreement. It should be noted that Australia is significantly 
less restricted to FDI from the RoW than Canada in sub-sectors like fishing and telecom, which put some 
upward pressure on Canada’s overall FDI restrictiveness – whereas Australia’s overall OECD FDI 
Restrictiveness index was 0.270 in 2003 vs. Canada’s 0.352, and Australia’s 2010 index was 0.138 vs. 
Canada’s .153 (and the EU24’s was 0.048). As such, CETA may encourage investment in Canada in these 
sub-sectors more so than the US-Australia FTA would encourage investment in such sectors in Australia. 
The effects of reducing investment barriers in creating economic benefits in Canada will likely be 
magnified by other provisions of CETA, particularly if these provisions are ambitious – for example those 
on government procurement, IPR, labour mobility, competition policy, and free circulation of goods (as 
well as those provisions typically found in FTAs in terms of trade facilitation, all provisions liberalising 
restrictions in services, and tariff reductions). These provisions may act along with other provisions of 
CETA to encourage investment flows, particularly in sectors where EU-Canada economic activity occurs 
as a result of global and regional value chains, investment and sales by foreign affiliates, and flows of 
people and technologies.1021 For these reasons, it is the opinion of the study that CETA might encourage 
‘notable’ investment, and this might be somewhat greater than the investment realised under the US-
Australia FTA. 
In summary, it is the opinion of the study that CETA might encourage ‘notable’ investment, but it is less 
likely that it will be ‘significant.’ The metrics herein are defined in the methodology of this SIA, and are 
supported by relevant economic literature. 
 
Impact of BITs on investment flows and trade, and implications for an Investment Chapter in CETA 
Certain studies suggest BITs themselves are not significant determinants of investment flows, and 
emphasise other factors are more significant determinants of investment flows. For example, Hallward-
Driemeier (2003) and Rose-Ackermann (2005) use empirical analysis to find BITs are not significant 
determinants of investment flows.1022 UNCTAD (2003) finds that “BITS play a minor role in influencing 
global FDI flows” and in another part of the report says “the policy framework [of BITs] is at best 
enabling, having by itself little or no effect on FDI flows.”1023 However, it should be highlighted that the 
same study does suggest that provisions in BITs do provide an “enabling” function for IIAs to ensure 
investors certain security in their investments after they decide to invest in a country.1024 Specifically, 
factors that encourage FDI may include reduction of numerous NTBs restricting investment, and pull 
                                                             
1021 Goldfarb, D and L. Theriault (2010). “Canada’s ‘Missing’ Trade With the European Union.” The Conference Board of Canada 
1022 Hallward-Driemeier, M. (2003). “Do Bilateral Investment Treaties attract FDI?” http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2003/09/23/000094946_03091104060047/Rendered/PDF/
multi0page.pdf; Rose-Ackermann (2005). “Foreign Direct Investment and the Business Environment in Developing Countries: 
the Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties.” Yale University. 
1023 See UNCTAD (2003). World Investment Report 2003, pgs 89 and 91 respectively 
1024 For example, see UNCTAD (2003). World Investment Report 2003. For a comparison of the conflicting economic theories on 
foreign investment see Sornarajah, M. (2004) “The International Law on Foreign Investment.” 2nd edition, Cambridge. 
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factors such as market size, infrastructure, human capital, and certain tax rules/incentives,1025 among 
other elements.  
In contrast, other studies find a positive correlation between the number of BITs signed and the foreign 
investment received by a country. Importantly, these findings  do not suggest that signing a BIT in itself 
increases investment, although do somewhat support the economic utility in signing BITs.1026 Still, even 
while establishing correlation of investment flows with the number of BITs signed, a number of other 
explanatory variables outside the BITs themselves would appear to be at work contributing to such 
increases in investment. 
 
Other studies critique Hallward-Driemeier (2003) directly, noting that the study does not fully consider 
the international integration that BITs in fact do foster. They suggest a country may benefit from a BIT if 
the treaty allows them to enhance international connections, like those related to expansion of trade or 
to increase value added in products. Swenson (2008)1027 follows this line of thought, and focuses on 
BIT’s effect on trade rather than just investment, analysing trade flows from 1975 to 2000. The study’s 
results suggest that investment treaties improve capital goods and differentiated goods, particularly for 
multinational companies. One reason used to explain why past studies did not find BITs to be 
statistically significant facilitators of commerce is that expanded activity via foreign presence of 
multinational firms does not necessarily imply that the host country will see high value foreign 
investments given the firms’ main investments may take an intangible form rather than one in fixed 
assets. The study also suggests, although not supported with specific evidence, that this may increase 
multinational technology transfer and finds “if BITs encourage high value trade, their presence may 
bring the benefits such as enhanced rates of country growth that are hoped for by signatory 
countries.”1028 
 
Although the literature is mixed on the precise economic benefits of BITs as trade and investment 
enhancing agents, what is clear in the studies that find BITs/the signing of more BITs to be trade and/or 
investment enhancing is that the level of any benefit is much less when involving a high income country 
with strong institutions. Specifically, the effects of BITs are far more significant when involving low 
income countries than when involving high income countries. Swenson (2008) makes this point. 
Blonigen and Wang (2005),1029 Subramanian and Wei (2007),1030 and Wheeler and Mody (1992),1031 while 
                                                             
1025 However, it should be noted that Blonigen and Davis (2000) suggest that tax treaties specifically can discourage FDI as they 
can be used to reduce tax evasion and not only make it easier to avoid double taxation. Source: Blonigen, B. and R. Davis. 2000. 
"The Effects of Bilateral Tax Treaties on U.S. FDI Activity." NBER Working Paper 7929. Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic 
Research.  
1026 Egger, P. and M. Pfaffermayr. (2004) “The impact of bilateral investment treaties on foreign direct investment” Journal of 
Comparative Economics, 32(4):788-804. Egger, Peter and Valeria Merlo. (2007) “BITs and FDI Dynamics.” World Economy; 
Salacuse, J. and N. Sullivan. (2004) “Do BITs Really Work? An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand 
Bargain,” Harvard International Law Journal: 46(1); Neumayer, E. and L. Spess (2005). “Do Bilateral Investment Treaties 
Increase Foreign Direct Investment?” World Development, 33(10): 1567-1585. Note: Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004) look at OECD 
investment, while Salacuse and Sullivan (2004) and Neumayer and Spess (2004) use larger sets of countries. 
1027 Swenson, D. (2008). “Bilateral Investment Treaties and International Integration.” University of California Department of 
Economics. Working Paper. 
1028 Ibid at Pg 14  
1029 Blonigen, B. A. and M. Wang. (2005) “The Inappropriate Pooling of Wealthy and Poor Countries in Empirical FDI Studies”, in 
T. Moran, E. Graham and M. Blomstrom (eds.) “Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote Development? Washington D.C.: 
Institute for International Economics, 221-243.  
1030 Subramanian, A. and SJ Wei. (2007) “The WTO Promotes Trade, Strongly but Unevenly,” Journal of International Economics, 
72(1):151-175. 
1031 Wheeler, D. and A. Mody. (1992) “International Investment Location Decisions: The Case of US Firms.” Journal of 
International Economics, 33:57-76. 
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not all analysing BITs specifically, emphasise that the magnitude of trade and investment differs notably 
when measuring the effects of international trade and investment agreements by grouping countries 
with different levels of development. Nunn (2007)1032 and Levchenko (2006)1033 find that investment 
protections are associated with an increase in the quality of trade, and that these impacts are most 
prominent in countries with weaker institutions and infrastructure needed to facilitate trade. As 
mentioned, the gravity modelling in Annex 3 of this study further lends support to the concept that 
capital generally moves from higher income countries to lower income countries. 
 
The above findings in their entirety do not provide a strong consensus that signing a BIT by itself will 
either prevent capital flight or enhance/increase investment, although there are certainly elements of 
evidence that indicate that under certain circumstances they could increase trade and commerce more 
generally. Specifically, BITs do appear to have economic benefits in that they provide benefits to 
multinational companies; foster forms of intangible business relationships, which may have economic 
benefits; stimulate the flows of trade in terms of capital and differentiated goods in countries with lower 
incomes; and in the sense that the signing of more BITs is positively associated with FDI flows (although 
a number of other explanatory variables outside the BITs themselves would appear to be at work 
contributing to such increases in investment). It is noteworthy herein that the studies that most strongly 
tout the benefits of signing a single BIT suggest the effects will be felt more in areas that are not 
measured in conventional investment statistics. Given these findings, an Investment Chapter in CETA by 
itself will appear to have a positive impact in terms of encouraging trade, and less evidence suggests it 
might encourage investment as commonly measured. 
 
This said, there is good reason to believe that the economic benefits created by an Investment Chapter 
in CETA would be less than significant, i.e. on a level of minor to notable but less than significant. This 
conclusion is reasonable given the mixed evidence as to the magnitude of economic benefits from BITs, 
none of which suggest that they lead to significant increases in trade, intangible linkages, or investment 
specifically, and many of which specifically suggest they in fact do not lead to significant increases in 
investment. The conclusion is also based on the fact that the trade, commerce and investment 
institutions in the EU and Canada are among the best in the world and citizens of Canada and EU MS 
enjoy some of the highest per capita incomes in the world – which, according to the literature, would 
mean they would see relatively less benefits from an agreement like CETA than if the agreement were to 
involve a developing nation(s) with lower per capita incomes. This likely also explains why all of the 6 
FIPAs Canada has signed with EU countries are with relatively less developed countries as opposed to 
with its most important investment partner in Europe – the UK.1034   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1032 Nunn, Nathan. (2007) ”'Relationship-Specificity, Incomplete Contracts and the Pattern of Trade.'' Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 122, No. 2. 
1033 Levchenko, A. (2006) “Institutional Quality and International Trade.” Review of Economic Studies. 
1034 It would be useful to analyse what additional areas of liberalisation might be afforded by CETA investment provisions vs. 
existing EU BITs and Canada FIPAs. For example, compared to the bilateral Canada-Poland FIPA/BIT, or through the Canadian 
and EU accession to the OECD Code on for Liberalisation of Capital Markets.  This comparison would also be helpful in 
determining the specific impact of ISDS under CETA. Unfortunately, given the lack of details of CETA among other limitations, it 
is beyond the scope of this SIA to perform such an exercise. 
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Box 35: FDI vs. portfolio flows 
 
FDI vs. portfolio flows 
Further research and analysis is needed to distinguish the specific impacts of an Investment Chapter in 
CETA on FDI vs. portfolio flows. There are distinctions in decision-making behind portfolio investments 
compared to FDI. Generally, the aforementioned impacts regarding investment flows specifically apply 
to FDI given its relative importance in the economic studies reviewed. Still, extending the economic logic 
exhibited in the gravity modelling in this report, portfolio flows will likely be encouraged through CETA 
to the degree that barriers currently inhibiting flows are removed, although the significance of this is 
uncertain. This would facilitate capital flows to firms that rely on portfolio investment, for example the 
finance industry. As with FDI, however, the impact of CETA in this regard would be lessened given the 
advanced nature of the institutions currently in Canada.  
 
 
Impact of BITs on FDI flows and trade, and implications for ISDS provisions in particular 
 
The role of ISDS in particular as a contributor to the aforementioned economic benefits of an 
Investment Chapter in CETA is unclear, as there does not appear to be readily available empirical 
evidence on the matter. Care should be taken not to confuse causality between the increased 
investment that CETA could foster by reducing barriers to investment in Canada via an Investment 
Chapter as a whole and the impacts of investor-state provisions in CETA in particular.  
 
In the absence of such results, one could make three different assumptions as to the role of ISDS in 
contributing to these benefits. These assumptions would be that ISDS is an enabler in the economic 
benefits that are created by BITs, as it is clearly a core pillar of enforcement in such agreements; ISDS 
does not contribute to these overall benefits; or that the allowance of ISDS in BITs actually reduces the 
level of economic benefits otherwise created by BITs.  
The first of these assumptions is the most intuitive and provides some support for the idea that ISDS 
allowances in CETA would contribute to the overall economic benefits attributed to an Investment 
Chapter in CETA. Given the findings of Swenson (2008) that BITs provide economic benefits to 
multinational companies, it appears reasonable to suggest that many multinational companies at least 
are aware of the security provided by ISDS. However, given the lack of available surveys suggesting 
otherwise, it seems reasonable to suggest that most SMEs would not consider ISDS as providing 
“security” to their investments as the economic benefits of ISDS appear to be most significantly realised 
by MNCs and given the general trend among SMEs in lacking resources for large scale legal action like 
the type typically involved in ISDS cases. Still, there are examples of individual investors or families of 
investors bringing Chapter 11 cases against Canada, for example. Also, as discussed in the “Impact on 
institutional and regulatory environment for investment” indicator hereto, ISDS most certainly serves a 
role in the functioning, and thus as some kind of contributor to the economic benefits realised from BITs, 
which are tantamount to an Investment Chapter in CETA. To be sure, without an enforcement 
mechanism there is no reason to believe that an Investment Chapter in CETA would stimulate the same 
positive economic impacts as predicted earlier in this analysis. 
However, even the aforementioned assumption does not convincingly support the conclusion that ISDS 
as currently structured maximises sustainable economic benefits. First, and again, the assumption 
cannot be made with full confidence and would need to be subject to empirical testing. Second, an 
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important distinction should be drawn between ISDS as a general enforcement mechanism, just as 
state-state dispute settlement is an enforcement mechanism, vs. investor-state provisions in particular.  
The question then becomes what is the ideal structure for an investment enforcement mechanism in 
maximising what is referred to hereafter as ‘sustainable economic benefits.’ As discussed under the 
“Impact on institutional and regulatory environment for investment” indicator, opponents of ISDS have 
not only expressed criticism over the existence of investor-state provisions but many appear more 
critical of the compounded effect such provisions have when implemented by existing tribunals in terms 
of lack of transparency, fairness and other issues. This suggests that the ISDS mechanisms as currently 
functioning are not ideal in the sense that they deserve to be improved in order to more clearly create 
sustainable economic benefits. In analysing the economic benefits of ISDS one would have to consider 
how much of a magnifying effect investor-state provisions will have in contributing to the economic 
benefits from an Investment Chapter. Further, even if ISDS is an enabler within the Investment Chapter 
of CETA in creating economic benefits, what additional benefits might be realised if ISDS provisions in 
CETA operated in a different, arguably improved/less partial, manner than ISDS at present? And how 
would this compare to the state-state dispute settlement mechanism, as mentioned in the “Impact on 
institutional and regulatory environment for investment” indicator? Moreover, do the monetary 
benefits from ISDS outweigh the potential negative economic costs as mentioned under the “Economic 
costs and benefits of ISDS” indicator below? 
Note: Even if it was found that ISDS as currently structured in CETA is ideal and would contribute to 
maximise the economic benefits realised from an Investment Chapter and CETA as a whole, several 
questions must be answered before concluding that ISDS provisions in CETA will produce net 
sustainability benefits.1035 
Conclusion 
The impact of CETA as a whole on investment in Canada will likely be positive, may be ‘notable,’ but is 
expected to be less than ‘significant.’ More specifically, CETA will likely positively impact investment in 
certain sectors in particular. Investment liberalisation in CETA is likely to reinforce existing trends in 
bilateral investment, with the majority of flows expected to be directed towards the financial, energy 
and mining sectors. If on the table, removal of restrictions in such sectors as telecom; transportation 
services, including water and transportation services; fisheries; finance; and mining/uranium sub-sectors 
may positively impact the level of bilateral investment in such areas. While consultations with the 
Contracting Authority suggest that CETA negotiations would not actively seek liberalisation of the media 
content sector in Canada, and thus it was not looked at in-depth in this SIA,1036 it should importantly be 
noted that stakeholders, for example the Canadian Media Production Association (CMPA), have 
expressed concern that liberalisation of telecoms could in-turn lead to pushes to liberalise certain 
cultural industries.1037 For more specific information on CETA’s impact on investment in certain sectors 
refer to the sectoral assessment sections of this SIA. 
                                                             
1035 In particular, it would need to be carefully considered if the monetary benefits discussed therein would outweigh the 
potential negative economic, social and environmental impacts mentioned in both the “Economic costs and benefits of ISDS” 
and economic, social, and environmental “policy space” indicators hereto. It is unclear if ISDS as currently structured in CETA 
would create any such net benefits, and there is reason to be concerned that it would result in net losses. 
1036 Consultations with the Contracting Authority at the Project Steering Committee Meeting in September 2010. As a note, if 
CETA were to liberalise the media sector in Canada, which has the highest level of restrictiveness of any sector in Canada, this 
would encourage investment in this sector.  
1037 Feedback from the CMPA, finds that “The CMPA is therefore of the view that any move to significantly liberalize the FDI 
rules in telecommunications, as contemplated by the CETA, would inevitably lead to comparable liberalization of FDI rules for 
broadcasting and broadcasting distribution – irrespective of the fact that the EU professes that it is currently not seeking 
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The Investment Chapter in CETA in particular could encourage economic benefits in Canada although 
the significance of these will likely be minor to notable at most. An Investment Chapter in CETA could 
provide benefits to multinational companies and foster forms of intangible business relationships, which 
may have economic benefits; and stimulate the flows of capital and differentiated goods. Evidence is 
much weaker that it will specifically increase FDI flows. It is unclear if an ISDS mechanism as currently 
structured within an Investment Chapter would in itself create net economic benefits, although there is 
doubt that the mechanism as operating is maximising sustainable economic benefits, let alone 
maximising such benefits in a way state-state dispute settlement in CETA could not. 
 
EU 
Investment in the EU under CETA would likely follow the positive trend predicted for Canada, but on a 
smaller scale. This is due to the relatively larger size of the EU economy compared to Canada, which 
makes a percentage increase in Canadian investment in the EU less significant in the EU than the impact 
in Canada of same increase in EU investment in Canada. Also, given Canada is currently more restricted 
to FDI than the EU at large (see “Quality of institutional and regulatory environment” indicator above), 
reduction of investment barriers in CETA will likely encourage new investment in Canada more so than 
in the EU. CETA is likely to reinforce existing trends in Canada-EU bilateral investment. This assessment 
is generally supported by the FDI gravity modelling performed for this report (see Annex 3). 
With regards to ISDS in CETA in particular, given limitations in research and analysis on the subject, it is 
not possible to decompose the economic impacts such provisions may have on the EU. On one hand, as 
mentioned in the Canada section, it seems intuitive that ISDS allowances in CETA would contribute to 
the overall economic benefits attributed to an Investment Chapter in CETA and CETA overall. However, 
again, this assumption cannot be made with full confidence and would need to be subject to empirical 
testing. 
Several questions must be answered before concluding that ISDS as currently structured in CETA will 
produce net sustainability benefits. In the absence of such research and analysis it is unclear if an ISDS 
mechanism as currently structured within an Investment Chapter would in itself create net economic 
benefits. And even if it can be generally ascertained that ISDS provisions in CETA would contribute to the 
overall economic benefits realised from an Investment Chapter in CETA and CETA as a whole, it is 
doubtful whether the mechanism is operating in maximising sustainable economic benefits. 
 
US and Mexico 
CETA would have a minor or perhaps lesser impact on investment into the US and Mexico, and may 
encourage investment from these countries in Canada. Chapter 11 of NAFTA automatically extends MFN 
and national treatment status to the US and Mexico in “like” circumstances that may occur under CETA, 
and thus the US and Mexico in certain cases would be granted the same opportunities to invest in 
Canada that the EU would enjoy under CETA. However, the legalities herein are nuanced, and thus there 
may not be many benefits from CETA realised under this mechanism as a result (see the “Quality of 
institutional and regulatory environment for FDI” indicator for more information herein). Of course the 
US and Mexico would not be granted the same opportunities Canada would gain to invest in the EU, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
liberalization of FDI rules as they apply to Canada’s cultural industries.” (submission to study team by Norm Bolen, CMPA, 11 
April 2011) 
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although it should be considered that Mexico recently signed an FTA with the EU, which would likely 
make this mostly a non-issue for Mexico.  
To the degree that EU or Canadian investment is diverted from the US and/or Mexico as a result of CETA, 
this would clearly negatively impact investment flows to these countries. In the US in particular, some 
have warned that the combined effect of the EU signing trade agreements with Canada and Korea could 
undermine US trade policy, investment inclusive, which has failed thus far to move forward with certain 
trade agreements, like the one with Korea.1038 The degree of this diversion is uncertain.  
 
INDICATOR: GDP 
It is a well documented phenomenon that investment liberalisation when combined with trade and 
certain other policies encourages GDP growth.1039 CGE modelling results from studies conducted on 
trade agreements between developed countries such as the US and Australia, EU and Korea, and Japan 
and Australia,1040 and between developed and developing countries like the EU-ASEAN FTA1041 suggest a 
strong growth in GDP from increases in trade and FDI, particularly in the long-run. Long-run capital 
mobility is partially responsible for this suggested growth. This body of quantitative evidence also 
suggests that the overall positive effects in the various sectors tend to accrue more towards services 
given the predominance of FDI flows to that sector.  
Some studies might be used to gauge the specific impact of CETA on encouraging investment and 
related impacts on GDP, an exercise requested by the Contracting Authority, although the studies 
producing quantitative results should be extending to the CETA context with great caution. As 
mentioned in the “FDI and portfolio flows…” indicator, IBM (2008), assumes a lower bound rise in FDI 
equivalent to 30% of the EU investment in Korea (slightly below $1 billion/year) and an upper bound 
60% rise in FDI (equivalent to an annual increase of FDI slightly below $2 billion) for the purpose of 
inputting these assumptions into econometrics predicting according rises in GDP from the FTA over an 
eight year period. The study then finds a “rather significant macroeconomic impact” on Korea, with an 
average annual real GDP growth rate over the eight year period tested (2008-2015) that is 0.2% higher 
than in the lower bound scenario without the increased investment and almost 0.4% higher than in the 
upper bound scenario without the increased investment.1042 While it is beyond the scope of this SIA to 
assess in detail how these specific estimates might apply to CETA, it is quite clear that the 
aforementioned assumptions are just that, and while perhaps a general metric there is little reason to 
believe they can be used as a reliable proxy for investment and related GDP increases under CETA.   
More generally, however, given the findings in the “FDI and portfolio flows…” indicator, it is reasonable 
to suggest the impact of CETA as a whole on investment in Canada will likely be positive, could be of a 
notable magnitude, and thus this could contribute to some increases in GDP growth in Canada and the 
EU. Certain increases in efficiencies of investment under CETA could have a multiplier effect in positively 
impacting GDP. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that an important amount of the EU-
                                                             
1038 Cooper, William H. et al. (2011) “The EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement and Its Implications for the United States.” CRS 
Report for Congress. 7-5700. 
1039 For example, among others see: Kirkpatrick, C. et al (2004)  
1040 Centre for International Economics (2005) 
1041 Institute for International Development and Economics (2009). Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment for FTA between EU 
and ASEAN. March 2009.  
1042 IBM Belgium et al. (2008). “Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment of the EU-Korea FTA: Final Report – (Phase 3)” 
http://www.eu-korea-
sia.org/uploads/filedir/Docs/Front%20Page%20T/EU%20Korea%20FTA%20SIA%20Phase%203%20Final%20Report.pdf 
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Canada economic relationship, for example the Canada-UK economic relationship, is based on 
investment and more intangible connections. 
The Investment Chapter in CETA in particular could encourage economic benefits of a minor to notable 
magnitude, yet this chapter by itself would likely result in negligible increases in GDP growth. An 
Investment Chapter in CETA could encourage a number of economic benefits in Canada which are not 
necessarily investment-related effects, although as mentioned in the “FDI and portfolio flows…” 
indicator the significance of these benefits will likely be minor to notable at most. Given the high level of 
development of both economies it is unlikely that this will lead to measurable increases in GDP growth 
in percentage terms. As such, ISDS allowances within an Investment Chapter in CETA would not have a 
measurable positive effect on GDP in either Canada or the EU. 
 
INDICATOR:  Economic costs and benefits of ISDS  
Canada 
Canadian stakeholders have expressed concern that investor-state provisions in CETA would lead to ISDS 
cases with significant costs in terms of damages and legal fees, as well as a significant number of such 
cases. The following analysis assesses these concerns of stakeholders using Canada’s experiences under 
NAFTA as a tool of comparison. Specifically, this section (1) assesses the significance of the monetary 
damages and legal fees borne by NAFTA signatories vs. the objectives of ISDS in terms of monetary 
benefits, and (2) assesses the trends in terms of number of ISDS cases over the last 16 years post-
implementation of NAFTA, and determines if including ISDS in CETA would create similar trends. 
Costs of NAFTA ISDS in terms of damages and legal fees  
While CETA provisions modelled off on NAFTA Chapter 11 would indeed likely cost Canada directly paid-
out damages on successful cases, the significance of these payments deserves further analysis. For 
example, from 1994 to early 2011 there were only 4 cases against Canada under Chapter 11 that 
resulted in monetary settlements.1043 One case filed in 1997 by the Ethyl Corporation, a US chemical 
company suing over a ban on import and inter-provincial trade of the gasoline-additive MMT, resulted in 
$US 13 million in damages. A 1998 case involving S.D. Myers Inc., a US waste disposal company suing 
over a temporary ban of toxic PCB wastes, resulted in payment of $US 5 million (plus interest). And the 
third case, also filed in 1998, involving Pope & Talbot Inc., a US lumber company that challenged 
Canada’s export quota system, resulted in a payment of $CAN 915,000.1044 In August 2010, the Canadian 
government agreed to pay $CAN 130 million to Abitibi Bowater Inc. in an out-of-court settlement over 
measures taken by the local government of Newfoundland and Labrador to return to the timber and 
water usage rights held by the company to the state and expropriate certain assets and lands associated 
with the company’s usage rights. 1045 This single case is particularly significant from a monetary 
standpoint as it constitutes approximately 83% of all investor-state damages (as valued in $CAN) 
awarded during the 16 years in which NAFTA has been in force.1046 
                                                             
1043 Review of cases as listed in Sinclair (Oct. 2010). The Trammel Crow Co. case, filed in 2001, resulted in an out-of-court 
settlement that did not involve payment of damages 
1044 Review of cases as listed in Sinclair (Oct. 2010) 
1045 All figures taken from review of cases as listed in Ibid 
1046 Author’s calculations using figure of $CAD 157 million mentioned in Ibid (which appears to incorporate at least some 
interest rate and exchange rate calculations). 
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The aforementioned four cases are out of a total of 28 cases filed under Chapter 11 against Canada from 
1994-2010, and out of a total of 64 cases formally brought by NAFTA countries against one another 
during that time.  
The importance of the payments under these four cases is debatable. These cases account for a 
miniscule percentage of the $CAD billions in average annual trade flows among Canada and its NAFTA 
partners. As another illustration, on one hand it might be more relevant to compare the damages paid 
under Chapter 11 cases to money that could be spent on environmental protection programs, given 
these four cases deal with environmental issues in some manner; however, this could be a skewed 
comparison given the uncertainty of ISDS as a contributor to economic benefits (see “FDI and portfolio 
flows…” indicator) and given that, depending on a number of factors, a dollar increase in government 
spending may have a higher or in fact lower than 1:1 cost-to-sustainability-benefits ratio. 
As an alternative comparison, Table 67 not only considers average bilateral FDI flows among NAFTA 
countries but also NAFTA’s contribution, in percentage terms, to FDI flow from the US (the source of all 
the winning investor-state cases) to Canada. It shows that NAFTA investor-state provisions have 
produced relatively little economic costs as a percentage of bilateral FDI flows from the US to Canada 
over the last 16 years.  
 
Table 67: $ Costs of US Chapter 11 cases against Canada vs. avg. annual bilateral FDI inflows from US 
(millions of $CAD) 
Total Chapter 11 damages 
paid by Canada since NAFTA 
implemented/yr* 
Avg. annual FDI inflow 
from US to Canada 
Damages as %  of FDI 
inflow from US 
$10.5 (yearly avg.) $12,337 0.0% 
*From $CAD 157 in Sinclair (Oct. 2010), unclear from source if this amount also includes any awards of legal costs (see note 3, 
pg 22 Sinclair (Oct. 2010)). Sources: Damage amounts from Sinclair (October 2010), FDI statistics from Statistics Canada. FDI 
avgs. from 1994-2009 (data for 2010 unavailable) 
 
The legal fees Canada has incurred defending against these specific cases and in defending all other 
cases (i.e. those that are still pending or did not result in the award of damages to the complainant) 
should additionally be considered. It has been suggested that the cost of administering a NAFTA 
arbitration panel usually falls between $500,000 to $1 million or more, and the losing party typically 
pays the costs of the arbitration itself; additionally, governments “routinely incur costs of several million 
dollars or more” when defending themselves in NAFTA cases.1047  One might question these numbers, 
for example, using cost estimates of the Canadian Tembec Inc. vs. the US case, which sources report 
resulted in the costs of the proceedings (which appears to be all of the costs) of only $271,000 to be 
paid to the US government. Still, some sources suggest that the legal defence costs of ISDS could be 
particularly extreme, citing examples where EU MS have had to pay $USD 10-15 million in defending 
themselves under bilateral investment treaties.1048 Other sources suggest that any ISDS costs should be 
contextualised by comparing the costs of domestic legal fees for a case of expropriation vs. legal fees 
incurred in the ISDS tribunal.1049 Tribunals decide how to divide legal costs among parties to disputes. 
Table 68 considers how the costs of defending an investor-state case combined with the damages that 
                                                             
1047 Sinclair (Oct. 2010), pg 24 
1048 Consultations with Gus Van Harten, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, February 2011 
1049 Consultations with DG Trade services trade and investment negotiator in February 2011 
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may be paid out upon losing such a case compare to FDI flows. It also considers the economic benefits of 
ISDS in NAFTA vs. costs in terms of impacts on policy space. 
 
Table68: Cost-to-benefit in Canada of NAFTA ISDS (money figures in millions of $CAD) 
ISDS 
damages 
paid by 
Canada since 
NAFTA 
implemented 
PLUS avg. 
legal costs of 
defending all 
cases/yr* 
Avg. 
annual FDI 
inflow 
from US to 
Canada 
Damages 
PLUS legal 
costs as % 
of avg. 
annual FDI 
inflow from 
US 
Economic benefits for 
Canada from ISDS in 
NAFTA 
Costs to Canada from 
ISDS in CETA in terms of 
impacts on policy 
space*** 
$29/yr avg. $12,337 
 
0.2%  May have/continue to 
contribute to some overall 
trends in NAFTA to: 
Increase in trade, and 
relationships stimulating 
output and VA 
 
= Uncertain. And even if 
contributed to the 
aforementioned benefits, 
overall benefit has been less 
than significant** 
  
Potential costs from  ↓  
policy space as relevant to 
the SIA 
 
= Uncertain. Likely less than 
significant but could be 
minor to notable  
 
* Uses $CAD 157 in Sinclair (Oct. 2010) as amount of damages, unclear from source if this amount also includes any awards of 
legal costs (see note 3, pg 22 Sinclair, S (Oct. 2010)). Uses the extreme upper bound of $CAD 10 million as the cost of every one 
of the 28 investor-state cases brought against Canada since 1994 (this is extreme given the average costs are likely far less and 
given that if the defendant is successful they often are at least partially compensated for their costs). Herein, costs of successful 
cases only would be $CAD 197 million. **Finding from Hufbauer and Schott (2005) *** Economic, social and environmental 
“policy space” as relevant to this SIA and as further analysed under the policy space indicators hereto. FDI avgs. from 1994-2009 
(data for 2010 unavailable). Sources: Damage amounts from Sinclair (Oct. 2010), FDI statistics from Statistics Canada  
 
Drawing from Table 68, even when adding in an extreme upper bound for legal costs, the 
aforementioned conclusion remains the same, i.e. that NAFTA ISDS has produced relatively little costs 
when compared to US-Canada investment flows since the implementation of NAFTA. However, and 
importantly, NAFTA ISDS also has not produced a relatively significant/quantifiable monetary benefit. 
There are also policy space implications of such ISDS, which are discussed further in the “Policy space” 
indicator(s) hereto. 
It is worth noting that there has been some discussion in Canada over who will pay the damages of 
NAFTA Chapter 11, which could have implications for individual provinces’ budgets. The issue here is 
over if or to what extent the federal government of Canada should be responsible for paying the 
damages of Chapter 11 against the actions of local governments. Most recently, after the Abitibi 
Bowater settlement the Canadian Prime Minister is reported as saying “I have indicated that in future, 
should provincial actions cause significant legal obligations for the government of Canada, the 
government of Canada will create a mechanism so that it can reclaim monies lost through international 
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trade processes.”1050 It is unclear how this mechanism might work, although if provinces are made 
responsible for paying damages this would put a new source of pressure on their budgets. 
Number of ISDS cases under NAFTA 
As mentioned, there have been 64 Chapter 11 cases formally filed from 1994- 2010. US investors 
brought 43 cases (27 cases against Canada and 16 against Mexico), Canadian investors brought 18 cases 
(17 against the US and 1 against Mexico), and Mexican investors brought 3 cases (2 against the US and 1 
against Canada). 
There does not appear to be a clear trend in the overall number of Chapter 11 cases brought over the 
last 16 years. Figure 7 below illustrates this point. However, one could cautiously point out a few trends. 
First, there is a trend in recent years towards not bringing cases against Mexico. There does appear to 
be somewhat of an increased trend in bringing cases against Canada (brought by US investors). There 
does not seem to be a particularly identifiable trend in cases brought by Canadian investors.     
 
Figure 7: Number of NAFTA Chapter 11 cases by year (1994 – 2010) 
 
Sources: Cases tallied from Sinclair (Oct. 2010) 
 
Despite these findings, it is worth noting that at the international level the frequency of ISDS cases have 
risen dramatically since 1994. As mentioned previously, UNCTAD suggests that the increase in investor-
state disputes has arisen as increased international investment flows and more IIAs lead to more 
occasions for such disputes and related cases. Also, with increased numbers of investment agreements 
in place, more investor-state disputes are likely to be within the realm of ISDS. Another reason for the 
increase may be the increased complexity of recent IIAs and other regulatory hurdles in their correct 
                                                             
1050 The Globe and Mail, August 27, 2010, page B3 
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implementation. Additionally, as investors hear about successful claims, more investors may be 
encouraged to use the mechanism.1051 
The four successful Chapter 11 cases brought against Canada to date are out of a total of 28 cases filed 
under Chapter 11 against Canada from 1994-2010, although only 13 cases appear to have been 
completed1052 and some sources suggest that only 8 cases in fact have led to a publicly confirmed final 
result in arbitration.1053 These figures suggest that 14% of NAFTA investor-state cases against Canada 
have resulted in awarding of damages to date. Although, when calculating this as a percentage of 
decided cases, depending on the number one uses for decided cases this means either 31% or 50% of 
cases have resulted in awarding of damages. It is worth noting that Canada has defended against the 
highest number of investor-state cases under NAFTA.1054  
As a further note, there does not appear to be a particularly significant trend in terms of the industries 
in which Chapter 11 cases have been brought against Canada, as these 28 cases include a wide array of 
industries: chemicals; recreation (outfitting/hunting); water disposal; water transport; lumber, paper 
and forestry; mining; fishing; oil and gas; courier services; real estate; media; dairy; healthcare; 
construction; pharmaceuticals; and on energy-related taxation policies. 
Conclusions: 
This analysis puts into perspective the direct monetary cost of the damages awarded and trends in 
terms of number of cases brought under Chapter 11 under NAFTA 16 years after implementation. The 
costs are not as significant as some stakeholders suggest but at the same time have not produced a 
significant quantifiable net monetary benefit. There has not been a clear trend in the overall number of 
Chapter 11 cases. This understanding is useful when considering the potential impacts of ISDS in CETA.  
Damages and number of ISDS cases under CETA 
Consultations with EC trade negotiators suggest that the fact that CETA is unlikely to liberalise the 
Canadian market much beyond what is afforded to the US and Mexico under NAFTA should serve to 
reduce the significance of damages and legal fees and the number of cases brought under CETA’s ISDS 
mechanism.1055  
 
Allowing ISDS in CETA will clearly open a new avenue for EU investors to sue Canadians, as the EU is not 
a party to NAFTA (although technically EU firms seemingly have had some chance to utilise ISDS under 
NAFTA given its ‘third country incorporation’ provision). Further, judging both from consultations with 
EC trade negotiators and stakeholders, CETA would at least provide certain types of liberalisation not 
currently afforded to the US and Mexico in NAFTA. These advances may be in the mining (uranium), 
transportation services, fisheries, and finance sub-sectors. As discussed in the “FDI and portfolio flows…” 
indicators, these advancements will likely create some economic benefits, however minor. At the same 
time, however, these advances clearly increase the probability that investor-state cases would be 
initiated against Canada.  
 
                                                             
1051 UNCTAD (2005) 
1052 Review of cases as listed in Sinclair (Oct. 2010) 
1053 Consultations with Gus Van Harten, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, February 2011 
1054 Specifically, 9 more than the US and 11 more than Mexico (or 9 depending on if one considers the “Halcehtte” and “Scott 
Ashton Blair” arbitrations as listed in Sinclair (2010) that according to that same source never commenced). Since no notice of 
arbitration was even provided for these 2 cases they are ignored throughout this analysis. The US had 19 cases filed against it 
and Mexico had 17 cases filed against it from 1994 – Oct. 1, 2010.  Source: Review of cases in Sinclair (Oct. 2010) 
1055 Consultations with DG Trade services trade and investment negotiator in February 2011 
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Herein, the level of litigiousness of EU investors would be one determinant of the frequency and 
monetary costs Canada would incur as a result of including ISDS in CETA. For the sake of analysis, 
assuming the EU is as generally as litigious as the US, and if the same basic liberalisation is afforded to 
the EU as afforded to the US under NAFTA, this would imply that Canada could expect to be on the 
defensive for the same number of cases and pay damages and legal fees roughly around the same as 
incurred under NAFTA to date. Specifically, taking from the upper bound estimates in Box 36, this would 
mean that from 2012 to 2028 (assuming CETA goes into effect in 2012), Canada might expect around 43 
CETA ISDS cases from the EU, the successful of which might cost $197 million in combined damages and 
legal costs. Overall, Canada might expect ISDS in CETA to cost it around $CAD 437 total in the 16 years 
post-implementation of CETA, which averages to $CAD27.3 million per year. Taking from the numbers in 
Box 36 in section on the EU below, Canada might expect an average initial claim to be around $USD 564 
million. Canada might even expect more significant numbers herein given CETA will liberalise some areas 
more so than NAFTA, although at the same time the impacts of this ‘additional’ liberalisation could be 
just as well offset by lesser liberalisation in other areas than that afforded to the US and Mexico under 
NAFA. The aforementioned figures are obviously only rough estimates, meant to provide a general idea 
of the number of cases and level of damages and legal fees Canada might expect under ISDS in CETA and 
can be adjusted in level of magnitude from there given a number of considerations. As mentioned in the 
below section for the EU, the frequency with which intra-EU ISDS cases have been brought and the 
sizeable claims in those cases indicate that it is not unreasonable to compare the level of litigiousness in 
the EU with that in the US. 
 
 
Box 36: Can an investor from any country sue Canada under CETA? 
 
NAFTA allows for companies of any nationality incorporated in a NAFTA country to bring a Chapter 11 
case. For example, this implies that an EU company incorporated in Canada can already bring a case 
against Canada under Chapter 11. This allowance does not appear, at least judging from the names of 
the complainant’s in Chapter 11 cases, to have been used thus far. This could be for any number of 
reasons, most likely of which is that investors are unaware this mechanism exists.  
 
Still, including this allowance in CETA creates a sizeable risk of investor-state litigation against Canada. 
While on one hand the existence of this allowance would seem to imply that the impact of CETA should 
be relatively limited, given investors from EU nations (or other third countries) already incorporated 
Canada, the US or Mexico could technically have already brought cases against such countries under 
NAFTA. Still, it is clear that if CETA were to include a similar mechanism it at very least would be opening 
up a significant channel for litigation. Moreover, if by including the mechanism in CETA this were to 
heighten awareness that the same mechanism existed in NAFTA, litigation could increase under both 
NAFTA and CETA rules. 
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Table 69: $ Potential costs-to-benefits to Canada of including ISDS in CETA ($CAD) 
Potential  
damages 
PLUS legal 
costs* from 
cases 
against  
Canada 
under CETA 
ISDS/yr 
Potential 
number of 
cases 
against 
Canada 
under 
CETA 
ISDS/yr  
Avg. annual 
FDI inflow 
from EU to 
Canada** 
Damages 
PLUS legal 
costs as % 
of avg. 
annual FDI 
inflow 
from EU 
Economic benefits 
for Canada from 
ISDS in CETA++ 
Costs to Canada from 
ISDS in CETA in terms of 
impacts on policy 
space** 
$27.3 
million/yr 
avg.* 
 
2.7/yr avg. 
 
$8,813 
million 
 
0.3% May lead to: Increase 
in trade and  
otherwise foster 
relationships 
stimulating output 
and VA – lack of 
maximisation of 
sustainable economic 
benefits in ISDS as 
structured =  
 
 Uncertain. Likely less 
than significant 
Potential costs from ↓  
policy space = 
 Uncertain. Likely less than 
significant but could be 
minor to notable  
 
*Uses the extreme upper bound of $CAD 10 million as the cost of defending every one of the 28 Chapter 11 investor-state cases 
brought against Canada since 1994 (this is extreme given the average costs are likely far less and given that if the defendant is 
successful they often are at least partially compensated for their costs). FDI avgs. from 1994-2009 (data for 2010 unavailable). 
++ Based on analysis in the “FDI and portfolio flows…” indicator hereto. **Policy space as defined and discussed in the “Policy 
space” indicator hereto. Sources: NAFTA damage amounts from Sinclair (Oct. 2010), Statistics Canada, and sources cited in 
aforementioned indicators 
 
In conclusion, as shown in Table 69 above, while including ISDS in CETA indeed may create some 
economic benefits it is uncertain that they would be maximised in a sustainable way. (Moreover, it is 
unclear that ISDS would create a net/overall sustainability benefit for Canada.) A careful judgement is 
required in determining if the threat in terms of number and monetary costs of including ISDS in CETA 
would outweigh the economic benefits. On one hand, there is a risk for Canada in including ISDS in CETA. 
On the other hand, when put into a proper context, the monetary costs of defending against ISDS cases 
brought by the EU through CETA will not be as significant as certain stakeholders suggest nor will they 
have a significant impact on investment flows. This latter point is reinforced by consultations with Gary 
Hufbauer of the Institute of International Economics in Washington D.C. who suggests that “Given the 
maturity of both Canada and the EU in investment matters, I would subscribe to the view that the 
investment provisions [in CETA] are more like an insurance policy against rare but damaging events. And 
because the adverse events are rare, the impact on investment flows will be quite small.”1056 A more 
detailed understanding of the dynamics herein can be ascertained by reading through the “Policy space” 
and “FDI and portfolio flows…” indicators.  
 
 
EU 
                                                             
1056 Consultations with Gary Hufbauer, Institute for International Economics, February 2011 
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As mentioned in the “Impact on institutional and regulatory environment…” indicator section, it is 
unclear if the experiences of developing countries are a useful proxy for assessing the implications on 
the EU of ISDS under CETA. The EU only contains five “emerging and developing countries” as defined by 
the IMF (Romania, Latvia, Bulgaria, Poland and Lithuania). Canada has already signed FIPAs with three of 
these countries (Latvia, Poland, and Romania) (and the remainder of its EU MS FIPAs are with some of 
the less wealthy countries in the EU, i.e. the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) and thus ISDS in 
CETA is not a particularly new instrument in dealing with these specific countries. Moreover, the vast 
majority of EU states are developed, some with some of the highest levels of economic development in 
the world. As such, a consideration of ISDS experiences in or otherwise involving developing countries is 
foregone in this analysis. 
There are some incentives in CETA ISDS that could lead to cases being brought against the EU, and thus 
result in damages paid by the EU. Given Canada to date has not signed a comprehensive agreement like 
NAFTA with provisions allowing all Canadian investors to sue EU governments, although it does have 
FIPAs with 6 EU countries, CETA will allow Canadian and certain other investors a wider mandate to sue 
the EU over the policies of its MS.  
The significance of ISDS under current EU BITs in terms of cost and number of investor-state cases 
should be contextualised by a number of factors. First, it must be considered that the EU has 1,200 BITs 
already in place, so investor-state provisions are not new to MS. At the same time, there remain 
concerns from different groups over the regulatory structure of BITs as they have been instituted in the 
EU, suggesting that in fact this experience has not been entirely positive. Under Article 207(1) of the 
TFEU, FDI now falls within the scope of EU commercial policy. The EU now has the exclusive competence 
to abolish barriers to foreign direct investment, whereas previously Member State BITs protected EU 
investors (market access was already an EU competence). Recently, the EC has discouraged individual 
MS from signing BITs in favour of an EU-wide approach to signing investment agreements. 
Other information regarding current EU BITs in terms of cost and number of investor-state cases 
deserves consideration. There have been numerous relevant cases of intra-EU ISDS disputes, some of 
which have led to sizeable damages paid by governments. For example, the Vattenfall vs. Germany case, 
named after the Swedish state-owned power company, was settled with the German government in 
2010. Although the awards in this case seem to be kept secret, given the sizeable sum of the original 
claim of €1.4 billion plus interest, it could be possible that a substantial sum was paid in this case. It 
should be noted that this case refers to intra-EU ISDS rather than ISDS with non-EU countries.  
Importantly, ISDS in CETA would bind the EU in its entirety in a way it has never before committed in any 
ISDS mechanism. These obligations would put an increased burden on the EC, particularly when 
becoming responsible for defending against investor-state cases brought against any number of the 
governments within MS in the EU.  
Who is more litigious in Chapter 11 disputes, the US or Canada? 
Some stakeholders have pointed to the commonly circulated notion that US is the most litigious country 
on earth to infer that the number of cases and size of the claims brought under ISDS in CETA would 
inevitably be less than those brought under NAFTA, as the US would not be a signatory to CETA. While it 
may be the case that the US is particularly litigious at large, this assertion and its extension to CETA 
deserves further analysis.   
Number of Chapter 11 cases (1994-2010): 
The below Figure 8, which measures the total number of NAFTA Chapter 11 cases by country of origin 
since implementation of NAFTA, supports the aforementioned assertion. 67% of Chapter 11 cases have 
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been brought by US investors, while only 28% of cases have been brought by Canadian investors and 5% 
by Mexican investors. 
 
Figure 8: Chapter 11 cases by country of origin (1994 – 2010) 
 
Source: Cases tallied from Sinclair (Oct. 2010) 
 
However, when considered on a per capita basis, Canada in fact is more litigous in Chapter 11 cases than 
the US. Per capita, a Canadian investor is 3.9 times more likely to bring a Chapter 11 case than a US 
investor. And a Canadian investor is 20.1 times more likely to bring a Chapter 11 case than a Mexican 
investor.1057    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Chapter 11 cases per capita by complaintant’s country of origin (1994-2010) 
                                                             
1057 For simplicity, this assumes roughly the same number of investors per capita in the US, Canada and Mexico. 
EU-Canada SIA Interim Report 
 
369 
 
Sources: Cases tallied from Sinclair (Oct. 2010), population statistics from CIA Factbook 2011 
 
Average claims in Chapter 11 cases (1994-2010): 
In addition to having a higher propensity to bring Chapter 11 cases, Canadian investors are also more 
likely to bring higher value claims than US investors, although not higher than Mexican investors. 
Canadian Chapter 11 claims are on average 2.5 times higher than US claims. And in fact Mexico has the 
highest average claims record out of any NAFTA country; however, this result is heavily skewed given 
the 2009 CANCAR case brought by Mexican investors requests “$2 billion annually” (considered for this 
exercise simply as $2 billion), given information is only available for this and one other Mexican claim 
brought to date (Signa SA), and given Mexico has only brought three Chapter 11 cases since 1994. 
 
Table 70: Average claim (millions $USD) in Chapter 11 cases by complainant’s country of origin  
(1994-2010) 
Complainant’s 
country of origin 
Avg. Chapter 11 
claim  
Mexico $1025* 
Canada $979 
US $387 
Notes: Does not include damages awarded to complainants for legal fees. Claims listed in $CAD in Sinclair (Oct. 2010) 
considered 1:1 with $USD. *2009 CANCAR case brought by Mexican investors requests “2billion annually,” although for the 
purposes of this exercise only $2billion used. Grand River Enterprises Six Nations Ltd (2003) claim of “between $310 and $664 
million” thus avg. cost of $487 used. No amounts available for 2009 Cemex case brought by Mexican investors. US claims 
exclude Peter Pesic case and Georgia Basin Holdings (as well as Scott Ashton Blair and Halchette, which apparently involve US 
investors vs. Mexico), as no data is available on these cases. Source: data compiled from Sinclair (Oct. 2010) 
 
By a different comparison, Canadians do not bring claims that are as high on average; however, they still 
remain higher than those brought by the US. Specifically, among Chapter 11 cases brought either by 
Canadian investors vs. the US or US investors vs. Canada, the claims of Canadian investors are on 
average 1.8 times higher than those brought by US investors. 
 
Table 71: Average claim (millions $USD) in Chapter 11 cases brought either by Canadian investors vs. 
US or US investors vs. Canada (1994-2010) 
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Complainant’s 
country of origin 
Avg. Chapter 11 
claim 
Canada $1030 
US $564 
Notes: Does not include damages awarded to complainants for legal fees. Claims listed in $CAD in Sinclair (Oct. 2010) 
considered 1:1 with $USD. Grand River Enterprises Six Nations Ltd (2003) claim of “between $310 and $664 million” thus avg. 
cost of $487 used. US claims exclude Peter Pesic case and Georgia Basin Holdings, as no data available on these cases. Source: 
data compiled from Sinclair (Oct. 2010) 
 
In conclusion, the assertion that the impacts of ISDS in CETA would inevitably be less serious than under 
NAFTA because the US would not be a signatory to CETA is seriously misleading. In fact, when analysing 
the data, a Canadian investor is 3.9 times more likely to bring a Chapter 11 case than a US investor and 
on average brings Chapter 11 claims that are 2.5 times higher than US claims. However, it should also be 
noted that it does not appear that Canada (or Mexico) has won a Chapter 11 case that has resulted in 
the defendant paying damages, although in some cases they have split the costs of the case with the 
defendant. Nonetheless, these finding have obvious implications for CETA, specifically that the EU 
should be more wary about Canada bringing more investor-state cases than perhaps otherwise assumed. 
There are other issues of concern with ISDS under NAFTA, which could also apply in CETA, that appear to 
be overlooked. As mentioned, NAFTA allows for companies of any nationality incorporated in a NAFTA 
country to bring a Chapter 11 case, and if CETA were to include this same allowance it would create a 
sizeable risk of litigation against EU. For example, a US company incorporated in the EU could in theory 
bring an investor-state case against the EU under CETA ISDS. Given the fact that the US is perceived as 
one of the most litigious country in the world, this possibility brings sizeable risk. Moreover, if by 
including the mechanism in CETA this were to heighten awareness that the same mechanism existed in 
NAFTA, litigation could increase under NAFTA and CETA rules. 
Given these findings, as with Canada, a careful balancing act is required in determining if the threat in 
terms of number and monetary costs of including ISDS in CETA would outweigh the economic benefits. 
The table below provides a cost-to-benefit comparison of including ISDS in CETA.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 72: $ Potential costs-to-benefits to the EU of including ISDS in CETA (millions of $CAD) 
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Potential  
damages 
PLUS legal 
costs* from 
cases 
against  the 
EU under 
CETA 
ISDS/yr 
Potential 
number of 
cases 
against EU  
under 
CETA 
ISDS/yr 
Avg. annual 
FDI inflow 
from 
Canada to 
EU** 
Damages 
PLUS legal 
costs as % 
of avg. 
annual FDI 
inflow 
from 
Canada  
Economic benefits 
for the EU from 
ISDS in CETA++ 
Costs to the EU from 
ISDS in CETA in terms of 
impacts on policy 
space** 
$10.6/yr 
avg.* 
 
1.1/yr avg. 
 
$8,189 
 
0.1% Increase in trade and  
otherwise foster 
relationships 
stimulating output 
and VA – lack of 
maximisation of 
sustainable economic 
benefits in ISDS as 
structured =  
 
 Uncertain. Likely less 
than significant 
  
Potential costs from ↓  
policy space = 
 Uncertain. Likely less than 
significant but could be 
minor to notable  
 
*Uses the extreme upper bound of $CAD 10 million as the cost of defending every one of the 17 Chapter 11 investor-state cases 
brought by Canada since 1994 (this is extreme given the average costs are likely far less and given that if the defendant is 
successful they often are at least partially compensated for their costs) . FDI avgs. from 1994-2009 (data for 2010 unavailable). 
++ Based analysis in the “FDI and portfolio flows…” indicator hereto. **Policy space as defined and discussed in the “policy 
space” indicators hereto. Sources: NAFTA damages from Scott Sinclair (Oct. 2010), Statistics Canada, and sources cited in 
aforementioned indicators 
 
In conclusion, as shown in Table 72 above, while including ISDS in CETA indeed may create some 
economic benefits it is uncertain that they would be maximised in a sustainable way. (Moreover, it is 
unclear that ISDS would create a net/overall sustainability benefit for the EU.) On one hand, there is a 
risk for Canada in including ISDS in CETA. On the other hand, when put into a proper context, the 
monetary costs of defending against ISDS cases brought by the EU through CETA will not be as 
significant as certain stakeholders suggest nor will they have a significant impact on investment flows. A 
more detailed understanding of the dynamics herein can be ascertained by reading through the “Policy 
space” and “FDI and portfolio flows…” indicators. 
 
US and Mexico 
Investor-state provisions in CETA are unlikely to have a significant impact on costs borne by, or the 
number of cases against, either the US or Mexican government. While CETA could theoretically increase 
the damages awarded by the Canadian government to US and Mexican companies under NAFTA 
investor-state provisions given the usage of the ratchet mechanism, as discussed in the “Impact on 
institutional environment” indictor hereto, these situations could be limited. Given these factors, it 
seems unlikely that the damages from any such litigation would be particularly significant.  
 
INDICATOR: Impacts on economic policy space   
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Canada, EU, US and Mexico 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
An Investment Chapter in CETA clearly would create reductions in regulatory flexibility in the EU and 
Canada. These reductions would first be caused by liberalising certain sectors. They would be caused by 
preventing foreign governments from denying national treatment and MFN to investors. They would be 
caused by other requirements that are standard in most trade agreements, for example requirements 
for a minimum standard of treatment, restrictions on expropriation, and prohibitions on performance 
requirements, among other requirements depending upon the agreement. CETA may also institute 
investor-state arbitration to enforce these requirements. While all these examples indeed constitute a 
reduction in regulatory flexibility, as explained in the methodology section, the “policy space” indictor in 
this SIA is exclusively used to measure reductions in the ability of governments to make policies that 
have clear economic, social or environmental benefits.  
Some of the aforementioned reductions in regulatory flexibility will contribute to the economic benefits 
discussed under previous indictors in this section, however others may also constitute a reduction in 
economic policy space as it is used in this SIA. However, further analysis would be needed in this area in 
order to create a fuller assessment of these impacts. Particularly when considering the extent to which 
ISDS in CETA might be more liberal than domestic takings laws in Canada and the EU in its definition of 
expropriation, this might have some negative implications on economic policy space in the EU and 
Canada (refer to the “Impact on institutional and regulatory environment.” indicator for more on this 
issue). As mentioned in the “…social policy space” indicator in the Social Assessment below, ISDS in CETA 
may reduce economic policy space by putting some limits on otherwise useful capital controls. 
Regulatory reductions on performance requirements may create some risk of reducing economic policy 
space of the type assessed in this SIA, although, again, without a more thorough assessment herein, 
which is outside the scope of this SIA, this is unclear (the discussion on offsets in the Government 
Procurement section in this SIA sheds light onto some questions that may need to be answered before 
making a fuller assessment herein).  
There are few if any impacts expected on economic policy space in the US and Mexico. 
 
 
SOCIAL ASSESSMENT 
 
INDICATOR: Impacts on social policy space (and spill-over effects on other types of policy space)  
Canada 
Canadian stakeholders have expressed concern that ISDS under CETA would lead to reductions in 
Canadian policy space. The main concerns of stakeholders are that investor-state provisions and their 
application in ISDS under CETA would threaten policy space by creating regulatory chill, reversal and/or 
undermining of public policies already in practice, and make it difficult to reverse failed privatisations. 
There are also concerns that CETA’s potential liberalisation of current investment policy and laws will 
limit policy space. While one could consider the impacts ISDS has had on developing countries in 
assessing the impacts ISDS in general could have on Canada, there are many obvious institutional, 
regulatory and other differences between developing countries and Canada and the EU at large. As such, 
the following analysis assesses the aforementioned stakeholder concerns using a more robust and 
directly relevant comparison – Canada’s experiences under NAFTA. As explained in the methodology 
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section, the “policy space” indictor in this SIA is only used to measure reductions in the ability of 
governments to make policies that have clear economic, social or environmental benefits. 
 
Regulatory chill and other reductions of policy space 
 
Stakeholders have expressed concerns that ISDS under CETA will lead to “regulatory chill” or other forms 
of reduced policy space that will have negative impacts on public welfare. Regulatory chill as defined in 
this analysis is a situation where the government does not enact new ‘socially desirable’ laws and 
regulations – i.e. those to improve areas like human rights (including human health, safety, and 
education) and environmental protection – in fear that foreign investors may seek compensation under 
certain legal agreements, like a trade agreement, and/or doing so could lead to capital flight.1058 The 
analysis uses this definition as opposed to a wider definition of regulatory chill given analysis based on a 
wider definition would stray from an SIA analysis. Some scholars suggest there are generally three types 
of regulatory chill or reduced policy space: (1) proposed regulatory measures may be abandoned or 
modified before they are introduced in the legislative or other rule-making process, (2) proposed 
measures may be abandoned or modified after they are introduced but before they are adopted, and (3) 
measures may be abandoned or modified after they are adopted.1059  
 
It is difficult to comprehensively analyse the extent of regulatory chill caused by a trade agreement. 
Among other reasons, a case does not necessarily have to be brought in order to cause a wave of 
regulatory chill, as the mere existence of investor-state provisions in a trade agreement can cause 
regulatory chill. This said, turning to NAFTA, while it will never be known if certain measures in Canada 
were not enacted in the past because of a chilling effect, it seems reasonable that if the chilling effect 
was significant enough, given Canada’s solid institutions and communication mechanisms, as well as an 
informed population, then government, academics, or other stakeholders would have pointed to the 
most significant and solid examples of regulatory chill. Still, and again, there is some uncertainty in this 
assumption. 
 
Box 37:  Reductions in Canadian policy space caused by Chapter 11:  
A questionnaire 
 
In an effort to add some more clarity to this situation, a questionnaire was distributed in mid February 
2011 to the Attorney General’s offices in all Canadian provinces and territories, as well as to the office at 
the national level, to assess the impacts of regulatory chill and other forms of reduced policy space in 
Canada caused by NAFTA Chapter 11 and the predicted impact under CETA ISDS. The results from one 
questionnaire, ultimately answered not by the Attorney General’s office but the Ministry of Economic 
Development and Trade in Ontario, indicated that NAFTA has had a “Non-existent or negligible” impact 
in terms of regulatory chill and did not create any other limits on policymaking and/or policy 
implementation in Ontario. Also, the same results suggest that investor-state provisions if included in 
CETA will likely have a “Non-existent or negligible” impact on policymaking in Ontario. This feedback 
downplays the importance of certain examples of regulatory chill in Ontario cited by some scholars.1060 
                                                             
1058 For definitions of “regulatory chill,” among other sources see: Cotula, L. (2008). “Reconciling regulatory stability and 
evolution of environmental standards in investment contracts: Towards a rethink of stabilization clauses.” Journal of World 
Energy Law & Business. Oxford Journals. June 2008. 1(2): 158-179.; and Neumayer, E. (2001) “Greening trade and investment: 
environmental protection without protectionism.” Earthscan Publications, London.   
1059 Consultations with Gus Van Harten, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, February 2011 
1060 For example, see: Kukucha, C. (2008). The Provinces and Canadian Foreign Trade Policy. UBC Press, Vancouver. 2008. 
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Results from the questionnaire sent to New Brunswick provide no rankings on NAFTA’s or CETA’s impact 
on policy space given the stated sensitive nature of the NB Attorney General office’s involvement in the 
CETA negotiations. Feedback from the questionnaire sent to Alberta only suggests that the province 
takes a range of issues into account when making regulations, including Canada’s international trade 
obligations. No other responses were received. 
 
 
 
Below is a broad and brief overview of NAFTA investor-state challenges that have been claimed will or 
actually have led to regulatory chill or otherwise reduce policy space in Canada. This is followed by a 
summary analysis of what these examples mean for CETA.    
 
Effect on public services/would-be public services 
Auto insurance: Perhaps the most clear-cut example of regulatory chill directly resulting from NATA 
investor-state provisions is where New Brunswick abandoned a public auto insurance proposal after 
threat of a Chapter 11 lawsuit. Sources suggest that Ontario also backed away from an automobile 
insurance plan given the precedent in the New Brunswick case.1061 It should be noted that regulation of 
auto insurance may not conventionally be thought of as part of ‘socially desirable’ regulation and thus 
the extent to which these instances are considered regulatory chill under the definition used in this SIA 
is debatable.   
Postal services: In 2005, concerns were expressed over the UPS Chapter 11 case challenging the cross-
subsidation of the Canadian Postal Service within the Canadian postal market, which was seen by some 
stakeholders to threaten the monopoly and undermine state regulation in the sector.1062 However, the 
case was subsequently dismissed. 
Health: British Columbia requested a clear definition of what social services were committed in Annex II 
(exclusions) of NAFTA, and were assured that “public education, public training, health and child care” 
were included in provisions related to cross-border investment and services.1063 In other words, none of 
these services fall under the full purview of the NAFTA investor-state mechanism. Also for context, there 
are provisions in NAFTA Chapter 11 to allow companies to operate services for public health and 
education without fear of being sued.1064 Also, as stipulated by NAFTA Article 1108, Article 1102 does 
not apply to measures that relate to social services such as healthcare (or childcare and social welfare). 
On healthcare specifically, particularly private healthcare, as distinguished from wider ‘health-related’ 
measures which are mentioned below, no successful investor-state case has been brought against 
Canada since NAFTA has been enacted. The most recent case on healthcare in Canada, Centurion Health 
Corporation vs. Canada which disputed that the Canada Health Act had limited investment opportunities 
in Canada by monopolising the healthcare market, was dismissed on procedural grounds in August 2010.  
                                                             
1061 Ibid 
1062 Public Citizen (2005). “NAFTA’s Threat to Sovereignty and Democracy: The Record of NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-State 
Cases 1994-2005.” February 2005. http://www.citizen.org/documents/Chapter%2011%20Report%20Final.pdf 
1063 Kukucha, C. (2010). “Provincial Pitfalls: Provinces and the Canada-EU Trade Negotiations.” University of Lethbridge. URL: 
http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2010/Kukucha.pdf 
1064 NAFTA Chapter 11, Article 1101, sub-article 4. “Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from providing 
a service or performing a function such as law enforcement, correctional services, income security or insurance, social security or 
insurance, social welfare, public education, public training, health, and child care, in a manner that is not inconsistent with this 
Chapter.” (emphasis added) 
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Nonetheless, concern exists about the regulatory chill investor-state provisions/ISDS in NAFTA may 
create on health-related regulations. While not solely related to health issues, the Government of 
Canada abandoned a regulation in December 2001 to prohibit the display of “light” and “mild” 
descriptors on tobacco packing after Phillip Morris International protested the ban.1065 Salazar (2010) 
suggests that recent NAFTA tribunal decisions confirm that “…a non-discriminatory regulation that may 
affect foreign investors’ property rights, but advances a public purpose may not constitute 
expropriation.” 1066 In other words, in practice leeway exists in policymaking for public purposes under 
the investor-state provisions in NAFTA Chapter 11, particularly Article 1110. However, the same analysis 
goes on to suggest there are still significant uncertainties in Chapter 11 which may cause regulatory chill, 
particularly in areas related to Canada’s pro-healthy eating policies.1067  
 Also, as further discussed below, there have been a notable number of environmental cases brought 
under Chapter 11, some of which also touch somewhat upon the issue of public health. For example, 
there is the aforementioned S.D. Myers Inc. case where a US waste disposal company sued and won 
over a temporary ban of toxic PCB wastes. There is also the aforementioned 1997 Ethyl Corporation 
dispute, where the Canadian government settled out of court with the Ethyl Corporation over Canada’s 
ban on the import and inter-provincial trade of the gasoline additive MMT, a suspected neurotoxin. 
There is the ongoing case, filed in August 2008, in which Dow Agro Sciences alleges the 2006 Quebec 
ban on the use of pesticides for cosmetic lawn care was imposed without a scientific basis or 
opportunity for the company to prove the pesticides are safe, and that the ban is tantamount to 
expropriation. 
Education: No investor-state cases regarding education have been brought against Canada to date.1068 
Readily available evidence does not suggest NAFTA has created significant regulatory chill on measures 
promoting education.   
 
Environment  
There have been a number of environmental cases brought under Chapter 11 of NAFTA. In fact, as of a 
decade after NAFTA was in force, over ¼ of all investor-state disputes involved environmentally-related 
concerns.1069 The aforementioned S.D. Myers Inc. and Ethyl Corporation cases involved environmental 
issues. While not only related to environmental issues, some observers raise environmental concerns 
over the August 2010 Abitibi Bowater Inc. out-of-court settlement over measures taken by the local 
government of Newfoundland and Labrador to return to the state timber and water usage rights held by 
the company and expropriate certain assets and lands associated with the company’s usage rights.1070 
Among other issues, the case concerns the role of Abitibi Bowater, who was in bankruptcy, in paying to 
clean up the environmental pollution it left at several former properties. These cases are of great 
                                                             
1065 Pavey, B. and T. Williams (2003). “The North American Free Trade Agreement: Chapter 11.” Parliamentary Research Branch, 
Library or Parliament of Canada. 26 February 2003.  
1066 Salazar, A. V.  (2010). “NAFTA Chapter 11, Regulatory Expropriation, and Domestic Counter-Advertising Law.” Arizona 
Journal of International and Comparative Law, 27 (1): 32 
1067 Ibid 
1068 Review of cases as listed in Sinclair (Oct. 2010) 
1069 Hufbauer and Schott (2005)   
1070 Sinclair (Oct. 2010) at pg 25 suggests “…the Abitibi Bowater settlement entails an open-ended, excessive conception of 
property rights that goes well beyond reasonable protections and domestic legal norms…Whenever natural resource 
concessions are revised or revoked, however legitimate the government’s reasons, investors can now be expected to invoke 
NAFTA’s Chapter 11.”  
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concern to a variety of stakeholders who are worried they will erode protection of plant, animal and 
human safety.1071  
There are a number of ongoing NAFTA investor-state cases that involve environmental issues and have 
raised concerns that they might reduce policy space to the detriment of the environment. For example, 
Bilcon Corporation is suing the Canadian government under NAFTA Chapter 11 for over $188 million for 
rejecting a development project in White Point Quarry, which lies along a coastal area near the Bay of 
Fundy biosphere reserve.  
 
Capital controls 
Recent studies have expressed concern over the restrictions investor-state provisions can put on a 
government’s flexibility to institute capital controls. 1072 The proper usage of capital controls has wide-
ranging implications in terms of maintaining the macroeconomic health of an economy, which in turn 
has implications on controlling inflation, curtailing wage inequality, among other social issues. 
 
Box: 38 Frequency of cases citing the expropriation provision and breadth of 
expropriation protections 
 
It is important to note that not all investor-state brought against Canada under NAFTA to date were 
based on the particularly controversial expropriation clause, although 79% were. For example, while the 
expropriation aspect of NAFTA cases often receives the most publicity, 6 cases out of the 28 NAFTA 
cases brought to date – United Parcel Service of America Inc. (2000); Trammel Crow Co. (2001); Peter 
Pesic (2005); Mobil Investments Canada, Inc. & Murphy Oil Corporation (2007); Bilcon Inc. (2008); and 
Centurion Health Corporation (2008) – 21%, do not invoke the expropriation provision in Chapter 11.1073  
Half of these cases were already mentioned in this “Policy space” indicator as being of concern to 
stakeholders, and the Mobil case, which has not been mentioned thus far, is also of concern to some. Of 
these cases the Bilcon and Mobil cases are still under review and the others have ended without known 
damages.  
 
The frequency of the usage of expropriation clauses, when considered alongside the principle that the 
allowances for cases on expropriation under NAFTA are wider than those under domestic Canadian law, 
produces a stronger force to reduce policy space. Still, there is not persuasive evidence that this will 
necessarily result in reductions of policy space considered relevant to this SIA. The significance of the 
expropriation flexibility in particular is uncertain given the relatively limited NAFTA jurisprudence on the 
issue. On one hand, one could suggest the limited jurisprudence on the subject allows for the possibility 
that this allowance is a relatively minor issue; however, many cases in NAFTA are still undecided (i.e. 15 
or 20 depending on one what information one consults as to the state of such cases). Also, there does 
not seem to be much utility, let alone equity, in allowing foreign investors to bring cases regarding 
expropriation in way not allowed to domestic investors.  
 
                                                             
1071 Among others, see The Council of Canadians. “NAFTA’s Chapter 11 investor-state dispute process: New challenges to 
Canadian environmental and health policy call NAFTA into question.” 
1072 Gallagher, K. (2010) 
1073 Review of cases in Sinclair (Oct. 2010) 
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Given the lack of clear implications of these issues under NAFTA precedent, there is not enough 
evidence to suggest that under CETA they will have clear impacts on policy space that will be of 
significance. Still, they are cause for concern.  
 
 
In addition to the aforementioned examples, which focus largely on regulatory chill concerns, certain 
sources infer that allowing ISDS like that in NAFTA in an agreement could actually lead to reversal and/or 
undermining of public policies currently in practice and this would have negative impacts on public 
welfare.1074 For example, stakeholders suggest some NAFTA cases have indeed undermined currently in 
force domestic and international laws.1075 Without a rigorous legal analysis it is not possible to fully 
assess the extent of these claims. 
 
Difficulty in reversing ‘failed’ privatisations 
As discussed in the government procurement section, investor-state provisions in CETA could 
conceivably discourage private services (including those that were formerly public and then made 
private) from being made public. Stakeholders have expressed particular concern that failed 
privatisations might not easily be remedied by making such services public for fear of investor-state 
litigation. Examples are cited where investor-state provisions have made reversing failed privatisations 
costly.1076  
However, these trends should be put into context. To the extent these concerns arise from the 
protection against expropriation allowed in CETA, domestic takings laws require compensation for 
typical forms of expropriation anyway (as discussed in the “Impact on the institutional and regulatory 
environment…” indicator). In other words, a lawsuit on expropriation issues could be brought, and can 
already be brought, in domestic courts without CETA investor-state provisions, with some rather rare 
exceptions as discussed in the “Impact on the institutional and regulatory environment…” indicator and 
again mentioned in the above Box 38. Also, it should be recognised that the government retains the 
right to act in what it considers the public interest, for example in nationalising failed private services, 
although if it loses an investor-state case it may have to pay compensation.  
Regarding the latter example on nationalising failed privately delivered services, the below Box 39 
briefly considers if investor-state provisions in CETA could make it more difficult to nationalise certain 
services, and includes a mention of water delivery and management services which were not covered in 
NAFTA in the same way stakeholders suggest they may be in CETA. It should be stressed that the impact 
of nationalisation, privatisation, and the difficulties that implementing either one has on the actual end 
quality of public services, which is a major focus of privatisations in addition to controlling the costs to 
government of otherwise providing such services, deserves an analysis of its own which is outside the 
scope of this SIA. 
 
                                                             
1074 Public Citizen (2005) 
1075 For example, respectively referencing the S.D. Meyers (1998) and Pope & Talbot (1998) cases under NAFTA Chapter 11 
against Canada, Public Citizen (2005) finds “…the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes and the U.S.-Canadian Softwood Lumber Agreement, were both successfully challenged using NAFTA investor-state 
system and damages were awarded in both cases.”   
1076 See examples in, among others: Sinclair (Oct. 2010) 
EU-Canada SIA Interim Report 
 
378 
 
 Box 39: Will investor-state provisions in CETA make it more difficult to 
nationalise certain services? 
 
Certain provisions in CETA on services and investment may compound the indirect, long-term trends 
towards forms of privatisation of certain services that are not currently as competitive as they would be 
with CETA as mentioned in the “Quality of goods and services” indicator in the Government 
Procurement section; however, it is unclear to exactly what extent this will make it more difficult to 
reverse failed privatisations in Canada or the EU. Stakeholders warn that CETA will in part push 
privatisation through a ban equity caps, performance requirements and certain other services-related 
provisions that will ultimately be locked in law and protected with a dispute resolution system, including 
via investor-state provisions.  
Indeed, certain services could be subject to investor-state cases under CETA; however they must first 
meet some criteria (again, assuming the functioning of the Investment Chapter in CETA will be 
structured similar to NAFTA). For example, they should not be directly related to government 
procurement. They should be actually committed in CETA and legally susceptible to investor-state 
provisions (i.e. they are not excluded by sectoral, 1077 reciprocal and investment review reservations). To 
single out the expropriation clause within investor-state provisions, the government would actually have 
to want to nationalise/further nationalise a service that is private in some form (for a discussion on 
forms of nationalisation and privatisation see the box on privatisation in the “Quality of goods and 
services” indicator in the Government Procurement section). Lastly, and obviously, an investor-state 
case would actually also have to be brought. 
Herein, how and why an investor-state case could challenge a nationalisation plan requires further 
analysis. The investor obviously needs to meet the legal requirements for bringing a case against a 
nationalisation. But also, the rationales behind investors bringing a case and the approaches/forms of 
nationalisation the government attempts to institute also requires further consideration. Specifically, 
what form of nationalisation is sought and what state of privatisation the target service provider is in 
will be a factor in determining if cases are even considered in the first place. 
Additionally, and as alluded to under this indicator, it is unclear to what degree the threat of a case, or 
even a formally lodged case, with or without a win, would cause regulatory chill or other regulatory 
pressures that would complicate or actually prevent a nationalisation plan. And without this certainly 
there is uncertainty in how difficult it would be to actually nationalise certain services.  
As such, the aforementioned limitations combined with the analysis on NAFTA precedent (i.e. only on 
the results of cases brought to date) suggest that it will not necessarily be as difficult to nationalise 
certain services under CETA as certain stakeholders seem to suggest. However, this certainly does not 
mean it will be easy, nor in certain cases without investor-state challenges which will cost money and 
may indeed derail such efforts. Also, this conclusion is based on evidence of the results of past NAFTA 
cases and many cases are still pending. Further, even if governments do not attempt to nationalise 
‘failed privatisations’ this should not necessarily detract from certain stakeholders’ views that 
privatisations may result in certain negative impacts.  
This issue warrants further study. For example, privatisation of water services, which were not covered 
                                                             
1077 Note: Canada carried over 48 sectoral reservations from CUFSTA under Chapter 11 of NAFTA (Hufbauer and Schott (2005), 
pg 202.) 
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in NAFTA in the same way stakeholders suggest they may be in CETA, has been recorded to have mixed 
impacts depending on the circumstances.1078 In fact, there is a notable amount of literature pointing out 
the significant negative impacts that can result from privatisation. 
 
 
Liberalising current investment policy and laws 
In addition to the impacts on the regulatory system caused by potential investor-state provisions in 
CETA, stakeholders have different views on CETA’s overall impact (not only limited to ISDS) in terms of 
liberalising and binding liberalisation of certain Canadian laws. Some stakeholders are concerned that 
CETA may directly liberalise and bind liberalisation of Canada’s investment requirements and this would 
in turn limit Canadian policy space. For example, Canada may reduce the equity cap on foreign 
investment in the telecom industry as a result of CETA. On the other hand, other stakeholders suggest 
more competition resulting from telecom liberalisation in particular is better for Canadian consumers as 
they pay notably more for their telecommunication services than do consumers in the EU. 
At a surface level, this obviously would limit the government’s flexibility in economic policymaking as 
previous investment restrictions would no longer be allowable; however this in itself does not indicate it 
would reduce the type of ‘policy space’ that is relevant to this SIA. An in-depth assessment of all of 
Canada’s investment rules that may be liberalised within CETA, their utility in policymaking, and an 
assessment of related results would be needed to fully assess positive and negative consequences 
herein.  
Conclusion 
The full effects in terms of regulatory chill from undecided NAFTA investor-state cases has yet to be 
assessed, and thus it is difficult to use these examples in a way that might specifically predict the 
impacts of similar provisions in CETA – nonetheless, some conclusions can be made. Although certainly 
creating some limitation on policy space there does not appear to be sufficient evidence to suggest 
investor-state claims under NAFTA to date have significantly undermined Canada’s domestic rules for 
health/safety or education, nor substantially inhibited Canada’s ability to propose and implement 
essential environmental regulations (see Environmental Assessment below). Consultations to date with 
Canadian government regulators, albeit limited to Ontario (other government consultations did not 
produce direct answers), support this. And for context, there are provisions in NAFTA (and the GATT) 
that stipulate the agreement should not prevent enactment of certain justifiable measures to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health,1079 which may have contributed somewhat indirectly to this 
outcome.   
This assessment is based on imperfect information and there is some information that suggests that 
NAFTA has created what could be defined as regulatory chill and other reductions in policy space. Clear 
examples of regulatory chill as defined by some include abandonment of an auto insurance plan in New 
Brunswick and Ontario, as well as abandoning a plan on packaging on cigarettes. Although 3 of the 4 
successful Chapter 11 cases against Canada involved regulatory inflexibility that should not be blamed 
solely on NAFTA but also on unrelated difficulties in domestic policymaking, they also could have 
somewhat reduced policy space via challenging bans on MMT, export quotas on lumber, and a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
1078 Among others see: Gleick et al. (2002)  
1079 See footnotes on related point in “Quality of goods and services” indicator and baseline for the Environmental Assessment 
in Government Procurement section. 
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temporary ban of toxic PCB wastes. Some continue to predict dire consequences for provincial and local 
regulatory authorities as a result of NAFTA ISDS, pointing to the 4th successful Chapter 11 case, Abitibi 
Bowater, and pending cases including the Dow Agrosciences and Bilcon case, among others. Further, 
there could be other forms of regulatory chill that have resulted from ISDS in NAFTA, although their 
regulatory significance is unclear, which compound the level of significance of such instances. 
It is important to again stress that a reduction in policy space as it is sometimes defined by stakeholders 
is not necessarily negative, and thus it is essential to fully consider in detail the actual significance of the 
aforementioned initiatives as impacting the policy space indicator as defined in this SIA. While 
considering this, some, for example Public Citizen (2005), go to extremes in criticising ISDS in NAFTA 
specifically. Others, while less extreme still find that available evidence from NAFTA suggests that ISDS 
may “lead to reductions in policy space and that those reductions are significant in light of the risk of 
large awards and the general cost to the public of failures or omissions to regulate in areas of public 
health and environmental protection and the delivery of public services. In the absence of further study, 
it is not possible to rule out this troubling outcome.”1080 This analysis disagrees with these levels of 
wariness over ISDS in NAFTA, and thus ISDS in CETA, for the reasons mentioned below, although also as 
mentioned below agrees with a need for wariness of ISDS in CETA (and NAFTA). 
The available evidence does not convincingly suggest that investor-state provision in NAFTA to date 
have created significant reductions of the type of policy space relevant to this SIA. To be sure, this 
conclusion is reached using a reasonable threshold for burden of proof (minding the obvious dangers of 
thresholds that are too low or high), i.e. following the same approach to what constitutes a “significant” 
impact as described in the methodology of this SIA. It considers the details of the examples provided in 
the above section, including via a review of tribunal rulings.1081 As such, many of the extreme concerns 
over Chapter 11 seem misleadingly overstated, a conclusion also reached by prominent experts on the 
impacts of NAFTA.1082 Many of these concerns often continue to be based more on a scenario of ‘what 
if’ in terms of past and future impacts rather than the available evidence from 16 years of precedent, 
sometimes draw upon the questionably relevant experiences of developing countries, and appear to 
undervalue the nuanced sustainability implications of ISDS discussed in other indicators hereto.  
Nonetheless, this analysis errs on the side of caution by concluding ISDS in NAFTA likely has created and 
will continue to create some reductions in policy space, i.e. policy space as relevant to this SIA, in 
                                                             
1080 Consultations with Gus Van Harten, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, February 2011 
1081 Primary sources on all cases: http://www.naftalaw.org/disputes_canada.htm. For information on the 4 cases in particular: 
(1) For  S.D. Myers Inc. vs. Canada (partial award, Nov. 2000) main opinion 
http://www.naftalaw.org/Disputes/Canada/SDMyers/SDMyersMeritsAward.pdf, separate concurring opinion at 
http://www.naftalaw.org/Disputes/Canada/SDMyers/SDMyersMeritsAwardOpinion.pdf 
(2) The final decision on Ethyl Corporation vs. Canada was kept secret although there are 1998 opinions available on place of 
arbitration, jurisdiction, and confidentiality: http://www.naftalaw.org/disputes_canada_ethyl.htm 
(3) For Pope & Talbot Inc. vs. Canada  (final award on merits, April 2001) 
http://www.naftalaw.org/Disputes/Canada/Pope/PopeInterimMeritsAward.pdf) 
(4) The final decision on Abitibi Bowater vs. Canada appears to be kept secret per request of one or both of the parties. No 
notice of confidentiality appears to be available. Information on notice of intent and arbitration at 
http://www.naftalaw.org/disputes_canada_abitibi.htm. Limited information is available on the final ruling, although some is 
available at sources such as Sinclair (Oct. 2010), and Best, C. (2010). “The Federal Government Settles AbitibiBowater’s NAFTA 
Claim.”  The Court.ca, August 27, 2010. 
1082 This same general conclusion was made by Hufbauer and Schott (2005) at pg 249, although not necessarily for all the same 
reasons provided herein and it should be note that their book was also published before the 2010 Abitibi Bowater decision. 
Additionally, in consultations with Gary Hufbauer, Institute for International Economics, February 2011, he warns of 
overemphasising the value of discriminatory practices meant to upkeep an often abstract concept of policy space, citing that 
these are dimensions of policy space (as it is often vaguely defined) that trade and investment agreements like CETA seek to 
limit. 
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Canada which may have negative impacts on social sustainability. This conclusion has implications for 
CETA. 
The policy reductions caused by ISDS allowances under CETA would likely be less significant than 
foreseen by some observers, but not necessarily insignificant and could indeed have negative impacts 
on social policy space. They might be on the magnitude of minor to notable. As stated, this opinion was 
reached after a careful weighing of relevant available evidence and erring on the side of caution for 
following reasons: (1) the seeming lack of utility in using investor-state arbitration panels between the 
EU and Canada, who have some of the most advanced legal systems in the world combined with the 
shortcomings of ISDS tribunals as currently operating; (2) the potential pressure that the number of 
investor-state cases and costs in terms of damages and legal fees may have had and continue to create 
in terms of regulatory chill; (3) the likelihood of the existence of unrecorded regulatory chill and other 
impacts reducing policy space that may have some negative impacts; (4) given there is some indication 
that ISDS cases under NAFTA and EU BITs have lead to reductions in policy space, and this is only part of 
the picture as Chapter 11 legal opinions are publicly available for only 50% of NAFTA Chapter 11 cases 
against Canada ending in payment of damages and limited information is also available on EU ISDS cases; 
and (5) given that including a provision allowing companies of any nationality incorporated in a CETA 
country to bring an investor-state case would compound these concerns.  
Taken individually, and especially when taken together, these issues provide a solid reason for concern 
that ISDS in CETA may reduce SIA-relevant social policy space in Canada. And as such, it is doubtful that 
including ISDS in CETA would create a net/overall social sustainability benefit for Canada. 
 
EU 
It is clear that the EC has been meeting some difficulties recently in ensuring that its policy objectives 
are met with regards to BITs. The EC has stated “EU investment policy has to be consistent with the 
other policies of the Union and its Member States, including policies on the protection of the 
environment, health and safety at work, consumer protection, cultural diversity, development policy 
and competition policy.”1083 Yet there remain concerns from different groups over the regulatory 
structure of BITs as they have been instituted in the EU, suggesting that in fact this experience has not 
been entirely positive. Under Article 207(1) of the TFEU, FDI now falls within the scope of EU commercial 
policy. The EU now has the exclusive competence to abolish barriers to foreign direct investment, 
whereas previously Member State BITs protected EU investors (market access was already an EU 
competence). Recently, the EC has discouraged individual MS from signing BITs in favour of an EU-wide 
approach to signing investment agreements. 
The significance of ISDS under current EU BITs in terms of threats to policy space as defined in this SIA 
should be contextualised by a number of factors. On one hand, it must be considered that the EU has 
1,200 BITs already in place, so investor-state provisions are not new to MS. On the other hand, many of 
these BITs are between certain MS and third countries that are developing and are not particularly 
litigious. There have been at least 35 known cases already brought against EU states, although as there 
is little publicly available information on many of these cases it is difficult to measure the policy impacts 
therein.  
Although the aforementioned findings provide general uncertainty as to the impacts of ISDS on EU 
policy space, when taken together with details of trends in ISDS against MS that are available, they 
provide a real concern that ISDS will reduce policy space in the EU. In recent years there has been 
                                                             
1083  EC (2010). “Memorandum: Q&A…” 
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concern over the application of intra-EU BITs in particular. For example, the EC has expressed concerns 
over a number of cases, for example in the Eureko v. Slovakia arbitration, Eastern Sugar v. Czech 
Republic, AES v. Hungary, and Electrabel v. Hungary cases. Some conclude concerns over these cases 
may reflect that intra-EU BITs serve as “a source of inequality between EU citizens as well as a hindrance 
to the harmonized development of EC law.”1084 The Vattenfall claim, named after the state-owned 
Swedish power company, involves a decision by the Hamburg city council in Germany and has generated 
a notable amount of press attention.1085 Some note that the Vattenfall case concerns a range of health, 
climate change and conservation concerns, and will likely raise concerns over regulatory chill among 
local decision makers in Germany.1086 While it is still not fully clear to what extent these trends should be 
extrapolated to EU-wide BITs with a foreign nation like Canada, they do provide relevant experiences 
that are cause for at least some concern. 
The aforementioned potential reductions in policy space in the EU resulting from current ISDS will likely 
be compounded in CETA given that current investment agreements do not bind the EU in its entirety as 
would investor-state provisions in CETA. Since the EU as a whole has not included investor-state 
provisions in its EU-wide trade and investment agreements it will take some time for the EU to adjust to 
investor-sate cases arising from CETA. Although Canada already has FIPAs with 6 EU countries, CETA will 
provide Canadian (and certain other investors if the ‘third countries incorporation’ provision is included 
in CETA) a wider mandate to sue the EU’s oversight institution over the policies of its individual MS. 
These obligations would put an increased burden on the EC by becoming responsible for defending 
against investor-state cases brought against any number of the governments within MS in the EU.  
In conclusion, the EU could experience limits on policy space from investor-state provisions in CETA that 
will have negative impacts on social sustainability. These limits could be on the magnitude of minor to 
notable. The rationale herein follows the same rationale in the Canada section, i.e. is based upon 
consideration of the (1) questionable utility of using ISDS as currently operating rather than domestic 
courts in the EU, (2) precedent of ISDS creating some regulatory chill, (3) risk of unrecorded regulatory 
chill from ISDS, (4) lack of information on ISDS case rulings, and (5) risk created by a ‘third country 
incorporation’ provision in ISDS in CETA. While the significance of ISDS cases under CETA may not be of 
the magnitude as that experienced under NAFTA to date, it is reasonable to suggest that CETA will 
likewise produce reductions of policy space. Further, at a minimum, it appears that CETA would reduce 
policy space in a way that would burden an EC that is at present struggling to steer the ISDS tendencies 
of its MS onto the right track. And this risk would be compounded by the propensity of Canada to bring 
investor-state cases, which counter to conventional belief is in fact noteworthy when dealing with a 
developed competitor like the EU (see “Cost of investor-state provisions…” indicator).  
Taken individually, and especially when taken together, these issues provide a solid reason for concern 
that ISDS in CETA may reduce SIA-relevant social policy space in the EU. And as such, it is doubtful that 
including ISDS in CETA would create a net/overall social sustainability benefit for the EU. 
 
US and Mexico 
                                                             
1084 Von Krause, C. (2010). “The European Commission’s Opposition to Intra-EU BITs and Its Impact on Investment Arbitration.”  
Kluwer Law International. http://kluwer.practicesource.com/blog/2010/the-european-commission%e2%80%99s-opposition-to-
intra-eu-bits-and-its-impact-on-investment-arbitration/ 
1085 Bryant, C.  (2009). “Germany faces action over power plant.” Financial Times. April 2, 2009. 
1086 Consultations with Gus Van Harten, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, February 2011 
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Investment provisions in CETA are not likely to have notable effects on policy space in the US and 
Mexico. This said, it is not fully clear if the inclusion of a ‘third country incorporation’ provision in CETA 
might impact policy space in the US or Mexico.  
 
INDICATOR: Inequality in wages, displacement of workers, decency and quality of work, knock-on 
effects in innovation 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Canada, EU, US and Mexico 
The overall social impacts of an Investment Chapter in CETA fundamentally depend on its implications 
for policy space and economic growth. For analysis on related impacts on policy space see the “Policy 
space” indicator above.  
The specific effects of an Investment Chapter in CETA on employment and wage inequality are mixed. 
Theoretically, when combined with other provisions of CETA, investment provisions in CETA could 
encourage some labour market frictions with employment shifts among sectors and wage inequality 
among workers.1087 However, trade and investment effects together would create this effect, and an 
Investment Chapter in CETA would likely have little impact on its own. The extent of shifts depends on 
the level of liberalisation in CETA. These negative effects could be at least somewhat offset by the 
positive effects mentioned below.  
There may be some positive impacts from investment encouraged under CETA; however, these impacts 
would most likely be realised when combining the impacts the Investment Chapter in CETA might have 
on stimulating investment with the number of other provisions in CETA, for example, those on labour 
mobility, free circulation of goods, competition policy, IPR, government procurement, trade facilitation, 
provisions liberalising restrictions in services (inclusive of those indirectly related to investment), and 
tariff reductions. Investment may be channelled into certain industries that benefit human health (and 
the environment), for example green technology. Investment also would likely be channelled into job 
creation overall, some of which may simply make-up for job loss in other areas but nonetheless could be 
concentrated in industries that have higher scores on certain decency of quality work indicators.  
For more on the social impacts caused by CETA-encouraged investment refer to the sectoral analyses in 
this report.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 
 
                                                             
1087 For example, for discussion of related impacts from NAFTA see Hornbeck (2004). 
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INDICATOR: Biodiversity, water usage and contamination, toxic contaminants and effluents, air 
pollution and GHG emissions 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Mining 
Energy is the fastest growing sector for investment in Canada, with $87 billion in 2006, up from $30 
billion in the late 90s. In 2006 it represented 20% of total inward FDI. The reason for this can be seen in 
the rising cost of oil and the dramatic growth in oil sands production in Alberta. Mining is also a fast 
rising target for investment, totalling 8.7% of inward FDI in 2006. Growth in mining and oil and gas 
extraction decreased in 2009, after successive years of growth. The average of the five-year growth rate 
was 15.2%. Oil and gas extraction rose 2.7% in 2008 to reach $78.8 billion, representing 14.4% of all 
industries. Mining’s growth rate decreased to 0.6% in 2009, representing $25.4 billion. The stock 
invested by the UK in mining and energy dropped $4.4 billion.1088 
As mentioned in the Industrial Products section, if CETA increased FDI in the oil sands and mining sectors 
this could lead to increased environmental impacts since these sectors are environmentally intensive. 
Given the relative concentration of FDI inflows in these sectors in Canada, a marginal increase in 
investment inflows driven by CETA and higher oil and mineral prices could lead to an increase in 
production capacity that would in turn lead to impacts on capital stocks, use of bio diverse areas, water 
use and contamination, toxic contaminants and effluents, and air pollution and GHG emissions. This said, 
although the gravity modelling for this report provides some indication that investment could increase, 
it is unclear how much CETA would increase investment in the oil sands and mining sectors.  
A full analysis of these potential impacts is available in the “Industrial Products” section.  
Other sub-sectors 
According to FDI gravity modelling performed for the study, increased investment might gravitate more 
towards sectors like transportation services and fisheries if barriers in these relatively protected sectors 
are reduced under CETA. Increased investment in the maritime transportation services could somewhat 
neutralise some polluting effects realised in other transportation services, for example via land transport. 
Increased investment in the fisheries sector could put some further stress on fish stocks, although 
feedback from stakeholders suggests Canada in particular has a strong record on sustainable fishing and 
is committed to maintaining such a record under CETA.1089    
Further details on these impacts can be found in the environmental assessments per the individual sub-
sectors. 
 
INDICATOR: Environmental policy space, institutional and regulatory environment 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Depending on its provisions, and as mentioned, CETA could also impact indicators such as 
environmental policy space and institutional and regulatory environments. Under NAFTA, the 
introduction of investor-state provisions to protect investment led to widely publicised investor-state 
disputes. As mentioned in the “Policy space” indicator in the Social Assessment section, as of a decade 
after NAFTA was in force over ¼ of all investor-state disputes involved environmentally-related 
                                                             
1088 Government of Canada Statistics (2010). http://www.international.gc.ca/economist-economiste/performance/state-
point/state_2010_point/2010_6.aspx?lang=eng 
1089 Feedback from Patrick McGuiness, Fisheries Council of Canada, 1 April 2011 
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concerns.1090 The broad interpretation of NAFTA’s investor-state provisions, combined with a panel 
process that was perceived as lacking transparency, as well as concerns about the lack of independence, 
public accountability, fairness, and participation of such processes led to much criticism from both 
public servants and civil society, and continues to receive criticism. Some argued, and some continue to 
argue, that NAFTA’s Chapter 11 provisions on investment create a regulatory chill that prevents the 
introduction of new environmental regulations. 
The available evidence does not convincingly suggest that investor-state provisions in NAFTA to date 
have created significant reductions of the type of environmental policy space relevant to this SIA. Both 
the EU and Canada have concluded numerous bilateral and regional investment agreements in the past 
16 or so years after NAFTA, and their regulatory frameworks have proven adaptable and robust enough 
to prevent a significant decrease in policy space and an erosion of their environmental regulatory 
frameworks.1091 Furthermore, the chilling effect on the introduction of new domestic regulations 
subsequent to NAFTA does not appear to be significant after 16 or so years as provinces and federal 
government have continued introducing environmental regulations. For these reasons, unless CETA 
would introduce provisions that move away from current EU or Canadian practice, it will likely not have 
significant environmental policy impacts. 
This said, this analysis still errs on the side of caution by concluding, while not meeting the threshold of 
‘significant,’ ISDS in NAFTA, as well as EU BITs, may very well have created and will continue to create 
some magnitude of reductions in environmental policy space relevant to this SIA, and thus ISDS in CETA 
may have some negative environmental impacts on the EU and Canada. In other words, the 
environmental policy reductions caused by ISDS allowances under CETA would likely be less significant 
than foreseen by some, but not necessarily insignificant. The rationale for this conclusion is based on the 
findings under this indicator as well as the rationale in the “Policy space” indicator in the Social 
Assessment. The potential for specific investor-state challenges to stall legitimate regulatory action is 
real and as such should be closely monitored.  For instance, the impacts of the recent Abitibi Bowater 
case and ongoing investor-state cases related to the environment should be monitored closely to the 
extent they may show gradual erosion of environmental protections. As a note, some stakeholders have 
expressed concerns on the potential impact of investor-state provisions on the future ability of Canada 
to curtail greenhouse gas emissions in the Alberta oil sands.1092  
Taken individually, and especially when taken together, these issues provide a solid reason for concern 
that ISDS in CETA may reduce SIA-relevant environmental policy space in the EU. And as such, it is 
doubtful that including ISDS in CETA would create a net/overall environmental sustainability benefit for 
the EU and/or Canada. 
 
                                                             
1090 Hufbauer and Schott (2005) 
1091 Among other sources describing the impact of investor-state provisions in NAFTA on the environment see Gaines, S. E.  
(2006). “Environmental Policy Implications of Investor-State Arbitration.” Third North American Symposium on Assessing the 
Environmental Effects of Trade, Montreal, 30 November – 1 December 05. CEC. February 2006. For example, pg 36 of that 
report finds: “What was surprising, even in retrospect, is that such a high proportion of the early Chapter 11 arbitrations 
concerned environmental measures. This high proportion led to reasonable concerns among environmental policy makers and 
advocates that Chapter 11 could have a broad constraining effect on governments considering new environmental restrictions 
on economic activity. This reasonable concern, however, has become exaggerated through claims of casual or partly-informed 
commentators, sometimes based on erroneous information about the nature of the compensation claims being made, the 
factual background, or the legal grounds on which compensation was paid or awarded...” 
1092 Shrybman, S. (Nov. 2010). “Potential Impacts of the Proposed Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) on the Pace and Character of Oil Sands Development: A Legal opinion.” Council of Canadians, et al. 
November 2010. 
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For further analysis on CETA’s impact on policy space, which is not limited to environmental policy space, 
see the “Policy space” indicator in the social assessment section. 
 
7.3.2. OTHER THIRD COUNTRIES  
 
BASELINE 
The EU and Canada have a number of key trade and economic agreements with foreign countries. 
Additionally, it appears that Canada has concluded or is still working on 35 FIPAs with other countries. 
These FIPAs are listed below. EU MS collectively have 1,200 BITs with foreign countries, and thus are too 
extensive to list in this section. 
 
Table 73: Multilateral trade and economic agreements and negotiations for the EU and Canada 
Type of Agreement EU Canada 
North American Free Trade 
Agreement (1994): US and Mexico 
FTA  
European FTA (2009): Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Norway and 
Switzerland 
Colombia and Peru Andean Community Countries: 
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru 
GCC Caribbean Community: Antigua and 
Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, 
Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, 
Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint 
Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines, Suriname, 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Central America Central America: El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua 
ASEAN1093 Free Trade Area of the Americas: 34 
democratic governments in the 
Americas  
FTA Negotiations 
MERCOSUR1094  
Economic Partnership Agreement CARIFORUM states (2008): Antigua 
and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, 
Belize, Dominica, the Dominican 
Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, 
Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent 
and the Grenadines, Saint 
Christopher and Nevis, Suriname, 
Trinidad and Tobago 
 
EAC: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, 
Tanzania, Uganda 
 EPAs under negotiation 
ESA: Comoros, Madagascar,  
                                                             
1093 March 2009 the Joint Committee agreed to “take a pause” in the regional negotiations 
1094 Negotiations on hold between 2004 and 2009 but restarted in 2010 
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Mauritius, Seychelles, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe 
Pacific: Papua New Guinea, Fiji  
SADC: Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, 
Mozambique, Swaziland 
 
MERCOSUR (1998) Trade and Investment Cooperation 
Agreement 
 
Andean Community (1999) 
Source: adapted directly from chart compiled in EU-Canada SIA Inception Report (2010) 
 
Table 74: Bilateral trade and economic agreements and negotiations for the EU and Canada 
Type of Agreement EU Canada 
Faroe Islands (1997)  Israel FTA (1997) 
Norway (1973)  Chile FTA (1997) 
Iceland (1973) Costa Rica FTA (2002) 
Switzerland (1973) Colombia FTA (2008) 
Croatia (2005) Peru FTA (2009) 
Albania (2006) 
Montenegro (2008) 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (2008) 
The former Yugoslav Republic 
(2004) 
Serbia (2010) 
FTA 
Chile (2002) 
 Mexico (1997) 
Jordan FTA (2009) 
Ukraine  Ukraine   
Morocco Morocco   
Korea Korea  
Egypt Dominican Republic   
India India   
Singapore 
Israel 
Jordan 
Lebanon 
Libya 
Occupied Palestinian Territory 
Syria 
FTA Negotiations 
Tunisia 
Singapore   
Andorra (1991) 
Turkey (1996) 
Customs Union 
San Marino (1992) 
 
Algeria (2005) 
Egypt (2004) 
Israel (2000) 
Jordan (2002) 
Lebanon (2002) 
Morocco (2000) 
Palestinian Authority (1997) 
Association Agreement 
Syria (1978) 
Palestinian Authority (1999) 
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Tunisia (1998) 
Chile (2005) 
Trade, Development and Co-
operation Agreement 
South Africa (2000) South Africa (1998) 
Trade and Economic Cooperation 
Agreement 
 Australia (1995) 
Ivory Coast (2009) Interim Economic Partnership 
Agreement Cameroon (2009) 
 
Economic Partnership Agreement 
Negotiations 
Ghana   
China 
Iran 
Iraq 
Trade and Cooperation Agreement 
Negotiations 
Russia 
 
Kazakhstan (Agreement on trade in 
certain steel products) 
 Other Negotiations 
Vietnam (trade in textile and 
clothing products) 
 
Source: adapted directly from chart compiled in EU-Canada SIA Inception Report (2010) 
 
Table 75: Canadian Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (FIPAs) 
Partner Country  for Canadian FIPAs  In force date/status 
Bahrain Negotiations concluded 
Tunisia Pending 
Tanzania Pending 
Indonesia Pending 
Madagascar Negotiations concluded 
Vietnam Pending 
Mongolia Pending 
India Pending 
China Pending 
Jordan 14 Dec 2009 
Kuwait Pending 
Peru 20 June 2007 
Croatia 30 January 2001 
Costa Rica 29 September 1999 
Lebanon 19 June 1999 
Uruguay 2 June 1999 
El Salvador Signed 31 May 1999 
Armenia 29 March 1999 
Thailand 24 September 1998 
Panama 13 February 1998 
Venezuela 28 January 1998 
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Egypt 3 November 1997 
Ecuador 6 June 1997 
Romania 11 February 1997 
Barbados 17 January 1997 
Philippines 13 November 1996 
Trinidad and Tobago 8 July 1996 
South Africa 27 November 1995 
Latvia 27 July 1995 
Ukraine 24 July 1995 
Hungary 21 November 1993 
Argentina 29 April 1993 
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic 9 March 1992 
USSR 27 June 1991 
Poland 22 November 1009 
Source: adapted directly from DFIAT “Negotiations and Agreements”1095  
 
ANALYSIS 
CETA-inspired investment reforms in Canada in particular (given its higher restrictiveness to investment 
than the EU as measured by the OECD FDI Restrictiveness Index) may also have minor spill-over effects, 
making Canada more attractive to FDI from a variety of third (non-EU MS) countries. This might occur if 
the reforms do not provide access solely to EU firms and go beyond investment provisions in Canada’s 
FIPAs and other investment-related agreements. Although the effects tied to an Investment Chapter in 
CETA alone will likely be less than significant, when combined with other provisions of CETA – for 
example those on labour mobility, free circulation of goods, competition policy, and trade facilitation – 
these effects may be more significant. 
 
                                                             
1095 DFIAT. “Negotiations and Agreements.” http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-
acc/index.aspx 
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7.4. TRADE FACILITATION 
Summary: Trade facilitation aims to promote transparency, facilitate customs clearance, enhance 
government effectiveness in collecting duties and help in the fight against fraud and corruption. 
Given the relatively sophisticated state of existing customs and border regimes in Canada and the EU 
overall, but with exceptions for certain individual EU Member States, it is unlikely that there will be as 
significant economic, social or environmental impacts from related trade facilitation reform under CETA 
compared to if the Agreement was signed between the EU and a developing country. However, 
incorporating provisions under CETA to reform and improve trade facilitation could assist with reducing 
trading costs, which would be particularly useful in limiting the costs of compliance that will inevitably 
increase with the introduction of new rules of origin under CETA.  
 
 
7.4.1. CANADA & EU 
BASELINE 
For the purposes of this section the narrowest definition of trade facilitation as it is most often applied 
in a technical sense is used, i.e. removing obstacles to the movement of goods across borders in terms 
of simplification and harmonisation of customs procedures and systems. Improving trade facilitation 
systems is therefore a means to removing trade barriers and increasing both the speed and quantity of 
trade flows.  
The apparent impact and costs presented by inefficient customs procedures have motivated WTO 
members to review and clarify existing GATT provisions. Trade facilitation became a topic of discussion 
at the WTO at the Singapore Ministerial Conference in December 1996, and WTO Members formally 
agreed to launch negotiations on trade facilitation in July 2004 on the basis of modalities contained in 
Annex D of the so-called “July package.” Those negotiations aim to clarify and improve the existing WTO 
provisions encompassing the following three elements: (1) Increasing the transparency of trade 
regulations (GATT Article X); (2) Simplifying, standardising and modernising import, export and customs 
procedures (GATT Article VIII); and (3) Improving conditions for transit of goods (GATT Article V).  
It is useful to note the relevance of rules of origin (RoO) in trade facilitation. In order to enjoy 
preferences under a trade agreement, members of the agreement have to prove the origin, and thus the 
eligibility, of a portion of their imported products are created by countries within the area established 
by the agreement. Businesses face costs of complying with such RoO and governments face costs in 
instituting and maintaining mechanisms for the RoO system. Two costs that are invariably incurred in 
gauging RoO, and related to trade facilitation, are 1) the cost of bookkeeping and recordkeeping 
ensuring that the rules themselves are complied with and 2) the costs of enforcing the rules at the 
borders.  
Under CETA, improvements in mutual recognition in numerous areas of customs control standards could 
serve to improve trade between the EU and Canada.  As identified in the 2008 Joint Study, these areas 
could include:  
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 The development and sharing of best practices in modern customs techniques:  risk 
management, simplified procedures, pre-arrival processing, post entry audit, and “single 
window” coordination of controls. 
 Promotion of common application of international rules, standards and guidelines in the field of 
customs and international trade, including simplification and harmonisation of import and 
export data and, where possible, use of documentation and procedures that are in line with 
relevant international standards of the World Customs Organization (WCO), the UN and other 
organisations. 
 Cooperation in the field of electronic data exchange with the aim of facilitating trade (e.g. in line 
with the results of the G7 initiative on trade facilitation), once the EU and Canada have 
completed their respective electronic data interchange systems. 1096 
 
Canada 
Even prior to the Cancun Ministerial conference Canada consistently made trade facilitation proposals, 
indicating that it has confidence in its systems. Canada’s customs policy is developed by federal 
government departments such as Finance Canada, Health Canada and the Canada Border Services 
Agency. With significant advances in automation and the incorporation of the latest technologies in risk 
management, from a technical standpoint Canada consistently demonstrates a high level of efficiency 
with respect to its custom regimes. Further, due in part to joint efforts with the US and Mexico 
implemented under NAFTA, Canada has developed a strong trade facilitation system. In 1998, Canada 
and the EU concluded an agreement on customs co-operation and mutual assistance in customs matters.  
Canada ranks 38th in the world on the World Bank’s Index of Indicators of Trade Costs1097 (see Table 76 
below).  
 
Table 76: Indicators of Trade Costs in Canada vs. OECD average (2010) 
Indicators of Trade Costs in Canada vs. OECD average (2010) 
 Documents 
for exports 
(number) 
Time for 
export 
(days) 
Cost to 
Export (US 
$ per 
container) 
Documents for 
import 
(number) 
Time for 
Import 
(days) 
Cost to 
import (US 
$ per 
container) 
World Bank 
Ranking  (1 
– 183) 
Canada 3 7 1610 4 11 1160 38 
OECD 
(avg) 
4.3 10.5 1089.70 4.9 11.0 1145.9 14 (avg.) 
Source:  World Bank, 2010 
 
EU 
Over the past 30 years, EU Member States have made considerable efforts with regards to improving 
trade facilitation. According to the Doing Business 2010 Report from the International Finance 
Corporation and the World Bank, four of the top ten indexed countries were the EU Member States of 
                                                             
1096 2008 Joint Study, pg. 66. 
1097 World Bank (2010). Indicators of Trade Costs. www.worldbank.org 
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Estonia, Finland, Denmark and Sweden.1098 Individual scores of EU MS on the World Bank’s Indicators of 
Trade Costs in the EU can be found in Table 77 below. 
 
Table 77: Indicators of Trade Costs in EU vs. OECD average (2010) 
Indicators of Trade Costs in EU vs. OECD average (2010) 
EU 
country*/OECD 
avg 
Document
s for 
exports 
(number) 
Time 
for 
export 
(days) 
Cost to 
Export (US 
$ per 
container) 
Documents 
for import 
(number) 
Time for 
Import 
(days) 
Cost to 
import (US 
$ per 
container) 
World Bank 
Ranking  (1 
– 183) 
Austria 4 7 1180 5 8 1195 24 
Belgium 4 8 1619 5 9 1600 43 
Bulgaria 5 23 1551 7 21 1666 106 
Cyprus 5 7 820 6 5 1030 15 
Czech Rep 4 17 1060 7 20 1165 53 
Denmark 4 5 744 3 5 744 6 
Estonia 3 5 730 4 5 740 3 
Finland 4 8 540 6 8 620 4 
France 2 9 1078 2 11 1248 25 
Germany 4 7 872 5 7 937 14 
Greece 5 20 1153 6 25 1265 80 
Hungary 5 18 1225 7 17 1215 70 
Ireland 4 7 1109 4 12 1121 21 
Italy 4 20 1231 4 18 1231 50 
Latvia 6 13 600 6 12 801 22 
Lithuania 6 10 870 6 11 980 28 
Luxembourg 5 6 1420 4 6 1420 31 
Netherlands 4 6 895 5 6 942 13 
Poland 5 17 884 5 25 884 42 
Portugal 4 16 685 5 15 999 19 
Romania 5 12 1275 6 13 1175 46 
Slovak Rep. 6 20 1445 8 25 1445 113 
Slovenia 6 20 1075 8 21 1130 84 
Spain 6 9 1221 8 10 1221 59 
Sweden 4 8 697 3 6 735 7 
UK 4 9 1030 4 8 1160 16 
OECD (avgs) 4.3 10.5 1089.70 4.9 11.0 1145.9 14 (avg.) 
Source:  World Bank, 2010. *Data unavailable for Malta1099  
In the EU, an important part of developing a customs union for the region has been the development of 
a common customs regime. Laws are developed at the EU level and then enforced by Member State 
customs authorities, which cooperate closely with one another. However, as evidenced in the above 
table, there exists a large variance in the results of the EU Member States. The average ranking among 
EU countries on the World Bank’s 2010 Indicators of Trade Costs was approximately 38th (note:  the EU-
26 was not taken as an individual country in the world ranking and thus the average of EU countries’ 
overall rankings had to be constructed). While Estonia and the Scandinavian countries scored well, 
                                                             
1098 World Bank and IFC (2010). Doing Business 2010 Report. http://www.doingbusiness.org/Rankings 
1099 For certain information on trade facilitation scores in Malta see “Malta Trade-at-a-glance” World Trade Indicators, 2009. 
URL: http://info.worldbank.org/etools/wti/docs/Malta_taag.pdf 
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Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia all ranked poorly, far below the OECD 
average on individual criterion. 
ANALYSIS 
 
ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT 
 
INDICATOR: Impact on institutional and regulatory regime 
Canada and the EU 
Trade facilitation measures under CETA would help strengthen the institutional and regulatory 
environment in Canada and the EU to the degree they follow the areas for cooperation outlined in the 
2008 Joint Study (refer to baseline section above for a listing of these). 
To the degree that CETA proposes new RoO that Canadian companies must meet to trade under certain 
preferences in the CETA, trade facilitation measures will become increasingly important. In fact, new 
trade facilitation measures will become necessary in managing an increasingly complicated and costly 
institutional and regulatory environment that would result from CETA introducing new RoO to a 16 year 
old trading relationship where NAFTA RoO have been the most significant RoO among Canada, the US 
and Mexico. Specifically, the accounting changes required to comply with new RoO are not only costly 
for businesses to follow and government to oversee, but this is magnified by the fact that Canadian 
companies actually have a significant interest in trading with the EU. This will lead Canadian companies 
to certain shifts in production to ensure a portion of their goods actually comply with CETA RoO, which 
in turn puts increasing importance on trade facilitation mechanisms between Canada and the EU. 
Canada’s trading system placed 38th in the world on the World Bank’s 2010 Indicators of Trade Costs, 
indicating that it has a relatively solid trade facilitation system although it is not the most efficient in the 
world. CETA may provide the opportunity for Canada to at least marginally strengthen this system, 
although this is also out of necessity to manage RoO changes brought about by CETA. 
The average ranking among EU countries on the World Bank’s 2010 Indicators of Trade Costs was 
approximately 38th,1100 the same as Canada’s overall world ranking, thus showing the EU also has a 
relatively solid trade facilitation system although it is not the most efficient in the world. This particular 
score appears to be due to a number of under-performing MS, indicating that the EU could improve its 
trade facilitation system if its underperforming MS were to improve their systems in particular. While 
there are opportunities to significantly enhance trade facilitation in recent years, it is important to note 
that increased security measures have played a role in slowing progress as MS try to find a balance 
between implementing policies to increase speed and efficiency while at the same time ensuring public 
safety. 
It can be inferred that there could be gains from reform of customs procedures for the most 
underperforming nations in the EU, for example Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, the Slovak Republic and 
Slovenia. To the degree that CETA encourages trade facilitation measures that in particular benefit these 
MS it would very likely lead to a strengthening in the EU’s overall performance in trade facilitation. 
 
 
                                                             
1100 Note: the EU-26 was not taken as an individual country in the world ranking and the average had to be constructed  
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INDICATOR: Costs to government of RoO, costs to business of RoO 
EU and Canada 
As mentioned, government and companies incur costs in complying with RoO. Government accounting 
for RoO entails the cost of bookkeeping and record keeping ensuring compliance of according rules, and 
the costs of enforcing the rules at the borders. Companies also incur costs to establish RoO on their 
products. CETA will inevitably impose RoO requirements for Canadian goods that will differ from NAFTA 
RoO on Canadian goods.  
As such, there will be costs involved in accounting for new changes in RoO in CETA. These will be 
incurred by government authorities as well as businesses. Out of all businesses, SMEs in particular, given 
their size, will likely feel the highest burden in terms of cost of compliance. Certain studies have 
suggested that such costs in trade agreements could be significant. As noted in Harris and Rankin Staples 
(2009): “If the costs of complying, and demonstrating compliance, with the prerequisites for preferential 
treatment exceed the value of the preferences, then the obligation to comply with these requirements 
regarding the rules of origin and the certification thereof disappears as the goods enter and pay the MFN 
tariff. While this reality imposes a helpful upper limit on the distortionary potential of RTAs, it also limits 
the degree to which the tariff reductions can boost trade.”1101  
Specific estimates on these costs of complying with new RoO under CETA are unfortunately unavailable, 
and it is beyond the scope of this study to attempt such estimates. However, there is evidence that 
improvements in trade facilitation systems can reduce the barriers imposed by RoO, including helping 
reduce costs incurred by businesses in complying with RoO.1102 Beyond this, at present it is unclear to 
what degree the increased trade facilitation efforts between the EU and Canada under CETA would 
offset the increased costs of compliance due to changing RoO under CETA. 
 
INDICATOR:  Production costs, output, exports, consumer prices 
Canada and EU 
Unlike past SIAs dealing with lesser developed countries than Canada, the CGE model was not used to 
measure changes in trade facilitation in this report.1103 However, findings from past SIAs on the benefits 
of trade facilitation measures might be generally applied to the EU-Canada FTA. The CGE model for this 
study predicts an increase in overall output in both Canada and the EU. Given past SIA results, increased 
output combined with improvements in trade facilitation lead to reduced producer costs. Thus, 
improved trade facilitation resulting from the CETA could lead to an overall reduction in production 
costs in Canada and the EU. This may in turn lead to some positive impact on output, exports, and 
consumer prices in both Canada and the EU. However, these positive impacts would be less than 
envisaged by many studies that have modelled the benefits of trade facilitation reforms in certain 
developing countries, as the EU and Canada have comparatively solid trade facilitation systems and thus 
there would be less efficiency gains from their reform. 
As mentioned under the “Impact on regulatory and institutional regime” indicator above, certain newer 
MS would benefit most from improved trade facilitation systems. Although given the relatively larger 
                                                             
1101 Harris, J. and B. R. Staples (2009). “Origin and Beyond: Trade Facilitation Disaster or Trade Facility Opportunity?” Inter-
American Development Bank. IDM Working Paper Series #IDB-WP-147. Pg 3-4 
1102 Ibid 
1103 For example, the EU-Andean SIA modelling measured trade facilitation using a 1% reduction of producer costs for a modest 
liberalisation scenario and a 3% reduction in producer costs for an ambitious liberalisation scenario. See: DEVELOPMENT 
Solutions et al (2009). EU-Andean SIA: Final Report. October 2009. 
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size of the EU economy compared with the Canadian economy this will limit the benefit of such reforms 
for the EU as a whole. 
Canada would likely improve most in terms of reduced costs to import and costs to export given their 
relatively lower scores in these areas as gauged by the World Bank’s 2010 Indicators of Trade Costs. Still, 
these reductions in Canada in particular would be offset at least partially by increased costs of 
complying with CETA RoO rather than NAFTA RoO. As noted under the “Costs to government of RoO, 
costs to business of RoO” indicator, it is unclear to what degree the increased trade facilitation efforts 
between the EU and Canada under CETA would offset the increased costs of compliance due to changing 
RoO under CETA. And it is clear there will be increased costs of compliance for Canada in particular. To 
the extent that trade facilitation does not fully offset the increased costs of compliance, this would 
negate the previously mentioned positive impacts on output, exports, production costs, and consumer 
prices. Specific estimates on the costs of complying with new RoO under CETA are unfortunately 
unavailable, and it is beyond the scope of this study to attempt such estimates. 
 
SOCIAL ASSESSMENT 
 
Canada and EU 
As discussed under the economic pillar, the CETA may result in some reduction of producer costs and 
consumer prices, and may lead to some increases in output and exports. As a result this may have some 
positive social impacts. Directly related employment effects may be minor/limited, 1104 and thus impacts 
on other social issues, such as poverty, health, education and equity are also expected to be relatively 
minor/limited. This said, as noted throughout the analysis, to the extent that trade facilitation does not 
fully offset the increased costs of compliance with CETA RoO, this will negate even the minor/limited 
positive impacts mentioned for Canada in particular. 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 
 
INDICATOR: Energy consumption, waste generation, air pollution, institutional and regulatory 
environment, policy space   
Canada and EU 
As limited change is forecasted in the economic results for trade facilitation measures under CETA, there 
is not expected to be significant environmental impacts, although there may be some impacts. Any 
impacts that would be attributed to improved trade facilitation would be from increased energy 
consumption and waste generation, and secondly attributed to potential impacts stemming from some 
                                                             
1104 While there is evidence that trade facilitation efforts can lead to increases in employment, the majority of this focuses on 
developing countries. (For example, see, among others, Hewitt, A. and Gillson, I. (2003). “Income Distribution Impact of Trade 
Faciliation in Developing Countries – Background Document for the International Forum on Trade Faciliation.”  Second 
International Forum on Trade Facilitation, organised by CTIED at UN/CEFACT on 14 and 15 May 2003 in Geneva.)  Given this, as 
well as the uncertainty of the RoO impacts of CETA, this analysis avoids a more specific discussion on shifts or gains in 
employment in Canada and the EU resulting from trade facilitation measures in CETA. Still, given the developed nature of the 
trade facilitation systems in Canada and the EU, as mentioned, it appears reasonable to suggest that CETA trade facilitation 
measures in and of themselves will not have a significant impact on net employment in Canada or the EU. 
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increased air and marine transport between Canada and the EU.  Still, trade facilitation reform would 
likely not in itself directly lead to significant environmental impacts in these areas.  
CETA could possibly modify how Canadian environmental regulations are developed or implemented or 
how environmental objectives are set. But given that both Canada and the EU already have relatively 
sophisticated and efficient trade facilitation regimes, it is not expected that CETA will have dramatic 
impacts on the policy space of environment and regulatory regimes. 
 
7.4.2. USA, MEXICO & OTHER THIRD COUNTRIES 
 
BASELINE 
Refer to baseline in “Canada & EU” section above as this also forms the most important background for 
this section. 
 
ANALYSIS 
USA & MEXICO 
One on hand, trade facilitation measures by themselves in CETA may have some limited negative 
impacts on the US and Mexico. To the degree that CETA proposes new RoO which Canadian companies 
must meet to trade under certain preferences in the CETA, trade facilitation measures will become 
increasingly important as they relate to distinguishing NAFTA RoO accounting from CETA RoO 
accounting. It is unclear to what exact degree the increased trade facilitation efforts between the EU 
and Canada under CETA would offset the increased costs of compliance for Canada to meet CETA RoO. 
But to the extent that trade facilitation measures make this shift to CETA RoO easier/reduce the costs of 
compliance, they will act as an incentive to shift certain production away from the US and Mexico.  
On the other hand, to the degree that trade facilitation measures in CETA reduce trading costs on 
products exported from the US and Mexico to Canada and the EU, the US and Mexico may see some 
benefits.  
Both the potential positive and negative impacts mentioned would be limited by the current level of 
integration among the Canadian, US and Mexican economies, including in their customs systems. 
OTHER THIRD COUNTRIES 
Trade facilitation provisions in CETA may have some positive impact on other third countries outside the 
US and Mexico. In the short run, implementing trade facilitation measures in the EU and Canada could 
also produce static efficiency effects in third countries which may benefit from improved performance 
of specific export industries and reduced costs of the EU and Canada border procedures. This said, for 
context, trade facilitation improvements unrelated to CETA within developing countries with which the 
EU and Canada trade (including those with which both have trade agreements), will likely have a much 
more significant impact on those countries trade with Canada and the EU.1105 But, if trade facilitation 
                                                             
1105 See evidence from: Wilson, J. S. & Mann, C. L. and Otsuki, T. (2004). "Assessing the potential benefit of trade facilitation: A 
global perspective.” World Bank Policy Research Working Papers, number 3224.  
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measures in CETA are in fact extended to bilateral agreements between the EU or Canada and third 
countries, it is reasonable to assume that the simplification of trade procedures in the former might 
increase transparency, facilitate customs clearance, enhance government effectiveness in collecting 
duties and help in the fight against fraud and corruption in such third countries.1106 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1106  As an illustration, the negotiations between the EU and Mercosur include trade facilitation measures which, among the 
static efficiency gains, would produce higher fixed capital formation through increased FDI since investing companies require 
cheap, quick, transparent and predictable customs services. See EC (2008). 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/november/tradoc_141396.pdf 
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7.5. LABOUR MOBILITY1107 
 
Summary: Labour mobility provisions in CETA focused on workers in professional business services could 
result in a more efficient allocation of skills and increased productivity in Canada and the EU, as well as 
increase innovation that could lead to some social and environmental benefits.   
 
 
7.5.1. CANADA & EU 
 
BASELINE 
Canada 
Movement of Foreign Workers in Canada 
General allowances on temporary movement of foreign workers 
Like many countries, Canada grants foreign nationals the right to remain and work in its borders 
temporarily. The number of individuals admitted annually on a temporary basis has been growing faster 
than the number of permanent immigrants. Some of these non-permanent residents are admitted 
under the Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP) expressly to fill jobs in Canada. Canada‘s federal 
government currently has the TFWP in place to allow employers to hire foreigners to work in Canada for 
an authorised period of time if they can demonstrate that they are unable to find suitable Canadians or 
permanent residents to fill the jobs and that the employment of these workers will not negatively 
impact the Canadian labour market. This assessment is made via a formal evaluation opinion on the 
labour market.  
In order to address skill shortages and to help meet program and international trade commitments, 
Canada has admitted thousands of workers each year. In 2007, Canada admitted more than 120,000 
temporary foreign workers. In 2006, there were more than 112,000 non-permanent residents employed 
in Canada. Europe accounted for more than 24% of the total with some 27,000 workers entering Canada 
from EU Member States, predominantly from France, Germany, Ireland and the UK.1108 While the 
majority of temporary workers in Canada are employed in predominantly manual labour positions in the 
agriculture and construction industries, European workers in Canada tend to be professionals in more 
knowledge based, service industries.1109 
While this program is in place to address issues with regards to foreign workers entering Canada, there 
are a number of instances where a work permit is not required. Business visitors may come to Canada to 
engage in international business activities without a work permit. There are a number of other 
categories where workers also do not require a work permit.  These workers include military personnel, 
                                                             
1107 Introductory notes:  This assessment focuses on labour mobility in the narrow context of professional business persons 
moving across borders to work on a temporary basis, as this is the focus of labour mobility provisions likely to be included in the 
CETA. The assessment involves consideration of temporary movement of foreign workers, intra-country labour mobility and 
mutual recognition agreements on both types of such labour mobility. This considers border issues such as authorisation 
requirements for temporary entry, work permits and labour market tests, as well as issues that go beyond the border such as 
licensing and accreditation. The baseline for this section is largely adapted from the 2008 Joint Study. 
 
1108 Statistics Canada 
1109 Human Resources and Skills Development Canada 
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foreign government officers, foreign representatives and their family members, students working on 
campus, athletes and coaches, performance artists, news reporters, expert witnesses and investigators, 
healthcare students, civil aviation inspectors, accident or incident investigators, crew members and 
emergency service providers. 
In order to ensure that the TFWP is responsive to regional skills and labour shortages, the Canadian 
government works closely with officials from the provinces and territories. The development of labour 
market opinions is of significant importance in helping to determine the existence of gaps in the 
Canadian labour market. Labour market data used in the opinions, including market information on 
wages, skills and labour shortages and labour standards, is provided by officials from the provinces and 
territories. The government also works with Canadian employers and industry associations in order to 
develop a greater understanding of the current and emerging needs of the labour market.  
 
Multi-lateral Commitments on Movement of Temporary Workers 
Canada is a signatory to several agreements that allow for the freer movement of temporary workers. 
They include, among others, NAFTA, GATS, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum. Under 
NAFTA, traders and investors, intra-company transferees, business visitors and specific categories of 
professionals are processed more easily. GATS mode 4 commitments provide for liberalised trade in 
services including the movement of professionals and technical experts. The Seasonal Agricultural 
Workers Program (SAWP) between Canada, Mexico and a number of Caribbean countries provides for 
the expeditious movement of farm workers. Canada’s Live-in Caregiver Program provides for the 
temporary movement of caregivers and child care workers to Canada from abroad. 
In relation to GATS, Canada has made commitments in three broad categories:  business visitors, intra-
corporate transferees, and professionals (both contract service suppliers and independent 
professionals).  Through the WTO Doha Round, Canada has tabled two offers, which reflect several 
improvements in mode 4 commitments. The first offer provided for a modification of Canada’s 
commitments on professionals to differentiate between contract service employees (employees of an 
enterprise) and independent professionals (those who are self-employed). The offer included provisions 
to increase the length of stay for business visitors, executives, managers and professionals. Included in 
the offer was after-sales and after-lease service providers in the business visitor category as well as 
adding senior computer specialists to the professional category. In addition, a new category which 
facilitates the entry of spouses and common-law partners of intra-corporate transferees and 
professionals has been added. 
 
Bilateral and Regional Agreements on Temporary Entry of Business Persons 
In bilateral and regional FTAs to date, Canada has used two different approaches. One approach has 
been to negotiate agreements which include a comprehensive, reciprocal stand alone chapter on the 
temporary entry of business persons. The other approach has been to include a chapter which strongly 
urges each party to reaffirm their existing GATS commitments. 
Foreign Credential Recognition 
Requirements and procedures with respect to recognising foreign credentials vary greatly by jurisdiction. 
Numerous bodies are involved in recognising, certifying, registering and licensing applicants.   
Under the Canadian system, the assessment of foreign credentials is shared between the federal 
government and the provinces and territories. The federal government is responsible for border issues 
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and immigration, determining labour market policies and for providing leadership and national tools 
which serve to strengthen the economic union; whereas the provincial and territorial governments are 
charged with the regulation of most skilled trades and most professions. Authority has been delegated 
to provincial regulatory authorities to regulate most professions, particularly via determining licensing 
and certification requirements. Recognition of credentials in non-regulated occupations remains the 
responsibility of employers.  
The government of Canada recently announced that it would spend $395,000 on initiatives designed to 
boost foreign credential recognition between Canada and EU countries and foster labour mobility for 
workers on both sides of the Atlantic.1110 The government will also fund work by the Environmental 
Career Organization (ECO) of Canada to develop a mutual certification framework for environmental 
workers in Europe and Canada. 
 
Inter-provincial Labour Mobility 
20% of Canadian workers are employed in regulated occupations or trades1111 of which most are 
professionals, skilled technicians, or work in compulsory trades. Under Canada’s federal system, the 
provinces are responsible for determining what occupational standards are needed to ensure, for 
example, that heavy equipment operators, paramedics, accountants and other skilled workers are 
properly qualified and will not put their clients, patients, students, or the public safety at risk. To ensure 
that provincial standards do not unduly impede labour mobility, the provinces have established various 
programs to reconcile competing standards where this is appropriate.1112 
In Canada, the provinces and territories are charged with the responsibility for regulating professions 
and trades. There are over 440 occupational regulatory bodies in Canada, representing over 100 
different occupations and millions of workers.1113 
The Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT) was signed by the federal, provincial and territorial governments 
in 1994 with an aim to reducing internal barriers to trade including labour mobility. In December 2008, 
Canadian trade officials approved the 9th Protocol of Amendment to substantially expand the application 
of the labour mobility provisions of the AIT which came into effect on April 1, 2009. Article 706:1 of that 
updated agreement provides that: 
 “…any worker certified for an occupation by a regulatory authority of a Party shall upon 
application, be certified for that occupation by each other Party which regulates that occupation without 
any requirement for any material training, experience, examinations or assessments as part of the 
certification procedure.”   
Under this new amendment, a worker certified by any provincial regulator is entitled to work anywhere 
in Canada. Each province will still be entitled to maintain higher certification standards; however, they 
cannot impose these on workers certified by other provinces unless they can prove that their higher 
standard is necessary to achieve a legitimate objective.1114   
                                                             
1110 Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, 2009 
1111 Industry Canada 
1112 Impediments to labour mobility are now addressed through Mutual Recognition Agreements among regulatory agencies, 
and the Red Seal Program. 
1113 Human Resources and Skills Development Canada 
1114 Article 708:2 of the amendment allows a party to impose a higher standard where a party can demonstrate that: 
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Although much progress has been made in the past 16 or so years, inter-provincial barriers to labour 
mobility in Canada still exist. It has been asserted that provincial and territorial differences in licensing 
and qualifications are one of the major hurdles to improving labour mobility in the Canadian market. 
These impediments are seen as hindering the inter-provincial movement in regulated occupations 
across the country and affect Canadian and internationally trained workers.   
 
The Red Seal Program 
 
The Interprovincial Standards Red Seal Program was established to provide greater mobility for skilled 
workers across Canada. The Red Seal program allows qualified trades people to practice their trade 
anywhere in Canada where the trade is designated without having to write further examinations. To 
date, there are 49 trades included in the Red Seal Program on a national basis, which account for over 
88% of all apprentices and more than 80% of the total trades’ workforce in Canada.1115 
 
Mutual Recognition Agreements  
Canadian Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) are cross-border and cross-sectoral agreements 
among jurisdictions in Canada or between Canada and foreign entities.  
Since the creation of the WTO, international MRAs have been included in free trade agreements with 
increased frequency. MRAs cover the varied components of professional qualifications and are intended 
to facilitate the mutual recognition of foreign credentials and experience thereby easing the movement 
of professionals from one nation to another.   
In Canada, the provinces and territories as well as self-regulated professional associations are 
responsible for the recognition and licensing of professionals. The Government of Canada only 
encourages and supports the negotiation of MRAs between professional bodies through the provisions 
negotiated as part of international trade agreements. Provisions in existing FTAs (for example, NAFTA 
and the Canada-Chile FTA) and ongoing FTA negotiations provide for the inclusion of non-binding and 
voluntary licensing and recognition guidelines. These provisions provide the framework and offer 
practical guidance for professional bodies entering into MRA negotiations. 
Discussions on mutual recognition agreements are strongly supported by Canada’s professional bodies, 
particularly those which are export oriented. The Government of Canada often consults with national 
professional associations regarding their potential interests in pursuing mutual recognition with their 
counterparts in other countries. However, the ultimate decision to pursue the negotiation of an MRA 
lies solely with the professional body. The MRAs are then signed by the national professional 
associations on behalf of the provincial and territorial regulatory bodies who then must ratify and 
implement the agreement once it has been adopted.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
 “…(a) there is a material difference between the scope of practice of the occupation for which the worker is seeking to be 
certified in its territory and the scope of practice of the occupation for which the worker has been certified by the regulatory 
authority of another Party; and  
(b) as a result of that difference, the worker lacks a critical skill, area of knowledge or ability required to perform the scope of 
practice of the occupation for which the worker seeks to be certified.”  
1115 Service Canada, URL http://www.servicecanada.gc.ca/eng/goc/aig/redseal.html  Retrieved:  21 October 2010 
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EU 
Movement of Foreign Workers in the EU 
General allowances on temporary movement of foreign workers 
Canadian business people entering into most EU Member States for stays of less than a three to six 
month period should follow the requirements for the Schengen acquis. The borderless zone created by 
the Schengen Agreements, the Schengen Area, currently consists of 25 European countries, covering a 
population of over 400 million people and an area of 4,312,099 square kilometres. The UK and Ireland 
have not signed up to the Schengen Convention and therefore decide their involvement on a case by 
case basis. The participating Member States also have the option of requiring a work permit. In order to 
gain entry, a number of conditions must be met: possession of a valid travel document; justification of 
the business purpose and conditions of the intended stay; proof of sufficient means of subsistence for 
the entire stay as well as for repatriation to the country of origin; the absence of an alert on the 
Schengen Information System; and the determination that no threat to public policy, internal security, 
public health or the international relations of any Member State exists.1116 
 
Multi-lateral Commitments on Movement of Temporary Workers 
The EU has undertaken a number of obligations on the temporary entry of business persons with 
regards to their multilateral trade agreements. The EU is a signatory to GATS and as such enjoys the 
facilitated access for temporary entry WTO parties have committed to under GATS mode 4.  
 
Bilateral and Regional Agreements on Temporary Entry of Business Persons 
With regards to trade in services in its bilateral and regional trade agreements, the EU has employed a 
different methodology from Canada. Similar to the methodology used in GATS, the EU uses a positive list 
approach. Therefore, commitments made under bilateral and regional agreements are similar in scope 
and structure to the ones made in GATS. 
 
Foreign Credential Recognition 
With the exception of some professions in the health and architectural industries (doctors, dentists, 
general care nurses, midwives, pharmacists, veterinarians and architects), the majority of professions in 
the EU are regulated by the individual Member States. As such, the competent national authorities in 
each Member State must recognise the qualifications of foreign workers. This also applies to third 
country nationals wishing to work in the EU. 
Each Member State may have different procedures for recognising foreign diplomas and assessing 
foreign diploma certificates for third-country workers. While Member States generally appear to 
recognise foreign qualifications and those of nationals equally, in other instances (for example, in 
Denmark) the recognition of diplomas and certificates depends on the existence of an international 
agreement with the worker’s country of origin. 
                                                             
1116 For the complete acquis, including the fundamental Agreement and Convention and certain subsequent acts and 
instruments see: EC (2000). "Official Journal of the European Communities - The Schengen Acquis" (in English). 2000-09-22. 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2000/l_239/l_23920000922en00010473.pdf. 
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Intra-EU Mobility 
The European Union originally developed a system for the mutual recognition of professional 
qualifications in order to ensure the success of the Single European Market. Specific Directives based on 
the principle of harmonisation relating to only a few professions (including architects) were expanded 
upon through Directive 2005/36/EC (hereafter the “General Directive”), which introduced a system 
applicable to all other professions.1117 The system allows those professionals who meet the criteria 
within the General Directive to move within Europe by claiming access to the national title of 
professionals who do the same work. The system is based on the education and/or professional 
diplomas awarded in each Member State and the nature of the activities which comprises the profession 
in each Member State. 
The new directive which took effect on 20 October 2007 maintains the three main systems of 
recognition: 
1.) Directive 2005/36/EC grants automatic recognition of the professional titles of doctors, dentists, 
nurses, midwives, pharmacists, veterinary surgeons and architects on the basis of harmonised 
minimum training requirements laid down in that directive. 
2.) The Directive provides for similar automatic recognition approach for various activities of craft, 
commerce and industry sectors listed in its annex.  In contrast to the first system, this approach 
is based on the recognition of consecutive periods of experience and skills (and not just on the 
possession of formal qualifications or diplomas). 
3.) The Directive provides for general rules applying to all other regulated professions not covered 
by the above-mentioned systems. Under these rules, called the “general system,” access to a 
profession shall be granted to a professional who is fully qualified for the profession in question 
in another Member State. However, if the duration or the content of training of a migrant differs 
substantially from those required in the host Member State, compensatory measures can be 
imposed on the migrant, i.e. either an adaptation period or an aptitude test. 
 
The Directive makes provisions for a variety of rules on third country qualifications held by EU citizens. 
Member State nationals holding third country qualifications may be permitted to pursue a regulated 
profession in accordance with Member State rules to which they are applying. However, in case of those 
professions for which EU law provides for minimum training conditions, the recognition shall respect 
these conditions. In order to be considered equivalent EU qualifications, third country qualifications 
must include a minimum of three years of professional experience in the Member State which has 
recognised these qualifications.   
Under certain conditions, third country nationals can benefit from EU law on the recognition of 
professional qualifications, for instance if they have the status of a long term resident under Directive 
2003/109/EC or if they are family members of an EU citizen within the meaning of Directive 2004/38/EC. 
Both directives provide for equal treatment with EU nationals which means that once they obtained 
their first recognition in one EU Member State (on the basis of a bilateral agreement or other agreement) 
and once they have worked in this EU Member State for three years, their third country professional 
qualification is considered equivalent to a qualification from the EU. If a third country worker then 
leaves this EU Member State of first entry, the second Member State where he moves has to apply the 
                                                             
1117EC. Internal Market Qualifications.  http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/qualifications/future_en.htm  Retrieved:  22 
October 2010. 
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system of recognition of professional qualifications as laid down in Directive 2005/36/EC (hereafter the 
“Directive”) to this “third country qualification.” 
The most important innovation of the Directive is the new regime to facilitate the provision of services, 
namely the right of a national of one Member State to pursue his or her profession on a “temporary and 
occasional basis” in another Member State without having to apply for recognition of qualifications. 
Pursuant to these rules, a Member State shall not, as a matter of principle, restrict, for any reason 
relating to professional qualifications, the free provision of services in the Member State if the service 
provider legally exercises the same profession in another Member State. 
However, the professional is subject to the rules and regulations of the host Member State that are 
directly connected to professional qualifications, such as malpractice and disciplinary provisions.1118 In 
addition, the first time the service is to be provided, the host Member State may require that the 
professional inform the host Member State in advance of the details of insurance coverage for 
professional liability.1119 The professional may also be required to submit the following documents: 
proof of nationality; an attestation that the professional is legally entitled to practice in the original 
Member State; evidence of professional qualifications; proof that the professional has practised this 
profession for at least two years during the previous ten years if the original Member State does not 
regulate this profession; and, for professions in the security sector, evidence of no criminal 
convictions.1120 Exceptionally, a prior check of qualifications is allowed in case of regulated professions 
having public health or safety implications.  
A move towards closer administrative cooperation and collaboration between the competent 
authorities of the Member States is also provided for under the new Directive. 
 
Mutual Recognition Agreements 
The EU has MRAs that are cross-border or cross-sectoral among jurisdictions in the EU or between EU 
entities and entities in third countries. European professional associations have been actively 
negotiating MRAs as well as reciprocal agreements and common understandings for a number of 
professions including accountants, architects, engineers, chiropractors and information systems 
specialists. 
MRAs only work with third parties or within the EU where there is substantial commonality between the 
nature of the professional activities (and therefore the professional education and training which 
underpins the professional qualification) in the professions in both the home country and the host 
country. Where there are minor differences in those professional activities, the Directive mentioned in 
the intra-EU labour mobility section allows for the applicant to remedy the deficiency either by 
undertaking an aptitude test or by undergoing a period of supervised work experience.  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1118 Article 5, section 3 of the Directive 
1119 Article 7, section 1 of the Directive 
1120 Article 7, section 2 of the Directive 
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ANALYSIS 
 
ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT 
 
INDICATOR:  Output, exports 
Canada and EU 
Several studies that have examined the temporary and permanent movement of workers in certain 
circumstances, for example between developed and developing countries, have found evidence of a 
positive correlation between labour mobility and efficiency growth.1121 Studies have more specifically 
focused on the relationship between migration and trade between developing and developed countries. 
Herein, there are different models of trade whereas one suggests that cross-border flows of goods act to 
reduce cross-border labour mobility, and others suggest a positive correlation between trade and 
migration. Still, generally, it is cited that increased trade encourages migration of skilled labour from 
non-industrialised/industrialising countries to industrialised countries. This trend is labelled the South-
North “brain drain.”1122  
 
While these studies primarily look at the movement of labour in general, as well as the movements 
among developing and developed countries, the focus of CETA and thus this analysis is the much smaller 
movement of business professionals among Canada the EU. Generally, taking from the theory 
established in the literature, trade and flows of skilled temporary labour like the type being discussed 
would be complements under CETA. Given the majority of the countries of the EU are well developed 
there would be far less demand for labour movement of skilled workers between the EU and Canada 
than between a developing country and either country/area. Nonetheless, the movements that would 
take place by decreasing barriers to movement would likely encourage efficiency. This may increase 
exports depending on if the areas in which the efficiency gains are realised are exporting industries, and 
of course depending on export demand.  
 
INDICATOR:  Rate/volume of FDI flows 
Canada and EU 
Generally, improved labour mobility is likely to have a positive effect on FDI. Labour mobility has been 
found to have a positive impact on investment between sending and receiving countries. A 2005 WTO 
study examining the relationship between FDI and the temporary movement of people found that a 10% 
increase in temporary movement correlated to an 8% increase of FDI inflows and 7.1% of outflows of 
FDI.1123   
While these figures relate at large to the movement of temporary labour workers in the non-services 
sectors, the effects of improved labour mobility on FDI in the services sector is less clear. A recent 
                                                             
1121 Among others, see: Walmsley, T. L. and L. A. Winters (2002) "Relaxing Restrictions on the Temporary Movement of Natural 
Persons: A Simulation Analysis", University of Sheffield; and Winters, L. A., T. L. Walmsley, Z. K. Wang, and R. Grynberg (2003). 
“Liberalising Labour Mobility Under GATS.” Economic Paper 53, Commonwealth Secretariat, London. 
1122  Ghose, A. K. (2002). “Employment Paper 2002/33: Trade and international labour mobility.” International Labour 
Organization. URL:  http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/documents/publication/wcms_142364.pdf 
1123 Jansen, M. and Piermartini, R. (2005).  “The Impact of Mode 4 Liberalization on Bilateral Trade Flows,” WTO Economic 
Research and Statistics Division, November 2005. 
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analysis by the University of St. Gallen has implied that the positive effects from general labour mobility 
claimed in the literature are likely only for a limited subset of services.1124 More empirical analysis would 
be required to assess the specific effects of labour mobility provisions regarding professional services in 
CETA on FDI flows.  
 
SOCIAL ASSESSMENT 
 
Canada and the EU 
Labour mobility provisions in CETA could allow for increased competitiveness which could translate into 
certain social benefits in Canada and the EU, although the magnitude of these benefits is uncertain. One 
of the clearest social benefits, outside those stemming directly from the potentially positive impacts on 
employment mentioned in the Economic section, is the encouragement of innovation. The extent to 
which business persons can more easily move across borders will have a direct impact on how quickly 
enterprises can adapt to technological changes or how quickly competitive advantages can be 
exploited.1125 Including provisions for labour mobility in professional services may facilitate improved 
flows of ideas like the types needed to create innovations that will benefit society.  
 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 
Canada and the EU 
No noteworthy negative environmental impacts for labour mobility provisions under CETA are predicted. 
This is due to the focus on professional service industries in which negative environmental externalities 
are limited.  
Moreover, in the mid- to long-term, including provisions for labour mobility in professional services may 
facilitate improved flow of ideas like the types needed to create environmentally-friendly technology. 
This would have a positive impact on the environment. And when combined with certain other 
provisions of CETA, for example those on investment, among others, this could magnify such benefits. 
 
7.5.2. USA, MEXICO & OTHER THIRD COUNTRIES 
BASELINE 
Refer to the baseline in “Canada & EU” section above as this also forms the most important background 
for this section. 
 
 
                                                             
1124 Henneberger, Fred and Ziegler, Alexandre (2006). “Employment Effects of Foreign Direct Investment in the Service Sector: A 
Systematic Approach.” Research Institute for Labour Economic and Labour Law, St. Gallen University. May, 2006 
1125 Radcliffe, Brent (2008). “The Economics of Labour Mobility”, October 2008. 
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ANALYSIS 
If the labour mobility provisions in CETA extend to other countries outside Canada and those in the EU, 
they may have positive impacts on the US, Mexico and other third countries. This would allow freer 
movement of professional business service workers. This could have particularly positive effects in lesser 
developed third countries by allowing skilled workers from these countries to gain knowledge and 
experience abroad and in turn use it to potentially develop the economic, social and environmental 
spheres in their home country (for example, through development of innovative technologies built with 
skills they learned abroad). This of course is contingent on these workers returning to their home 
country, rather than creating a “brain drain” by staying in the EU or Canada or moving to another 
developed country or region.  
However, in the opposite scenario, if the provisions do not extend to other trading partners of the EU 
and Canada, this could provide some advantage for movement of professional service workers among 
the EU and Canada over professional workers from other countries. Without specifics on such provisions 
in CETA it is not possible to further assess the significance of these potential impacts. 
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7.6. FREE CIRCULATION OF GOODS1126 
Summary: Similar to non-tariff barriers that exist in international trade, internal trade barriers often 
distort production and consumption costs, raising the purchase prices of goods paid for by consumers, 
businesses and governments. The negative impact of internal barriers created by Canadian labelling rules 
in particular are not exclusively encountered by Canadian companies, as incoming goods from the EU 
and other countries are also subject to the same rules. Thus, reducing these internal trade barriers 
increases efficiency in the Canadian market and while the EU does not face the same issues internally 
with respect to the free circulation of goods that Canada does, the benefits expected to be realised 
within Canada as a result of CETA, or at least CETA-encouraged inter-provincial reform, will likely have a 
favourable effect on the EU. 
While governments within Canada have made efforts in the past to reduce internal trade barriers, 
including those to free-circulation of goods, the pace of progress has been slow and CETA provides an 
opportunity to bring the federal and provincial governments together to enact major reform. Provisions 
allowing freer circulation of goods could improve Canada’s productivity and would be particularly 
focused within the agriculture and agri-foods sector. Additionally, addressing this internal issue will likely 
have a more general positive influence on investment in the country by changing the current global 
perception that Canada has many internal impediments to free circulation of goods.  
7.6.1. CANADA & EU 
BASELINE 
 
Canada 
 
Although Canada has contributed to the liberalisation of international trade and signed bilateral free 
trade agreements as a complement to the multilateral system, it has not as actively reduced its own 
internal trade barriers at the same pace. In a 2007 speech from Prime Minister Harper, the Canadian 
government recognised that, “despite the globalization of markets…it is often harder to move goods and 
services across provincial boundaries than across our international borders.”1127 
 
Although Section 121 of the Canadian constitution prohibits the use of inter-provincial tariffs, 
subsequent judicial interpretation has allowed provinces to implement non-tariff barriers which have 
fragmented the country’s internal market and provide obstacles to pan-Canadian standards. After the 
implementation of NAFTA, the Canadian federal government managed to bring the provinces together 
and negotiated an Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT), although not without resistance from groups for 
provincial protectionism. The AIT took effect in 1995 but as it required separate legislative and 
                                                             
1126 Introductory Notes: While barriers to labour mobility and investment as well as government procurement issues are often 
discussed in conjunction with the free circulation of goods and services, the former elements have been analysed in their own 
sections. This section focuses primarily on the movement of goods (foreign or Canadian) among jurisdictions within Canada.  
1127 Text of Prime Minister Stephen Harper's speech from the throne, Oct.  16 2007 
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administrative actions by each of the provincial governments to take effect, implementation started 
slowly and little progress was made.1128  
However, under the Harper government there has been a renewed interest in removing the internal 
barriers and recent progress has been made albeit only by some provinces. In 2006, the governments of 
British Columbia and Alberta signed a Trade, Investment and Labor Mobility Agreement (TILMA). With 
certain exceptions, TILMA phases out existing barriers to free circulation of goods and creates a 
mechanism for dispute settlement that is accessible by businesses, NGOs and individuals. The 
governments of Ontario and Quebec are said to be considering talks on a related agreement of their 
own.  
While internal trade barriers impede a number of different sectors, the most prevalent internal trade 
impediments exist in the agriculture and agri-foods sectors. For example, restrictions are in place that 
limit inter-provincial shipments of supply-managed commodities such as wheat, dairy and poultry 
products; prohibitions are in place on bulk shipments of fruits and vegetables; different labelling rules 
and food packaging requirements discourage internal trading; and meat inspection requirements often 
overlap which prevents shipments to processors in other provinces or territories. 
The negative impact of internal barriers created by labelling rules in particular are not exclusively 
encountered by domestic companies, as incoming goods from the EU and other countries are also 
subject to the same rules. In many cases, stakeholders have claimed that numerous provincial laws have 
not been harmonised with federal regulations. This creates a problem where labelling is therefore not 
possible during production or before shipment but instead must take place in Canada. This can lead to 
shipping delays and increased costs for operators. Also, as the issue is at the provincial and not federal 
level, products not meeting requirements are often not stopped at the border but are instead only 
discovered during spot checks once the goods have arrived at retail locations. 
These practices have been justified by noting that many health and safety-related labelling requirements 
fall under the jurisdiction of individual provinces and territories. Contrary to certain stakeholder claims, 
the Canadian Competition Bureau has stated that most requirements have been harmonised or 
reciprocal agreements put in place to address such issues. Nonetheless, the bureau has recognised that 
further negotiations need to be conducted with an aim to establishing less burdensome and less costly 
requirements for labels.     
 
EU 
The European Union has been considerably more successful than Canada in eliminating internal trade 
barriers with respect to the free circulation of goods. Since 1992, the EU has worked towards the mutual 
recognition and harmonisation of different laws, regulations and administrative provisions of individual 
Member States that previously hindered the movement of goods throughout the union. As a result of 
the integration, both physical and technical barriers have been virtually eliminated. Border checks of 
goods were abolished, EU-wide quotas against restricted outside country goods were adopted, customs 
forms were standardised, the requirement for bilateral permits that rationed truck transportation 
between countries was eliminated, and Value Added Tax (VAT) and excise taxes were harmonised as 
were product health standards.1129   
                                                             
1128 DFIAT. “Domestic Trade Barriers.” http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/ait/domestic-
trade-barriers.aspx?lang=en 
1129 Chapman, A. “Economic Union: A Comparison of Canadian Government Proposals and the Plans of the European 
Community.” Government of Canada.  
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ANALYSIS 
 
ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT 
 
INDICATOR: Institutional and regulatory regime 
Canada 
Canadian governments have recently implemented a number of potential improvements to facilitate 
inter-provincial investment, and to the degree that CETA builds on these measures it could further allow 
for more efficient circulation of goods. CETA may propose a number of initiatives to allow more 
flexibility in Canada’s institutional and regulatory regime, one being to change product labelling 
protocols. 
 
EU 
The inter-state institutional and regulatory systems for circulation of goods in the EU will likely not be 
strengthened much further by CETA. 
 
INDICATORS:  Output, exports, real income, production costs, employment, market prices 
Canada 
Proponents of improving the free circulation of goods through the reduction of internal trade barriers 
also believe that the barriers between provinces stifle economic growth and hamper business 
development. Others have argued, however, that the barriers are minimal. In an analysis of the 
economic case for TILMA, Lee and Weir (2007) conclude that “there are very few obstacles to trade and 
investment among provinces, and no evidence that such obstacles entail significant economic costs.”1130 
They argue that, in addition to using faulty methodology, a number of studies of the effects of barriers 
consistently overlook the economic benefits of those same barriers that allow government to act in the 
public interest.1131 
Different estimates have been produced on the cost of inter-provincial trade barriers in Canada. In a 
2006 hearing, the chairman of the Canadian Senate’s Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and 
Commerce cited estimates on the costs of current inter-provincial trade barriers at between $10 and 
$25 billion dollars annually1132 ($25 billion would equate to 2.23% of Canada’s GDP in 2007).1133 Certain 
empirical studies done in the 1980s and 1990s show that inter-provincial barriers in Canada impose a 
comparatively smaller cost on the overall economy, estimating that removing such barriers would 
increase Canada’s GDP by less than 0.5 per cent.1134 (The dated nature of these latter studies may affect 
their applicability to the current market in Canada, although this does not necessarily imply the 2006 
figures are more accurate.) 
                                                             
1130 Lee, M. and E. Weir (2007). “Behind the Numbers: The Myth of Interpovincial Trade Barriers and TILMA’s Alleged Economic 
Benefits.”  Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives. pg 1 
1131 Ibid 
1132 Sands, C. (2007). “Canada’s Problem: Domestic Trade Barriers.” The American. www.american.com/archive/2007/may-0507 
1133 Calculations using Canada’s 2007 GDP of $1.089 trillion 
1134 Whalley, J. (1983) 1(995).  “Induced Distortions of Interprovincial Activity: An Overview of Issues” and “The Impact of 
Federal Policies on Interprovincial Activity.”  In M.J. Trebilcock et al. (eds.), Federalism and the Canadian Economic Union. 
Ontario Economic Council. 
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Although there may be disagreements on the magnitude of the effects, it is reasonable to state that 
internal trade barriers in Canada increase production costs and result in higher consumer prices. This in 
principle also results in less choice for consumers. Further, such inter-provincial trade barriers 
contribute to additional costs that are ultimately passed on to the public through increased taxes, 
inferior services or increased debt.1135  
While free circulation of goods is not the only trade barrier among provinces in Canada (as noted in the 
introductory notes to this section), it is one of the major barriers. As a significant amount of the internal 
barriers for circulation of goods are concentrated in the agriculture and agri-foods industry, if CETA 
removed such barriers the impacts will be most present in these sectors. As a result, input costs to 
producers could be lowered and suppliers who had previously faced barriers could have greater access 
to markets in other provinces and territories.  
In summary, increasing the free circulation of goods by removing internal trade barriers will most likely 
benefit Canada economically. However, the magnitude of the benefit will depend on CETA’s specific 
provisions and on Canada’s implementing legislation. 
 
EU 
As previously noted, the EU does not face the same issues internally with respect to the free circulation 
of goods that Canada does. However, the benefits expected to be realised within Canada as a result of 
CETA, or at least CETA-encouraged inter-provincial reform, will likely have a favourable effect on the EU. 
In particular, CETA could importantly provide a mutual recognition or reconciliation of key standards and 
regulations, including technical standards and barriers pertaining to agricultural products. This 
harmonisation would allow European companies to more easily conduct business throughout all of 
Canada’s provinces and territories. This would likely lead to a lowering of production costs and thus 
increased production. As a significant amount of the internal barriers for circulation of goods in Canada 
are concentrated in the agriculture and agri-foods industry, these impacts will be felt within this industry 
in the EU. The magnitude of these benefits will increase when combined with reduced tariffs for EU 
agricultural, PAPs and fisheries products, but overall depends on CETA’s specific provisions and on 
Canada’s implementing legislation. 
 
SOCIAL ASSESSMENT 
 
No significant social impacts are predicted outside those directly linked with the positive economic 
impacts mentioned in the Economic section above. 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 
 
No significant impact predicted. 
 
 
 
                                                             
1135 Macmillan, K. E. and Grady, P. (2007).  “A New Prescription:  Can the BC-Alberta TILMA Resuscitate Internal Trade in 
Canada?” C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder No.106. 
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7.6.2. USA, MEXICO & OTHER THIRD COUNTRIES 
 
BASELINE 
Refer to baseline in “Canada & EU” section above for further details as this also forms the background 
for this section. It is worth noting that relative to both market size and distance, Canadian enterprises 
are 12 times more likely to trade goods (and 30 times more likely to trade services) between provinces 
than with the US.1136  
 
ANALYSIS 
 
To the degree that CETA reforms the Canadian market to allow for free circulation of all goods 
regardless of nationality, this would likely have positive effects on US and Mexican companies as well as 
those from other third countries currently restricted by such limitations. This may allow for lowering of 
production costs and thus increased production. As a significant amount of the internal barriers for 
circulation of goods in Canada are concentrated in the agriculture and agri-foods industry, these impacts 
will be most present in this industry in the US and Mexico. However, these benefits would be offset to a 
certain degree by Canadian tariffs on agriculture and agri-foods, among other policies. The magnitude of 
the benefits will depend on CETA’s specific provisions and on Canada’s implementing legislation. 
                                                             
1136 Helliwell, J. (2002). Globalization and Well-being. UBC Press. 2002. 
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7.7. COMPETITION POLICY 
Summary: A competition policy chapter in CETA will likely focus on removing discriminatory measures 
imposed by Canada’s provincial liquor control boards and its Wheat Board, include provisions on 
international letter delivery, and make changes to EU and Canadian state aid policies.  
 If CETA removes discriminatory practices of the Canadian liquor control boards this could improve the 
transparency of the Canadian regulatory regime and encourage competition. Evidence suggests that this 
would not necessarily undermine public health and safety objectives as the Canadian government would 
retain the most important policy tools for reducing over-consumption of alcohol, i.e. being able to set 
price floors and impose taxes on beer, wine and spirits.  
Removal of discriminatory practices of the Wheat Board could improve sales and wages of wheat 
farmers in Canada if they prove themselves more competitive without the Board. While some 
stakeholders allege it could also result in a reduction of the value of wheat farmer’s lands, which would 
limit/eliminate an important source of funding for farmers to pay their bank debt and significantly limit 
the amount of money otherwise received by selling the land to fund their retirement plans, other 
evidence appears to limit these concerns. The EU wants to remove discriminatory practices of the Wheat 
Board in an effort to increase market share in the grains regulated by the Board.  
 International letter delivery in Canada has already been opened to foreign competition under budget Bill 
C-9, passed in July 2010, and thus CETA itself would not open up this sector although it would bind such 
access in a trade agreement. Changes in market share and employment in Canada Post resulting from 
Bill C-9 and also stipulated by CETA would depend on Canada Post’s ability to compete with EU producers 
in this cross-section of the market. No notable negative effects would be expected in regards to quality of 
services.  
Without further details of CETA and an in-depth analysis beyond the scope of this report it is unclear how 
revision of state aid policies under CETA would affect wages and working environments in Canada and 
the EU. 
Overall, the competition policy chapter of CETA is not expected to have significant environmental 
impacts. 
 
7.7.1. CANADA & EU 
 
BASELINE  
Regulatory and institutional framework 
Competition policy is not explicitly addressed in any WTO agreements despite that it was introduced as 
an issue for discussion by the WTO 1996 Singapore Ministerial Declaration; however, sections on 
competition policy have already been included in a number of in force or proposed bilateral and regional 
agreements negotiated separately by Canada and the EU. For example, Chapter 15 of NAFTA sets-forth 
provisions on competition policy between Canada, the US and Mexico. Due to potential losses in welfare 
and fairness caused by the lack of good competition policy, both Canada and the EU have advocated 
including basic competition policy principals in their FTAs. 
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Prior to the commencement of CETA negotiations, Canada and the EU had already initiated bilateral 
cooperation between the regions with the implementation of the Agreement between the Government 
of Canada and the European Communities regarding the Application of their Competition Laws 
(hereafter in this section the “Competition Agreement”), which was signed at the EU/Canada Summit in 
Bonn, Germany in June 1999. In Canada, the Competition Agreement is administered by the 
Competition Bureau, and in the EU it is administered by the EC Directorate-General for Competition (DG 
COMP). 
The Competition Agreement is designed to assist in the process of increasing cooperation between the 
two regions in terms of enforcing their respective competition rules. Namely, the Competition 
Agreement includes provisions related to the following: 
 Requiring reciprocal notification of cases being investigated by either authority if a case may 
have an effect on important interests of the other party;   
 Rendering assistance to one another and allowing for possible coordination of enforcement 
activities by the two authorities;   
 Allowing for one party to take into account the important interests of the other party in the 
course of its enforcement activities (traditional comity) and for the additional possibility of one 
party requesting  the other to take enforcement action (positive comity); and 
 Allowing for the exchange of information not affecting either party’s confidentiality 
obligations.1137  
As gauged from stakeholder consultations and a literature review, the following competition policy 
issues are the most relevant to CETA:   
 Specific boards (provincial liquor control boards, Wheat Board) 
 Other specific public monopolies (Canada Post) 
 State aid/subsidies 
 
Provincial liquor boards in Canada (also discussed in the Agriculture, PAPs and fisheries section)  
Each province and territory within Canada has a body that oversees control, distribution and sale of 
alcoholic beverages within its jurisdiction. With the exception of Alberta, which is the only Canadian 
province to have privatised its alcohol distribution system, each of these liquor boards are granted a 
quasi-monopoly position over the import, supply and distribution of alcoholic beverages. These liquor 
control boards (LCBs) operate under two primary objectives: revenue generation and limitation of 
abusive/excessive alcohol consumption. 
Operating independently (i.e. not at a federal level), these liquor boards establish ‘reference’ or ‘floor’ 
pricing standards, which set the minimum retail price for each product category. These prices are 
enforced within the retail and distribution system operated by these liquor boards. Where off-site point 
of sale is allowed, e.g. in licensed bars, restaurants and hotels, etc., the retailer is required to purchase 
their products through the liquor board outlet.  
The LCBs also importantly place quota systems on imported products. Liquor board purchasing groups 
have strict sales quotas for all brands listed. Brands not reaching their quota are discounted at the 
supplier’s cost, sold out and denied future access to the retail network. 
 
 
                                                             
1137 2008 Joint Study 
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Canadian Wheat Board (also discussed in the Agriculture, PAPs and fisheries section) 
An additional area of state-trading in Canada that has received particular attention is that of the 
Canadian Wheat Board (CWB). Established in 1935 by the Canadian Parliament as a means of controlling 
the price of grains, the CWB is a state-trading company that is granted monopoly status as the country’s 
chief exporter of wheat and barley. With Canadian farmers located predominantly in the Western 
Prairies1138 required to sell their wheat and barley to the CWB, the CWB is the largest wheat and barley 
marketer in the world, accounting for 20% of the world’s wheat and barley sales.1139   
 
De-regulation of Canada Post 
After attempting several times to deregulate international letters, in July 2010 the Canadian government 
passed the C-9 budget bill which removes previously enjoyed privileges by Canada Post on delivery of 
letters intended for an address outside Canada.1140 International mail options at Canada Post include 
Priority Worldwide (partnered with FedEx), Xpresspost International, Light Packet International, 
International Parcel – Air, Small Packet International – Air, International Parcel Surface, and Small Pack 
International – Surface.1141 Private international firms have for years delivered certain Canadian mail 
abroad, including brochures, checks, and invoices.1142 
 
State aid 
Canada and the EU take different approaches to state aid. EU Member States must comply with strict 
rules set out in the Treaty establishing the European Community when granting state aid (the Treaty of 
Lisbon does not change these rules) in order to ensure that it does not adversely affect competition. In 
Canada, state aid is self-regulated at both the federal and provincial/territorial levels.  
State aid programs in Canada offer, among other benefits, cash grants, low interest loans, tax breaks, 
and government equity participation and are most predominant in the agriculture, fishing, forestry, 
automobile and mining industries. Each of these sectors is considered for the geographical 
concentration of their activities. In some cases, for example in agriculture, producers have become 
dependent on government support although Canada has transitioned away from commodity-specific 
and market-price support to a whole-farm approach. 
Canadian subsidy programs are targeted to address potential externalities and tend to revolve around 
initiatives that supply funds for research and development, technology adoption, research joint ventures 
and training or apprentice programs. Some programs also are in place to assist certain minority groups 
such as First Nations, inhabitants of remote communities and the disabled.   
Like Canada, the EU has also transitioned away from commodity-specific and market-price support and 
has reduced its market distorting export subsidies in the agriculture sector. Reforms to the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) implemented from 2005 are phasing out specific subsidies in favour of flat-rate 
                                                             
1138 Farmers in Eastern Canada and in most of British Columbia are not under the Board’s authority and may market their grain 
on the open market 
1139 Statistics Canada 
1140 See Section 1885 of Bill C-9 (2010) amending Section 15, sub-section (2) of the Canada Post Corporation Act 
1141 www.canadapost.ca “Shipping Products & Services” 
1142  Consumer Postal Council (2009) ‘Canada – Canada Post: Index of Postal Freedom.’ 
http://www.postalconsumers.org/uploads/1/Canada_-_Canada_Post.pdf 
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payments based only on the area of land in cultivation, as well as adopting environmentally beneficial 
farming methods.  
Other sectors in the EU supported by subsidies include fishing, mining, energy (nuclear, gas, coal and 
renewable energy), and telecommunications. 
Both the EU and Canada have rules that include regulations to implement countervailing and/or anti-
dumping measures to balance certain negative market effects of certain subsidies on products and 
services from third countries. 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT 
 
INDICATOR: Impact on institutional and regulatory regime, economic policy space 
Canada 
Liquor board 
While the concerns over liquor control boards in Canada have in part been addressed bilaterally through 
the 1989 EC-Canada Agreement on trade and commerce in alcoholic beverages and the 2004 EU-Canada 
Wine and Spirits Agreement, the issue remains unresolved due to continued concern from the EC over 
lack of enforcement/compliance at the provincial level and continued ongoing discriminatory behaviour. 
The EU has taken issue with the Canadian provinces’ monopoly control over distribution and retail, 
arguing that liquor boards “appear discriminatory and substantially hinder the access of European 
alcoholic beverages to the Canadian market.”1143 Garnering particular contention from the EU has been 
the complaint of discriminatory listing procedures, pricing and quota systems that favour domestic over 
imported products. The liquor boards’ listing procedures require any supplier of beer, wine or spirits 
wishing to sell their product(s) in a province to first obtain a listing from the provincial marketing agency.  
The EU has complained about a number of issues concerning Canadian liquor control boards. Generally, 
decisions by the boards pertaining to listing requests lack transparency, while such decisions have 
seemed to discriminately exclude entry of imported products.1144  Further, it is claimed that the 
monopoly status of these boards, which for example has made the Liquor Control Board of Ontario the 
world’s largest purchaser of alcoholic beverages, has allowed these provincial liquor boards to leverage 
their position to inflict further “onerous commercial conditions on suppliers, once an imported product 
is listed.”1145 Also, the EU claims that provincial liquor boards in Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia 
provide discriminatory pricing mechanisms that favour locally produced wines and that some liquor 
boards apply discriminatory cost of service differentials on imports of EU wines.1146 Additionally, the EU 
has also claimed that the sales quota for liquor brands imposes discriminatory sales quota systems for 
                                                             
1143 EC Market Access Database.  http://madb.europa.eu/madb_barriers/barriers_details.htm?barrier_id=960047&version=6 
1144 Market Access Database 
1145 Market Access Database 
1146 These include: (1) minimum and maximum price requirements on certain imported products; (2) waiver or reduction of 
various charges to the domestic industry (e.g. freight, direct delivery mark ups, costs of marketing programmes) that are 
unavailable to imported products; (3) Ontario authorises its Liquor Control Board to charge an additional 5% reduction on all 
sales of Ontarian wines to restaurants and bars; (4) British Columbia allows its Liquor Board to implement a mark-up discount 
on the province’s wines, which is said not to benefit imported wines. 
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imported wines that make it difficult for EU products to meet the sales quota and therefore maintain 
the ability to be sold in state-run retail stores.  
If CETA deregulates the Canadian liquor control boards, it goes without saying that this would reduce 
regulatory flexibility Canadian provinces currently have in this area. This may in fact have positive 
impacts in terms of improving the transparency of the Canadian regulatory regime and encouraging 
competition (see below indicator), and there is limited evidence to suggest it would lead to reductions in 
the type of policy space relevant to this SIA, i.e. negative regulatory impacts, that could not be mitigated 
by domestic policy tools allowed outside CETA (see social assessment below). 
 
Wheat board 
 
Although the CWB was reformed to meet free market conditions under NAFTA and the WTO, it 
continues to receive complaints from the US and EU that its exclusive rights over the export of wheat 
and barley from Canada make it non-competitive. The EU has expressed particularly negative views 
towards supply management practices used by the CWB, maintaining its provision of an unfair 
competitive advantage. The Canadian government has expressed a willingness to dismantle the CWB; 
however, removing discriminatory practices of the board is a controversial subject which currently 
divides stakeholders and will not be something which is easily achieved.  
To the degree that CETA facilitates removal of discriminatory CWB practices it would decrease the 
regulatory flexibility afforded to authorities operating the board. As mentioned in the next section, this 
could have positive benefits, and although some observers fear it could reduce policy space, i.e. have 
some negative social impacts, there is evidence to limit these concerns (see social assessment below). 
 
Deregulation of certain letters delivered by Canada Post 
 
Stakeholders’ have complained that the CETA may ‘deregulate’ the Canadian postal service’s control 
over business in certain types of letters, specifically the international letter service. Stakeholders claim 
that the postal service needs international letters and other letters for revenue and that there is little 
public support for the deregulation of Canada Post.1147 However, the 2010 C-9 budget bill passed in July 
2010 removes previously enjoyed privileges by Canada Post on delivery of letters intended for addresses 
outside Canada. As such, while including such provisions in CETA will bind the liberalisation afforded 
under Bill C-9 in an international agreement, thus making it more difficult to alter these commitments, it 
would not propose a new type of liberalisation per se.1148 
 
State aid 
 
Depending on how state aid policies are reformed under CETA this may reduce the regulatory burden of 
implementing directly and indirectly related regulations or may in fact increase this burden if the 
reforms are relatively extensive and complex. This might affect policy space. 
EU 
Competition policy reforms under CETA would have mixed effects on the institutional and regulatory 
environment in the EU, most of which would not particularly affect the type of policy space relevant to 
this SIA, in the EU. As potential reform of the liquor control boards, CWB, and Canada Post under CETA 
                                                             
1147 Trade Justice Network. “CETA and public postal service.” http://tradejustice.ca/en/section/15,  
1148 See Section 1885 of Bill C-9 (2010) amending Section 15, sub-section (2) of the Canada Post Corporation Act 
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only directly relates to the institutional and regulatory system in Canada, reforms therein will not have 
any significant direct impacts on the institutional and regulatory system of the EU. As such, there would 
not be a direct affect on policy space. However, the same potential impacts predicted for Canada in 
terms of the state aid issue also apply generally to the EU. 
 
INDICATOR: Market share, employment 
Canada and the EU 
Liquor boards 
To the degree that CETA encourages a significant reduction in the provincial boards’ monopoly status, 
this could allow greater access for Europe’s alcoholic beverages industries in Canada. These alcohol 
products are the most widely exported processed food products into Canada and exhibit sizeable 
demand in Canada. As such, CETA could produce significant market gains for the European alcoholic 
beverage industry. Changes in market share and employment for Canadian alcohol producers would 
depend on their ability to compete with EU producers in the same cross-section of their respective 
markets. Refer to the beverages sub-section in the Agriculture, Processed Agricultural Products and 
Fisheries section for further details on related impacts. 
Wheat board 
There are mixed views as to if reducing discriminatory practices of the CWB will positively benefit 
Canadian and/or EU wheat farmers. Certain farm groups consulted in Canada suggest that dismantling 
the discriminatory practices of the CWB would allow Canadians to increase sales of Canadian wheat.1149 
Meanwhile, other consultations and literature suggest the CWB guarantees wheat prices and in fact 
provides optimal prices for wheat for individual farmers operating outside large farming conglomerates. 
This is said to be primarily due to the fact that the CWB has established a “Canadian” brand for western 
grain which allows it to earn premium prices on the world market. 1150 As mentioned, the EC appears to 
desire dismantling of discriminatory practices of the CWB to allow EU wheat farmers improved 
opportunities to compete with Canadian wheat farmers. 
The role that CETA has on the overall trade in wheat and barley between Canada and the EU will likely 
be influenced by changes to the CWB, but future trade in these products also importantly depends on 
other factors of competitiveness outside the CWB. As predicted in the preliminary CGE modelling (see 
discussion of wheat in the “agriculture” sub- section in Agriculture, Processed Agricultural Products and 
Fisheries section), the CETA is expected to have a positive impact on the Canadian wheat sector.1151 To 
the degree that CETA deregulates the CWB and this allows for more competition in Canada, it may allow 
for the EU to compete more for market share in wheat. However, the extent of this impact will likely be 
limited at least somewhat by Canada’s competitiveness in wheat due to reasons not only attributable to 
the CWB.  
 
Deregulation of international letters delivered by Canada Post 
Stakeholders claim that the Canadian postal service needs international letters and other letters for 
revenue. The EU is particularly competitive in the delivery of international letters, led by DHL and TNT. 
                                                             
1149 Consultations with Grain Growers of Canada, November 2010 
1150 Consultations with CWB in October 2010 and individual wheat farmers 
1151 Note: the CGE model considers imported wheat as imperfect substitutes of domestically produced wheat, and models 
Canada’s wheat import tariff as zero. 
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As such, the EU could very well see some market gains in the international letters monopoly by including 
provisions allowing for competition with Canada Post in CETA, but, as mentioned, CETA itself would only 
be binding this market access already granted in Bill C-9 passed in Canada in July 2010.  
Changes in market share and employment for Canada Post would depend on its ability to compete with 
EU producers in the same cross-section of their respective markets. It is notable that private 
international firms have for years delivered certain Canadian mail abroad, including brochures, checks, 
and invoices. This has continued despite the 2004 court ruling determining outbound international mail 
was an exclusive right of Canada Post,1152 and now is explicitly allowed by Bill C-9 passed in 2010. Also, 
key EU service providers, for example DHL and TNT, as well as other key foreign-service providers like 
FedEx, continue to operate a variety of postal services in Canada. As such, Bill C-9 and CETA, taken 
together, may allow EU firms to expand within Canada’s international letter delivery service, and by 
gaining more of a foothold in that market in the mid- to longer-term they may be able to enhance their 
existing domestic operations. Shifts in market share and employment may result, and would involve 
competition not only between EU companies and Canada Post but also with FedEx (who cooperates 
with Canada Post in the “Priority Worldwide” international delivery service, for example) as well as 
other foreign firms. Economic gains could be realised by a number of enterprises to the extent that CETA 
encourages new business operations and increased letter mail abroad, to Europe for example. 
 
State aid 
To the degree that CETA changes state aid policies this may in the short term alter the balance of market 
share of companies in the EU and Canada currently enjoying these preferences. Without an in-depth 
analysis, which is beyond the scope of this report and cannot be performed without specifics on state-
aid provisions from CETA, it is not possible to assess exactly how these changes may play out to the 
benefit of either Canada or the EU.  
Still, it is worthwhile to note that reform to state aid policies under CETA or resulting as a by-product 
from CETA may affect certain industries specifically because they currently enjoy state aid. To recall, 
state aid policies in Canada particularly take the form of cash grants, tax breaks, low interest loans and 
government equity participation in the agriculture, fishing, forestry, automobile and mining industries; 
they could also affect minority groups such as First Nations, inhabitants of remote communities and the 
disabled. In the EU they particularly deal with subsidies to EU agriculture, fishing, mining, energy 
(nuclear, gas, coal and renewable energy), and telecommunications industries.  
 
SOCIAL ASSESSMENT 
 
Canada and EU 
Liquor boards 
Opponents of the proposed CETA’s encroachment on the provincial liquor boards claim dismantling the 
liquor boards will undermine the government’s ability to “implement policies that reduce the substantial 
social and economic harm caused by alcohol consumption.”1153Herein, these opponents cite increases in 
                                                             
1152 Consumer Postal Council (2009) 
1153 Grieshaber-Otto, J. (2010). ‘Protecting Ontario’s Alcohol and Public Health Policies in Negotiations on the Proposed Canada-
EU Treaty’. Alcohol Workgroup: Ontario Public Health Association. 
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drunk driving convictions and sales to minors following privatisation in Alberta.1154 Additional concerns 
over the potential negative social impact revolve around employee benefits derived through the liquor 
board owned distribution system’s usage of union employees. Specifically, concern has been raised over 
the impact on Alberta’s employees in the alcohol industry who have seen privatisation lead to lower pay 
and benefits as well as decreased job security.1155  
A number of factors determine alcohol consumption levels. The impact of prices on alcohol 
consumption, with higher prices both reducing consumption and creating certain related negative 
consequences, is well documented.1156 There is also evidence that the ratio between price and alcohol 
content creates consumption incentives, i.e. to consume beverages with a lower cost-to-alcohol content 
ratio (for example, among different types of beer), and that these perverse incentives currently exist in 
Canada due to alcohol pricing policies that could benefit from reform.1157 Also, and importantly, 
increases in population growth and disposable income allow for increased alcohol consumption. For 
example, sources suggest these factors are the more likely explanatory variables for the aforementioned 
increased alcohol consumption in recent years in Alberta rather than the privatisation of liquor sales 
there.1158  
CETA will likely have some effect on the abovementioned factors related to alcohol consumption, 
although there does not appear to be strong evidence to suggest this will necessarily lead to an increase 
in alcohol abuse in Canada. It is likely that increased competition among directly competitive beers, 
wines and spirits encouraged by the competition policy chapter in CETA would lead to some reduction in 
prices. Still, the precise impact of CETA on prices of wine and spirits, particularly those prone to be 
abused via over-consumption, is not fully clear and thus the related social impacts are also not fully clear. 
However, as mentioned below, key policies to control alcohol prices would not be affected by CETA. 
CETA is not envisaged to alter the price-to-alcohol content ratio pricing policies in any way beyond 
ensuring national treatment for EU products in Canada. The effect of CETA on population growth and 
disposable income as it relates to alcohol consumption is far too much of an indirect impact to warrant 
analysis in this section. 
CETA commitments would not restrict policy space to make alcohol taxation and pricing policies, which 
are identified as among the “most effective policies available to government to combat alcohol 
abuse.”1159 As mentioned, evidence suggests these policies need to be reassessed in Canada regardless 
of if CETA is implemented. Importantly, consultations with the EC suggest that CETA will not disallow the 
LCBs from setting price floors for beverages.1160 Also, the Canadian government would retain the ability 
to apply within-border taxes to beer, wine and spirits if applied in a non-discriminatory manner. These 
are strong tools to prevent over-consumption of alcohol and as such should serve to considerably limit 
concerns over related negative social impacts caused by CETA.    
As a final point, evidence clearly suggests that liquor control boards need not employ discriminatory 
practices favouring domestic suppliers in order to protect public health and safety. For example, the EU 
Member State of Sweden’s Systembolaget is itself a government-owned chain of liquor stores that 
                                                             
1154 National Union of Public and General Employees. Canada’s Liqour Boards. http://www.nupge.ca/content/3387/canadas-
liquor-board-unions-join-fight-save-lcbo 
1155 Ibid  
1156 See, among others, Chaloupka, F. J. et al. “The Effects of Price on Alcohol Consumption and Alcohol-Related Problems.”  
Alcohol Research & Health. Vol. 26, No. 1, 2002. 
1157 Stockwell, T. et al. (2007). “Alcohol Consumption in British Columbia and Canada: A Case for Liquor Taxes that Reduce 
Harm.” Centre for Addictions Research of BC. Bulletin 2 – December 2007. pg 2 
1158 Vancouver Sun.“Putting a price on alcohol abuse shows a simple first step.”  June 13, 2008. 
1159 Stockwell (2007) pg 2 
1160 Consultations with EC representatives in Ottawa, November 25, 2010 
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maintains the sole right in retail of alcoholic beverages exceeding 3.5% alcohol content by volume. 
Similar to Canada, the Systembolaget is maintained as a means of ensuring public health by reducing the 
abuse and excessive consumption of alcohol; 1161 then again, while similar in regards to health and safety, 
differences between Sweden and Canada exist in Systembolaget’s expressed mandate of being brand-
neutral and selecting its products based on consumer demand.1162 As such, opponents’ concerns that 
the CETA cannot put an end to discriminatory practices while ensuring public health may be unfounded.  
Wheat Board 
Removal of discriminatory practices of the CWB as a result of CETA could have positive effects on 
Canadian wheat farmers. It could improve their earnings if they prove themselves more competitive 
without the board (for example, it could more generally allow farmers to sell at higher prices than those 
regulated by the CWB), which would be a notably positive effect.  
In contrast, some stakeholders suggest that as a result of reducing the CWB’s discriminatory practices 
farmers who have borrowed money to purchase their farms could end up owing more to the bank than 
their un-subsidised farm would then be worth. In other words, the value of their land would not be 
worth as much as when they received subsidies from the CWB.1163 Also, under this situation, retiring 
farmers looking to sell their land could face a significantly reduced retirement fund with new entrants 
into the farming industry looking to purchase unsubsidised farms at lower costs. 
Upon initial investigation, there appears to be evidence to limit the aforementioned concerns raised 
over negative impacts on land value resulting from CETA’s removal of discriminatory practices of the 
CWB. First, there is at least some ambiguity as to the type and impact of the ‘subsidies’ being provided 
by the CWB.1164 Also, consultations with some stakeholders suggest that significant portions of loans to 
wheat farmers go towards farming equipment, not just to land costs and thus CETA’s impact on the 
repayment of loans is in fact not as significant of an issue. Moreover, the value of land on which wheat is 
grown is not only calculated according to the value it might generate farming wheat, with or without the 
CWB, but also in terms of its value for producing other grains and crops.1165 Generally, in support of the 
latter statement, the Municipality Property Assessment Corporation (MPAC) of Canada finds “Farmland 
values are based on the land’s productive capability and other factors such as location.”1166   
 
Deregulation of international letters delivered by Canada Post 
 
As mentioned, passage of Bill C-9 has already allowed for open competition in international letter 
delivery in Canada, while CETA would only further bind these commitments. The impact of this opening 
                                                             
1161 Swedish National Institute of Public Health (2006). “If Retail Alcohol Sales in Sweden were Privatized, what would be the 
Potential Consequences?” 
1162 Systembolaget.se  
1163 Certain consultations suggest that if farm subsidies were to be removed it could likely lead to a significant drop in farm real 
estate prices (especially in communities where farming, particularly wheat farming, is the only or most prevalent use of land). It 
is thus argued by some that as the overwhelming majority of farmers have not fully paid the land mortgage on the land on 
which they farm, they could end up owing more to the banks than this land is worth. Bankruptcy rules are strict in Canada and 
it is not particularly easy to walk away from mortgage responsibilities. 
1164 For example, the Canadian Wheat Board itself claims to offer no “subsidies” to wheat growers except in cases of natural 
disasters; however, they do offer programs which are viewed as subsidies by numerous external groups. These programs 
include: (a) Value Added Incentive Program where $3 per tonne premium is paid to grower if wheat is delivered directly to 
eligible mills and malting plants; (b) Growers are eligible to borrow up to $400,000 from the board with the first $100,000 being 
interest free; and (c) A pricing guarantee is offered by the board for all wheat produced. 
1165 Consultations with Grain Growers of Canada, November 2010 
1166 MPAC. “Assessment Procedure for the Valuation of Farm Properties.” 
http://www.mpac.ca/pages_english/procedures/procedure_for_valuation_of_farm_properties.asp 
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may encourage changes in wages and the working culture of Canada Post, although without an in-depth 
analysis on the competitiveness of Canada Post vs. European firms  (and factoring in competition from 
other foreign firms) the extent of these effects are uncertain.  
Given the high level of service that both the EU and Canadian private letter carriers provide it is unlikely 
the aforementioned opening would have a substantial effect on the quality of delivery of letters. 
Moreover, as the main issue herein is opening of international letter delivery services, even binding the 
provisions of Bill C-9 under CETA would not directly affect the delivery of domestic letters within Canada, 
although as mentioned in the “Market share…” indicator it could in the mid- to longer-term allow 
foreign providers to expand their domestic operations somewhat in Canada. 
State aid  
Without further details of CETA and an in-depth analysis, which is beyond the scope of this report, it is 
unclear how revision of state aid policies would affect wages and working environments in Canada. 
 
EU 
Limited/minor overall effects in the EU are expected, but there may be some potential positive social 
impacts. Some increases in wages in sectors where the EU becomes more competitive as a result of 
removing discriminatory measures could be expected. No significant and direct effects on public health, 
safety or quality of services are expected. 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 
 
Canada and the EU 
No direct environmental impacts are expected from a competition policy chapter in CETA. To be sure, 
this chapter should not affect how the Canadian and EU environmental regulations are developed or 
implemented or how environmental objectives are set, and so its impacts on the policy space and 
regulatory framework. Other production-focused environmental indicators would not be particularly 
affected.  
 
7.7.2. US, MEXICO & OTHER THIRD COUNTRIES 
BASELINE 
Refer to the baseline in “Canada & EU” section above as this also forms the background for this section. 
ANALYSIS 
Economic assessment 
Limited/minor direct, short-term impacts on policy space and the institutional and regulatory 
environment in the US, Mexico and other third countries are predicted from a competition policy 
chapter in CETA. Although, in the long-run the aforementioned changes under CETA could encourage 
the US, Mexico and other third countries to adjust their regulatory and institutional environments, 
particularly in terms of state aid policy, to adapt to relevant changes made in Canada and the EU.  
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If CETA were to make some of the discussed changes to competition policy in Canada and the EU it may 
result in some positive economic gains in the US, Mexico and other third countries. Removal of 
discriminatory LCB practices and binding market access for the international letters businesses, if not 
legally restricted to only benefiting the EU, could provide increased opportunities for US businesses in 
particular to better participate in the Canadian market. Removal of discriminatory practices of the CWB, 
if not legally restricted to only benefiting the EU, could allow increased opportunities to the US in 
particular to better participate in the Canadian market. To the degree that state aid reforms (e.g. in 
fisheries and agriculture) resulting from CETA are substantial enough and not only worded to benefit 
Canada and/or the EU, any number of other countries that are competitive in such industries could gain 
market share and accompanying economic benefits.  
 
Social assessment 
 
Limited/minor overall effects are expected for the US, Mexico and other third countries, but there may 
be some potentially positive social impacts. Some increases in wages and potentially in employment in 
sectors where other countries become more competitive as a result of removal of discriminatory 
measures mentioned could be expected. For example, these might be realised in the US wheat sector 
given the removal of discriminatory practices of the CWB. Also, to the degree that state aid reforms (e.g. 
in fisheries and agriculture) resulting from CETA are substantial enough and not only worded to benefit 
Canada and/or the EU, any number of other countries that are competitive in such industries could gain 
market share and enjoy some accompanying social benefits. No notable effects on public health and 
safety are expected. 
 
Environmental assessment 
 
No significant environmental impacts are predicted. 
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8. Policy Recommendations 
8.1 Overview 
 
The policy recommendations herein, also called flanking measures, are based on the results of the 
sustainability assessment of potential economic, social and environmental impacts that were discussed 
in detail in the preceding sections of the report. The proposed policy recommendations cover both 
enhancement and preventative/mitigation measures, i.e. measures needed to reinforce any significant 
positive sustainability impacts and to prevent or at least mitigate negative sustainability impacts.   
 
Recommendations are presented in two main categories: 
 
 Measures related to provisions that will likely be included in CETA (“trade measures”) 
 
 Measures, not directly related to provisions in CETA, for cooperation that may accompany the 
agreement (“cooperation measures”) 
 
Section 8.2 summarises the major potential impacts that were identified in the preceding SIA analysis. 
Section 8.3 details the proposed flanking measures relating to these major impacts.  
8.2 List of Major Impacts 
 
Agriculture, PAPs & Fisheries 
Economic 
 Beef: if beef is liberalised to a significant degree, the CETA could lead to significant increases in 
exports from Canada to the EU. This would be accompanied by increases in output in Canada 
and decreases in the EU, though this depends on the quota allowed to Canadian producers. It is 
unlikely that the ban on GM beef in the EU will be lifted, but Canadian producers could be 
induced to increase hormone free production if the quota increases are large enough. Creation 
of a separate tariff line for bison meat could help Western Provinces diversify. Rules of origin are 
important and depend on whether origin is determined by place of birth or slaughter.    
 Pork:  If liberalisation occurs, it could lead to significant increases in exports from Canada to the 
EU. This would be accompanied by increases in output in Canada and decreases in the EU. Rules 
of origin are important and depend on whether origin is determined by place of birth or 
slaughter.    
 Dairy: Significant degrees of liberalisation would substantially benefit the EU, while leading to 
declines in output and domestic market share in Canada. Dairy producers in the EU would be 
expected to see significant increases in exports and output with the removal of tariffs in Canada. 
Results would likely depend on the fate of supply management in Canada. Nevertheless, the EU 
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could realise gains through improved minimum access commitments for certain products (i.e. 
specialty cheeses). Protection for EU GI cheeses could also confer benefits onto the industry.  
 Other PAPs: Canada’s manufacturers of processed foods could potentially see increases in 
output and exports, though this impact is contingent on the openness of the CETA’s rules of 
origin with respect to sugar. Cooperation on harmonisation of ingredient and labelling 
regulations could provide benefits to both sides. The EU could benefit from increased exports of 
cereals and flours (e.g. pastas, bread, biscuits), while removal of Canada’s compulsory container 
size requirements could lower costs for EU exporters.  
 Alcoholic beverages: EU producers and exporters would likely benefit from the removal of 
discriminatory practices in place at the provincial level that are implemented through the Liquor 
Control Boards. Either greater compliance or enforcement could lead to greater export sales in 
Canada, benefiting the EU alcoholic beverages industry. This could potentially lead to reduced 
domestic market share for Canadian producers.  
 Fisheries: Canada would likely benefit from the full removal of tariffs on fish and seafood 
(mostly in frozen seafood). Facilitating access to Canadian GM salmon could provide significant 
gains to Canada’s aquaculture industry. Liberalisation could also benefit processors and 
consumers in the EU. Removal of investment restrictions in Canada could lead to greater 
investment opportunities for EU processors.  
Liberalisation of tariffs on Canadian imports into the EU could potentially impact the fisheries 
sectors in Greenland and Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon (SPM) by eroding preferences enjoyed under 
the Overseas Association Decision. For SPM, this could disrupt plans to utilise preferential access 
to the EU to transform the archipelago into a transhipment hub, harming the sustainability of 
the industry and limiting its ability to diversify its economy. For Greenland, the liberalisation of 
tariffs on shrimp and Greenland halibut could reduce competitiveness of Greenland’s two most 
important exports, resulting in moderate losses for the economy. 
 
Social 
 Beverages: A CETA leading to removal of LCBs would likely have a negative social impact. 
Nevertheless, LCBs can be non-discriminatory while maintaining their public health role (as with 
Sweden’s Systembolaget).  
 Cross-sectoral: In Canada, workers in agriculture are generally subject to provincial regulation 
and are often regulated differently from workers in other sectors. Given that many provinces 
exempt a number of workers involved in agriculture and certain types of processing from 
minimum employment standards, greater shifts into the sector could lower the overall level of 
standards that the workforce is exposed to. This would also create greater levels of temporary 
employment, given the nature of the work, which in Canada could disproportionately be filled 
by foreign labour under the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program. Further, as agriculture and 
food processing tend to have some of the highest rates of work related injuries and fatalities, 
expansion of employment in Canada and the EU’s agriculture and food processing sectors could 
expose a greater number of workers to working conditions that are more unsafe than average. 
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This could, in turn, produce negative consequences for the level of work-related stress of 
employees in both Canada and the EU.  
 
Environmental 
 If significant degrees of liberalisation are achieved, there is potential for the CETA to contribute 
to the intensification of agriculture, potentially increasing to greater use of chemical inputs, 
changing the distribution of crop production and potentially encroaching onto marginal or other 
productive lands. Any changes hereto would affect land usage and quality, water usage and 
quality, air pollution, biodiversity and waste creation.  
 Liberalisation of beef and pork, in particular, could potentially lead to greater herd size in 
Canada, potentially leading to increased release of methane as a by-product.  
 
Industrial Products 
Economic 
 Mining: removing foreign ownership restrictions on uranium mining could lead to substantial 
increases in EU investment in the sector in Canada.  
 Cross-sectoral: tariffs are low on many manufactured products making it likely that removal of 
NTBs and restrictions on investment will foster the greatest economic gains in many cases.  
 Automotive industry: removal of tariffs could positively benefit auto manufacturers in Canada 
and the EU leading to greater exports and output over the long-term. This impact would be 
contingent on the openness of the CETA’s rules of origin. This could also facilitate greater 
investment by Canadian manufacturers in meeting EU emission standards, helping to upgrade 
the industry and enhance competitiveness vis-à-vis producers in the US.  
 Textiles: Tariff removal would likely benefit the textiles industries of both Canada and the EU. 
Exports and output would be expected to increase, with the EU seeing gains in apparel, textiles 
and leather manufacturing. The EU could see further benefits from the removal of NTBs that 
limit interprovincial circulation. Rules of origin are important and would influence Canada’s 
ability to benefit from reductions in tariffs. Greater IPR enforcement (border seizures and anti-
counterfeiting) would likely further benefit the EU.  
 
Social 
 Cross sectoral: A chapter on Trade and labour could help foster greater implementation of the 
ILO’s core labour standards and perhaps lead to ratification of ILO conventions in Canada.  
 Cross sectoral: a mechanism that fosters regular dialogue and cooperation between Canada and 
the EU could include commitments to and exchange on reducing occupational injuries, perhaps 
fostering improved safety over the long-term.  
 
Environmental 
 Greenhouse gas emissions are expected to increase in the oil sands sector if the combined effect 
of higher world prices and increased EU investment increase output in that sector. 
 Water contamination and water use could increase if the CETA, combined with higher world 
prices leads to increased investment in Canada’s extractive industries. 
EU-Canada SIA Interim Report 
 
427 
 
Services 
Economic 
 Maritime transport: The CETA will likely have a positive impact in both Canada and the EU, with 
greater liberalisation increasing gains. Liberalisation of feeder services and repositioning in 
Canada would lower costs, increase competitiveness and also spur greater levels of FDI in 
Canada’s maritime transport sector. This could also assist in the development of Canada’s short-
sea shipping industry. Additional benefits include the upgrading of Canada’s maritime fleet 
through the potential removal of prohibitive tariffs on imported new vessels (25%) as well as 
increased investment in Canada’s ports and greater attractiveness as port-of-calls vis-à-vis U.S. 
ports along the Atlantic, Saint Lawrence and Great Lakes.  
 Telecom: Removal of foreign ownership restrictions would likely have a significant impact on 
Canadian output and exports. FDI from the EU to Canada would likely increase significantly. 
Competitiveness of the Canadian telecom sector would improve as would technological 
acquisition, which would help to stimulate expansion of Canadian telecom services into foreign 
markets over the long-term. Canadian consumers would likely benefit from lower costs, greater 
selection and better service. EU exports via mode 3 would increase. 
 Business services: Liberalisation of both at-the-border and behind-the-border restrictions on 
temporary movement of professionals would likely serve to increase the level of cross-border 
trade as well as the investment and trade occurring via foreign affiliates. In order to realise the 
greatest gains it will be important for the CETA to foster mutual recognition agreements 
allowing professionals to have their qualifications/certificates recognised in both Canada and 
the EU. This, however, is complicated by the fact that the power to negotiation MRAs resides 
with professional organisations at the national/provincial level.   
 
Social 
 Maritime transport: The CETA could have a positive impact on quality and decency of work by 
putting in place a mechanism for cooperation and dialogue on labour issues as well as 
promotion of the ILO’s Maritime Labour Convention in third countries. It could also contribute 
to greater collaboration on safety and security issues associated with maritime transport 
services. 
 
Environmental 
 Increased maritime transportation as a result of CETA is likely to lead to increased demand for 
infrastructure and dredging, especially in the St-Lawrence River. Increased maritime 
transportation may also increase the risk of accidental spills and other types of accidents. 
 GHG emissions from road, air and other transport sectors, including maritime transport, are 
expected to increase as a result of the agreement.  
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Cross-cutting issues 
 
Government Procurement 
Economic 
 The competition caused by GP provisions, like those in CETA, will likely result in increases in 
welfare. These increases may translate into lower cost public goods and services. 
 EU companies would likely see some increase in market share as a result of GP provisions in 
CETA, and Canadian companies could also gain although overall are likely to see comparatively 
less increases in market share.  
 CETA would encourage more firms to participate in the GP process, which should reinforce the 
trend that companies that provide quality services win contracts; however, beyond this 
theoretical statement there is not enough available evidence to suggest this will have a 
significant positive or negative impact on the end quality of goods and services tendered in the 
EU and Canada. 
 CETA is unlikely to result in any significant loss of domestic employment to companies operating 
in the GP market that have not established a foreign presence in Canada and are not employing 
people living in Canada.  
 GP provisions in CETA would limit Canada’s regulatory flexibility, and, to a lesser extent, limit the 
EU’s regulatory flexibility. However, any simultaneous loss of policy space herein needs to be 
contextualised in terms of thresholds and the fact that CETA will be based on international 
standards.  
 If set-asides for Aboriginal and minority businesses are prohibited, it would have some negative 
effects on employment (and culture), at least in the near term, on those currently benefiting 
from such preferences. And this would create a negative social impact, not just an economic 
impact. However, such concerns over Aboriginal businesses specifically may be unnecessary as 
consultations with the EC suggest it intends to respect set-asides with a social dimension. 
Social 
 Prohibition of offsets in Canada’s schedule could have some negative economic/social impacts 
in the short-term at least, but a comprehensive analysis would be needed to gauge the full 
impacts therein.  
 Overall, CETA’s affect on decency and quality of work in the GP market would be limited by the 
strong domestic laws and institutions in the EU and Canada. CETA’s impact on “fair wage” and 
other “social consideration“ GP policies in the EU and Canada is unclear without further details 
of the Agreement, although government consultations suggest both parties remain committed 
to preserving such policies. 
Environmental 
 A GP Chapter in CETA would likely have mixed environmental impacts, although the full extent 
of these impacts is unclear without further details of the Agreement. CETA’s prohibition of 
offsets could have some mixed environmental impacts, particularly in Canada. If CETA restricts 
initiatives on green procurement it would have a significant negative impact in Canada and the 
EU according to a number of environmental indicators; however, this may very well be a non-
issue given the current commitment of the parties to green procurement policies.  
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IPR 
Economic 
 The CETA will likely have significant adverse impacts on consumers of pharmaceutical products 
in Canada 
 The CETA could potentially have a positive impact on R&D spending in Canada 
 The CETA will likely significantly reduce counterfeiting and piracy levels in Canada.  
 
Investment 
Economic 
 Regulatory and institutional reforms encouraged by CETA may remove certain barriers in 
Canada to EU investment, which could increase investment at a ‘notable’ magnitude. 
Investment in the EU would likely follow the positive trend predicted for Canada, but on a 
smaller scale. These gains could contribute to some increases in GDP growth in Canada and the 
EU. 
 The Investment Chapter in CETA specifically would provide benefits to multinational companies 
and foster forms of intangible business relationships, which may stimulate the flows of capital 
and differentiated goods. The evidence is far less persuasive that it would by itself increase FDI 
flows. 
 The Investment Chapter in CETA will create limitations in regulatory flexibility that on one hand 
will likely have positive economic effects while on the other hand may to some extent constitute 
a reduction in economic policy space. 
Social and Environmental 
 There may be some mixed social and environmental impacts from investment encouraged 
under CETA as a whole.  
 Regarding investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) specifically, the conflicting costs and benefits 
of such a mechanism make it doubtful that its inclusion in CETA would create a net/overall 
(economic, social and environmental) sustainability benefit for the EU and/or Canada. There is 
no solid evidence to suggest that ISDS will maximise economic benefits in CETA beyond simply 
serving as one form of an enforcement mechanism, just as state-state dispute settlement is also 
an enforcement mechanism. And the policy space reductions caused by ISDS allowances in CETA, 
while less significant than foreseen by some parties, would be enough to cast doubt on its 
contribution to net sustainability benefits.  
 
Trade facilitation 
Economic 
 Incorporating provisions under CETA to reform and improve trade facilitation could assist with 
reducing trading costs, which would be particularly useful in limiting the costs of compliance 
that will inevitably increase with the introduction of new rules of origin under CETA.  
 
Labour mobility 
Economic 
 Labour mobility provisions in CETA focused on workers in professional business services could 
result in a more efficient allocation of skills and increased productivity in Canada and the EU. 
EU-Canada SIA Interim Report 
 
430 
Social and environmental 
  Could foster innovation which would in-turn lead to some social and environmental benefits.  
  
Free circulation of goods 
Economic 
 Provisions allowing freer circulation of goods could improve Canada’s productivity and would be 
particularly focused within the agriculture and agri-foods sector.  
 
Competition policy 
Economic 
 If CETA removes discriminatory practices of the Canadian liquor control boards this could 
improve the transparency of the Canadian regulatory regime and encourage competition.  
 Removal of discriminatory practices of the Wheat Board could improve sales and wages of 
wheat farmers in Canada if they prove themselves more competitive without the Board. The EU 
could also potentially increase market share in the grains regulated by the Board. There is 
evidence to limit concerns that such liberalisation would create net negative impacts on the 
value of farmers’ land holdings, which would in turn impact their retirement plans. 
 Provisions on state aid policies could have a variety of different impacts, although the specifics 
therein are unclear without further details of CETA. 
Social 
 Evidence suggests that removing the discriminatory practices of the Canadian liquor control 
boards would not necessarily undermine public health and safety objectives as the Canadian 
government would retain the most important policy tools for reducing over-consumption of 
alcohol, i.e. being able to set price floors and impose taxes on beer, wine and spirits.  
 
8.3. Recommendations 
8.3.1. Trade Measures 
 
 T1: Include a Trade and Sustainable Development chapter in the Trade Pillar of the Agreement. 
The proposed Trade and Sustainable Development chapter could include a requirement that 
both parties commit to the effective implementation of core environmental regulatory 
measures. Also within this chapter, include a section on trade and labour that commits to 
implementation the ILO’s core labour standards and Decent Work Agenda (see T 2). (See C1 on a 
monitoring mechanism for this chapter). 
 T2: Include a section on trade and labour within a Trade and Sustainable Development chapter 
(see T1) that commits to implementing the ILO’s core labour standards and Decent Work 
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Agenda. While labour standards in Canada and the EU are strong relative to most countries, 
greater commitment to the ILO’s standards could help ensure greater implementation while 
helping to foster greater cooperation in international fora such as the WTO. Further, 
cooperation could help lead to eventual ratification of all Core Labour Standards that have not 
yet been ratified in Canada due to conflicts such actions would have with provincial labour laws. 
This could assist with improving rights of collective bargaining and association at the provincial 
level. Included in this chapter should be a framework ensuring oversight and enforcement while 
also creating an impartial review panel that can hear and rule on complaints.  
 T3: Establish an appropriate timetable for the phased reductions in tariffs and non-tariff barriers 
in the sectors which are likely to be significantly impacted in Canada and the EU. Canada is a 
major competitor in beef, pork and fish and seafood and the injudicious removal of barriers 
could significantly impact EU producers, particularly in the pork sector. The EU OCT’s of Saint-
Pierre-et-Miquelon and Greenland could be particularly impacted by liberalisation in the 
fisheries sector, making it imperative than reductions in tariffs for sensitive fisheries products be 
phased in gradually. In Canada, providing increased access to EU dairy imports is likely to 
negatively impact domestic producers. To the degree that this leads to a removal of supply-
management, the impact on Canadian dairy producers will be significant, likely requiring a 
longer phasing-in period. Outside of agriculture, it would also be important to establish an 
appropriate phasing-in period for liberalisation in textiles and transport equipment so that 
producers have time to adjust to changing incentives.  
 T4: Create a separate tariff line in the EU for meat products derived from bison. Such an action 
would not harm European producers given the lack of bison production in Member States, but 
would allow Canadian producers greater access to the EU market without subjecting their 
imports to the tariff-rate-quota for beef. Although it is not clear whether EU consumers would 
exhibit demand for bison, additional access could assist with diversification efforts undertaken 
by Canada’s Western Provinces.  
 T5: Ensure that access to the Canadian market for EU alcoholic beverages does not lead to the 
removal of Canada’s provincial liquor boards but rather better compliance by these boards to 
ensure an end to practices that discriminately favour local producers. Canada’s liquor control 
boards serve an important role in helping to reduce abuse of alcohol and underage drinking, and 
should remain intact (after removing discriminatory barriers) so as to ensure public health 
objectives.   
 T6: Rules of origin should be carefully considered in the negotiations, with a special group of EU 
and Canadian officials formed to deal with the issue. Interests should be carefully balanced 
between (i) restricting the ability of third countries (most notably the U.S.) to capitalise from 
Canadian preferential access to the EU; and (ii) ensuring Canadian producers are able to benefit 
from improved access to the EU. At the sectoral level, special attention should be given to the 
following: 
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o Beef and pork. With sufficient improvements to the TRQ for beef and pork, Canadian 
producers would likely shift some of their production to hormone free products and 
invest in slaughterhouses that meet EU standards. This could also induce producers to 
ensure that, over the long-term, these cattle and hogs are born and slaughtered in 
Canada to ensure they meet EU rules of origin. With limited improvements in market 
access, however, the benefit of meeting all of these criteria would be significantly 
diminished, limiting gains for the industry. 
o Automotive products. Integration with the United States makes it unlikely that Canadian 
producers would be able to benefit from an agreement that adopts EU rules of origin. At 
the same time, rules of origin that are too relaxed will likely allow U.S. producers to take 
advantage of Canadian access granted under the CETA. EU emissions standards will also 
play a role, and allowing greater access to Canadian producers while ensuring their 
products can qualify as originating could help promote environmental goals by inducing 
greater investment in Canada to meet higher emissions standards than those presently 
in place within North America.  
o Textiles. Canada’s textiles industry has become increasingly integrated with its NAFTA 
partners and as such it would favour rules of origin that are more open than the EU’s 
double transformation rule. Special care should be given to ensure, however, that the 
rules established are not injurious to LCDs who benefit from the EU’s generalised system 
of preferences and rule of single transformation.  
 T7: In order to promote environmental goals it is recommended that trade in green technologies 
and environmental resources be fully liberalised. 
 T8: Restrictions on investment in the Canadian telecom sector should be liberalised or removed 
completely. Liberalisation could lead to an influx of FDI from the EU, helping to improve 
competitiveness of the Canadian telecom sector, while creating jobs, reducing costs for 
consumers and improving service.   
 T9: In liberalising investment in Canada’s telecom sector, it is recommended that a phase-in 
period be carefully considered. This should take into account the recommendations of the 
Telecommunication Policy Review Panel which call for two 5 year phase-in periods. It is further 
recommended that divisions be made between carriage and content so as to ensure the 
maintenance of Canadian cultural objectives. Specifically, it is recommended that liberalisation 
follow the findings of a 2003 report by the House of Commons Standing Committee on Industry, 
Science and Technology that recommended that foreign investment restrictions should be 
eliminated while maintaining restrictions on investments in broadcasting. 1167  Given the 
increased integration of these services, however, it is important that the Agreement establish 
                                                             
1167 http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/Content/HOC/committee/372/inst/reports/rp1032302/instrp03/14-chap4-e.htm#6 
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rules for determining when an investment can be defined as encroaching on cultural objectives 
so as to eliminate ambiguities and encourage investment.  
 T10: Liberalising feeder services within Canada’s maritime transport services is encouraged. 
Such an action could increase infrastructural investments over the long-term while helping to 
improve Canada’s underdeveloped short-sea shipping industry. This could improve the 
efficiency of logistics in Canada, but could also serve an important environmental role by helping 
to shift land transport to maritime transport. Similarly, removal of the 25% tariff on new vessels 
could help Canada’s shipping industry upgrade its aging fleet.  
 T11: To increase bilateral trade and investment in services, it is recommended that measures be 
taken to streamline the visa process for professionals seeking to temporarily work in Canada or 
the EU. Canada should review its requirements for ‘needs tests’ for certain professionals under 
the TFWP, with specific attention to facilitation of intra-corporate transfers between the EU and 
Canada.  
 T12: Both Canada and the EU made important progress in environmental regulation and 
awareness. The CETA can enhance this by calling for harmonisation of environmental regulation. 
In addition, this could be extended to third country trade partners. Sectors that need particular 
attention are: fisheries, mining and oils, forestry and livestock. 
 T13: The agreement should leave sufficient flexibility to its signatories for implementing policies 
that are required by their specific legal, economic, social, industrial, and cultural environment. 
To ensure a minimal level of flexibility, it is recommended to duplicate the language of TRIPs 
agreement article 7, 8, 13, and 30 as well as the language of the Declaration on the TRIPs 
Agreement and Public Health in the introduction of CETA IPR chapter.  
 T14: Ensure that language in CETA’s Competition Policy Chapter clearly states that alcohol price 
floors are not prohibited under the agreement and that the ability to use legitimate regulations, 
i.e. alcohol taxation and pricing policies is maintained. 
 
 T15: Ensure sufficient reductions in state aid policies with little net sustainability benefits while 
preserving state aid that does produce clear sustainability benefits.  
 
 T16: Explicitly allow for Social Considerations in Public Procurement, including fair wages, in the 
General Notes of both Canada and the EU in the GP Chapter. Provide some criteria of what 
constitutes these policies. (And create a monitoring body to oversee that these allowances are 
not being abused, and allow renegotiation on the language herein if the monitoring body 
reports abuse. The monitoring body might be set up through the Trade and Sustainable 
Development Chapter. See C13 for details on the monitoring body). 
 
 T17: Explicitly allow for green procurement policies in all ‘standard’ forms in the General Notes 
of both Canada and the EU in the GP Chapter. (And a monitoring body might be set up to ensure 
these policies are implemented in a way that is legitimately furthering the objectives to improve 
the environment with limited adverse costs to business. The monitoring body might be set up 
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through the Trade and Sustainable Development Chapter. See C13 for details on the monitoring 
body.) 
 
 T18: GP Chapter should explicitly allow for preferential treatment for those with officially 
documented disabilities. 
 
 T19: Explicitly allow set-asides for Aboriginals in Canada’s schedule in the GP Chapter, however 
make such exception more stringent than the one allowed in NAFTA and the GPA. Specifically, 
require that any preferences to be given under these exclusions are based on cultural 
considerations and/or go to those who meet an ‘economically disadvantaged’ criterion. (The 
‘economically disadvantaged’ assessment to be conducted by the appropriate bureau in Canada 
or by a committee established under the Trade and Sustainable Development Chapter in CETA. 
See T1 about the chapter and C13 about the committee.) 
 
 T20: Consider keeping set-asides for minority business in Canada’s schedule in the GP Chapter 
but make this contingent that this group is distinguished from Aboriginals, better defined than 
under current regulations, and also meets a similar if not the same ‘economically disadvantaged’ 
criteria mentioned for Aboriginal set-asides. (The ‘economically disadvantaged’ assessment to 
be conducted by the appropriate bureau in Canada or by a committee established under the 
Trade and Sustainable Development Chapter in CETA. See T1 about the chapter and C13 about 
the committee.). 
 
 T21: Include environmental protection provisions in the GP Chapter like that in Note 7 of 
Canada’s GPA Annex 2 that states “Nothing in this Agreement shall be constructed to prevent 
any provincial or territorial entity from applying restrictions that promote general 
environmental quality in that province or territory, as long as such restrictions are not disguised 
as barriers to international trade.” (Also see T17) 
 
 T22: Include a provision in the General Notes of the EU’s GP commitments similarly worded to 
that mentioned in T21 but applying to localities in EU MS.  (Also see T17) 
 
 T23: Allow exclusions, in the General Notes section of the GP Chapter for Canada and the EU, of 
provisions on agricultural products made in furtherance of human feeding programs. Language 
could generally follow that listed in NAFTA Annex 1001.2b, General Notes, Schedule of Canada, 
sub-article 1(f) – however, the language should be tightened, for example it should only exclude 
programs that ‘if abandoned would clearly jeopardise emergency human feeding programs.’ 
 
 T24: Under certain circumstances, allow GP offsets for projects in Canada in the same sectors as 
those listed in the Annex II/exclusions annex of the Investment Chapter in CETA. 
 
 T25: Do not include a full-stop prohibition on GP offsets for municipalities, but rather include an 
‘offset justification provision’ pertaining exclusively to municipalities. The provision would only 
generally be drafted like Article XVI (2) of the 1994 GPA, which allows offsets for certain policy 
considerations when “used only for qualification to participate in the procurement process and 
not as criteria for awarding contracts. Conditions shall be objective and non-discriminatory.”  A 
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transparent mechanism/panel should be set-up to approve or disapprove the invoking of this 
‘offset justification provision.’ (See C12 for details of this mechanism) 
 
 T26: Consider allowing a higher GP threshold exclusively for Canadian (and possibly EU) sub-
federal contracts (GP Annex II) over which offsets are prohibited. This threshold would be higher 
than ‘main’ thresholds being negotiated for the party’s Annex I, II and III of CETA GP 
commitments, whereas offsets cannot be used in any contracts with values over this threshold. 
Contracts below that threshold, however, and, for example, even above the party’s ‘main’ 
Annex II thresholds, are allowed to use offsets so far as they are justified under the ‘offset 
justification provision’ to the offset review panel. (See C12 for details of this review 
panel/mechanism) 
 
 T27: As a safety valve to ensure the quality of goods and services delivered in GP, as well the 
maintaining of decency and quality of work standards, include the provision: “Where a 
procuring entity receives a tender with a price that is abnormally lower than the prices in other 
tenders submitted, it may verify with the supplier that it satisfies the conditions for participation 
and is capable of fulfilling the terms of the contract.” (Canada and all EU member states should 
also agree to sign ILO Convention 94 on decency and quality of work in government 
procurement.) 
 
 T28: Consider excluding the ‘third country incorporation’ provision in an Investment Chapter, or 
if it is included ensure this action is properly justified and that the drafting language prevents 
treaty shopping and unintended usage of such provision. 
 
 T29: In the GP and Investment chapters, clearly define the rules governing bulk exports of water, 
particularly allowing unbound flexibility in implementing national water policies that explicitly 
protect water necessary to support human and ecosystem health and prohibit the export of 
non-renewable water resources. 
 
 T30: Consider excluding ISDS from CETA, whereas well-crafted state-state dispute settlement 
could be used instead. Such a mechanism in CETA might be modelled off the US-Australia state-
state dispute settlement mechanism, including, for example, a provision allowing for signatory 
parties to reconsider the details of the enforcement mechanism, and consider instituting ISDS, 
for example, under certain circumstances. Special attention should be given to require all 
remedies are only applied in relevant ways, and in ways that do not have negative sustainability 
implications. 
 
 T31: If it is nonetheless decided that ISDS should be included in CETA, consider an ‘emergency 
renegotiation’ clause for ISDS. The clause can only be invoked under certain circumstances and 
after a certain amount of time of CETA being in force. An investment dispute settlement forum 
would be established to monitor usage of ISDS under CETA and make recommendations as to if 
the ISDS clause in CETA needs to be reworded or further measures need to be implemented to 
ensure it is creating sustainable benefits for both the EU and Canada. A mechanism should be 
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established for signatories to CETA to consider the forum’s recommendations and take timely 
actions.  (See C13 for details on the ISDS forum) 
 
 T32: If ISDS is included in CETA, consider using expropriation language recognised to be more 
refined than that in NAFTA 1994, for example that similar to the “tantamount to expropriation” 
article from the US-Singapore FTA and US-Chile FTA; or seriously consider using language 
generally following the Calvo doctrine/similar to that recommended in T33 below.   
 
 T33: If choose to include ISDS in CETA, draft the expropriation provision generally like the 
following: ‘expropriation as defined for Canada and EU/EU MS under this agreement exclusively 
follows the same definition of takings under the domestic takings laws of Canada and EU MS, 
respectively, as of the signing of this agreement and should in no circumstances provide 
treatment to foreign investors beyond that which is afforded to domestic investors under those 
domestic takings laws.’ Should any revisions be made to domestic takings laws, in order for 
those revisions to apply under the aforementioned clause they should treat foreign and 
domestic investors the same. Such revisions should also be respected by foreign investors under 
the Agreement, although any change must be notified to the appropriate body of the other 
CETA party within 1 month of it being made. 
 
 T34: If choose to include ISDS in CETA, require domestic arbitration avenues are ‘fully 
exhausted’ before disputes move to international tribunals. 
 
 T35: Exclude 'essential and basic' public services from investment commitments in CETA (e.g. 
certain healthcare and education services). Include exceptions in CETA like those in Articles 1102 
and 1103 of NAFTA. 
 
 T36: In terms of the EU OCTs Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon (SPM) and Greenland, it is strongly 
recommended that EU negotiators for the fisheries sector consult with representatives from 
SPM and Greenland. Consultation should include a discussion of which products are sensitive in 
each as well as perceived impacts on the industries should the CETA lead to liberalisation in 
these products.  
 
8.3.2. Cooperation measures 
 
 C1: Work through a Trade and Sustainable Development Monitoring Body of EU-Canada experts, 
government, organised business, unions and civil society to conduct M&E on the CETA 
agreement. The body would review sectoral labour and environmental commitments and 
related impacts as well as commitments and impacts in the areas of GP, IPR, investment, labour 
mobility, and competition policy issues overall, as well as house the specific review bodies 
discussed in the policy recommendations hereto (i.e. review bodies for offsets in GP (C12), other 
social and environmental issues (C13), and investment dispute settlement specifically (C15)). 
(Only if necessary, the aforementioned Body may be divided up into distinct bodies from the 
outset, e.g. a Body for labour and a Body for environmental issues.) 
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 C2: A framework should be established to formalise enhanced regulatory cooperation and 
regular dialogue on SPS and TBT issues. Such cooperation should seek to prevent future barriers 
while providing greater transparency on packaging, labelling and certification requirements. An 
ultimate goal should be increased harmonisation and mutual recognition of food safety 
standards, nutrition policies and inspection processes. 
 
 C3: Included in the CETA’s section on trade and labour within the Trade and Sustainable 
Development chapter, should be a framework for increasing awareness of legal rights and 
obligations and fostering social dialogue. This dialogue and cooperation should be extended to 
include exchanges on reducing occupational injuries. The M&E body for this framework is 
discussed in C18. 
 C4: It is strongly recommended that negotiators create a mechanism for fostering mutual 
recognition of professional qualifications. Given its limited role in this capacity, it is 
recommended that the Government of Canada build on efforts in past trade agreements to 
encourage and support the negotiation of mutual recognition agreements between relevant 
professional bodies in Canada and authorities in the EU. A framework should be developed that 
guides and encourages Canadian professional bodies, while also ensuring regular dialogue 
between Canada and the EU so as to identify professional bodies of importance.  
 C5: Potential welfare loss in third countries, in particular in small economies such as Saint Pierre 
and Miquelon, could be mitigated by cooperation measures to promote business initiatives. 
 C6: Cooperation between companies in the energy and minerals sectors could help to produce 
sound environmental governance across the EU and Canada, and also have important spill-over 
effects in third countries. This could include exchanges of information, technology transfers, 
involvement of public-private initiatives from both sides and, in the long run, the formulation of 
a common energy policy. 
 C7: Canada and European governments should cooperate on the exchange of best agricultural 
practices to reduce the environmental impacts associated with agricultural production.   
 C8: Collateral cooperation initiatives from the EU and Canada towards their low-income trade 
partners, and other dependent economies could help to strengthen social protection in these 
countries, particularly for vulnerable populations that will be affected by adjustment costs. 
 C9: Promote fishery practices that are more sustainable through Canada-EU collaboration, while 
maintaining strict monitoring and implementation of quotas and Total Allowable Catch to 
remain within sustainable population levels and avoid overfishing. More R&D should be invested 
into environmental risk of farmed fish, and into mechanisms such as the containment tasks, to 
reduce impact on wild species.  
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 C10: CETA’s provisions on IPR enforcement will have limited impact on global counterfeiting and 
piracy if they are not reproduced elsewhere. The European Union and Canada should cooperate 
to make sure their agreed norms on enforcement become recognized globally as minimal 
standards. This cooperation could be crystallized in multilateral fora (WHO, WIPO, WTO, etc.), in 
plurilateral settings (OECD, ACTA, etc.) and bilaterally in their respective agreement with third 
parties.  
 C11: To accelerate the entry of new medicines on the market and lessen the actual use of patent 
extensions, the European Union and Canada should cooperate to fast-track marketing approvals 
for those drugs already approved by the respective regulatory agencies.  
 C12: A GP ‘offset review’ panel should be set up, perhaps as a small committee within the 
monitoring body discussed in C1, or perhaps within the current bodies for bid challenges in the 
EU and Canada, to monitor the invoking of the ‘offset justification provision.’ The body should 
be well trained and informed in the sustainable utility surrounding usage of GP offsets and be 
able to approve applications within 2 weeks of submission as not to overly hinder the GP 
tendering process. (See T25 and T26 for further details on the ‘offset justification provision.’) 
 
 C13: Create one or more bodies to monitor the application of those allowances for policies on 
fair wages and Social Considerations in Public Procurement, Aboriginal and minority business 
set-asides, as well as green procurement, as mentioned in T16, T17, T21, and T22. The body 
would hear reports/allegations of abuse of such provisions and ensure policies are legitimately 
being used to meet their intended and sanctioned objectives. The body may be incorporated 
along with the ‘offset review panel’ as mentioned in C12 (and within the larger body mentioned 
in C1) to create a larger ‘GP sustainability review’ body, or perhaps within the current bodies for 
bid challenges in the EU and Canada. It may draw upon initiatives currently being discussed by 
the US and Switzerland within the Government Procurement Committee at the WTO to monitor 
set-aside policies for SMEs. 
 
 C14: Cooperate on a separate study (i.e. outside of this SIA) on the impact of privatisation of 
water sources that might in the long-term indirectly result from CETA.  
 
 C15: An investment dispute settlement monitoring body/forum should be created. The forum 
should be created to monitor the dispute settlement mechanism, i.e. state-state dispute 
settlement or ISDS, included in CETA. An even larger forum should be created to monitor 
investment dispute settlement mechanisms, i.e. ISDS and state-state dispute settlement, in BITs 
and trade & investment agreements not only related to those agreements between Canada and 
the EU. For CETA, the forum would be composed of representatives of certain governments in 
the EU and Canada (national level, provinces and territories and municipalities), academics, civil 
society and business. Regarding ISDS, members would commit to periodic dialogues on, among 
other issues, the impacts investor-state provisions/ISDS in CETA are having in terms of causing 
regulatory chill and other reductions on policy space. Regarding state-state dispute settlement, 
members would commit to periodic dialogues on, among other issues, the performance of such 
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a mechanism in CETA in effectively and efficiently addressing the concerns of business. 
Notifications are required from governments on these issues at least once every 6 months. 
Participation required from all members. The body could be organised under the auspices of the 
larger Trade and Sustainable Development Monitoring Body mentioned in C1. 
 
 C16: Create a short-term forum for members of various NAFTA and EU FTA dispute settlement 
bodies to discuss or make recommendations to CETA negotiators before final drafting of CETA. 
 
 C17: The EU-Canada Joint Cooperation Committee should take on tasks similar to the 
Transatlantic Economic Council between the EU and US, for example to facilitate legislative 
convergence between the EU and Canada. A number of the entities described in the 
cooperation measures hereto may fit under this organisation. It should work closely with the 
Trade and Sustainable Development Monitoring Body mentioned in C1. 
 
 C18: Continue initiatives whereby, as relevant, EU workers in the professional business services 
wanting to work in Canada are schooled on relevant Canadian standards, and vice versa.  
 
 C19: Conduct a study on the implications of rules of origin policies being negotiated under CETA 
and how trade facilitation measures can best mitigate the negative impacts such policies may 
have. During this process may consider examples from the EU-Korea FTA and consider potential 
problems with NAFTA rules of origin. (Also see T6) 
 
 C20: Create a clean energy partnership initiated between the EU and Canada modelled off of the 
EU-China Clean Energy Centre and/or US-China Renewable Energy Partnership, operating Eco-
Partnerships via P3s. Foster initiatives in a number of relevant environmental areas, including in 
areas that might otherwise be subject to GP offsets and investment performance requirements.  
 
 C21: Require that part of the role in the clean energy partnership mentioned in C20 is to foster 
green finance, including in areas that might otherwise be subject to GP offsets and investment 
performance requirements.  
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9. Conclusions 
 
This Final Report for the EU-Canada SIA on the EU-Canada CETA provides a comprehensive assessment 
of the potential impacts of trade liberalisation under the CETA. The impact analysis assesses the 
economic, social and environmental impacts in Canada and the European Union, in three main sectors, 
sixteen sub-sectors and seven cross-cutting issues. It also assesses the potential impacts of CETA on the 
US, Mexico and other countries and regions, including a number of developing countries as well as the 
EU OCTs of Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon and Greenland.   
The study has been prepared using the standard SIA methodology which involves carrying out an 
evidence based assessment, where evidence is drawn from a range of sources, including economic 
modelling, literature review, expert opinion and stakeholder consultation. The study has included a 
consultation process which has been carried out in parallel with the assessment of potential impacts. 
The analysis finds that the CETA will lead to overall gains in welfare, real GDP, total exports and real 
wages in both Canada and the EU over the long-term. While these gains are expected under the four 
scenarios modelled in the economic assessment, the gains are expected to be higher under an 
agreement that offers the highest degree of tariff and services liberalisation. Third countries are 
estimated to experience minor degrees of welfare loss as a result of the Agreement, though the overall 
impact on these countries is insignificant. The EU OCTs of Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon and Greenland could 
experience economic losses through the erosion of preferences for their exports of fisheries products to 
the EU, though more research is needed in this regard.  
At the sectoral level, the greatest gains in output and trade appear to be stimulated by services 
liberalisation and by the removal of tariffs applied on sensitive agricultural products. Both Canada and 
the EU would benefit from a CETA that provided a high degree of liberalisation in the services sector, 
particularly with respect to transport, telecom and business services. The formal modelling’s inability to 
account for the impact from investment liberalisation and measures that facilitate the movement of 
professionals suggests that gains for both sides could surpass those estimated. In terms of Agriculture 
and PAPs, Canada could realise significant gains from notable improvements in access to the EU market 
for beef and pork products, while this would also likely negatively impact domestic producers and 
processors in the EU. Alternatively, EU dairy producers could experience significant increases in output 
and exports with the full removal of tariffs in Canada; though this would likely coincide with decreases in 
production and employment in the Canadian dairy sector. For a number of agriculture and agri-food 
products – beef, pork and other processed food products – the overall impact would likely be heavily 
influenced by the RoO that are agreed to under the CETA. In terms of industrial products, the low 
existing tariffs applied on EU-Canada trade in merchandise would likely limit the impact the CETA will 
have. Investment liberalisation could lead to greater EU investment in Canadian industries such as oil 
and mining, though it does not appear that the current restrictions have overly inhibited investment. 
The auto and textiles industries in both the EU and Canada would likely benefit from the removal of 
tariffs and other non-tariff barriers. For both products, the rules of origin agreed to in the text of the 
CETA will influence the impact.  
The CETA could have a positive social impact where it includes text devoted to better implementation 
and ratification of the ILO’s Core Labour Standards and Decent Work Agenda. Canada, specifically, could 
see its standards and rights improved with respect to collective bargaining and freedom of association 
with provisions that require ratification of the ILO’s Convention 98, which provides legally binding 
EU-Canada SIA Interim Report 
 
441 
measures on such rights. In terms of the environment, increased agricultural production could lead to a 
greater degree of intensification and use of chemical inputs, while increased beef production could lead 
to greater herd size and production of methane. The environmental impact associated with energy and 
extractive industries is likely to be limited, though it could be exacerbated if the agreement leads to 
significant increases in FDI in Canada’s oil sands and mining industries. Increased trade would likely 
increase the GHG emissions associated with transport, though this could be mitigated should the CETA 
replace land transport (notably between Canada and the U.S.) with maritime transport and facilitate the 
development of Canada’s short sea shipping industry.  
A number of key impacts are identified in the areas of GP and IPR. A GP chapter in CETA will have a 
variety of economic impacts that are positive for some and negative for others, particularly felt in terms 
of government savings, market share, and employment. Potential social impacts are mixed, and a GP 
Chapter in CETA would likely have mixed environmental impacts, although the full extent of these 
impacts is unclear without further details of CETA. In terms of IPR, it is assumed that CETA will lead to an 
upward harmonisation and call primarily for change in Canadian IPR laws. IPR-related provisions of CETA 
could have a minor positive economic impact on Canadian GDP growth, and may have a minor positive 
impact on European GDP. An IPR chapter in CETA would also have economic impacts on employment 
and policy space. Raising levels of IPR protection is likely to have some social impacts but unlikely to 
have significant environmental impacts.  
Several key impacts are identified in the areas of investment and competition policy. The economic 
impact of CETA as a whole on investment in Canada will likely be positive, and could be of a ‘notable’ 
magnitude. As a whole, there will likely be some positive, and potentially some negative, social and 
environmental impacts from such investment. Regarding investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
specifically, the conflicting costs and benefits of such a mechanism make it doubtful that its inclusion in 
CETA would create a net/overall (economic, social and environmental) sustainability benefit for the EU 
and/or Canada. In terms of competition policy, if CETA removes discriminatory practices of the Canadian 
liquor control boards this would support economic gains by encouraging competition. Removal of 
discriminatory practices by the Canadian Wheat Board could improve sales and wages of competitive 
wheat farmers. No significant negative impacts or unclear impacts are predicted for liberalisation in 
international letter delivery in Canada and revising state aid policies, respectively.  
Some impacts are identified in the areas of trade facilitation, labour mobility and free circulation of 
goods. It is unlikely that there will be significant economic, social or environmental impacts from trade 
facilitation reform under CETA. Labour mobility provisions in the CETA focused on workers in 
professional business services could result in economic gains in the form of a more efficient allocation of 
skills and increased productivity in Canada and the EU, as well as increase innovation that could lead to 
social and environmental benefits. Provisions in CETA allowing freer circulation of goods, which will 
likely focus on the agriculture and agri-foods sector given the barriers in that sector, could result in 
positive economic impacts. 
In order to minimise potential negative impacts and maximise positive impacts, it is recommended (in 
addition to the other proposals mentioned in Section 8) that CETA: (i) Establish an appropriate timetable 
for the phased reductions in tariffs and non-tariff barriers. (ii) Form a special group of officials from both 
sides to deal with rules of origin. (iii) Develop a framework to formalise enhanced regulatory 
cooperation and regular dialogue on SPS and TBT issues. (iv) Collaborate on sustainable fishery practices. 
(v) Remove investment restrictions on telecom, but do so in a way that includes an appropriate phase-in 
period while allowing Canada to continue to form and implement policies that ensure cultural objectives 
can be met. (vi) Streamline the visa process for professionals seeking to temporarily work in Canada or 
the EU and create a mechanism for fostering mutual recognition agreements for professional 
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qualifications and credentials. (vii) For GP, explicitly allow for Social Considerations in Public 
Procurement, including fair wages, and create a monitoring body to oversee that these allowances are 
not being abused; allow for green procurement policies in all ‘standard’ forms in the General Notes of 
both Canada and the EU in the GP Chapter and include other specific language for environment 
protection; explicitly allow set-asides for Aboriginals in Canada’s schedule in the GP Chapter; do not 
include a full-stop prohibition on GP offsets for municipalities, but rather include an ‘offset justification 
provision’ pertaining exclusively to municipalities. (viii) For IPR, duplicate the language of TRIPs 
agreement article 7, 8, 13, and 30 as well as the language of the Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement 
and Public Health in the introduction of CETA’s IPR chapter; cooperate to ensure agreed norms on 
enforcement become recognised globally as minimal standards and cooperate in multilateral fora (WHO, 
WIPO, WTO, etc.), in plurilateral settings (OECD, ACTA, etc.) and bilaterally in the respective agreement 
with third parties; and the EU and Canada should cooperate to fast-track marketing approvals for those 
drugs already approved by the respective regulatory agencies. (viv) For investment, consider excluding 
investor-state dispute settlement from CETA and instead use a state-state enforcement mechanism like 
that in the US-Australia FTA; consider a number of key issues when drafting dispute settlement 
expropriation language; emphasis domestic dispute settlement even if ISDS is included in CETA; exclude 
'essential and basic' public services from investment commitments; create a dispute settlement 
monitoring body/forum. (vv) For overarching issues, include a Trade and Sustainable Development 
Chapter in CETA and within that chapter establish an effective monitoring body; ensure CETA allows 
usage of domestic policy tools to limit alcohol abuse; and create a clean energy partnership initiated 
between the EU and Canada, which could be modelled off of existing programs. 
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